Piotr will present some of his ongoing research on the relation between so-called "4E cognition" and cognitive semiotics. All are welcome with cameras on from 15:00. The talk will start at 15:15.

Cognitive semiotics, emerging out of – among others – cognitive scientific theories and methods, has overlaps with the so-called “4E approach” of the mind as embodied, embedded extended, and enactive, with particular emphasis on the latter. The label suggests that there is one approach, but by in reality there are number of different ones. What is common to them is reluctance to Cartesian view on mentality and the cognitivist view on the mind as governed by representations and computations. Despite apparent unity in “march against a common enemy” (Wheeler 2008), one cannot ignore crucial philosophical differences between the four components. In particular, the justified conviction that our mind goes beyond the boundaries of brain and body and extends into the world is accompanied by the awareness of a tension between enactive and extended views (Thompson & Stapleton 2008, Wheeler 2008, Rowlands 2010). The issue of the very nature of cognition and the benchmark of the cognitive, the problem of location of cognitive processes, the relationship connecting a subject and elements of her/his environment, the role of agency in cognition - are among the problems to be resolved in this context. I will suggest that here are at least two possible solutions. The first is rejection of one (or more) E’s. The second is revision of extended and enactive frameworks. The latter prospect seems more alluring, and I will provide a few ideas in this direction.