

# Where does metonymy stop? Senses, facets and active zones

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## 1 Introduction

Within the framework of Cognitive Linguistics both metonymy and metaphor are seen as pervasive phenomena in thought and language. They are, however, different conceptualizations of experience. Metaphorization, such as ‘*Love is a journey*’, involves the mapping between a source and a target in different ontological domains. Metaphorization is based on a relation of configurational sameness (PATH) and ontological difference (LOVE and JOURNEY). Metonymization, on the other hand, is based on contiguity and involves mapping and/or highlighting within one ontological domain, e.g. ‘There were a lot of new *faces* at the party’, where the notion of FACES relates to PEOPLE via conceptual association within the one and the same concept complex, i.e. that of PEOPLE. In other words, metaphor is based on a construal of comparison, while metonymy is a construal of salience.<sup>1</sup> Metonymy in Cognitive Linguistics is a *reference-point phenomenon* (Langacker 1999: 199) in that ‘the entity that is normally designated by a metonymic expression serves as a reference point affording mental access to the desired target, i.e. the entity actually being referred to. It is thereby also an *activation phenomenon* (Langacker 1987: 385-386).

In contrast to the cognitive school of thought, the traditional objectivist approach makes different assumptions. Metonymy is a figure of speech that makes use of the name of one thing for that of something else with which it is associated, e.g. *faces* for *people* (*The new Oxford dictionary of English*: 1998: *sub voce*). Metonymies are language operations that concern names (words) of things (referents). The transfer of metonymy from a language phenomenon to metonymy as a cognitive process has caused some terminological *cum* definitional confusion. There are, however, two observations that traditionalists and cognitivists have in common. Firstly, there is some sort of discrepancy in the link between the conventional name for the referent and the referent itself, and, secondly, there is a contiguity relation between the two referents.<sup>2</sup> Both the aspects, i.e. the lexical side as well as the semantic side of the matter, are the focus of the present study. The analysis is substantiated by a corpus-based, empirical study of nominals in spoken English, in which the actual contextualized reading of a nominal makes the basis for the analysis.

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<sup>1</sup> The cognitive view of metaphor and metonymy introduced by Lakoff & Johnson (1980) is in stark contrast to non-cognitivist approaches (objectivist and generative alike) to linguistics where metaphor is largely ignored or reduced to a rhetorical device which is a performance phenomenon in language.

Over the years, metonymy has received much less attention than metaphor in the literature. Within the cognitive framework, however, metonymy has recently experienced an upsurge in interest. It is being discussed both in its own right and in relation to metaphor (Warren 1992; Barcelona (ed.) 2000; Panther & Radden (eds.) 1999, Dirven & Pörings (eds.) 2002) as well as the role of ‘figurative language’ in understanding (Giora 1997, 2002, Giora & Fein 1999, Gibbs 1999).

<sup>2</sup> Referent in the traditional sense can be translated into *profiling* in conceptualization in the cognitive framework. “An expression’s profile is the entity it designates, and as such is a focus of attention within the overall conception evoked.” (Langacker 1999: 45).

In order to answer the question posed in the title: ‘Where does metonymy stop?’, it is necessary to identify the core as well as the boundaries of metonymy, i.e. the cases where lexical items are capable of evoking meanings that are ‘non-conventional’ from the point of view of the lexical item, but also conventional focalized meanings of lexical items in certain contexts. Consider (1), (2) and (3):

- (1) The *red shirts* won the match.
- (2) The *court* had to assume that the statement of claim was true.
- (3) Fill *it* up, please! (i.e. the glass)

In (1), the notion of RED SHIRTS is profiled and foregrounded on the basis of FOOTBALL PLAYERS (PEOPLE) and not on CLOTHES (ARTEFACTS). Both concepts are mapped on to one another and jointly activated. RED SHIRTS is assigned the focus of attention by being linguistically expressed and thereby highlighted. (2) profiles and foregrounds STAFF/PEOPLE and not the ADMINISTRATIVE UNIT or the PREMISES facets which are also conventionally covered by the lexical item *court*. There is no inter-conceptual mapping going on in facetization. There is only highlighting of one of the facets of the concept expressed by *court*. In like manner, (3) profiles a certain part of the glass, namely the CAVITY, but GLASS is still in the foreground. Still, GLASS itself is most salient. The lexical item *glass* conventionally refers to both the material and the cavity. Seen from the perspective of what the lexical item encodes, (1) is a PART/WHOLE configuration, while (2) and (3) are WHOLE/PART configurations. All three types of contiguity associations occur in the cognitive literature as examples of metonymy. In the traditional view, only (1) and (2) would be regarded as metonymical.

The position defended in this paper is that (1), (2) and (3) are all special cases of *construals of salience*. It is argued that (1) is a case of *metonymization*. Out of context, ‘red shirts’ and ‘football players’ represent two distinct senses that evoke the idea of two different entities. In the context given, they are associated by conceptual contiguity. (2) involves another construal of salience, referred to as *facetization*.<sup>3</sup> Out of context, ‘court’ necessarily calls up both ADMINISTRATIVE UNIT, PREMISES and PEOPLE/STAFF. They are three different facets of meaning, not three different senses. Either of the facets of meaning can be distinguished if the context calls for it. Inversely, all three may be jointly referred to without discrimination. Moreover, unlike metonymization of senses, facets of meaning are conventionally associated with one and the same lexical item, which in this case is *court*. Finally, (3) is *zone activation*, which means that only part of the ARTEFACT is relevant and conceptually focalized in that context. Like *court*, the particular profiling of *glass* is routinely associated with the particular lexical item. Zone activation is the most pervasive process in that it is true of all meanings on all occasions of use. The various arguments for distinguishing three types of construals of salience are elaborated in the light of both conceptual ontologies and the lexical items that call them up. The ultimate generalization in terms of these construals of salience is that they all represent some elaboration of the relation between PARTS and WHOLEs in a concept complex.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> The term facet is taken from Cruse (1995). He applies the term to the meaning of ‘book’, but not to meanings such as ‘court’ (see Section 3.2).

<sup>4</sup> Like Ruiz de Mendoza Ibáñez (2000: 115), I postulate two general types of correspondences, i.e. WHOLE/PART and PART/WHOLE. In Ruiz de Mendoza Ibáñez’s terminology PART/WHOLE is referred to as target-in source relations and WHOLE/PART is referred to as source-in-target relations. I take these relationships to be a consequence of the qualia structure of the conceptual complexes that serves as the source for metonymization, e.g. people have faces. Metonymic expressions do not only profile parts of objects, but also functions of objects or a more peripherally linked concepts such people’s possessions and activities as we shall see later in this section. (cf. Lakoff’s (1987) *Idealized Cognitive Models* (ICMs) Fillmore’s (1982) *frames*, Schank’s &

## 2 The cognitive framework

The cognitive approach to meaning advanced in this paper takes concepts to form the ontological basis of lexical knowledge, which involves both encyclopaedic and linguistic knowledge. The link to the use potential of lexical items in conceptual space is what meaning is. Specific readings are construed on-line on the occasion of use. Conceptual space is structured relative to two types of knowledge domains: the content domain and the schematic domain (Cruse & Toggia 1996; Paradis 2001, 2003). Content domains involve meaning proper and schematic domains provide various configurational templates. Both these domains are conceptual in nature and mirror our perception of the world. In addition to the conceptual realm, there is an operating system consisting of different types of construals, which are imposed on the domains by speakers and addressees on the occasion of use. They are not themselves conceptual, but ways of structuring conceptual domains, reflecting some broad basic cognitive abilities, such as the focussing of attention (salience), the choice of configuration (Gestalt), the selection of speaker perspective and the ability of making comparisons (Croft & Wood 2000). It is through the operations of construals on the ontological material that meanings of lexical expressions arise.

Conceptual ontologies and construals are the prerequisites of metonymization. However, it is also essential that the analysis of metonymies be linked to lexical items, since they are the triggers that evoke the intended readings. Metonymy in the cognitive literature is modelled as idealized cognitive models (icms) by Lakoff (1987), conceptual mappings by Radden & Kövecses (1999), domain highlighting by Croft (2002), combinations of mappings and highlighting by Ruiz de Mendoza Ibáñez (2000), scenarios by Panther & Thornburg (1999) and more generally as reference-point activation by Langacker (1999) and Barcelona (2000). These approaches are all broadly compatible in that they are in one way or other based on contiguity. My model assumes all these processes, which are not mutually exclusive, to be at work in meaning formation.

### 2.1 Material and method

The investigation is based on 2,720 ADJ N combinations randomly selected from the spoken part of the ICE-GB corpus (approximately 1/10 of the total number of ADJ N combinations in the spoken part of the corpus). The total number of words in the spoken part is half a million words.<sup>5</sup> For each combination the noun was analyzed in terms of its ontology in the actual context, which means that *faces* in ‘There were a lot of new *faces* at the party’ would be identified as PEOPLE rather than NATURAL OBJECT (BODY PART). This method of investigation was used in order to highlight possible discrepancies between the ‘conventional’ reading of lexical items and their context uses, as well as to point up various *construals of salience*. Most of the examples are from the corpus, but there are also examples that are found or heard elsewhere. The examples from the ICE-GB corpus are followed by an asterisk.

### 2.2 Meaning as ontology and construal

As already mentioned, the present model of meaning has two components: ontologies and construals. The ontological basis of categories is not directly related to the world but to how humans perceive of the world. They serve to explicate concepts and categorization and are thereby also related to the nature of lexical knowledge. Ontologies involve both (i) what

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Abelson’s (1977) *scripts* and Barsalou’s (1983) *theories*). The various subtypes of PARTS and WHOLES is beyond the scope of this paper (Radden & Kövecses 1999 and Warren 2002).

<sup>5</sup> For more information about the corpus see Nelson, Wallis & Aarts (2002).

things are (content structures) and (ii) how they are configured (schematic structures). The three types of construals of salience, i.e. metonymization, facetization and zone activation, can all be explained through the schematic WHOLE/PART configuration, i.e. a contiguity association. Furthermore, two types of configurations are distinguished for the individual nominal occurrences: *constitution* and *function*. The construals are responsible for the dynamicity of the model. They operate on the ontologies.

Following Lyons (1977:442-445), a trichotomous distinction of nominal content structures is assumed: first-, second- and third-order entities.<sup>6</sup> First-order entities are physical objects such as ANIMALS, PEOPLE, PLANTS, ARTEFACTS, e.g. ‘dog’, ‘woman’, ‘tulip’ and ‘car’. These entities are relatively stable from a perceptual point of view. They exist in three dimensional space, at any point in time, and they are publicly observable.

The ontological status of both second- and third-order entities is more vague in the sense that they are not associated with as many stable properties as first-order entities. They are more variable and therefore also more difficult to define and more controversial. Second-order entities are EVENTS, PROCESSES and STATES, such as ‘victory’, ‘discussion’ and ‘knowledge’ respectively. These entities are located in time and are said to *occur* rather than *exist*. Finally, third-order entities are abstract entities that are outside both space and time. They are entities such as ‘facts’, ‘concepts’, ‘ideas’, ‘possibilities’ and ‘propositions’, referred to as SHELLS in this paper.<sup>7</sup> The content structures are summarized as follows:

First-order entities	ANIMAL, HUMAN BEING, PLANT, ARTEFACT, NATURAL OBJECT, SUBSTANCE, LOCATION
Second-order entities	EVENT, PROCESS, STATE
Third-order entities	SHELL

Figure 1. The trichotomy of conceptual ontologies for nominals and their subcategories.

The ontologies also have a schematic side to them. The schematic representation that applies to all content structures is qualia structure. The observation that noun meanings are based on a structure of qualia roles was first suggested by Aristotle, and this insight was brought to the fore again in contemporary linguistics by Pustejovsky (1995). In recent years, the idea has been employed by other scholars such as Jackendoff (2002), Cruse (2000: 117-119), Warren (forthcoming) and Paradis (2003). In Pustejovsky’s, Jackendoff’s and Warren’s models, qualia structure is located in the lexicon, whereas Cruse and Paradis consider them to be conceptual in nature. The four qualia roles are: the *formal*, the *constitutive*, the *telic* and the *agentive* roles. The qualia of a noun encode information about particular properties and activities associated with them, such as their constituent parts, taxonomic relations, functions and modes of creation. In the present analysis, constitution and form have been conflated to one involving static constitutional aspects, i.e. the configuration of an entity as an object and thereby delimiting the conceptual possibilities to make-up. For instance, CAR has an engine and four wheels and it is the hyponym of VEHICLE. Telicity and agentivity have been conflated into *function*, i.e. delimiting the potential use to dynamic aspects. For instance, CAR can be used for ‘driving’, ‘fast driving’ or ‘slow driving’. The focussing on either of these qualia presupposes a PART/WHOLE configuration.

<sup>6</sup> It should be noted that Lyons semantic model is a structuralist model and not a conceptual model.

<sup>7</sup> The term SHELL is borrowed from Schmid (2000).

To the best of my knowledge, qualia structure has been applied to first-order entities only. If qualia structure is as powerful as it seems to be, it should be adaptable to other types of noun meanings too, such as EVENTS, PROCESSES, STATES and SHELLS.<sup>8</sup> For instance, the insights of qualia structure would involve the following parts for an activity noun like *jog*. The constitutional quale of *jog* would mean that it is a type of moving where somebody moves on a certain route. This corresponds to the argument structure of the cognate verb. It would also involve the manner of the motion, i.e. ‘not too fast’. The functional quale specifies the reason for jogging, e.g. ‘feeling fit and healthy, losing weight.’ *Jog* expresses a PROCESS/ACTIVITY and it is clearly episodic in nature. These different qualia are drawn out in different contexts. The difference between ‘book’ and ‘jog’ is that ‘jog’ can never be profiled as a concrete object. Furthermore, Cruse (2000: 114-117, forthcoming *Revue*) points out that some lexical items call up more than one set of qualia. They are called *facets* of meaning.

- (4) Please put the book back on the shelf. (TOME)
- (5) I find this book unreadable (TEXT)

The two facets of meaning, (4) and (5), draw on two different ontologies, which form two different *Gestalts*. Facets differ from senses, such as ‘face’ and ‘woman’ in (1), in that they do not produce a zeugma when co-ordinated. Cruse (2000:114) gives the following example: “Put this book back on the shelf; it is quite unreadable”. The co-ordination of these two propositions does not reveal any antagonism between them. *It* (TEXT) in the second part of the sentence refers nicely back to book (TOME) in the first part. This anaphoric relation can be compared to \*‘There were a lot of new faces at the party. They were friends of Bill’s’ in which case ‘they’ (PEOPLE) in the second sentence is not co-referential with FACES in its conventional reading as BODY PART.<sup>9</sup> Put differently, this state of affairs is indicative of a mapping between two concept and two senses, where the highlighted and foregrounded concept is the lexically expressed concept.

In spite of the fact that facets do not show signs of antagonism in anaphoric reference, their qualia involve different content structures. Consider this difference for the two readings of *book*:

#### **TOME**

- (i) CONSTITUTION: ‘object made of paper with cover and pages’
- (ii) FUNCTION: ‘was printed and bound’

#### **TEXT**

- (i) CONSTITUTION: ‘information, chapters, paragraphs, sentence’
- (ii) FUNCTION: ‘was written, to be read’

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<sup>8</sup> In his account of Pustejovsky’s work, Jackendoff (2002:373) also makes an informal note on the rather selective examples used by Pustejovsky. He too draws our attention to the potentially wider application of qualia structure and its importance for a theory of semantic compositionality.

<sup>9</sup> For a discussion of this see Ruiz de Mendoza Ibáñez (2000: 115). He shows that anaphoric reference makes use of the source in target-in-source relations and of the target in source-in-target relations.

The two facets of books are thus construed according to different schematic configurations of sense boundaries of the whole use potential of the lexical item *book*. In contrast to Pustejovsky whose senses reside in the actual words in the lexicon, boundaries for readings, like sense boundaries, are set in conceptual space according to Cruse and Paradis.

### **3 Construals of salience**

In addition to the ontologies (content structures as well as schematic structures), there are construals that are dynamic and operate on the ontologies. Following Croft and Wood (2000), I assume four basic construals. I take them to be at work in the formation of different readings on all occasions: *focus of attention (salience)*, *configuration (Gestalt)*, *perspective* and *comparison*. The scope of this inquiry is restricted to what they refer to as *metonymization* which is a special case of our focus of attention, or *construal of salience* as the term is in the present model.

This paper argues that there are three types of construals of salience, which are used to make particular aspects of concepts salient. The three types represent different degrees of conceptual intrinsicness and linguistic conventionalization of the encoded reading, from *metonymization* through *facetization* to *zone activation*. Metonymization as in ‘The *red shirts* won the match’ is based on the idea of an expressed lexical item which evokes the idea of a non-conventional, though contextually motivated, reading, which means that with respect to naming there is no conventional overlap lexically encoded. Most of these reading would not be found in a dictionary. Rather, the interpretation is made possible by a conventionalized mode of thought. Out of context there are no polysemy generalizations. The generalizations made are of an inferential nature. The reverse conditions prevail in the case of facetization and zone activation, which both concern one and the same lexical item conventionally used for different aspects of meaning within the concept complex. Apart from the activation of the appropriate reading, no real creative burden is put on the interpreter in terms of inferencing. This section discusses the above distinctions, one at a time, and examples are given for each type to illustrate the differences between them.

#### **3.1 Metonymization**

Metonymization, first, is a construal that serves to make two aspects of the total use potential of a concept salient at the same time. Typical of metonymization is that there is a discrepancy between what the lexical expression conventionally profiles and the lexical item for the jointly evoked concept. For instance, in ‘She turned out to be yet another *pretty face*’, *pretty face* is a shortcut for ‘a *woman* who has a *pretty face*’.<sup>10</sup> Some metonymies are directly derived from the core of the concept itself, as in the case of ‘pretty face’, while others are more peripheral and situationally induced. But, they too emanate from the qualia structure of the concept, in that the co-activated aspects are more or less inherently linked by conceptual contingency and they are jointly received. For instance, I once sent an e-mail to our IT-manager to ask for help because my home page did not seem to be available. I wrote the following message to him ‘Please, have a look at the departmental home page... I have ceased to be’. I received a reply to my mail, saying that I was rescued and back in place, i.e. not me but my page on the web. In the above context, ‘I have ceased to be’ is straightforward and easy to understand. In that particular context, the lexical element *I* was used as shorthand for

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<sup>10</sup> See Warren (1999: 121-135) for a comparison between metonymical expressions of nouns and noun-noun combinations.

the intended concept ‘my personal homepage on the departmental website’. The IT-manager expects mail to his work address to be concerned with IT-related matters, which made the interpretation of my message immediately transparent to him. The relationship between I and HOME PAGE is an example of the WHOLE for a PART in the broad sense.

Our understanding is guided by world knowledge and contextual relevance. Some metonymies rely heavily on the situational context such as the above example about me and my homepage, while others are more directly dependent on the inherent qualia roles that are presupposed by the ontological type. Compare (6) and (7) which represent two levels of situational integration:

- (6) The *pasta bake* asked for some more wine.
- (7) There are a lot of *good heads* at our university.

*Pasta bake* in (6) refers to a human being who is named by the dish s/he has ordered. The restaurant situation is a necessary condition for the interpretation of the phrase. The *pasta bake* serves as the linguistic encoding for the CUSTOMER in the restaurant, and the choice of expression comes across as natural in a conversation among staff that wait on them. However, outside such an environment it is not a conventionalized way of referring to people, since it is not an inherent property of all people in all situations. This means that the interpretation relies on an inferential generalization that presupposes a restaurant frame. There is no polysemy generalization available. A lot of *good heads* in (7), is also to some extent dependent on the context, but HEAD is tightly connected to the constitution of PEOPLE due to the fact that heads and brains are prototypical parts of a human beings. However, nor in this case is there a proper polysemy generalization to lean on, but only a less situationally constrained inferential generalization than in (6).

The focalized concept, which the lexical item names, may be from a first-, second- or third-order ontology. First-order entities are particularly suitable and efficient as metonymies because their use potential is characterized by a rich conceptual representation in terms of qualia structure, with many predictable concepts within different domains and different episodic frames. Second- and third-order entities are abstract and typically sparsely conceptually furnished with general predictable links, which make them less suitable for metonymies.

- (8) Three *red shirts* converge on him and the red shirts win out\*
- (9) *Poor Nottingham*\*
- (10) This wine has a *creamy nose* and a *fruity palate*
- (11) It was just a *bad ball* across the field and Coventry regained possession with Pe Paul Furlong\*
- (12) You then don’t have a lot of food you’re you’re not going to be as big as big as you would have been but you’d still be bigger than someone who had *small genes* and didn’t have a lot of food d’you understand\*

The metonymical expressions in (8) and (9) need specific contextual boosting. Both of them are firmly anchored in a sports event. RED SHIRTS and POOR NOTTINGHAM are both first-order notions that are linked to the referents in their capacity of being football players. The functional quale, ‘people as players’ is made salient through their shirts and their team respectively. In like manner, *creamy nose* and *fruity palate* in (10) suggest a specific situation of wine tasting. The expressions are conventionalized and the lexical items refer to two different body parts of the wine taster and not to the wine itself, but it is anchored in the wine domain with focus on wine-tasters. The technical connotations of the phrases suggest a frame

of serious wine tasting. It is the STATES of SMELL and TASTE of the wine as perceived by the wine taster that are made salient. Two first-order entities, NOSE and PALATE are used for naming two second-order concepts SMELL and TASTE. In this context we know that it is not the proper body parts that are in focus, but something associated with the wine, and wine does not have a nose and a palate. Furthermore, *bad ball* in (11) refers to another first-order entity. We know from the functional quale of BALL that such entities can be used for playing with. This is a general characteristic of BALL that does not require a specific situation such as a football match. A 'bad ball' calls up a 'bad shot'. In other words, a first-order entity, BALL, is used to refer to a second-order entity, SHOT, and the adjective modifies a manner quale in SHOT as an EVENT, and not a constitutive quale of BALL as an ARTEFACT. Finally, *small genes* in (12) is a NATURAL OBJECT, however small, in the first-order ontology, while the metonymy highlights the functional quale of GENES, namely that they determine the size of people. The expression *small genes* in this context refers to the STATE of being SHORT, not to *genes* as NATURAL OBJECTS.

Up to this point, we have only been concerned with lexical items that conventionally refer to first-order entities. There are also lexical items in metonymical construals that conventionally refer to second- and third-order concepts that in certain metonymical contexts are taken to be first-order concepts:

- (13) The *Caesarean section* is still on the drip.
- (14) And you 're also in a *good postcode* as well so\*

The *Caesarean section* in (13) denotes an EVENT but in this context it stands for a concrete object, more precisely a patient in a medical treatment situation. POSTCODE in (14) is a SYSTEM, and as such it is a third-order notion. In the expression a *good postcode*, the system specification evokes the idea of a concrete LOCATION. It is only in this metonymic sense that postcodes can be good or bad. The functional quale of postcode as specifying a location is drawn out and the adjective plays a crucial role for the interpretation of the expression, i.e. 'the postcode' signifies a place where it is safe for families to live, prices of property are high and stable, schools are good, and so on.

Metonymy is a cognitive process that directs our focus of attention on a certain aspect of the concept complex evoked by an unconventional name for the intended source concept. Both the source and the target concepts are evoked, since the lexical item suggests one thing, and the context suggests a different thing. They are jointly profiled with a resulting ambiguity of focus of attention with the linguistically encoded concept in the foreground. This is a case of a conventional mode of thought which draws on our knowledge of the world. It is only when the context calls for it that we interpret *face* as WOMAN, *Caesarean section* as a HUMAN BEING and so on. We arrive at these interpretations by systematic inferences that operate on concepts. Metonymies are efficient in discourse for two main reasons: one being that they serve to make particular aspects of meaning salient in particular contexts of concept complexes, the other being that they may serve as shorthand for a longer expression that explicitly mentions the concept itself as well as the highlighted associated aspect of meaning. In other words, metonymy is motivated either by salience or economy, or both.

Metonymies may be either within or across first-order entities, second-, and third-order entities. The ease of making use of metonymies is a reflex of the usefulness of the concept in question based on the number of predictable qualia roles and presupposed concepts in the linked network of concepts. For that reason first-order entities as concrete elements with a rich qualia structure and a high level of predictable links to other concepts easily lend themselves to metonymical construals. But, as we have seen, also second- and third-order entities can be used in metonymy. Metonymy is a natural phenomenon in a cognitive model



of language, whereas it poses severe problems to most formal models of meaning, since these readings are considered truth-conditionally deviant.

An important requirement on metonymies is that there has to be some kind of conceptual contingency in the mapping of our encyclopaedic knowledge between the two concepts as well as the directionality from PART to WHOLE or from WHOLE to PART. These concepts have to be related in a way that can be predicted from how the concept is categorized, which involves the total use potential of a concept in a certain context. Strictly speaking, had this not been the case, a lot of highly general concepts would also be metonymies and they are not because there is not contingency restriction.

(15) He doesn't seem to care though does he which isn't such a *bad thing*\*

Firstly, *bad thing* in (15) is similar to metonymy in that it does not refer to a thing at all. It takes a whole proposition as its referent, i.e. 'he does not seem to care'. But it differs from metonymy in not being predictable contentwise.<sup>11</sup> Any proposition can be reified by 'thing'. Secondly, this proposition has to be explicitly expressed, otherwise *bad thing* would make no sense at all. It is too abstract and totally unspecified, except for being a THING (in the technical sense of the word, see Langacker 1987: 183-213). In order for the notion of metonymy not to be completely vacuous, a certain degree of specificity is required. An inherent feature of general lexical elements is that they may be used for a plethora of notions. In principle generality could be seen as metonymical. This would, however, mean that there would be no end to metonymy. Linguistic elements that are general can be used to encode almost anything. What is made salient is the configuration as THING. Vagueness and versatility with respect to content are trademarks of general elements. Also, there is no directionality from PART to WHOLE or from WHOLE to PART. Generality is yet another case of a construal of salience, which differs from metonymization on the above-mentioned grounds.

### 3.2 Facetization

As has been demonstrated in Section 2.2, some concepts are characterized by having different facets of meaning, such as BOOK and MONEY. They have both a constitutional side to them as ARTEFACT, and a content side to them as SHELL (BOOK as TOME and BOOK as TEXT) and MONEY as ARTEFACT (COIN/PAPER) and SHELL (SYSTEM). The two facets derive from different inheritance structures with different Gestalts and different qualia structures. They converge in the linguistic encoding, i.e. both facets are conventionally referred to by the same words, *book* and *money*. They are mutually dependent on each other, and one side is useless without the other. But, one or the other can be contextually highlighted. Unlike, metonymization, no conceptual mapping is required.

Facets of a concept are all on a par with each other. They co-exist in one and the same conceptual envelope and have one name. On the one hand, their various readings can be separately focalized, but on the other the readings are not antagonistic, i.e. sentences such as 'Put the book back on the shelf (TOME). It is totally unreadable (TEXT)'. Like metonymies they are motivated context variants.

There are two major types of notions that have facets. They will be referred to as (i) the BOOK group and (ii) the DEPARTMENT group. The BOOK group has two facets, whereas the DEPARTMENT group has three facets.

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<sup>11</sup> Yet, from a configurational point of view we know that *thing* can be used for other kinds of meaning configurations than propositions. *Thing* may refer to an PROCESS, e.g. 'The whole thing lasted for three hours' (referring to a debate) or to an ARTEFACT, e.g. 'I was furious, the bloody thing didn't start this morning' (referring to my car).

(i) BOOK

- (16) He had ignored the views of his own *political party*\*
- (17) Yes because I don't like I don't like *historical books*\*
- (18) Douglas Hurd stressed what he called *sound money* and social responsibility\*
- (19) But surely it 's said *British society* is changing\*
- (20) You know you there are only three *vegetarian dinners* here\*
- (21) Well it 's not that *wonderful a film* really\*
- (22) Uhm a *terribly boring poster*\*

In the BOOK group, the activated notions have two facets, one concrete first-order reading and one abstract third-order reading. In the above contexts the lexical item maps on to different facets. *Political party* in (16) highlights the members of the party, i.e. PEOPLE. In *historical books*, *sound money*, *British society*, *vegetarian dinners*, *wonderful a film* and *boring poster*, in (17-22), the SHELL concepts of TEXT, MONETARY SYSTEM, SOCIETAL SYSTEM, MENU, KINETIC ART and TEXT or PICTORIAL ART are called up. The differences in terms of ontologies apart, the functional quale is in focus in all these cases.

Secondly, the DEPARTMENT group has three facets. They are: PEOPLE/STAFF, ARTEFACT/BUILDING or LOCATION and SHELL/INSTITUTION.

(ii) DEPARTMENT

- (23) The *whole department* has read the National Curriculum\*
- (24) Presumably if we 're going to distribute the students in this way according to pro rata according to the student uh distribution in the uh college we ought to be doing the same thing within the faculty should we so *a big department* has more representation than a small department\*
- (25) This is a huge department consisting of 35 offices, 5 teaching rooms and two lecturing theatres

*Department* in (23) refers to PEOPLE who work there. In (24), the focus is on 'department' as an abstract administrative unit, i.e. SHELL, and in (25) the BUILDING is made salient. *Department* in the above three capacities would not be listed as three entries in a dictionary, and we do not perceive of the three readings as different senses. For instance, only *department* as a section of an organization is listed in *Cobuild* (1987; *sub voce*). We know from our knowledge of the world that the three facets are necessary components for something to be a department. They are all on a par with each other on the conceptual level to form the section in a large organization.

- (26) The *little marsh village* hums with anticipation\*
- (27) Uh a friend took me to the *local spiritualist church* as a guest\*
- (28) The processions move towards the first representatives of other *Christian churches* as the sounds of this much loved hymn Praise to the Holiest in the Height rise to the height of the magnificent gothic vaulting of the nave almost a hundred and two feet\*
- (29) What worries me about *regional theatres* at the moment is that almost none of them have permanent companies\*

- (30) We we We 've learned that uh the banking profits of the *major clearing banks* are going to be down by about a billion pounds compared with the the the equivalent figures last year\*
- (31) In particular they want the senior Japanese officer George Takai to be acquitted because the game plan is to appoint him along with other survivors of the Nipponese nobility to run *post-war Japan* as a puppet state under U S control\*
- (32) It 's funny because much to my amusement some of them send their s send their girls off to you know *local fee-paying schools* who are you know not nearly as good as we are\*

In *little marsh village* (26) PEOPLE are in focus, while the *local spiritualist church* (27) highlights BUILDING. *Christian churches* (28), *regional theatres* (29), *major clearing banks* (30) and *post-war Japan* (31), the highlighted readings are INSTITUTIONS, i.e. SHELLS. In (32) *local fee-paying schools* highlights two facets, both BUILDING and STAFF/PEOPLE. BUILDING is suggested by the context before *local fee-paying schools*, i.e. 'send their girls off to' and STAFF/PEOPLE by 'who are you know not nearly as good as we are'. In all cases, the function of the notions is in focus, except for the *local spiritualist church* which points up the ARTEFACT as an object configuration. The DEPARTMENT group typically holds concepts that make use of the same lexical item for first-level entities of two kind, namely BUILDING and STAFF as well as the third-level entity which refers to the INSTITUTION as such. When the ontological basis for these lexical items is PEOPLE, they border on being metonymies, but they are similar to BOOK in that they are highly intrinsic for the WHOLE conceptual envelope. Instead of being jointly activated by two different lexical items, they are received separately by the same lexical items. Some lexical items are more conventionalized as PEOPLE than others, e.g. 'court' in example (2) as compared to 'village' in (26) and 'department' appears to in between these two on the continuum towards full lexicalization. This state of affairs may be taken as an argument in favour of only one type of facetized meaning, namely those with two facets.

Unlike metonymization of conventionalized senses, anaphorically referring pronouns in the context of facets are not constrained by the composite source concept. For instance, if we change '*local fee-paying schools* who are not nearly as good as we are', evoking the idea of STAFF/PEOPLE into '*local fee-paying schools* which are not nearly as good as we are', the interpretation is vague between STAFF/PEOPLE and INSTITUTION/SHELL, but a focus on STAFF/PEOPLE is not ruled out. This observation is consistent with our previous example with book in Section 2.2. Also, unlike in metonymization, the lexical item used for the whole as well as a part is the same. Again, facetization is not a process of concept to concept mapping, but one of conceptual highlighting within the envelope concept only.

Another type of lexically encoded aspects of meaning are: 'Bill is a late reader', 'Susan is a good driver' and 'He is a terrible bore'. *Late reader*, *good driver* and *terrible bore* all name an aspect of a person. The difference between these examples and the above examples is only that these aspects of meaning happen to be linguistically encoded as people who do these things or people who have a certain personality. Such examples raise the question of what facets really are. Similar to facets both the person *qua* human being and the person in this capacity are received jointly. In contrast to facets, the lexical item makes the person *qua* 'doer' or the person *qua* personality trait salient through the conventional link between the linguistic element and the concept. However, it is possible to focus the attention on the person as such too, e.g. 'Here comes our second speaker' or 'Susan is a beautiful dancer'. These examples are borderline cases of lexical items that encode facets of meaning. From this point of view, we may argue that all hyponymic relations in some sense are facets in that they highlight a salient feature of their superordinate. They focus our attention on a part of the

whole in that sense. True, this is what hyponymic relations do. This state of affair illustrates how powerful this construal is and what the repercussions are on lexical encoding. Like generality, specialization is another special case of a construal of salience.

### **3.3 Zone activation**

Thirdly, active zone activation is found in all construal of meaning on all occasions. Zone activation is similar to both metonymization and facetization in focussing on a particular aspect of a concept. They are in the same concept complex either in its constitutional or functional quale. Active zone readings foreground the WHOLE and background the PART configuration. On one occasion my son was asked to fill in as a barman while the owner was out. A customer came in and ordered a whisky. “Fill it up, please”, the woman said. This means that the cavity of the glass should be filled, but GLASS would still receive the focus of attention by being lexically expressed and conventionally associated with both the material as such and the cavity. Another example illustrating this is ‘eye’, where different parts of the eye may be in focus, such as ‘red eyes’ where the white part of the eye is in fact the part referred to and ‘blue eyes’ where the iris is described. Active zones are conventionalized WHOLE/PART readings. In spite of the fact that only part of the entities are relevant, the WHOLE is in the foreground. These parts may represent different qualia of a notion such as ‘I have a *small car*’, where *car* is construed as an object with constitution configuration, as compared to ‘I have a *slow car*’, where the functional quale of CAR receives the focus of attention through profiling, or they may be focalized constitutional parts, such as in *red eyes* and *blue eyes*.<sup>12</sup> Like for facets, the various aspects of a concept that a lexical item highlights does not show any signs of antagonism. For instance, in ‘the boy has blue eyes, but today one of them was red’ the anaphoric reference of *them* applies to both the iris and the white without creating a zeugma. Again, the reason is that no mapping between concepts and senses takes place. Zone activation is just a case of highlighting. Active-zone construals are omnipresent in that they concern all readings. They are the perspective side of profiling.

## **4 Conclusion**

This paper addresses the question of what metonymy is and what kind of lexical/conceptual pairings that may be subsumed under the term within a cognitive framework. Our encyclopaedic knowledge about entities, their qualia configurations and their associated conceptual frames are all crucial ingredients in how various readings are construed. It is argued that three types of construals of salience that are referred to as metonymy in the cognitive literature should be divided into: metonymization, facetization and zone activation. Most generally, all three are based on a schematic PART/WHOLE or WHOLE/PART configuration of conceptual inclusion, which is triggered by an interplay between the degree of conventionalized readings of lexical items and conventionalized modes of thought in language use. In all three of them, the lexical element in question evokes a portion of meaning that is a predictable part of the same conceptual whole on the occasion of use. The PARTS and the WHOLES may be represented by different ontological entities in the case of metonymization and facetization, while zone activation always applies to one and the same

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<sup>12</sup> In the majority of cases, it is the function of nominal expressions that is made salient and talked about. Across all the 2,720 ADJ N combinations that constitute our whole corpus of data, 53% of the concrete first-order entities are profiled as functions. For second- and third-order entities the corresponding figures are 87% and 86%, respectively.

ontological basis. Examples (1), (2) and (3), here repeated as (33), (34) and (35), are used to summarize the observations of the investigation.

- (33) The *red shirts* won the match.
- (34) The *court* had to assume that the statement of claim was true.
- (35) Fill *it* up, please (the glass with whisky)

Lexical item	Lexically encoded notion	Intended notion	Direction
<i>red shirts</i>	ARTEFACT	PEOPLE	PART/WHOLE
<i>court</i>	ARETEFACT+ADMINISTRATIVE UNIT+PEOPLE	PEOPLE	WHOLE/PART
<i>it (=glass)</i>	ARTEFACT	CAVITY	WHOLE/PART

**Figure 2. The construal of salience from the point of view of lexical encoding and conceptual activation.**

Proper metonymies make use of two different concepts in a conceptual complex, which, conventionally, are activated by two different lexical items, which represent two different senses. In metonymization, one of the concepts is lexically encoded and thereby foregrounded and highlighted, e.g. *red shirts*. The jointly activated concept that RED SHIRT maps on to is FOOTBALL PLAYER/PEOPLE, which is the source and the ‘real referent’. It is FOOTBALL PLAYER/PEOPLE, not RED SHIRT, that is employed in anaphora resolution, e.g. \*‘One of the red shirts came in from the left. It ran towards the goal’. Out of context, ‘football player’ and ‘red shirt’ represent two different senses. In this context, they are used to refer to the same entity by means of a conventional mode of thought.

Facets of senses, on the other hand, reside in the same conceptual envelope under one and the same lexical expression. Facetization is not a case of conceptual mapping. It is a matter of highlighting only. A facet of a concept (and a sense) is highlighted and thereby evoked separately. In (34), the facet is ‘judges, jurors and magistrates who work there’. Facets reside within concepts and senses. This is shown by the fact that the readings are not antagonistic in anaphoric constructions, e.g. ‘The woman was standing outside the court that was going to announce the verdict’. Only concepts that hold both a concrete and abstract interpretation have facets.

Similarly, zone activation involves a conventionalized pairing of a lexical item and a certain profiling of an entity, e.g. *glass* for CAVITY when we are concerned with the liquid that you pour into it. Like facetization, zone activation involves one concept where the various specific profiles are part and parcel of the concept in question. The specific profiles are motivated at the level of qualia structure. Facetization and zone activation construals are the reverse of metonymy in that the conventional naming is constant both for the WHOLE and the highlighted part. The difference between facetization and zone activation is that they operate on different levels. Since zone activation is motivated by qualia structure, it is omnipresent and concerns all readings, be they senses or facets. We do not normally conceive of concepts in their entirety, i.e. the full use potential. On the contrary, particular perspectives of meaning are foregrounded on all occasions. Facetization and zone activation also differ in that the profiling of the concept is backgrounded in relation to the more salient WHOLE in zone activation, i.e. CAVITY is backgrounded relative to GLASS, while in the case of facetization the profiled PART is in the foreground, e.g. PEOPLE is foregrounded relative to the conceptual whole as LOCATION, ADMINISTRATIVE UNIT and PEOPLE.

Metonymization, facetization and zone activation are special cases of construals of salience. They form a continuum from mappings between lexical items and concepts that emerge through conventional modes of thought through highlighting of certain aspects of lexicalized meanings. Metonymization is a process of concept mappings which involve different senses. Facetization is a process of highlighting of a part of a sense, and zone activation is quia highlighting within both senses and facets. Metonymization involves a conventional mode of thought, while facetization and zone activation rely on conventional lexical encodings. On this definition, metonymy is a special case of a construal of salience. Metonymy stops at the level of senses, where a conventional mode of thought is responsible for the reading, not a conventional mapping between a lexical item and a reading.

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