Subjectivity and Epistemicity
Corpus, discourse, and literary approaches to stance
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Preface

The goal of this volume is to bring together research on the notions of subjectivity and epistemic stance from distinct, yet analytically compatible, research traditions. Three such traditions, literary criticism, discourse analysis and corpus linguistics, all share the assumption that ‘text’ is the basis of any analysis and that this analysis must account for, first and foremost, what is observed in that text. In line with these three research traditions, the volume is very roughly divided into three subsections. Although the first three empirical studies can be categorically referred to as literary criticism and the last three as corpus linguistics, the 10 studies that lie between can only be called discourse analysis in the broadest terms, beginning with a literary study and passing through conversation analysis, critical discourse analysis to what might be termed corpus-driven discourse analysis. These studies reveal the continuum that exists between the research in literature and the research on corpora.

The first study, Glynn’s “Quality and quantity”, serves as an introduction to the volume. It seeks to show how the above-mentioned different fields of enquiry are all brought together by certain fundamental tenets in both their object and method study. Following this, the discussion outlines a set of methodological concerns, from a corpus linguistics perspective, designed to be informative for both literary scholars and discourse analysts.

The literary subsection begins with Anderson Ahlstedt’s “A word for wildness”, an ecocritical study on the fictional setting of Wessex as an urbanatural environment; it argues that nature, as a character with agency, takes on the stance of wildness in Hardy’s novels. Pudney’s study on “Chorus and stance in early modern English drama” examines how the function of the choric speaker changed during the early modern period from expressing a clear stance to problematizing the action. Sjölin’s narratological study on “Attitude and irony in the narrative voices of Jane Austen’s juvenilia” looks into how the relationships between the attitudes of implied authors, narrators and characters contribute to the workings of the irony in Austen’s early works. Skorasińska’s study on “Epistemic modal verbs in Shakespeare and Marlowe” does not represent a literature study, rather a linguistics study where the works of two authors are treated as a corpus. In this sense, the study lies between literature and corpus linguistics. The paper is placed with the literary studies merely because if its object of study, its method being entirely quantitative and therefore quite distinct from the discourse studies that follow.

The first entirely linguistic contribution is De Cock’s analysis of “The discursive effects of Spanish impersonals uno and se”. The study examines the (inter)subjectivity and pragmatic effects of the two generic person constructions and focuses on spoken language. Marhula, in her study “Acknowledging the addressee in spoken interaction” continues the theme of conversational language but is precisely concerned with intersubjective structuring. The study is a
semasiological analysis of you know that demonstrates the importance of intersubjective use of this addressee orientated stance marker.

Continuing the intersubjective line, but moving from conversational language to the interactive written language, Põldvere’s “The interaction between epistemicity and social rank” seeks to reveal the effects of hierarchical structures on stancetaking strategies. Her study operationalises social hierarchy through the stratified status awarded locutors on a bulletin board. Another take on interpersonal language is treated in Axelsson’s “Confirmation-demanding tag questions in fiction dialogue”. Tag-questions are a quintessential example of intersubjective structure and one that is often used to encode power structures in conflict situations. This study seeks to isolate their use in fictional narratives in an attempt to identify their use outside this socially marked usage. Hommerberg & Paradis’ “Constructing credibility in wine reviews” examines strategies for the expression of evidentiality and epistemic control in wine reviews. The study focuses on the texts of a single author and offers a detailed qualitative analysis of how that author draws upon encyclopaedic semantics and the structures of the genre itself, combining them with a set of stancetaking devises, to express evaluation.

The next two studies are also based on specific texts but move towards critical discourse analysis in their research questions. The first, Ushchyna’s study, “Stancetaking in the discourse on risk identities construed,” represents a close qualitative examination of a public announcement of a ‘preventional’ mastectomy. It considers the strategies taken by the announcement’s author in justifying her stance concerning her risk minimisation. Kovalchuk’s “Discourse markers of emotional expressiveness in charismatic rhetoric” examines American presidential speeches. The analysis is quantitative and focuses upon stylistic differences associated with charismatic and non-charismatic expression.

At this point in the volume, the studies move towards more corpus orientated research. Usonienė & Šinkūniënė’s “A corpus-based look at zero correspondences” examines the omission and conversion of epistemic stance markers in translation from English to a range of European languages. The study shows that many uses of especially the English verb seem do not readily translate and the authors conclude that this is evidence of its grammaticalisation. Elorza & Pérez-Veneros’ “Constructing stance by means of attribution” examines authorial voices in science popularization articles and focuses on the construction of the journalists’ stance with regard to the reported proposition. The final two papers represent quantitative corpus-driven studies. Krawczak’s “Epistemic stance predicates in English” employs Multifactorial Usage-feature Analysis (also called Manual Sentiment Analysis or the Profile-based Approach) to examine the stance uses of a range of epistemic cognition predicates in British and American English. Deshors, in her study “Constructing meaning in L2 discourse”, employs the same method. The study treats modal stance in L2 discourse, focusing on may and can’s patterns of use in French- and Chinese-English interlanguage. The volume wraps up with an annotated bibliography for current research in stance, subjectivity, epistemic modality, and evidentiality.
Quality and quantity
Object and method in the study of subjectivity and epistemic stance

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Abstract
This introduction has two aims. Firstly, it offers a working definition of subjectivity as an object of analysis for the volume. Subjectivity is operationally defined as ‘epistemic stance’. The discussion argues that this working definition allows three otherwise distinct lines of research, narratology, discourse analysis and corpus linguistics, to come together. Secondly, it argues that, analytically, these distinct approaches can only inform each other if a specific methodological axiom is accepted. The methodological premise is that analysis be exclusively text-based. Having established the analytical and methodological link between the three approaches, the discussion, from a corpus linguistics perspective, examines a set of analytical-methodological concerns that are relevant to all text-based research on subjectivity.

1. Introduction

There can be little doubt that corpus linguistics, discourse analysis and narratology differ greatly, not only in the research questions they typically address, but in the scientific discourses they employ. Yet despite these substantial differences, the notions of subjectivity and epistemicity, or more specifically, how speakers (or authors) position themselves with regards to their understanding of the world and how they express this ‘stance’ is a central question to all three domains of research. Indeed, one can argue that subjectivity and the expression of epistemic stance is one of the fundamental functions of language. Whether that stance is expressed through the voice of a fictional character in a novel, the stage directions in a theatre piece, the choice of a reporting verb in news broadcast, or a slight pause or hedge in an amicable conversation, is surely one of the condiciones sine quibus non of communication and, therefore, language structure.

The introduction serves two purposes. Section 2 offers a summary of the object of analysis. Subjectivity and epistemic stance represent an immense and varied field of enquiry. In order to appreciate how the studies in this volume relate to each other and the field of enquiry more broadly, this section outlines the main
lines of theoretical research. Section 3 moves from the object of analysis to the method of analysis, considering a range of practical issues, essential for ascertaining the validity of an empirical study. The aim is to set out a relatively discipline-neutral list of methodological criteria with which we can appreciate the studies presented in the volume. Although written from a corpus linguistics perspective, it is hoped these criteria will be applicable and valuable, regardless of the study’s approach.

2. Object of analysis. Subject, object and inter-subject

The research presented in this volume is as diverse as the fields that consider its research question. The fundamental and general nature of the notion of subjectivity means that any attempt to approach it in a cross-disciplinary manner risks casting a net too far and too shallow to capture any coherent understanding of the problems at hand. In this section, an operationalised definition of subjectivity it proposed. The theoretical models and lines of research regarding subjectivity, in both linguistics and literature, are summarised. Given these theoretical and analytical premises, it is argued that a coherent, yet inter-disciplinary, approach to subjectivity is possible.

2.1 Subjectivity. An operational definition

Even the most modest of overviews of this immense field of research would be impossible here. Instead, we will attempt an operationalised definition of our object of analysis so as to contextualise the research presented in this volume.

It is Benveniste (1966[1958]) who is most frequently accredited with identifying the crucial role of the subject in linguistic structure:

The placing of “subjectivity” in *langage* creates [...] the category of person. [...] *[L]angage* is marked so deeply by the expression of subjectivity that one wonders if it were otherwise constructed, could it still function and be called language. [...] *Langage* is so organised that it permits each speaker to appropriate an entire language by designating himself as *I*. Benveniste (1966[1958]: 261-263).²

Importantly, Benveniste also understood the need to approach subjectivity as a phenomenon contextualised discursively, indeed, in terms of the interlocutor

Consciousness of self is only possible if it is experienced by contrast. I only use 'I' when addressing someone who will be a 'you' in my address. It is this condition of dialogue that is constitutive of *person*. (Benveniste 1966[1958]: 260).³

As evidence for his claims, Benveniste discusses the meaning shift of verbs such as *believe* and *swear*, when used in the first and third person. It is this realisation that,
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in part, lies at the origins of the rapidly growing field of subjectivity research. Drawing on Benveniste’s examples of a subject’s belief in the future event of rain, consider the following propositions:

(1)  
   a. It will rain  
   b. It appears that it will rain  
   c. I believe that it will rain

In these three phrases, the ‘subject’ is present, be that explicitly or implicitly, and the epistemic stance of the speaker is expressed. Other than the obvious difference between the choice of the grammatical construction (declarative, evidential and epistemic) and person (3rd person and 1st person), there are two points to consider. Firstly, the speaker chooses an expression that represents the degree of epistemic commitment that he or she has with respect to the proposition. Secondly, this choice is also, in part, determined by the speaker’s relationship to the interlocutor / addressee. In order to appreciate this second point, consider some natural examples of double epistemic verbs:

(2)  
   a. I suppose I think we should try to avoid fetishism in our writing.  
   b. I suppose I think if it were all orderly, the magic would go, somehow. Daft, no?  
   c. yeah so thats that for now i believe i think it might even work.  
   d. i think i believe that if stones could dream they’d dream of being laid side by side, piece by piece and turned into a castle for some towering queen.

Such doubling of 1st person mental state predicates is not particularly unusual and highlights the inter-personal dimension in the expression of epistemic stance. The first mental state predicate is in index for the interlocutor to gauge the degree of commitment that the speaker has to his or her own belief. This act can only be understood as intersubjective in nature. Although the doubled mental state predicates make this interpersonal role explicit, it is always present, regardless of the stance strategy adopted. This is true since the very act of expressing one’s beliefs is an intersubjective choice. This choice is either designed to convince the interlocutor of a ‘belief’ or to indicate to the interlocutor the position the speaker holds with regard to some other speaker, who is often, but necessarily, that of the interlocutor. Therefore, it is not that a given expression equates a given degree of commitment to a proposition, but that a given expression in a given context will represent a degree of commitment to a proposition. In other words, the expression of subjectivity is inherently intersubjective.

If we accept this, subjectivity can be summarised as the expression to an ‘inter-subject’ (interlocutor) of a subject’s epistēmē (‘knowledge’) of an object. Three pieces of the communication triangle, the individual’s concept of the world, the objective yet cognised world itself and the interpersonal expression of that conceptualisation. This extremely abstract phenomenon, can be summarised as
epistemic stance. The term *epistemic* refers to the individual’s conception of reality and *stance* refers to the subject’s expression towards an external subject, another individual. This definition, of course, includes every declarative utterance. That is, however, just how broad a field and fundamental a phenomenon we address.

It may be obvious, but it must be stressed that the complexity involved in this ubiquitous function of language is considerable. It is this complexity, rather than the ubiquitous nature of the phenomenon, that draws our attention. From prosodic structure and the lexical choice of verb, adverb, adjective through discursive and narrational devices to a range of grammatical structures, such as voice and person, the expression of subjectivity, or epistemic stance, is possibly the most complex function of language. Each of the approaches exemplified in this volume seeks to identify, describe, and explain certain facets of this function.

2.1 Linguistic Theory
The main theoretical treatments have come from Langacker (1985) and Verhagen (2005) in Cognitive Linguistics and from Traugott (1989), Nuyts (2000), Narrog (2012) and Boye (2012) in Functional Linguistics. Langacker’s (1985, 1990, 2006) work focuses on the conceptual level, where he seeks to integrate the notion of subjectivity into the theory of Cognitive Grammar. This theory holds that all linguistic form is a symbolic device for the representation, or encoding, of conceptualisation. The emphasis of this approach is on the relationship between the subject and the cognised object. Verhagen (2005), working from the theoretical tenets of the same paradigm, develops the interpersonal dimension of this approach.

Functional linguistics is a more diverse research paradigm than Cognitive Linguistics. Only the basic assumption that language structure is motivated by meaning (in the broadest possible sense) unites the functional and cognitive paradigms. It is this primacy of meaning, or more accurately, semiotic function, that makes subjectivity so important in these approaches. However, if Cognitive Linguistics’ emphasis can be described as the conceptualisation of the object, then Functional Linguistics could be described as more concerned with the expression of that conceptualisation intersubjectively. Within Functional linguistics, Traugott (1989, 1995, 2003, 2010) and Narrog (2012) take a diachronic perspective, primarily concerned with grammaticalisation and the role of subjectification in language change. The principle idea is that the subject has a special place in language use and therefore lies behind general patterns of language change across the world’s languages. This diachronic line of research, especially in grammaticalisation, has developed into a subfield in its own right. In contrast to Traugott’s diachronic perspective, Mushin (2001) examines subjectivity synchronically and brings evidentiality into the fold, examining the phenomenon cross-linguistically. Nuyts (2000) and Boye (2012) seek to bring the cognitive and functional perspectives together. Nuyts (2000) takes a relatively formal view, examining the notion in terms of lexico-grammatical structures where Boye (2012) focuses on the cross-linguistic development of subjectivity research.
Beyond these theoretically orientated approaches, it is in the fields of typology, comparative grammar and descriptive grammar as well as in critical discourse analysis, discourse analysis and conversation analysis that the greatest amount of research has taken place. The typological and grammatical research on subjectivity and epistemic stance is subsumed in the research projects on modality and evidentiality. Section 2 of the annotated bibliography, in the last chapter of this volume, is devoted to describing these lines of research. In discourse analysis, broadly speaking, stance represents a cornerstone in the tradition. Hedging, boosting, reporting and evaluation all directly interact with stance taking. A tentative summary of the vast amount of work, relevant to subjectivity and epistemic stance, is presented in section 4 of the annotated bibliography.

2.2 Literary theory
In literary theory and criticism, the question of subjectivity and the representation of the self has become a central theme, crossing the boundaries to cultural studies and, at times, spanning the bridge to philosophical enquiry. In critical discourse analysis and cultural studies, the role of the subject is entwined with the notion of identity. However, these fields of research are beyond the purview of the current discussion. The transient or intransient role of the subject in epistemology is also a traditional line of research in philosophy, yet is entirely distinct from the research presented in this volume.

In literary research per se, the notion of subjectivity is especially important for work in narratology where it is crucial for the understanding of voice and focalisation. In literary theory, Bakhtin’s (1975[1934]) notion of dialogism, or the possibility of multiple voices in literary text, is arguably fundamental. This proposal, often overlooked in contemporary linguistics, was not uniquely proposed as a device for literary analysis. Bakhtin’s argument was that an utterance is always contextualised and that the meaning of that utterance is a result of that context. Therefore, subjectivity, and the expression of a given perspective, is entirely dependent on its intersubjective context. Kristeva (1969), who originally translated Bakhtin’s ideas and introduced them to Western linguistics and literary theory, also developed these ideas in psychology (especially with regards to subjectivity) and cultural studies (intertextuality and heteroglossia). In narratology, especially with regards to the notion of focalisation, Genette (1972) and Bal (1977, 1980) are arguably the main lines of research. Genette, drawing on work by Lubbock (1921), Pouillon (1946) and Todorov (1966), proposes the term focalisation as a cover term for notions such as point of view and perspective. He operationalises focal point as three possible relations between character and narrator: where the narrator expresses information beyond the knowledge of the character; where the narrator expresses less than the character; and where the narrator is the character. Bal develops these notions but modifies the operationalisation, reworking the notions of narrator, implied author, perspective and point of view. She rejects Genette’s basic three-way distinction, arguing that an internal and external distinction suffices to account for focalisation, but that this distinction needs to further account...
for different kinds of objects, such as those which are external to the subject (actions and events) and those which are internal (thoughts and feelings). Her work focuses on how a range of narrational devices are used to construct different focalisations.

2.3 Narration, Discourse, Corpus
A simple generalisation, offered with all the obvious hedges, may help us understand why these distinct lines of research can work together. Linguistic research focuses on what structures are potentially available to the language user where the literary research focuses on the effect that such structures have in given specific usage events. Unfortunately, in reality, it is not that simple. Usage-based linguistics, whether examining a specific conversation, a discourse, or the broad scope of corpora, actually examines extant speech events. Narratology, likewise, is not just about the interpretation of specific language uses, but about what language strategies exist for an author. Seen from this perspective, linguistic and literary research overlap.

So why then the do we observe such divergence, resulting in almost zero communication between the disciplines? Perhaps the difference is methodological in nature, a contrast between qualitative interpretation versus quantitative description? This is clearly the not the case, evidenced by the large amount of quantitative research in literature and the equally large qualitative research tradition in linguistics. Perhaps, the difference is merely discursive, the scientists of linguistics versus the scholars of literature? Perhaps, it is the abstract goal that differs, one discipline seeking to unravel the mysteries of the faculty of language, the other the expression of the human condition? Perhaps it is the abstract goal that differs, one discipline seeking to unravel the mysteries of the faculty of language, the other the expression of the human condition? Perhaps it is merely the degree of the generalisation that one wishes to be made, the corpus linguist looking to make statements about all human language, the discourse analysis about language in specific contexts, and the literary scholar about a given author or work. None of these sweeping statements would stand up to any reasonable debate. Whatever the reason for the disciplinary isolationism, it cannot be a good thing, and the aim here is to find ways to overcome it.

Therefore, regardless of the cause for the difference and the resulting lack of communication between the disciplines, it should be clear that the working definition of subjectivity presented above, unites them. How one expresses a personal worldview is just as much a linguistic question as a literary one. So, let us assume that whatever the cause of the disciplinary divergence, linguistics and literature should be able to work together on the topic of subjectivity and epistemic stance.

Indeed, if we restrict ourselves to the text-based research, typical of corpus linguistics, discourse analysis and narratology, arguably, it is not the different theoretical models or research questions that leads to disciplinary differences, but the kinds of text examined. Different kinds of texts warrant different analytical tools and so the different analytical traditions emerge. Once again, the reality is more complex than this, but this reasoning appears sound enough that a tentative
step can be taken to bring these divergent lines of research together in the hope for inter-disciplinary communication. If we accept this proposal, then the bridges we need to cross to enable communication lie in the divergent analytical methods. To these ends, let us consider a set of methodological concerns from the perspective of corpus linguistics, presented in a manner intended to be accessible to the discourse analyst and literary scholar.

3. Method of analysis. Text-based approaches to meaning

Both linguistics and literary studies are immense and heterogeneous fields of research. For this reason, any sweeping generalisations are bound to be false. However, if we restrict ourselves to strictly text-based research, perhaps we can find common ground and room for each field to learn from the other. To these ends, a little more definitional precision is warranted. By text, it is meant any recorded natural language event and by based, it is meant any research that begins with a chosen sample of language and seeks to explain all relevant structure in that sample, regardless of whether that research is descriptive or whether it seeks to test a hypothesis. This definition immediately cordons off half of linguistics that bases its research on elicitation and/or experimentation. It also side-liners much of the research in literary and linguistic theory which, although ultimately based on language and literature, seeks to propose abstract theoretical models whose implications go far beyond textual description.

If one’s starting point is text, then one is ultimately dealing with observable data. If the data are observable, they are likely to be quantifiable and, except in specific situations, they will represent but a sample of the all the possible data available. Given these methodological implications of analysing texts, this discussion considers five analytical concerns that stem from this textual starting point.

3.1 Sample viz. population

If a sample is a subset of a population that is studied inductively to make statements about that population, then the relationship between sample size and population is a fundamental difference between linguistics and literature. This somewhat unusual claim warrants some explanation.

Arguably, the most the fundamental difference between descriptive linguistic and literary research is that linguists seek to make generalisations that are valid for all language, where literary scholars restrict the generalisations to a specific work, author or genre. Although descriptiveness is a means to an ends for both disciplines, the point of the descriptions differ and therefore, so too, do the nature of those descriptions. Linguists seek to explain the faculty of language, that is how it is possible to speak and communicate. In order to test theories about how this is possible, one must possess accurate descriptions of language behaviour. The ultimate aim of literature, on the other hand, is the content, that is, what is meant
and how language is used to explain the world, or at least how specific speakers (authors) understand the world. Therefore, the reason a linguistic description differs from a literary one is not due to its descriptiveness, but the aim of the description. When a linguist asks what structures are used to express a phenomenon, it is in order to test a theory about how that is possible. A literary scholar asks the same question, but in an effort to identify what is intended by the text.

It should be evident how this difference can be understood as a difference in terms of sample size and population. If the object of study is the works of a specific author and we possess the complete works of that author, absolute claims can be made about any given observable phenomenon under investigation. Of course, the literary scholar is rarely interested in only observable phenomena, just as he or she is not always specifically concerned with works of a specific author, but rather the genre or a period. Nevertheless, in most instances, the sample size can, at least theoretically, approach the entire population.

This is, of course, completely impossible for the linguist – even the largest corpus in the world is but a infinitesimally small sample of the production of a living language. Again this statement is not entirely true. Rather than making statements about the entirety of a given language, usage-based linguists are beginning to restrict their claims to more specific types, or perhaps, contexts of language. Corpus linguistics developed during the era of Generative linguistics, where claims, based on the notion of the ideal speaker, were frequently made about an entire language. Since, usage-based linguists assume that variation is inherent to the linguistic system, this assumption no longer holds. Despite this fact, corpus linguistics supposed for some time that its statements were also true for the entirety of a language. However, this is no reason to assume that any corpus is representative of a language, if indeed, we could categorical define a given language. Therefore, happily, the current trend is to restrict the object of study to specific contexts of language use. Nevertheless, even with this over-development, our largest corpora / samples are but drops in the ocean compared to natural language production. Seen in these terms, the small samples that linguists use (compared to the size of the population) is a profound methodological weakness when put up against the large samples (again compared to the size of the population) employed in literary research.

3.2 Type vs. Token
The notions of type and tokens are crucial in empirical research. Rephrased, type can be understood as the category under scrutiny and token as an occurrence of that category. In quantitative research, in order to make an inductive claim, one needs a reasonable number of tokens for any given type. This is sometimes referred to as the type-token ratio. The implications of this are that, for purely practical reasons, one must restrict the range of types under investigation in order to have sufficient numbers of tokens for each type investigated. This methodological constraint on quantitative research is fundamental. A high number of tokens, relative to the
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number of types, allows one to say more and with more confidence, but, crucially, about less. For example, a qualitative study can examine all the different ways in which a given author, or set of authors, express epistemic stance, where a quantitative study would typically be restricted to a small number of different stance strategies, quite simply because it is better to have more examples of a specific phenomenon than less examples of various phenomena. The implications of this limitation on quantitative research are profound, often determining the limits of the research and validity of the results, regardless of whether the study is salience– or frequency–based. Obviously, this issue must be borne in mind when determining whether the sample is sufficiently large to make inductive statements about the population. The sample is, in effect, the number of tokens analysed relative to the number of tokens that exist. For example, if an analysis examines 10 different authors (types) or 10 different stance strategies (types), and collects 1000 occurrences (tokens), the sample size per token is 100 (if an equal number of occurrences per type are collected). If the study were restricted to 4 types, this number would increase to 250 tokens per type. At nearly 3 times more examples, it is more likely that subtleties will be identified but also that any claims made will be more inductively valid. The trade off between ‘saying more about less’ versus ‘saying less about more’, represents a basic question in the design of any inductive study and is equally valid for corpus linguistics, discourse analysis and literary criticism.

3.3 Prominence vs. typicality

All scientific enquiry, from the study of Petrarchan poetry to subatomic physics, seeks to make generalisations, to distinguish the regular from the irregular, the intended from the arbitrary. Prominence and typicality are two different operationalisations of such structure in inductive research. Salience, or relative prominence, assumes that which is most remarkable is representative of structure, where typicality, or relative frequency, assumes that which is most common represents structure. These two different operationalisations represent a fundamental methodological difference.

Corpus linguistics treats every occurrence as equal. Each token, or occurrence of the phenomenon under investigation, is given equal weight and relative frequency is the sole operationalisation of structure. The assumption that all events are treated equally and that their selection is random is the methodological condicio sine qua non of the method. In non-quantitative literary studies, the opposite is true. In traditional literary analysis, the scholar’s interpretation determines what is analysed and what is not. The selection of the phenomenon under investigation is motivated by the noteworthiness of the observation rather than the random selection necessary for frequency/typicality–based studies. Discourse analysis lies between these two approaches. The focus here is on a highly specific context of language use. Indeed, conversation analysis, if taken to be a specific type of discourse analysis, goes even further and focuses on a specific thread of language use. In discourse analysis, just as in conversation
analysis, relative salience is taken into account, but typically all occurrences of the phenomenon under investigation are systematically considered.

It is important to note that this is not a matter of quantitative versus qualitative. To demonstrate this point, there exists a great deal of experiential research in linguistics that operationalises salience in purely quantitative terms. It would seem that operationalising structure in terms of typicality is the fundamental constraint upon corpus analysis. This constraint takes the form of three inherent limitations.

Firstly, and most evidently, corpus studies are restricted to what is common. In any sample, rare events will be, by definition, rare or absent. Even when rare events are caught in the sample, they are side-lined from any generalisation for the very fact that they are not common enough to treat inductively.

Secondly, and more importantly, is the question of rarity itself. Given the immense size of the population and the extremely small size of the sample, what appears to be rare in the corpora, are, in fact, quite common. They are only relatively rare, their rarity an unfortunate artefact of the small sample size. This problem is often treated in terms of *hapax legomena* where, from a single occurrence of a lexeme, we cannot tell if that lexeme is unique or simply relatively rare. This is because no quantitative extrapolation can be made from a single occurrence in any sample.

Thirdly, and the point of the most serious concern, is the very fact that each event, or token, contributes equally to the generalisation made. If we assume that language structure is not entirely a result of relative frequency, basing results entirely on what is typical will produce skewed generalisations. We know that when learning a language, each input event is not equal. One may study a lexeme in a vocabulary list a hundreds times and still forget the word, yet hear another word just once in a personally salient context and never forget it. Similarly, ask any European English speaker to name a bird and *sparrow* will occur significantly more frequently than other bird types. These bird types are culturally salient, and therefore, for whatever socio-cultural reason, they are central to our concept of ‘bird’. Yet, almost surely for the majority of urban speakers, these birds are experientially relatively rare, especially in comparison to the humble pigeon with which we interact daily. Although an extremely important operationalisation, frequency alone cannot explain language. Corpus linguistics might do well to look to discourse analysis and literary studies in this regard. Ultimately, we need to understand how typicality and frequency interact in linguistic structure, but until that is known, caution is needed and researchers must remain open to the results gleaned from the approaches to language different from their own.

### 3.4 Subjectivity vs. objectivity

Subjectivity, as a methodological notion, should not be confused with the functional structure of linguistic subjectivity. Subjectivity, in methodological terms, refers to the analysis of non-observable phenomena. Of course, in the human and social sciences all objects of study are experienced and therefore, arguably,
observable, just as every observation is cognised, and therefore, ultimately subjective. However, without a lengthy discussion in Hermeneutics, we can approximate the question by describing a so-called subjective analysis as an analysis where it is not feasible to operationalise the index (indirect evidence) of the phenomenon in question. The term, objective analysis, on the other hand, can be restricted to instances where the object of study is formally observable and, its occurrence or measurement, therefore, directly falsifiable. Much traditional corpus linguistics is primarily concerned with observable phenomena contrary to much of the traditional literary analysis, which is concerned with non-observable phenomena.

An important point to appreciate is that objective analysis is not necessarily more accurate than the subjective analysis. In contrast to the generative era of linguistics and, perhaps, certain formalist approaches to literature, most linguists and literary scholars alike, suppose that their object of study is motivated and structured by intention. In other words, meaning (conceptualisation and function) in language lies behind language use, and therefore, for a usage-based linguist, lies behind its structure. The impact of this assumption on purely objective research is clear.

Firstly, since the true object of study is the motivation for the use of the form, not the form itself, detecting variation in the motivation for use of a form is far from self-evident. That is not to say that form-based research is not attempting to achieve this through the study of “latent semantic” structures, but the accuracy of such indirect analysis is not to be assumed without caution. By way of example, even the results of the simplest collocation analysis are problematic. What is collocating? The collocation is merely the co-occurrence of two forms. Yet we know a priori that all forms vary in meaning, and, typically, this variation is substantial. If meaning structures language, then we know that regardless of the sample size, regardless of the quantitative measures used, that the forms are not a simple index of that meaning and, therefore, any extrapolation about structure is necessarily inaccurate. If lexemes had a one-to-one relationship with meanings (concepts – functions), then formal association (collocation) would be an accurate index, but it is not. Although formal approaches (such latent semantic analysis and word space modelling) are improving their ability to identify meaning structure through the use of ever-larger samples, more precise parsing, and the use of multivariate statistics, they are still long way from explaining the subtle semantic structures of quotidian language, let alone the structure of literary expression.

Secondly, and by extension, if the object of study is not the form, but the motivation for using that form, then so-called objective study is, in fact not, objective, but indirect and indeed, subjective, using our working definition of the term. This is more than a point of theoretical pedantry. If the object of the analysis is only an index of the phenomenon we are trying to explain, then necessarily, we need to interpret the results of the objective analysis. As soon as we interpret so-called objective results, we return to subjectivity. This is essentially the argument for using intuition over observation in linguistic analysis. A simple example will
serve to demonstrate the importance of this point. Let us leave aside the fact that
the discrete formal index can only approximate the continuous nature of meaning
and suppose that forms can reliably represent meaning structures. The collocation
mentioned above would then be an accurate index of a semantic association.
However, what does it ‘mean’ that two semantic structures are strongly associated
in a language? Hypothetically, if the lexeme sunny and the lexeme day co-occur
significantly more often than by chance and if these two lexemes are monosemous
and therefore an accurate index of the association of these concept ‘sun’ and ‘day’,
we still must interpret this result. In other words, what does this association tell us
about the object of study, that is the novel, the author, the lexicon or language. This
final and essential step is necessarily subjective.

If we accept that the structuring forces in language are non-observable, and
that this is true for all language, from poems to syntactic patterns, we must
ultimately interpret any results in subjective terms. The problem is not one of
terminology. Whether we call the data observable or non-observable or the analysis
subjective or objective, in language research, regardless of the discipline, we must
confront the simple fact that we will never fully explain the phenomenon without
some degree of personal interpretation. The lesson is that we should not dismiss
analytical subjectivity, but strive to develop methods of analysis that permit
repeatability and the possibility for the falsification of results, regardless of the
subjectivity of those analyses.

3.5 Quantitative vs. qualitative
There is much talk about qualitative and quantitative analysis in the social and
human sciences. These debates are fundamental to what constitutes our
understanding of the world as well as how ‘true’ that understanding is. Great
themes in contemporary thought, from Empiricism and Hermeneutics to
Behaviourism, are all involved in answering these fundamental questions. Yet for
the language scientist and literary scholar, when choosing a method of analysis or
judging the reliability of the results of a study performed using one method or
another, what are the concrete concerns that should be considered?

Before we consider the strengths and weaknesses of these two approaches,
let us briefly define them. Quantitative research can be understood as any analysis
which seeks to measure or count observable phenomena. It is an attempt to
describe such phenomena in measurable or numerable quantities. In contrast,
qualitative research is concerned with observer impressions, based on close and
detailed analysis of the object of study. If we accept these definitions, we can argue
that quantitative research foregrounds objectivity, large samples, a small number of
types and is more easily amenable to frequency based-studies where qualitative
research foregrounds subjective analysis, small samples, a large number of types,
and is more amenable to salience-based studies. Each approach has its strengths
and weaknesses. We will consider each in turn.

The question of sample size in quite straightforward. Although a sample,
which is proportionally large relative to the size of the population, is an undeniable
advantage in inductive research, this can be offset by the detail of the analysis. Arguably, the main advantage of quantitative research is the relatively large sample size. However, in its use of large samples, quantitative research may include a less detailed analysis, that is, a more superficial treatment of the data. This means that although a claim made in quantitative research may be more reliable in terms of representativity (due to sample size), it may be less reliable in terms of accuracy (due to superficial analysis). Of course, both quantitative and qualitative research seek to minimise their weaknesses and maximises their strengths making this difference far from categorical. Nevertheless, the trade off between the fine-grained analysis of small samples and the coarse-grained analysis of large samples is unavoidable and the tendency for each approach towards one or the other is natural.

In order to understand the role of the ratio between types and tokens in the two approaches, we need to return to the notions representativity and accuracy. Since samples tend to be smaller in qualitative analysis, the type token ratio tends toward more types relative to the number of tokens. Given this fact, the question of representativity versus accuracy for the two approaches reverses. Given that quantitative studies tend to have more tokens for less types, the accuracy of the analysis increases but the representativity may decrease. In contrast, the small number of tokens in qualitative analysis means it tends to say less about more different things, increasing representativity through a broader spectrum of analysis, but with less detail for each type under analysis.

In terms of subjectivity and objectivity, one might assume the correlation to be obvious since the terms are sometimes used interchangeably. Although it is evident that qualitative analysis is characterised by subjective analysis and quantitative by objective, two caveats need to be borne in mind. Firstly, since our object of study resides in the mind of the speaker, intuition can be argued to be the most direct method of analysing the data. Given our definitions of objective and subjective, this would, in fact, render intuitive analysis more objective. However, if we are concerned with text-based data, this point is only relevant to the extent that hearer (reader) intuitions can be employed in this manner. Secondly, assuming that meaning is our objective of study, we must also assume that its nature is continuous, that semiotic objects are not discrete in nature. Although the measurement of continuous phenomena is non-problematic in quantitative research, again given that we are here concerned with text-based research, such measurements are not possible. This means that for the most part, quantitative research will be based on discrete categorisation of continuous objects, further distancing the analysis from the object and arguably rendering it less objective. Although there is no dispute that quantitative research is typically more objective, these two points serve to demonstrate that the relationship is far from one-to-one.

Finally we can consider quantitative and qualitative research with regards to the question of frequency-based analysis and prominence-based analysis. Although it was stated above that quantitative methods are more amenable to frequency and qualitative methods to prominence, this is only true of text-based research.
Experimental research in linguistics is typically concerned with prominence where it is highly quantified. Moreover, frequency inarguably plays a role in qualitative approaches to conversation analysis and literary criticism, usually (though not necessarily) under the guise of repetition. These exceptions aside, for text-based research, quantification is most typically based on frequency and qualitative evaluation in terms of prominence.

Clearly both approaches have their strengths and weaknesses. Quantification has the benefits awarded by the use of statistics including the calculation of significance to determine the probability that observed differences in a sample are representative. Moreover, for many research questions, the use of multivariate statistics means that complex patterns can be identified, patterns that would be difficult to identify qualitatively. Similarly, modelling permits the calculation of relative effect size, or the relative importance of certain characteristics of a pattern. The same models can be used to determine the predictive power of the patterns identified, in effect, testing their accuracy by how well they can predict natural language production. However, despite the analytical and descriptive value of quantification, it is not appropriate for all kinds of data or all research questions.

Qualitative research’s strength lies in the fact that it can be applied to small samples but also, importantly, in its potential for close and detailed analysis. The detailed nature of analysis and sample size are often linked. In literature, the close reading of a poem, for example, is a small sample, but it is not feasible to perform the close reading of 120 poems and include the results in a single analysis. Obviously, such research requires qualitative analysis. However, the same is true in much field linguistics where data are obtained through conversations with speakers who are sometimes the last remaining speakers of their language or who live in remote regions. Again here, large samples are obviously not possible for simple practical reasons.

However, sample size is not the most important reason for qualitative analysis. Human language is extremely subtle and the most delicate nuance can change entirely the intent of a given utterance. In such situations, quantification becomes extremely difficult. Even if the operationalisation of subtle phenomena is possible, practical constraints on the quantification of such phenomena are inhibitive. Moreover, any quantified approach to such phenomena must be manual and therefore highly subjective. In such situations, the line between quantitative and qualitative blurs. In Cognitive Linguistics, usage-feature analysis or the profile-based approach (Dirven et al. 1982, Geeraerts et al. 1994, Gries 2003, 2006, Divjak 2006, Divjak & Gries 2009, Glynn 2009, 2010, 2014a) and in computational linguistics, sentiment analysis (Wiebe et al. 2005; Verdonik et al. 2007; Daille et al. 2011; Balahur & Montoyo 2012; Taboada & Carretero 2012) are two related methodologies that seek to bring together the approaches. Glynn (2014b) offers a discussion on these possibilities. The current volume does not seek to combine quantitative and qualitative research, but showcase how the two approaches complement each other.
Notes
2. L’installation de la « subjectivité » dans le langage crée, dans le langage et, croyons-nous, hors du langage aussi bien, la catégorie de la personne (p. 263). Il est marqué si profondément par l'expression de la subjectivité qu'on se demande si, autrement construit, il pourrait encore fonctionner et s'appeler langage. (p. 261). Le langage est ainsi organisé qu'il permet à chaque locuteur de l'appropreir la langue entière en se désignant comme je. (p. 262), (translated by the author).
3. La conscience de soi n'est possible que si elle s'éprouve par contraste. Je n'emploie je qu'en m'adressant à quelqu'un, qui sera dans mon allocution un tu. C'est cette condition de dialogue qui est constitutive de la personne [...] (p. 260), (translated by the author).
4. Examples (2a) – (2d) are taken from the LiveJournal corpus (Speelman & Glynn 2005).

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A word for wildness
Nature’s stance in Thomas Hardy’s Wessex

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Abstract
Thomas Hardy’s Wessex provides an example of an urbanatural environment in which ‘wildness’ can be conceived as both a property and a process of nature. In Wessex, nature operates with an intentional stance of ‘wilding’ as a means of reordering circumstance and facilitating change. It is this multi-leveled process of reordering which accounts for the dynamic mutability of the Wessex environments. Nature’s stance of wildness is particularly firm in the wilderness of Egdon Heath in The Return of the Native. Wildness, however, is not a phenomenon confined to the wildernesses of the world, but is a universal trait and a practice shared by all species.

1. Introduction

In the fictional world of Thomas Hardy’s Wessex, narrative is steeped in nature. Unlike other fictional worlds in which nature figures as an object – as a resource and/or background upon which human discourse unfolds – Hardy’s nature often assumes the role of a character, the quiddity of which is untamable and unpredictable. Nature is woven into Hardy’s writing as an element often indispensable to the narrative due to its faculty for agency. Like any other character, nature initiates action that can alter the course of events in the development of plot. It interferes with the aims and designs of human characters, and the consequences of its interference can create pivotal changes in the story. Nature has the potential to maim and kill, but also the power to heal and let flourish. On a smaller scale, interventions of nature in the human sphere can alter the tone of the text in order to aggravate or alleviate the situation. While some acts of nature may parallel the situation of human characters in a way that enhances or amplifies the state of affairs, other enterprises of the natural world contrast with those of the human, creating tension out of the dissonance.

The various discourses of human characters may be both elevated and degraded by the discourses of nature. This would suggest that the nature of Thomas Hardy’s Wessex has its own agenda, an agenda that is independent of those of human characters. In Wessex, nature’s stance is one of wildness. When viewed in
instances of discordance between the agendas of human and non-human subjects, wildness in nature is often understood as being synonymous with ‘decultivation.’ However, considering that all species – both human and non-human – are products of nature, human characters can also achieve and produce wildness. Therefore, nature’s stance may also be seen in instances of concordance with those of human characters, when the aforesaid are also acting with wild agendas.

This chapter investigates the nature of Wessex and its stance of wildness in *The Return of the Native* (1878), as well as in a selection of other Wessex novels by Thomas Hardy, such as *The Woodlanders* (1887), *Far from the Madding Crowd* (1874), *Under the Greenwood Tree* (1872), and *Tess of the d’Urbervilles* (1891). The nature of Wessex, especially that of the environmental wilderness Egdon Heath in *The Return of the Native*, not only is wild, but it makes wild, demonstrating that wildness can be conceived as both property and process. Wildness, however, is not a phenomenon exclusive to the wilderness; it can be found in all living things, including humanity. Recording processes of wildness in places other than wildernesses helps to confirm the presence of the integration of nature and culture in mixed environmental spheres.

2. **Defining wildness**

Wildness is typically regarded as a property of nature, as the state of being undomesticated, unpredictable, and free. As Snyder (2010: 9) has observed, “*wild* is largely defined in our dictionaries by what – from a human standpoint – it is not.” Therefore, while culture is equivalent to cultivation, the civilized, and tame, wildness is typically to be found in nature and represents the uncultivated, uncivilized and untamed.\(^1\) The polarization of the properties of “cultivated” and “wild” intimates the degree to which their referents – culture and nature – have been theoretically separated. Nature has been understood as the antithesis of culture in that it is comprised of all elements nonhuman – the flora, fauna, and physical elements of the real world; ipso facto culture is that which is of human derivation. This definition of nature and culture contrives a kind of species segregation in which humanity, and all that it produces, is divorced from nature and hence potentially “unnatural.” As a result the human and nonhuman may figure as rivals for pre-eminence in the real and fictional worlds, a rivalry which in turn creates a multitudinous variety of the “man-versus-nature” conflict. Situating nature as something outside of humanity not only “skews environmental awareness and priorities in ways that blind us to the devastating ecological impact of our own everyday lives” but also hinders the development of realistic solutions to environmental problems (Hess 2010: 85). Indeed, the term *wild* has grown out of this segregation to connote a characteristic of the nonhuman, one to be contrasted to the characteristics of the human. The definition of *wild*, as that which is the opposite of the human, is the ultimate removal of humanity from nature. Environments have also been categorically divided according to their supposed
human and nonhuman properties, thus resulting in the nonhuman wilderness – “a place where the wild potential is fully expressed” (Snyder 2010: 12) and its human counterpart, the urban.

Rather than continue in this tradition, the facilitation of greater ecological awareness in the field of ecocriticism calls for the rapprochement of culture and nature in a way that accounts for the inevitable entwinement of the two in integrated spaces. This often entails a process of redefinition, and therein reclamation, of terminology once infused with a discourse of antithesis. In one such attempt to reconcile culture and nature Ashton Nichols coins the term urbanature as a means to break down categorical barriers between natural and built environments. Urbanature assumes that culture and nature are not estranged as separate entities doomed to opposite corners of the hypothetical room, but permeate each other. Even in the most urban spaces, there are birds nesting in the eaves of buildings and grass pushing through cracks in the pavement. Simultaneously, countless nature enthusiasts travel by plane, train, and automobile, fully equipped with the latest technologically savvy gear of Gore-Tex and GPS, to saturate the spheres of wildernesses. Nichols writes,

Crucial to urbanature is the idea that human beings are never cut off from wild nature by human culture. This is the central truth of all ecology. Nothing I can do can take me out of nature. There is nowhere for me to go. I am a natural being from the moment I am born (biologically) until the moment I die (organically). Instead of describing the nonhuman world anthropocentrically – in human terms – there are now good reasons to describe the whole world ecocentrically [eco-: oikos, house]. Nichols (2010: xv)

This inclusive view of environment would assume that the pre-industrial rural worlds of Thomas Hardy are saturated with cultural elements, and likewise that the urban is imbued with the natural. Thus, as a property, wildness is no longer restricted to the wildernesses of nature, but can be found everywhere: in the “inerradical populations of fungi, moss, mould, yeasts, and such that surround and inhabit us” (Snyder (2010: 14) and also in the very nature of humanity itself. ²

To conceive of wildness as a property of nature does not make it exclusive to the nonhuman. Cookson (2011: 187) writes that “humans are animals and therefore already ‘natural,’ suggesting no special distinction from wild things.” The simple fact that the human body is an organic, biological entity ensures that humanity cannot be separated from nature, nor from the potential of wildness. Snyder (2010: 17) calls attention to the fundamental and animalistic reactions of the human physical body: “the involuntary quick turn of the head at a shout, the vertigo at looking off a precipice, the heart-in-the-throat in a moment of danger, the catch of the breath, the quiet moments relaxing, staring, reflecting – all universal responses of this mammal body” (Snyder 2010: 17). Even the mind is characteristically wild in its daily operations, as “thoughts, memories, images, angers, delights, rise unbidden” often in a way that is completely uncontrollable (Snyder 2010: 17). The
theoretical reconciliation of nature and culture dictates that man is “an inhabitant, or a part and parcel of Nature” and therefore anything but removed therefrom (Thoreau 1937: 659). So long as humanity is understood as an extension of nature, it too inherits the potential for wildness.

When expounding a definition of wildness, it becomes clear that the term not only signifies a property, but also a process. In his definition, Cookson (2011: 187) describes wildness as a system which generates wild things. He defines wildness as “a quality of interactive processing between an organism and its surroundings in which the realities of base natures are met, allowing the construction of durable systems.” Here, wildness becomes something that is done: it is an action that is performed, and possibly even a type of behaviour.

Similarly, Snyder (2000) defines wildness as nature’s dominant characteristic and also the primary manner by which it operates:

‘Wild’ alludes to a process of self-organization that generates systems and organisms, all of which are within the constraints of – and constitute components of – larger systems that again are wild, such as major ecosystems or the water cycle in the biosphere. Wildness can be said to be the essential nature of nature. Snyder (2000: 127)

The use of the term “process” further emphasizes the notion that wildness is an ongoing and regular operation. To conceive of wildness as a process it may be helpful to understand it as an action performed by nature, namely as a verb. Nichols’ (2011: 45) reading of Thoreau’s definition of wildness in “Walking” calls attention to the use of “wild” as a verb in that Thoreau advocates that people can wild both their external and internal realities. Similar to wilding a physical landscape, the wilding of a mind is to simply let it “go to grass”, with the awareness that “you have eaten hay long enough” (Thoreau 1937: 681). Here the conception of wild is no longer only a property attributed to an object in nature, but an action which nature performs, and one in which humans may, and should, partake for the sake of their own welfare. For Thoreau it is in this act of making wild that the preservation of the world is to be found. 3

The process of wildness and nature’s potential for making wild is not always seen in such a positive light as conceived by Thoreau. In his book Second Nature: A Gardener’s Education, gardener Pollan (1991) frequently depicts nature as an active agent that regularly assaults human-made stability in its preference for making wild. He often describes the construction and maintenance of his garden in New England as a personal struggle against nature’s many energetic and voracious forces:

The woodchuck was no free-agent pest, snacking strictly on his own account. He was part of a larger, more insidious threat: he labored on behalf of the advancing forest. Not only the animals, but the insects, the weeds, even the fungi and bacteria, were working together to erase my garden – and after that
my lawn, my driveway, my patio, even my house. [...] So don’t lecture me about harmony in the garden. Or about the continuity of gardens and natural landscapes. The forest is so vigorous around here, and so well served by its advance guard of animals and bugs and weeds, that a single season of neglect would blast my garden back to meadow. Pollan (1991: 46-8)

Pollan’s perspective as a gardener deflates romanticized ideals about the harmonious interactions of the ecosystem by showing instead that nature has the ability to ‘wild’ his garden, to actively riot and revolutionize it as soon as its caretaker turns his back. From the subjective perspective of a single observer the process of wilding creates “an ordering of impermanence” (Snyder 2010: 5). Considering that collective systems of wildness ensure that nature is in a constant state of upheaval and renewal, it should be mentioned that the notion of stability in nature becomes an impossible fiction. What is more, Pollan suggests that nature not only actively ‘wilds’ landscape, but has a clear intention of doing so.

Wildness is a product of nature; thus, nature’s prerogative is to operate by the process of wildness with the intentional stance of ‘wilding.’ Having a stance of wildness means that nature seeks to alter for alteration’s sake, to recalibrate set conditions free from concerns for outcome or consequence. This does not mean that nature is an agent devoid of volition, but as a wild entity its volition is to make wild. This definition of wildness is not necessarily synonymous with decultivation, though this was certainly the case with Pollan’s garden. Nature strives to make wild – to stimulate the stagnant, impregnate the barren, and reorder the ordered. Even more, nature’s wild impetus can also sometimes stimulate an environment in such a way that begets order.

I would like to emphasize the use of the term reorder as opposed to disorder in conjunction with the process of wildness in nature. To reorder entails a repetition of the act of ordering, to order again and in a different way, while to disorder involves a reversal or negation of order which may invoke pejorative connotations of the word. Disorder also bears the subjective value of one particular party involved and is dependent upon their relative perspective or stance in the matter. To claim that “to make wild is to disorder the ordered” would be to imply that processes of wildness consistently yield negative results for all parties. Humanity may regard a storm as disorder created by wild nature due to the negative effects it may entail specifically for humanity, such as traffic accidents, loss of electricity, and damaged housing. Yet the same storm can generate positive effects for other species involved in the ecology, thus creating order and stability. It is therefore that I choose to use reorder as a means to maintain an objective and neutral standpoint.
3. Wildness in Wessex

In Wessex nature’s stance of wildness can be observed in its consistent revolutionary drive towards change and contingency with little or no regard to the outcome. Similar to a dealer shuffling a deck of cards, nature in Wessex endeavours to rearrange circumstance – to reorder the ordered, to ‘unpredict’ the predictable. The total summation of all various systems of organization by which individual species operate often yields a pattern too complex to understand from any given single standpoint. It is precisely this animated complexity – the collective processes of wilding – that is the essence of Hardy’s nature; it makes for a vigorous dynamic of relations between species which is forever shifting.

This immutable force of wildness and contingency permeates the writing of Hardy as a quality inherent in nature which man must accept. Natural entities and the forces they exert are abundant in Wessex. There humanity is anything but estranged from nature; instead, nature and culture are enmeshed in a way that attests to the integration of both in a holistic environment of urbanature. The very homes of the residents of Wessex are urbanatural conglomerations of elements both natural and built, showing that the line between culture and nature is blurred. In the wooded lands of Little Hintock, “dangling and etiolated arms of ivy” weave and creep between the tiles of the roofs, “pushing in with such a force at the eaves as to lift from their supports the shelves that were fixed there” (The Woodlanders Chapter 4, 24). Considering the situation of Hintock House as “prejudicial to humanity”, it is instead described as “a stimulus to vegetation” and even “vegetable nature’s own home” (Chapter 8, 53). Similarly, in Upper Mellstock the tranter’s cottage is “covered with creepers” and surrounded by “thick bushes of box and laurestinus [sic] growing in clumps outside” (Under the Greenwood Tree, Chapter 2, 7). Pigeons are to be found roosting in lofts at Blooms-End (The Return of the Native, Book 2, Chapter 2, 112) and at Weatherbury farm “soft brown mosses, like faded velveteen, formed cushions upon the stone tiling, and tufts of the houseleek or sengreen sprouted from the eaves of the lower surrounding buildings” (Far From the Madding Crowd, Chapter 9, 74). Elements of nature encroach upon the cultural in a lively sort of activity (dangling, pushing, growing, roosting and sprouting) that changes the overall integrity of homes. Nature is woven into the everyday lives of human characters as an integral part of their very existence, and it is portrayed as an energetic force inducing changes which wild the stagnancy of built environments.

In this urbanatural environment human residents are never cut off from nature, but share a common space occupied by a multitude of other denizens of the natural world. Whether at the height of spring or the dead of winter, the presence of nonhuman species in Wessex is ubiquitous and ever-changing. The perpetual movement provided by nature yields a continual ordering and reordering of impermanence in the environments. In this way, nature can be said to wild environment. In springtime nature is replete with action:
Another year’s installment of flowers, leaves, nightingales, thrushes, finches, and such ephemeral creatures, took up their positions where only a year ago others had stood in their place when these were nothing more than germs and inorganic particles. Rays from the sunshine drew forth the buds and stretched them into long stalks, lifted up sap in noiseless streams, opened petals, and sucked out scents in invisible jets and breathings. \(\text{Tess of the d’Urbervilles, Chapter 20, 113}\)

Nature is renewed every spring and practically bursting with changing enterprise, the rich descriptions of which are almost overwhelming in their variety. Spring is depicted as a vigorous and “teeming time,” rife with “flossy catkins of the later kinds, fern-sprouts like bishops croziers, the square-headed moschatel [sic], the odd cuckoo-pint… snow-white ladies’-smocks, the toothwort, approximating to human flesh, the enchanter’s night-shade, and the black-petaled doleful-bells” \(\text{Far From the Madding Crowd, Chapter 22, 152-153}\). It is a time when “there was everywhere around that sign of great undertakings on the part of vegetable nature,” where the senses are overrun due to the fact that “the rush of sap in the veins of trees could almost be heard” \(\text{The Woodlanders, Chapter 19, 121}\). Spring is a season in which the wild rush of change is made palpable to the senses.

Similarly, the summer brings more variety of species’ action that even the merciless heat of the sun cannot still. In the summer “the intermittent husky notes of the male grasshoppers” call attention to the fact that “amid the prostration of the larger animal species an unseen insect world was busy in all the fullness of life” \(\text{The Return of the Native, Book 4, Chapter 6, 295}\). Butterflies and bees are pollinating the flowers while colonies of ants “toiled a never-ending and heavy-laden throng” \(\text{Book 4, Chapters 2 and 6, 258 and 295}\). As the bright brilliance of summer fades into the golden plenty of the fall, the work performed in the spring and summer yields its reward. Autumn in White-Hart Vale is described as “prodigally bountiful,” with its “orchards lustrous with the reds of apple-crops, berries and foliage;” even “in the poorest spots the hedges were bowed with haws and blackberries; acorns cracked underfoot, and the burst husks of chestnuts lay exposing their auburn contents” \(\text{The Woodlanders, Chapter 28, 184}\). From spring to autumn nature is constantly changing in its labour and make-up. The same can also be said about the cold season of winter, which is no less abundant with wildlife and movement:

At the passing of the breeze the fir-trees sob and moan no less distinctly than they rock; the holly whistles as it battles with itself; the ash hisses amid its quiverings; the beech rustles while its flat boughs rise and fall. And winter, which modifies the note of such trees as shed their leaves, does not destroy its individuality. \(\text{Under the Greenwood Tree, Chapter 1, 3}\)

In this passage the nature of winter is full of sound, showing that regardless of the change of season nature does not lose its voice but only changes its tone. During
the winter months in the Hintock woodlands, squirrels and birds still travel “noiselessly over mats of starry moss, rustled through interspersed tracts of leaves, skirted trunks with spreading roots whose mossed rinds made them like hands wearing green gloves” (The Woodlanders, Chapter 7, 48). Even on the solitary hills of Egdon Heath the presence of migrating birds is made known, in that “several keen round eyes were always ready on such a wintry morning as this to converge upon a passer-by” (The Return of the Native, Book 1, Chapter 10, 86). Season by season Wessex proves to be a dynamic environment of constantly shifting sands awash with life. Nature is perpetually present, assuring humanity of its integrated status in the natural world, and as such it is alive and energetic in its propensity to change according to individual species’ processes of reordering throughout the seasons.

Change in nature is always imminent, and while it may tread on steadily throughout the progression of seasons, it may also come on abruptly in a sudden smack of force. Such is undoubtedly the case when change is induced by capricious fluctuations in weather. As a literary device not uncommon in Hardy’s work, storms illustrate nature’s prerogative to reorder through a more violent form of upheaval, often as a form of decultivation. In Wessex the incident of a storm is an act of wildness, for it is a time when “every voice in nature [is] unanimous in bespeaking change” (Far from the Madding Crowd, Chapter 36, 260). Storms can be devastating for nonhuman species, causing “amputations, bruises, cripplings, and harsh lacerations, from which the wasting sap would bleed for many a day to come”, to the beech trees planted on Egdon Heath (The Return of the Native, Book 3, Chapter 6, 214). Just like the rest of natural species, humanity is subject to the various processes by which the complex natural world organizes itself, and thus also victims to the whims of “Crass Casualty” (Hardy (1993[1898]: 1694). In the human realm storms provide pivotal moments in the plot that can also result in grave consequences and loss. In Far from the Madding Crowd the coming of a great storm threatens the very livelihood of Weatherbury farm as 750 pounds worth of newly harvested wheat and barley is left to stand outside, vulnerable to the wind and rain (Chapter 36, 261). Wessex storms also have the potency to bring about the violent deaths of human characters, such as the case with Giles Winterbourne in The Woodlanders (Chapters 41-43) and Eustacia Vye and Damon Wildeve in The Return of the Native (Book 5, Chapter 9). Regardless of the outcomes, storms in Wessex are game changers with the wildest sorts of objectives. Storms serve as a means to riotously wild the urbanatural environment of Wessex, shaking both humanity and nonhumanity out of a stagnant stupor.

The multifarious array of species and the ever-changing, dynamic activity present in Wessex call attention to the complexity of all processes of organizations by which each individual species operates. Everything and everyone acts from its unique perspective and desire to reorder. It is when these actions are united in a conglomerate whole that an overall sense of wildness to the world is conveyed. Similar to the sound produced by the mummified heath-bells on Bonfire Night, a sound which causes the hearer to envisage “the infinity of those combined
multitudes; and perceive[e] that each of the tiny trumpets was seized on, entered, scoured and emerged from by the wind”, wildness becomes species action amassed in a collective chorus to produce cacophony, or “this wild rhetoric of night” (*The Return of the Native*, Book 1, Chapter 6, 51-2). It is thus that wildness is often revealed in the action of zooming in and out from individual perspectives to the collective – in viewing the enterprises of separate species in an orchestrated composition of the urbanature as a whole.

On all levels the very temperament of nature is bent on change. Whether by means gradual and predictable like the progression of the seasons or by those swift and unpredictable as the onset of a storm, the nature of Wessex is constantly reordering, which calls attention to the fact that the nature’s main purport in Wessex is a process of wildness. Though the nature of Wessex may be united under a common stance of wilding, the degree to which it wilds varies from environment to environment. In an environment such as Egdon Heath, humanity fails to instill manmade order; instead it is nature, and its wild agenda, which has the upper hand.

4. **Wildness in the wilderness: An analysis of Egdon Heath**

Being one of the most extreme environments in Wessex, Egdon Heath in *The Return of the Native* is closely related to a wilderness. Even so, it is not a virgin landscape uninhabited by man, but like all Wessex environments it is comprised of both cultural and natural elements and therefore can also be categorized as an urbanature. Homes and houses populate the area, and the existence of other manmade features – such as Rainbarrow, Shadwater Weir, and the long stretching highway spanning its lower levels – provide evidence of cultural influence on the heath, albeit arguably a weak one. Cultural elements present on Egdon are sparsely scattered amidst vast reserves of nature; those that do survive the wildness of the heath are “themselves almost crystallized to natural products by long continuance” (Book 1, Chapter 1, 6). Humanity resides on the heath, but represents a small facet of the entire population and generally is a rare species seldom seen. Here “any man could imagine himself to be Adam without the least difficulty, they attracted the attention of every bird within eyeshot, every reptile not yet asleep, and set the surrounding rabbits curiously watching from hillocks at a safe distance” (Book 2, Chapter 1, 107). Egdon Heath constitutes a sort of urbanatural wilderness: mankind and culture endure on the heath, but humanity cannot claim mastery over the environment. The presence of humanity in a wilderness such as Egdon Heath shows that wildness does not assume the exclusion of humanity.

Egdon Heath’s status as a wilderness is in great part due to a lack of successful agricultural enterprise. Egdon is a landscape largely uncultivated, and therefore wild in the traditional sense that the land in itself is not cultured. “Not a plough had ever disturbed a grain of that stubborn soil”, for the very soil is untillable (Book 1, Chapter 3, 14). Instead of crops, grasses, and gardens, the
principal product of the heath is furze, a bushy evergreen shrub that typically grows generously on waste lands.\(^6\) Time and again, human efforts to develop agriculture and refine the nature there prove fruitless, for “attempts at reclamation from waste, tillage, after holding out for a year or two, [recede] again in despair, the ferns and furze-tufts stubbornly reasserting themselves” (Book 3, Chapter 2, 178). Farming on Egdon Heath is impossible, and instead, the primary means of survival on the heath is to be found in furze-cutting for the production of faggots, an occupation for which human residents accept the role of gatherers.

Without agriculture humanity is bereft of the ability, and the authority, to reorder and shape their environment. Robinson (1999: 17) writes that “the farm is in many ways an entity based on order and control, dedicated to the use of the land for ends decided by the farmer, usually economic ends. The farm, that is, can be seen as the first step in the denial of the wild.” Unimpeded by the yoke of agriculture, an intensity of wildness of the nature in Egdon Heath is maintained. As if master of its own design, the nature of Egdon Heath is resilient to the cultivation impinged upon it: “civilization was its enemy; and ever since the beginning of vegetation its soil had worn the same antique brown dress, the natural and invariable garment of the particular formation” (Book 1, Chapter 1, 5-6). It is precisely this characteristic that makes Egdon Heath unstable in relation to mankind and therefore wild – its rejection of manmade order frees environment from human expectation and constraint. In turn, by taking charge of its own form and fate, the natural enterprises of Egdon Heath’s environment become increasingly unpredictable from a human perspective.

The constitution of Egdon Heath’s nature is by and large resistant to cultural influences instituted by humanity, and thwarts human domination with a tenacity of spirit. But Egdon is more than just resistant to humanity, and additionally shows a great reluctance to be dictated to by other pressures not of its own devising. Egdon’s wildness lies partly in its obstinacy of “ancient permanence” (Book 1, Chapter 1, 6) – in its constant resistance to being acted upon as an object by external forces. This does not mean that Egdon Heath is a stagnant environment that does not change, but rather that change is facilitated by its own agency in accordance with its own natural processes of organization. Rather than be influenced, Egdon Heath instead exerts its influence on others in a way that reorders circumstance according to its own stance of wildness.

Firstly, the nature of the heath does not allow for a conventional temporal order and is, on the whole, resistant to the absolute telling and the passing of time. The telling of the time of day on Egdon is rendered difficult in that “the face of the heath by its mere complexion added half an hour to evening” for “the spot was, indeed, a near relation of night” (Book 1, Chapter 1, 3). This obscurity of time helps to contribute to an overall sense of the heath’s unpredictability. Time on Egdon Heath deviates from the norm, which is perhaps why humanity does not succeed in establishing a uniform standard: “On Egdon there was no absolute hour of the day. The time at any moment was a number of varying doctrines professed by the different hamlets... West Egdon believed in Booms-End time, East Egdon
in the time of the Quiet Woman Inn” (Book 2, Chapter 5, 132). If time cannot be
told, proving its actual passing becomes problematic. The actual changes wrought
by the passing of time are relatively insignificant, which lends Egdon Heath an
element of timelessness, and even more, the potential for infinite continuity. This
point is heavily emphasized in the first chapter of the first book titled “A Face on
Which Time Makes But Little Impression” in which it is stated that “the sea
changed, the fields changed, the rivers, the villages, and the people changed, yet
Egdon remained” (Book 1, Chapter 1, 6). Egdon Heath is a temporal anomaly in
which the flow of time is erratic; “the untameable Ishmaelitish thing that Egdon
now was it always had been” (Book 1, Chapter 1, 5) with a nature reminiscent of
“the ancient world of the carboniferous period, when the forms of plants were few,
and the fern kind; when there was neither bud nor blossom, nothing but a
monotonous extent of leafage, amid which no bird sang” (Book 3, Chapter 5, 210).
Time is elusive on Egdon, and in terms of organization is not a standard upon
which humanity can rely.

In its resistance to time, the nature of Egdon refuses to be acted upon as an
object. Instead, nature itself seems to have a great deal of power in directing the
flow of time. This is best demonstrated by active voiced sentences which ascribe
agency to the nature of the heath in relation to time’s progression. When night
approaches, it is not the falling of twilight that embrows the heath but “Egdon
Heath embrown[s] itself moment by moment” (Book 1, Chapter 1, 3). Similarly the
natural constitution of the heath has the power to “retard the dawn, sadden noon…
and intensify the opacity of a moonless midnight” (Book 1, Chapter 1, 3). It is the
heath that is credited with agency for inspiring temporal transitions, not the force of
time itself, suggesting that time is partially controlled by environment. Egdon
Heath is not a land to be broken by any rules imposed upon it; it conducts itself
according to its own agenda.

Similar to the defiance of time, the geographical make-up of the heath
proves resilient to climactic forces: “Those surfaces were neither so steep as to be
destructible by weather, nor so flat as to be the victims of floods and deposits”
(Book 1, Chapter 1, 6). Weather is one such force which seems to accord with the
wild agenda of the heath. The heath takes charge of the weather and recruits it to its
cause of making wild, for “the storm was its lover, and the wind its friend” (Book
1, Chapter 1, 5). Egdon has a decided penchant for storms because they offer great
potential to wild environment; it is by means of wild weather that nature has the
opportunity to reorder itself as it sees fit. The hardy nature indigenous to the heath
is not victimized by forces of weather, and for these species storms are of little
consequence. But trees foreign to Egdon become “splintered, looped [sic], and
distorted by the fierce weather that there held them at its mercy whenever it
prevailed” (Book 4, Chapter 5, 284) as if the agenda of nature intends to have them
uprooted. The same storm that wrenches the roots of tree stems “like a bone in its
socket” assumes an almost playful demeanour with species indigenous to the
environment, with winds that “merely waved the furze and heather in a light caress.
Egdon was made for such times as these!” (Book 3, Chapter 6, 215). Weather is
nature’s tool for routing species alien to the natural environment of Egdon Heath; in this, storms become the crucible which tests species’ fitness and ability to survive the intended wildness of the landscape.

Nothing seems to have a great impact on the natural make-up and longevity of the heath. Egdon Heath is not objectified in relation to the forces of weather and time, but is able to maintain its agency and its stance. Even humanity does not attain mastery over the environment by the installation of cultural order, or by overwhelming nature by sheer numbers. In *The Return of the Native* humanity does not succeed in cultivating nature; nature instead manages to wild humanity.

5. **The Human potential for wildness on Egdon Heath**

In his definition of wildness, Cookson (2011: 188) writes that “the internal effect of wildness is that it draws upon base natures, instincts, and desires. Using wildness or going wild lets one do, or try to do, whatever one wants.” In *The Return of the Native* it is not uncommon for characters to lose themselves to the wildness surrounding them in nature. Eustacia Vye, foreigner to Egdon Heath, is one such character easily swayed to wildness. Though usually a ponderous person, Eustacia is inclined to sudden “passing freak[s]” during which “she would make a dash which, just for the time, was not unlike the move of a natural lively person” (Book 2, Chapter 4, 128). Eustacia’s chief characteristic which opens her up to wildness is her potential for passionate emotion. Her situation is isolated and lonely, and to remedy this she desires nothing more than “to be loved to madness” (Book 1, Chapter 7, 66). Her emotion, often triggered by scenes in nature, is the gateway to her reckless abandonment of reason. Against her better judgment, Eustacia gives way to her fierce jealousy of Wildeve’s courtship of Thomasin Yeobright, and in a capricious act of wildness she summons her former lover to her on Bonfire Night. Overcome with feeling, Eustacia lends her voice to nature’s wildness out on the dark heath:

Suddenly, on the barrow, there mingled with all this wild rhetoric of night a sound which modulated so naturally with the rest that its beginning and ending were hardly to be distinguished. The bluffs, and the bushes, and the heather-bells had broken silence; at last, so did the woman; and her articulation was but as another phrase of the same discourse as theirs. Thrown out on the winds it became twined in with them, and it flew away. What she had uttered was a lengthened sighing, apparently at something in her mind which had led to her presence here. There was a spasmodic abandonment about it as if, in allowing herself to utter the sound, the woman’s brain had authorized what it could not regulate. One point was evident in this; that she had been existing in a suppressed state. (Book 1, Chapter 6, 52)

Here Eustacia is put in a context of similarity with her nonhuman peers; her wildness is no different from theirs, and it is out on the open hills that she can let it
out. Though she believes the heath to be the reason for her oppression, the nature of Egdon actually seems to be the agent which liberates her suppressed emotion, encouraging it to come forth in a rush of savagery. The nature of Egdon Heath helps to wild Eustacia’s emotions, indicating that humans too can have a propensity for wildness.

This becomes further apparent during the course of a country dance in Book 4, Chapter 3, in which the environment reveals its full powers of persuasion. The newly married Eustacia attends a village picnic event in an effort to battle depression, and there she is surprised to meet her former suitor Mr. Wildeve. The couple’s reunion is attended by “a round yellow moon” which enhances the “whole village-full of sensuous emotion” (Book 4 Chapter 3, 265), helping to rekindle the wild emotions in the dancing pair:

The pale ray of evening lent a fascination to the experience. There is a certain degree and tone of light which tends to disturb the equilibrium of sense, and to promote dangerously the tenderer moods: added to movement it drives the emotions to rankness, the reason becoming sleepy and unperceiving in inverse proportion; and this light fell now upon these two from the disc of the moon. All the dancing girls felt the symptoms; but Eustacia most of all. The grass under their feet became trodden away, and the hard-beaten surface of the sod, when viewed aslant towards the moonlight, shone like a polished table. The air became quite still; the flag above the wagon which held the musicians clung to the pole, and the players appeared only in outline against the sky… The pretty dresses of the maids lost their subtler day colours, and showed more or less of a misty white. (Book 4 Chapter 3, 267)

The moon powerfully transforms the scenery, blurring the reality of the situation into a hazy, milky-white dream. In doing this it lulls the dancers into a sort of trance, persuading them to abandon their reason and instead give way to an animalistic lust. The moon acts as a catalyst, wilding the more primal emotions of both Eustacia and Wildeve. Nature’s ability to wild characters shows humanity to be very much a part of the natural environment, just as other animals are, and contributes to the urbanatural quality of the Wessex environment as a whole.

Nature’s influence on humanity becomes paramount in the descriptions of Egdon Heath’s key representative of the population: the returning native Clym Yeobright. Egdon Heath presents itself as a force in Clym’s life that is unequivocally overpowering: “He was permeated with its scenes, with its substance, and with its odours. He might be said to be its product. His eyes had first opened thereon; with its appearance all the first images of his memory were mingled; his estimate of life had been coloured by it” (Book 3, Chapter 2, 177). Here the heath is directly invested with agency in that Clym’s very being is moulded by it. Clym’s connection to the heath runs deep, forming the basis of his identity: “[he] had been so inwoven with the heath in his boyhood that hardly anybody could look upon it without thinking of him” (Book 3, Chapter 1, 172). Yet Clym’s intimate relationship with the heath does not give him mastery of it, nor of
any other natural species. If anything, the heath causes Clym to understand the belief of man’s supremacy as false, as a delusion of grandeur painted by culture. Such moments of insight often come to Clym while he is out on the open hills: “As he watched, the dead flat of the scenery overpowered him… There was something in its oppressive horizontality which too much reminded him of the arena of life; it gave him a sense of bare equality with, and no superiority to, a single living thing under the sun” (Book 3, Chapter 5, 213). The wildness of Egdon Heath speaks to Clym, as if to disprove his belief in the separation of man from nature.

In returning to Egdon Heath, Clym Yeobright returns to his heart’s desire and to his basic nature. Clym’s homecoming to his beloved heath immerses him in its activity, giving him a sense of direction and easing his existential burdens. For him Egdon Heath is a great healer: “To my mind it is most exhilarating, and strengthening, and soothing. I would rather live on these hills than anywhere else in the world” (Book 3, Chapter 3, 191). Nature’s influence on Clym proves to be greater than that of his mother and his wife, who both seek to persuade him to return to his work in a more urban setting. Clym abandons his former aspirations of cultural greatness and resolves to remain on the heath with the goal of opening a school. When even these plans are thwarted by illness, Clym lets go of his will to order his future plans and throws himself into the work of furze-cutting. Surrendering his cultural identity – as Clym Yeobright the scholar and traveller – Clym joins the animalistic activity and movements of nature, opening himself to their influences. While working on the heath Clym complements his fellow creatures:

> His familiars were creeping and winged things, and they seemed to enroll him in their band. Bees hummed around his ears with an intimate air, and tugged at the heath and furze-flowers at his side in such numbers as to weigh them down to the sod. The strange amber-coloured butterflies which Egdon produced, and which were never seen elsewhere, quivered in the breath of his lips, alighted upon his bowed back, and sported with the glittering point of his hook as he flourished it up and down. Tribes of emerald-green grasshoppers leaped over his feet, falling awkwardly on their backs, heads, or hips, like unskilful acrobats, as chance might rule; or engaged themselves in noisy flirtations under the fern-fronds with silent ones of homely hue. Huge flies, ignorant of larders and wire-netting, and quite in a savage state, buzzed about him without knowing that he was a man. (Book 4 Chapter 2, 258)

Here man and nature blend their voices, intentions, and enterprises – touching, singing, flying, and working – showing that the two are, in fact, one and the same. Working on the heath beside his brethren insects, Clym becomes one with his surroundings and his base animal instincts; he almost melts into nature, diving into wildness as he sheds his thinking and planning human self. Correspondingly, he also seems to lose faith in the validity of culture and manmade meaning, as he explains to Eustacia that “If I feel that the greatest blessings vouchsafed to us are not very valuable, how can I feel it to be any great hardship when they are taken
away?" (Book 4, Chapter 2, 261). With no goal towards which to work and no meaning assigned to his life as a human being, Clym severs his tie to culture and becomes “a mere parasite of the heath, fretting its surface in his daily labour as a moth frets a garment, entirely engrossed with its products, having no knowledge of anything in the world but fern, furze, heath, lichens, and moss” (Book 4, Chapter 5, 283). Clym’s shift into wildness is complete as he transitions into an animal-like creature with concerns only for the present moment. Thus, as a wild man, he sings to pass the time. Very much like the heath, Clym shakes off the limitations placed upon him by culture and time in order to take up a stance of wildness.

It is arguably not until the deaths of his mother and wife that Clym is roused from his wildness. As if wakened from a deep slumber, Clym’s cultural identity slowly resurfaces as he realizes meaning through the loss of his loved ones. Clym is not allowed to continue in his escapist fantasy of retreating into nature as a means of liberating himself from culture. Culture is just as deeply a part of him as nature; to suppress it or separate oneself from it would be impossible. Even in the midst of wildness, Clym recognizes the futility of his escape: “In returning to labour in this sequestered spot he had anticipated an escape from the chafing of social necessities; yet behold they were here also” (Book 3, Chapter 4, 199). Human beings cannot separate themselves from either culture or nature, but, similar to the very environments in which they reside, they are inevitably products of both. In this, human beings themselves figure as urbanatures, for their very selves are made up of properties and processes both natural and cultural. In the end, Clym manages to reconcile his cultural and natural identities, merging both culture and wildness as an “itinerant open-air preacher and lecturer” on the hoary hills of the heath (Book 6, Chapter 4, 418.) In The Return of the Native the integration of culture and nature is not just a phenomenon specific to environment, but is an issue pertinent to the psychological well-being of humanity.

6. Conclusion

As a property inherent in nature, wildness is prevalent in Thomas Hardy’s Wessex. Moreover, wildness also constitutes a process of action which defines nature’s stance. Nature is wild and in turn strives to make wild. The effect is a constant and multi-levelled process of reordering in the given environment. In the works of Thomas Hardy, this wild process of reordering defines the dynamic and ever-changing character of the environment. Though the intensity of wildness can vary by degrees from environment to environment as well as from species to species, the discourse of wildness in Wessex attests to the potential for wildness in all places and in all living things. Humans also have a propensity for wildness, a fact which proves them to be very much a part of nature.

Hardy’s Wessex shows that wildness – both as a property and as a process – is not restricted to the wildnesses, nor cultivation to the cities, but that these processes permeate each other in both external and internal urbanatures. Thus, the
term wild no longer needs to represent a separation between humans and nature, but can instead signify their unity.

Notes
2. In his definition of wildness in The Future of Environmental Criticism, Buell (2005: 149) attests that “wildness is a quality humans share with nonhuman entities”. Henry David Thoreau (1937: 672-3) also alludes to man’s desire to seek and aspire to wildness in “Walking”.
3. Thoreau’s (1937: 672) original quote is “in wildness is the preservation of the world”.
5. Objectivity is becoming increasingly important in ecocriticism’s vernacular regarding nature and culture; a simple choice between words, such as disorder instead of reorder, can taint terminology in a way that charges it with preconceived and relative values.
7. This wilding of self is perhaps what Thoreau would consider a return to one’s senses. Clym is physically in nature, but more importantly so are his thoughts. Having successfully “shake[n] off the village” he thinks of nothing but the nature surrounding him, thus, he is also there in spirit. See Thoreau (1937: 663).

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Chorus and stance in Early Modern English drama

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**Abstract**
Choric speakers have their origins in ancient drama, and their function typically involves guiding audience reactions by expressing stance towards the events depicted on stage. This chapter examines the use of choric speakers in early modern English drama. It argues that, while choruses tend to proliferate in didactic or propagandistic plays, the function of choric speakers changed during the early modern period. While the use of choric speakers declined in terms of the proportion of plays which made use of them, those plays that did use choruses began to use them in increasingly innovative ways. From being a way for a dramatic text to express a clear stance, the chorus became a way for plays to complicate and obscure straightforward interpretation. In some cases, choruses were even used to directly warn the audience against attempting to ascribe any particular stance to the playwright or the literary work. Having declined during the heyday of the professional theatre, the use of choruses increased with the closing of the theatres in 1642, after which plays were chiefly consumed by readers rather than audiences.

1. **Introduction**

Stance is a difficult thing to pin down in literature, and never more so than in the case of drama. While novels have a narrator and poems have a speaker, the situation in a play is more complex. In drama, and perhaps particularly in Renaissance drama, the problem is not the absence of stance but a superabundance of it. A variety of characters within a play will express multiple stances in relation to the events on stage, but it can often be hard to discern an ‘overall’ stance in the midst of all the competing voices. All of the characters in a play, from king to peasant, have a limited and partial perspective. While this might also be true of some, most or arguably even all narrators in novels, it is more obviously problematic in drama, since no single character’s voice is responsible for telling the story.

However, some plays from the period do have a kind of narrator: the chorus. Choruses originated in Greek drama, where they consisted of a group of up to fifty people giving commentary, sometimes in the form of song and dance, on the action. The chorus acted as, among other things, “a group of ‘built-in’ witnesses, giving collective and usually normative responses to the events of the play.”
Choruses in Greek drama are generally separate from the actors, and are typically a homogeneous and non-individuated group, and it is this quality which lends them their authority. Their pronouncements guide interpretation of the drama, pointing the audience in the right direction, and can thus be regarded as expressing stance towards the action of the play from within the play itself.

Choruses were also used by the Roman playwright Seneca, and although the Greek chorus had some influence on Renaissance dramatists, it is primarily on Seneca’s example that early modern English choruses are modelled. Typically, in English drama of the period the chorus appears between acts, in order to introduce the action that will follow or comment on what has gone before. Having done so, the chorus generally exits the stage rather than being present on stage throughout as in Greek drama. In both these respects, the English chorus follows Seneca (Boyle 1997: 155). The influence of Seneca on late Elizabethan drama is apparent in the literary record of printed plays and in the entire genre of revenge tragedy, starting with Kyd’s *The Spanish Tragedy*, discussed below.

Seneca had reduced the size of the chorus, perhaps to between three and seven people (Boyle 1997: 218 fn. 20). The chorus in early modern English drama was still smaller – usually a single actor, and presumably one who would have played another part as well as acting as chorus. In some plays, the chorus consists of more than a single actor; in *The Spanish Tragedy*, for example, Andrea and Revenge provide a choric dialogue, while in *The Magnetic Lady* three parts make up the chorus. In these two examples, at least, the choric exchanges are partly characterised by dispute between the speakers.

This chapter will consider the extent to which the chorus, in Renaissance drama, fulfils its original function by expressing stance. It will be argued that the chorus, named as such, was originally introduced from translations of Seneca, primarily as a literary, rather than as a dramatic, device. With the opening of the public theatres the use of choruses declined somewhat, before being revived once the theatres were closed. However, during the period in which the public theatres were flourishing, choric elements in plays, when they were used, underwent significant experimentation, and were often used in ways which were highly unorthodox. Rather than expressing stance in accordance with their traditional function, choruses in the period from roughly 1590-1630 were frequently used to complicate and confuse the audience response to the main action of the play, and sometimes even to directly contradict possible audience interpretations.

2. Incidence of choruses

Considering the profound influence of Seneca’s plays on early modern English drama, it might be expected that choruses would appear more frequently than they do. However, it should be remembered that the development of English drama was influenced by the medieval tradition, as well as borrowing from classical examples.
Figure 1, below, shows the incidence of choruses – defined fairly broadly – in English plays from 1550 to 1659.

Choruses never appear in more than about a third of extant plays throughout the period. Within this relatively low incidence of choruses, there are two clear peaks during the period, the first in the 1560s, and the second in the 1640s and 1650s. Interestingly, the late Elizabethan and Jacobean period usually regarded as the ‘golden age’ of English drama features fewer choric speakers than the years on either side of it. In the Caroline period, which is still typically regarded as producing less interesting drama than the period preceding it, the proportion of plays featuring choric speakers begins to rise again. It may be that this is no coincidence. A chorus’ traditional function is to ‘tell’, rather than ‘show’, which leaves little to the imagination. While some early modern commentators approved of didacticism in drama, theatrical tastes in our own time tend not to appreciate the rather blunt approach of a chorus.

The two peaks would seem to be explained by different factors. In the 1560s the peak is the result of a very large number of translations, above all from Seneca. No fewer than eight translations from Seneca, plus one pseudo-Senecan translation, occur in the years 1559-1567, by John Studley, Jasper Heywood, Thomas Nuce and Alexander Neville, all of whom were poets and translators rather than dramatists. George Gascoigne’s translations of Ariosto and Dolce also appeared in this period.

The second peak includes some translations from classical sources as well, including Seneca’s plays Medea (translated by Edward Sherburne in 1648) and Hippolytus (translated by Edmund Prestwich in 1651). However, most of the plays
featuring choruses are new plays written in English. Many of these are patently political in intent. Titles such as *Tyrannical Government Anatomized* (1643), *The Levellers Levelled* (1647), *Crafty Cromwell* (1648) and *The Cruelty of the Spaniards in Peru* (1658) are not suggestive of subtlety and nuance, but of a clear and unambiguous political message. The traditional characteristics of choric speech – moral authority and the capacity to address the audience directly – obviously lend themselves to such works.

As indicated previously, there is another factor that connects the two peaks. The first peak is principally made up of plays that were produced primarily as literary translations rather than works for public performance. The title pages of *Seneca His Tenne Tragedies* (1581), Neville’s *Oedipus* (1563) and Nuce’s *Octavia* (1566) make no reference to performance, while the title page of Heywood’s *Hercules Furens* (1561) identifies the work as having been translated “for the profit of young schollers.” The first peak also takes place before the opening of the first permanent, purpose-built public theatre in 1576. The second peak coincides with the ban on public performances from 1642. The ban did not mean a complete end to public performances; there is some evidence that plays continued to be acted, possibly with the “connivance” of the authorities in some cases (Randall 1995: 148). Some performances were permitted, too, such as the series of “Representations” in “recitative music” produced by Davenant in the 1650s, including *The Cruelty of the Spaniards in Peru*, which was acted at the Cockpit in 1658. It is also true that some plays during the period may have been written specifically for private performances. However, these would have been written not by professional playwrights (since it was no longer possible to make a living as a playwright) but by classically-educated ‘persons of quality,’ who might have been more inclined to follow Senecan or Greek examples.

Notwithstanding the continuation of private, surreptitious and even some permitted performances, it seems likely that the large number of plays featuring choruses during the 1560s and the 1640s and 1650s is a consequence of the fact that these plays were for the most part intended to be read, rather than performed. As the dramatic equivalent of a narrator, the chorus is typically a literary device used in plays aimed at readers. It is less frequently used in plays intended for performance. This is interesting in view of the influence of Seneca on early modern drama in general and choruses in particular, as the scholarly debate over whether Seneca’s plays were designed for performance or not has never been resolved.

3. The chorus and stance

While the relatively high incidence of choruses in plays from the 1640s and 1650s are often found in plays written to express a clear political stance, the use of choric speech in plays with a political message is not limited to the civil war and interregnum period. One of the plays featuring choric elements from the first peak in the chart above is Thomas Sackville and Thomas Norton’s *Gorboduc* (1561).
Gorboduc follows the tragic consequences of King Gorboduc’s decision to split his kingdom between his two sons, Porrex and Ferrex, confusing the succession and ultimately leading to intrigue, murder and civil war. In this play, the chorus, together with five mimed ‘dumb shows’ performed before each act, performs the traditional interpretative function. As Pincombe (2003: 40) points out, the chorus in Gorboduc does not add anything to the action performed on stage, but rather expresses a clear and unambiguous stance towards the events that have been represented. The significance of the dumb shows, which performed without comment would have been somewhat mystifying, is also explained by the chorus. The result is to make the dumb shows, and the play as a whole, highly didactic, presenting moral lessons which to a modern audience would seem rather trite.

The didacticism of Gorboduc may have been partly a matter of aesthetic taste: Sidney (2002: 110), commenting on the play in his *Apology for Poetry* (1595), claims that “it is full of stately speeches, and well-sounding phrases, climbing to the height of Seneca his style, and as full of notable morality, which it does most delightfully teach, and so obtain the very end of poesy”. This praise suggests that the overtly didactic stance taken by the chorus actually appealed at least to some contemporaries. However, it is more likely that the play was specifically designed to prompt certain responses from audiences, and even from particular members of audiences.

Gorboduc was written by two politicians – both Sackville and Norton were members of parliament – with strong views about one of the burning issues of the day: the succession to the throne. Gorboduc has long been interpreted as a thinly-veiled warning to Elizabeth about the consequences of leaving the succession unsettled (McEachern 2002: 326). This places Gorboduc within a tradition of court plays which were not merely ‘political’ in terms of their content but which were political acts in themselves: plays written with the intention of encouraging those in positions of power to adopt a specific policy (Walker 1991). Such plays exploited their putative status as entertainments in order to send a message to the audience – especially, in this case, to one particular member of it: Queen Elizabeth. That Elizabeth’s courtiers understood this is indicated by the notes made by one audience member from the Inns of Court performance.

Sending a political message through the medium of a dramatic work clearly involves striking a balance. On the one hand, the didacticism of Gorboduc could not be allowed to destroy the interest of the play – or worse still, offend the Queen – by being too heavy-handed. On the other hand, it is vitally important that the ‘message’ of the play be understood. Gorboduc would seem to have been relatively successful in achieving this balance; Sidney, at least, felt the play was successful as a literary work, while the message could hardly be avoided in some places:

When settled stay doth hold the royal throne
  In steadfast place by known and doubtless right:
  And chiefly when descent on one alone
  Make single and unparted reign to light.
Each change of course unjoints the whole estate
And yields it thrall to ruin by debate.
[...] *Gorboduc*, l. 439-444
And this great king, that doth divide his land
And change the course of his descending crown
And yields the reign into his children’s hand,
From blissful state of joy and great renown,
A Mirror shall become to Princes all
To learn to shun the cause of such a fall. *Gorboduc*, l. 457-462

The chorus warns of the dangers of “debate” in a piece of political advice aimed at the watching Queen and her courtiers; what is needed in a kingdom is certainty. The political advice in *Gorboduc* is also applied to its own aesthetic; within the play, the chorus leaves no room for any debate on the significance of the play. Short of addressing Elizabeth by name, the final two lines above could hardly make the play’s rhetorical purpose any clearer. On stage, this kind of unambiguous stance is most successfully expressed by a choric speaker whose impersonality and distance from the action lends his or her words greater authority.

However, if its purpose was to persuade, *Gorboduc* clearly failed. It did not move Elizabeth to marry or name an heir, and there is some evidence that she did not always take kindly to being given thinly-veiled advice by playwrights (Dutton 1991: 36). Parry (1997: 199) points out that as Elizabeth’s reign went on, fewer and fewer performances at court were specifically designed for the court; instead entertainments tended to be supplied by the professional theatre companies. The players and those who wrote for the public stages were not politicians, they were professionals employed to do a job. Their primary motivations, it seems safe to assume, were not political but aesthetic and economic: they wanted to make good plays that would please the audience and earn money.

Notwithstanding Sidney’s high opinion of *Gorboduc*’s attempt to ‘teach’ the audience, it seems that plays designed for the public stage were more circumspect when it came to expressing stance. Despite the similarities of plot and theme in *Gorboduc* and *King Lear*, the absence of a chorus in *Lear* is one major formal difference. In *King Lear* the audience is shown, by actions represented on stage, the tragic consequences of an unclear succession. In *Gorboduc* these consequences are shown as well, but the audience is also directly addressed by the chorus, and *told* how terrible a mistake it is to divide one’s kingdom. *Gorboduc* thus communicates stance much more effectively and explicitly than *King Lear*, and this is a consequence of its rhetorical intent. Shakespeare’s play is not designed primarily to express stance; it aims instead to arouse strong emotions – especially pity – in the audience. The inevitable result of *Lear*’s different rhetorical purpose is greater ambiguity and reduced clarity of stance. As the chart above shows, the large number of plays written in the period 1580-1642, mostly for the public stage, were considerably less likely to feature a chorus than the much smaller number of plays...
written before and after. The reason for this relates to the purpose of these plays, which was, generally speaking, to entertain rather than to persuade.

4. The professional theatre’s rejection of stance

The reluctance of playwrights to resort to the blunt instrument of expressing stance through a chorus is sometimes expressed in plays, ironically enough, by the play’s chorus. Ben Jonson’s late work The Magnetic Lady (1632) features a choric group consisting of Master Probee, Master Damplay and “a Boy of the house”. The boy serves as Jonson’s mouthpiece throughout, winning a series of arguments with the straw man, Damplay, whose name reveals him to be the kind of audience member to whom Jonson took exception. In the first of their exchanges, the boy is used to directly express what he claims is Jonson’s opinion to the audience. Master Damplay asks for information regarding the characters who are making their entrance to the stage, and the boy replies:

Because it is your first question, (and these be the prime persons) it would in civility require an answer: but I have heard the Poet affirm, that to be the most unlucky Scene in a Play, which needs an Interpreter; especially, when the Auditory are awake: and such are you, hee presumes. Ergo.

The Magnetick Lady Induction l. 143-8.

No further explanation is offered, and the play begins. Rather than being spoon-fed information from an authoritative choric speaker, the audience is instructed to wait and see. There is to be no ‘interpreter’, no expresser of stance; the audience must pay attention and understand the play by themselves. In another sense, however, Jonson’s chorus expresses a very clear stance towards the audience themselves, and although this first chorus demands that the audience do their own interpreting, later choric exchanges reprimand them for doing precisely this. In the choruses before the second act, Master Damplay is censured for criticising the first act on the grounds that “there is nothing done in it, or concluded”. The Boy responds with a lesson in poetics and the classical unities. Before the third act, Damplay attempts to interpret the action in relation to contemporary reality: “But whom doth your poet mean now by this master Bias? what lord’s secretary doth he purpose to personate or perstringe?” Here Damplay demands a kind of stance from the play, a stance in relation to current affairs and to the public figures of the time. The Boy and Probee react angrily, disowning any such intention on the part of “the poet”, and ascribing all attempts to draw these sorts of conclusions to the “malice of misapplying”. The chorus thus expresses itself with great clarity, but its statements are at a remove from the actual events of the play. The chorus seeks to guide the interpretation of the audience, or rather to proscribe it, while at the same time refusing to ‘help’ the audience, on the explicitly
stated grounds that the audience ought to be able to understand the play without help.

The chorus before the fourth act continues to attack the audience’s possible (mis)interpretations of the play:

**DAMPLAY**  This was a pittifull poor shift o’ your Poet, Boy, to make his prime woman with child, and fall in labour, just to compose a quarrell.

**BOY**  With whose borrowed eares have you heard, Sir, all this while, that you can mistake the current of our *Scene* so? The stremue of the *Argument*, threatened her being with child from the very beginning, for it presented her in the first of the second *Act* with some apparent note of infirmity[.]

_The Magnetick Lady_ III.vi. Chorus 1-8

This could be regarded as helping the audience; it certainly recapitulates the action, but it does not express stance so much as combat any possible negative stance towards the play on the audience’s part. At times, the choric dialogue ventures into openly mocking audience behaviour, as when Damplay insists he will “censure and be witty, and take my tobacco.” This is a risky tactic on Jonson’s part, especially since Damplay is identified as a gentleman rather than the lower-class audience members mocked as ‘penny stinkards’ in other plays.

By the final chorus, the instructions given to the audience begin to explicitly rule out the possibility of finding stance in the play.

**DAMPLAY**  I am…pull’d into that knot, by your Poet, which I cannot easily, with all the strength of my imagination, untie.

**BOY**  Like enough, nor is it in your office to be troubled or perplexed with it, but to sit still, and expect. The more your imagination busies it selfe, the more it is intangled

[...]

**DAMPLAY**  Why, here his *Play* might have ended, if hee would ha’ let it; and have spar’d us the vexation of a fift *Act* yet to come, which every one here knowes the issue of already, or may in part conjecture.

**BOY**  That conjecture is a kind of Figure-flinging, or throwing the Dice, for a meaning was never in the *Poets* purpose perhaps. Stay, and see his last *Act*, his *Catastrophe*, how hee will perplexe that,
The chorus makes quite clear in this passage that the audience must not attempt to read any stance into the play; this is not their job and they are incapable of doing it properly. Whether the poet’s “purpose” includes any kind of meaning or not is unclear, and perhaps also irrelevant. The important point, according to the chorus, is that audiences are there to be entertained and delighted, not to draw any kind of lesson from the performance. The chorus not only refuses to give them such a lesson, it forbids them to attempt to work out their own. Any kind of normative stance, then, especially towards any kind of risky political matter such as the “personation” of public figures, is firmly ruled out by the chorus.

Handled with a rather lighter touch is the aesthetic argument against the clarity provided by choruses – both the choric prologue and the explanatory speeches of the other characters – in *A Midsummer Night’s Dream*. A large part of what makes the rude mechanicals’ performance of *The Lamentable Comedy of Pyramus and Thisbe* absurd is their long stream of excessive explanation of the play. Quince’s lengthy Prologue begins with ten lines of disordered apology, after which Quince apparently calms himself enough to speak clearly and relate the story:

> Gentles, perchance you wonder at this show,
> But wonder on, till truth make all things plain
> This man is Pyramus, if you would know;
> This beauteous lady Thisbe is, certain.
> This man with lime and roughcast doth present
> Wall, that vile wall which did these lovers sunder.

*A Midsummer Night’s Dream*, V.i.126-131

Quince begins this part of the speech by expressing a similar attitude to the view expressed by the chorus of *The Magnetic Lady*. He will not explain things to the audience, he implies; they must ‘wonder on’ until the play reveals itself to them. Having made this point, Quince goes on to ruin it by explaining the plot to his auditors in detail, thereby destroying any suspense the story might have held. He also introduces the characters, as Jonson’s ‘Boy’ refused to do. Having done so, the characters redundantly introduce themselves as well. Snout, as the wall, speaks his only lines in explaining his function in the play. The Lion, played by Snug the joiner, also introduces himself in order to avoid frightening the ladies, and the height of absurdity is reached when Starveling the tailor announces that “the lantern is the moon, I the man i’th’ moon, this thorn bush my thorn bush, and this dog my dog” (*A Midsummer Night’s Dream*, V.i.252-4). The contrast between Shakespeare’s own dramatic economy and the amateurish excess of the rude
mechanicals is sharp. Offered the choice of a bergamask dance or an epilogue, Theseus is not slow to opt for the dance:

No epilogue, I pray you; for your play needs no excuse. Never excuse, for when all the players are dead there need none to be blamed. Marry, if he that writ it had played Pyramus and hanged himself in Thisbe’s garter it would have been a fine tragedy; and so it is, truly, and very notably discharged. But come, your bergamask. Let your epilogue alone.

_A Midsummer Night’s Dream_, V.i.347-353

_A Midsummer Night’s Dream_, ironically, does include an epilogue of the usual begging-for-applause variety, but the play-within-the-play clearly mocks the tendency to over-explain prevalent in the work of an earlier generation of playwrights, and shows the confidence of the later Elizabethan playwrights in both their own professionalism and their audiences’ powers of concentration; audiences are expected to be able to follow a play and be entertained by it without too much help. The greater dramatic sophistication that grew from the establishment of the public theatres accounts for the tendency of Elizabethan and Jacobean playwrights to avoid using devices like the chorus as a means of expressing stance. By the Caroline period, in which _The Magnetic Lady_ was performed, audiences are warned that they may if anything have become too sophisticated, looking for stances which might prove inconvenient to the playwrights.

5. **The professional theatre and choric experimentation**

Although the chorus was used much less frequently during the period that is still regarded as the high point of the early modern English theatre, its use was never entirely abandoned. Some plays written specifically for the public theatres in early modern England continued to use choruses and choric speakers. An early example is Thomas Kyd’s _The Spanish Tragedy_ (1587). This play does not feature a character named in the text as a chorus, but the choric function is fulfilled by the ghost of Andrea and the personification of Revenge. These two speakers appear at the start of each act. Revenge informs Andrea, and the audience, of their function:

Then know, Andrea, that thou art arriv’d  
Where thou shalt see the author of thy death,  
Don Balthazar, the prince of Portingal,  
Depriv’d of life by Bellimperia.  
Here sit we down to see the mystery,  
And serve for Chorus in this tragedy.  
_The Spanish Tragedy_ I.i.86-91
The position of the two speakers is finely balanced. They are both a metatheatrical audience who ‘sit down to see’ the play that follows and, at the same time, a chorus, commenting on and interpreting the action for the actual audience. They are thus removed from the action while at the same time being able to see it all, and, at least in the case of Revenge, even knowing what will happen in advance. This apparent omniscience makes their perspective less limited than the perspectives of the characters that are in the thick of the action. As one editor of the play points out, all of the main characters “always have mistaken notions about what their actions are leading them towards” (Introduction to *The Spanish Tragedy*, lii). Even Lorenzo, who is at first glance a fiendishly clever plotter, reveals his crime by his unnecessary attempt to cover it up. Further weight is given to the choric interpretation of events by the supernatural status of the choric speakers; Andrea is a ghost, while Revenge is a personification. It might at first seem, then, that Andrea and Revenge allow for an unambiguous expression of stance towards the events depicted on stage in the same way as the chorus of *Gorboduc*. 

Such an impression is misleading, however; Andrea cannot be regarded as a neutral observer of events. Instead, like most of the other characters on stage, he thirsts for revenge. Also like the other characters, Andrea’s interpretation of events is, at least to start with, incorrect. That Andrea’s companion is the personification of Revenge – rather than Justice, for example – further complicates matters. In the morality play tradition both vices and virtues are personified, and although the vices often disguise themselves, the audience can be certain which is which. But *The Spanish Tragedy* is not a morality play, and Revenge cannot easily be categorised as a vice or a virtue. Rist (2008: 40) has recently argued that the assumption that revenge is an evil was “a far from self-evident claim for early modern Christians.” Bacon (1973: 14), however, certainly disapproved of it, writing that revenge is “a kind of wild justice; which the more man’s nature runs to, the more ought law to weed it out.” Bacon goes on to stress that it is better to forgive, so even if Rist is correct and revenge was not always regarded as self-evidently wrong, it was certainly not held up as an ideal in early modern England. 

The chorus in *Gorboduc* is both the dramatic equivalent of an omniscient narrator and a source of moral authority. In *The Spanish Tragedy* one of the choric characters – Revenge – is omniscient, but neither Revenge nor Andrea is invested with indisputable moral authority; their stance is as open to question as the stances of the other characters in the play. 

Rather than instructing the audience and guiding its interpretation, Andrea in particular is presented by the play as in a position analogous to that of the audience. While unable to affect what happens on stage, he is emotionally involved in the action, with the result that his judgements are not disinterested. As a result, his function in the play departs from that of a choric speaker in the usual sense. After his enemy Balthazar has made peace with the Spanish king and begun courting Bel-Imperia, Andrea’s ghost expresses dissatisfaction with the way events are unfolding:
Come we for this from depth of underground,
To see him feast that gave me my death's wound?
These pleasant sights are sorrow to my soul:
Nothing but league, and love, and banqueting?
_The Spanish Tragedy_, I.v.1-4

It has been said of _The Spanish Tragedy_ that “few readers fail to find the early scenes tedious” (Edwards 1959: liii). In view of Andrea’s speech it might be concluded that the slow start is a deliberate ploy aimed at deferring the audience’s (or reader’s) gratification. Revenge reassures Andrea that his enemies will indeed suffer; but he might also be reassuring the audience, who, like Andrea, did not come to see “league” and “love”: they wanted a tragedy full of blood and death to entertain them. Andrea, rather than guiding the audience’s interpretation of the action by expressing a clear stance towards it, expresses their dark desire to be thrilled by the theatrical shedding of blood. The function of the chorus in _The Spanish Tragedy_ is markedly different from the function of the chorus in _Gorboduc_. Stance is clearly expressed by Andrea and Revenge, but only in the same way as all dramatic characters express it: in an interested and partial way. The authority of this stance is questionable at best. This means that, while the audience vicariously enjoys Andrea’s bloodlust, they are not required to endorse or condone it.

While the audience finds itself in a position similar to Andrea’s, it is at the same time separated from him. That this is a specifically ‘Spanish’ tragedy is highly significant, as is the fact that it is not located in contemporary Spain or in any identifiable period of Spanish history – it is not possible to say exactly when the action is taking place. This act of distancing in both time and space allows the English audience to enjoy the gruesome bloodshed in the play as spectacle, without being in the uncomfortable position of identifying with it too closely. The ‘otherness’ of Andrea, and indeed of all the other characters, is part of what removes the burden of moral authority from the choric speeches. It also removes the burden of listening to heavy-handedly moralistic choric speeches from the audience. This may in turn have helped to make the play the enormous success that it was in early modern England. The play continued to be performed well into the seventeenth century, and no fewer than eleven editions were published, the latest in 1633 (Edwards 1959: lxvi-lxix). In _The Spanish Tragedy_, then, the function of the chorus is not to express a normative stance on the events of the play but to accentuate and condone the guilty pleasure taken by the audience in those events.

Other plays in the late Elizabethan repertoire introduced further innovations in choric function. The chorus in Marlowe’s _Dr Faustus_, for example, appears at first sight to be performing its traditional role. Introducing Faustus, the chorus describes him as
swollen with cunning, of a self conceit,
His waxen wings did mount above his reach,
And, melting, heavens conspired his overthrow.
For falling to a devilish exercise,
And glutted now with learning's golden gifts,
He surfeits upon cursed necromancy:
Nothing so sweet as magic is to him,
Which he prefers before his chiepest bliss.

Dr Faustus, Prologue 20-27

Leaving aside the faintly disturbing suggestion that heaven may have “conspired” against Faustus for the moment, this seems fairly straightforward. It describes in a nutshell what the audience later sees when Faustus delivers his soliloquy rejecting the arts and sciences one by one and makes his terrible decision to turn to “cursed necromancy”. While the opening chorus does not directly express a judgement of Faustus’ decisions, the description given of his activities here is far from neutral. The speech makes it difficult to see Faustus’ decision to turn his back on his “chiepest bliss” as a wise or laudable decision. By the end of the play, the chorus’ position is briefly stated, and even clearer:

Cut is the branch that might have grown full straight,
And burned is Apollo's laurel-bough,
That sometime grew within this learned man.
Faustus is gone: regard his hellish fall,
Whose fiendful fortune may exhort the wise,
Only to wonder at unlawful things,
Whose deepness doth entice such forward wits
To practise more than heavenly power permits.

Dr Faustus, Epilogue 1-8

The chorus insists on a clearly articulated Christian interpretation of events. It not only mandates this specified interpretation but also demands that the audience regard Faustus as an example to be avoided. The chorus, in this passage, not only expresses a stance in relation to the events of the play but even declares a rhetorical purpose for the play. The chorus claims that the play is there to provide instruction – in contrast to the chorus in The Spanish Tragedy.

But there are moments in Dr Faustus when the central character is presented in a different light, and the most telling of these moments is not represented on stage, but described by the chorus:

Learned Faustus,
To know the secrets of astronomy
Graven in the book of Jove's high firmament,
Did mount himself to scale Olympus' top,
Being seated in a chariot burning bright,
Drawn by the strength of yoked dragons' necks.
He now is gone to prove cosmography.[1] 

*Dr Faustus*, Chorus 2 1-7

The adjective applied to Faustus in this passage is “learned”, a term with exclusively positive connotations. Faustus’ methods remain infernal – he is drawn by dragons – and he may be trespassing on forbidden territory since he has gone to learn “secrets” which properly belong to “Jove”. Nevertheless, the picture of Faustus here is certainly much more positive, and arguably even heroic. Oddly enough, in terms of this depiction of Faustus as a dedicated seeker after knowledge, the explicit statement of the chorus is undermined by the action presented on stage. As Deats (1976) points out, Marlowe for the most part accentuates the foolishness of Faustus, compared with his source, the English Faust Book:

the shift in emphasis from forbidden knowledge to power, from the sin of Prometheus to that of Lucifer, radically alters the nature of [Faustus’] transgression. Furthermore, by magnifying the hero’s aspirations (making them vaster if not more lofty) and sharply curtailing his realization, Marlowe accentuates the vast disparity between the omnipotence of Faustus’ dream and the impotence of his reward. Deats (1976: 14)

In particular, Deats points to the enormous gap between Faustus’ grand ambitions and his decidedly modest achievements. Marlowe juxtaposes “Faustus’ grandiose boast that “the Emperor shall not live but by my leave” with the magician’s later subservience in the Emperor’s presence (Deats 1976: 6). In general, then, the play is if anything less nuanced than its source. Apart from the choric speech quoted above, there is very little in the play to suggest that Faustus has serious intellectual or scientific ambitions. Indeed, his attitude towards those sciences he considers in the opening scene of the play is dismissive and even contemptuous, and Faustus tends to dismiss the knowledge revealed to him by Mephistopheles. The chorus does not actually contradict what happens on stage, but it does introduce a tension in the portrayal of Faustus, complicating the play’s initially quite clear stance towards him. While the opening and closing speeches of the chorus express stance quite clearly, then, the middle chorus is the part of the play that departs most strongly from this stance.

The cases of *Dr Faustus* and *The Spanish Tragedy* show that Elizabethan dramatists were prepared to experiment with the choric function, and this experimentation reaches a peak with Shakespeare’s *Henry V*. If *Dr Faustus* presents the audience with some tension between choric pronouncements and on-stage action, in *Henry V* this tension is taken to far greater lengths. In *Henry V*, the chorus does to a great extent fulfil its traditional role in providing an ‘official’ interpretation of events. The chorus describes a straightforwardly great king – “the
mirror of all Christian kings” (*Henry V*, II.6) in fact – leading an army so eager and loyal to serve him that they follow “[w]ith winged heels, as English Mercuries.” (*Henry V*, II.7) The stance expressed by the chorus is what might be expected of the patriotic play which *Henry V* has sometimes been interpreted to be. However, in this play, the action complicates, undermines and even contradicts the simple stance of the chorus.

The chorus of *Henry V* offers the audience a description of the action at the start of each scene. The version of events that the Chorus describes, however, does not always tally with what is presented on stage. In Act 2 the Chorus claims that “all the youth of England are on fire….honour’s thought / Reigns solely in the breast of every man” (*Henry V*, II.1-4). This is followed by an argument between Nym and Pistol in what appears to be a brothel. The argument concerns Pistol’s marriage to a woman that Nym had previously been engaged to. Both men draw their swords repeatedly, but there is no fight, just a lot of bluster. These men, who may or may not be young, are ‘on fire’ in a sense, and ‘honour’s thought’ could be said to reign over them, but these are grand terms for what is obviously a comic scene between characters at whom the audience is expected to laugh.

This particular scene, on its own, might be taken as an example of comic inversion, a fairly standard theatrical ploy during the period. But *Henry V* goes much further than this; the chorus’s claim, that Henry’s followers are enthusiastic and loyal, is repeatedly undermined by what is represented by the actors on stage. The audience is presented with the boy who would give all his fame for “a pot of ale and safety.” (*Henry V*, III.ii.13) Later in the play, the common soldier Williams shows his independence of mind by arguing that “if the cause be not good, the King himself hath a heavy reckoning to make,” (*Henry V*, IV.i.134-5) as critics have often noted. Less frequently pointed out is the fact that in the same scene Bates, too, is less than enthusiastic about the war, wishing that the king were “in Thames up to the neck” (*Henry V*, IV.i.115) rather than in France risking other men’s lives. Neither of these soldiers is represented as a clown or a coward, as Nym and Pistol are, and after the battle Williams is remarkably unrepentant for his earlier questioning of the king’s authority. Instead of apologising for what he has said, Williams asks Henry to “take it for your own fault and not mine.” (*Henry V*, IV.viii.54-5)

Low morale might be expected from common soldiers, but in *Henry V* even the nobility show signs of strain. Before the battle of Agincourt, Henry’s men are exhausted, outnumbered, and half-starved. Henry himself admits to the French herald Montjoy that “[w]e would not seek a battle as we are,” (*Henry V*, III.vi.163) but this is quickly forgotten when he speaks to his own troops. When Westmorland wishes the English had more troops, Henry immediately replies “[t]he fewer men, the greater share of honour. / God’s will, I pray thee wish not one man more.” (*Henry V*, IV.iii.22-3) In doing so, Henry uses the adversarial rhetorical technique of *antistrephon*, the twisting of an opponent’s argument to fit one’s own purpose. In a previous scene Henry says to Gloucester “‘tis true that we are in great danger; / The greater therefore should our courage be.” (*Henry V*, IV.i.1-2) What Gloucester
Eric Pudney

has said to invite this response is spoken offstage, but it seems likely that he has expressed doubts about the way the war is going. Henry’s officers appear to be restive, and need to be argued into obedience. The choric assertion of the unity of Henry’s army is revealed to be false by what the audience sees and hears in the rest of the play. The bonds that hold the English together are in fact extremely fragile and in need of constant reinforcement by Henry’s rhetorical skill.

An even more serious problem for the chorus’s version of events takes place before the battle of Agincourt, when Henry walks through the camp in disguise, talking to his soldiers. The choric introduction to this scene says that Henry is giving his men “a little touch of Harry in the night,” and that “every wretch, pining and pale before, / Beholding him plucks comfort from his looks.” (Henry V, IV.47; IV.41-2) As Patterson (1989: 90) points out, however, what the audience sees on stage does not quite match this cheerful description. Instead, Henry ends up starting a quarrel with Bates and Williams, and even arranges to fight Williams after the battle. It is after this that the speech on ceremony comes, and in it Henry is bitterly contemptuous of the common people who make up the bulk of his army. What the chorus has told the audience, that the soldiers have taken comfort from Henry’s presence, is not merely undermined but directly contradicted by what the play shows the audience.

One thing that is remarkable about the chorus of Henry V is the sheer quantity of apologising that it engages in. The chorus asks the audience to “pardon” the “flat unraised spirits” responsible for the play and the “unworthy scaffold” on which they will perform; it expresses the hopes that the actors will not “offend one stomach with our play”; it requires the audience to “eke out our performance with your mind.” (Henry V, Prologue 8-10, II.40, III.35) Before Agincourt, the chorus apologises again:

And so our scene must to the battle fly,  
Where – oh for pity! – we shall much disgrace  
With four or five most vile and ragged foils  
Right ill-disposed in brawl ridiculous  
The name of Agincourt. Yet sit and see,  
Minding true things by what their mockeries be. (IV.48-53)

And at the very end of the play, the chorus continues to denigrate what the audience has seen:

Thus far, with rough and all-unable pen,  
Our bending author hath pursued the story,  
In little room confining mighty men,  
Mangling by starts the full course of their glory. (Epilogue 1-4)

The sheer volume of apology makes it clear that what is happening in these choric speeches goes beyond conventional expressions of humility. Part of what the
chorus is doing is responding to criticisms that had been levelled at the late Elizabethan theatre and defending the form of this particular play. *Henry V* covers a lengthy period of English history, simplifying and condensing events into a more streamlined and dramatically effective form. This is hinted at by the chorus when it speaks of “mangling” the glory of the protagonist. The chorus also provides a response to some of the critics of the implausibility of the theatre, the best-known of whom is Sir Philip Sidney. Sidney (2002: 111), in his *Defence of Poetry*, criticised the failure of contemporary chronicle history plays to observe the unities of time and place. In fact, Shakespeare’s “four or five most vile and ragged foils” have their counterpart in Sidney, who refers to armies “represented with four swords and bucklers.” The chorus apologises for this failure, while simultaneously refusing to conform to the unities. In the prologue, the chorus admits the inadequacy of theatre to represent the epic events it describes, but also places the burden of responsibility squarely on the audience, who must use their “imaginary forces” – powers of imagination – to create the “imaginary forces” of Henry’s army. In part, the choric apologies are a defence of the specific theatrical form of *Henry V*.

But the chorus’ apologies do more than this; as Danson (1983: 28) suggests, they also entail the recognition that theatrical representation always involves simplification. More specifically, the chorus points to the fact that a play can never represent historical reality as it really was. This recognition is not limited to the representation of events; it also embraces the expression of stance. The story presented by the chorus represents a dramatic simplification of Henry: it presents him as a kind of superhero, and his army as loyal subjects inspired by the presence of the king. The play complicates this simple story, as Danson (1983: 38) points out, by complicating the character of Henry. (It should be added to Danson’s observation that the play also quite drastically complicates the characters of his followers.) Henry is not, or is not just, the hero presented in the choric summaries; he is more human, more vulnerable, and more anxious than those speeches suggest; his anxiety is at its most prominent when he prays before battle: “not today, O Lord, / O not today, think not upon the fault / My father made in compassing the crown” (*Henry V*, IV.i.289-291). Henry’s followers, too, are not as loyal, as obedient, or as homogenous as the chorus says. Indeed, it could be regarded as troubling that the one commoner to express any loyalty to the king is the highly disreputable Pistol: “The King’s a bawcock and a heart of gold…I kiss his dirty shoe” (*Henry V*, IV.i.44-7).

The chorus’ statements, then, are undermined by the play, but the reverse is also true. The repeated apologies of the chorus, and its insistence that the theatrical form is incapable of truly representing the reality of Henry’s reign, have the effect of undermining any claim to legitimacy ascribed to the play, even though its version of events is more complex than that presented by the chorus. If the dramatic form itself is inadequate, as the chorus repeatedly points out, then the play cannot tell us what ‘really’ happened.
Like a Greek chorus, the chorus of *Henry V* could be said to represent the verdict of history, but this verdict is revealed to be as limited as the individual verdicts of the characters caught up in the events on stage. In this sense, while the play rejects Sidney’s criticisms of the chronicle history play, it endorses his highly sceptical attitude towards the historian, whom Sidney (2002: 89) describes as “loaden with old mouse-eaten records, authorizing himself for the most part upon other histories whose greatest authorities are built upon the notable foundation of hearsay.” Like the historian, the audience of *Henry V* can only approach ‘true things’ by way of ‘mockeries’. *Henry V* not only rejects the opportunity to express a single, normative stance towards the events depicted through the chorus, it denies the possibility of such a stance. Instead, the play insists on multiple stances – as many stances as there are characters, in fact. As with the classical Greek and Senecan drama, the chorus of *Henry V* can be regarded as the voice of history. In contrast to the classical examples, however, this voice is not privileged over others.

6. Conclusion

The chorus was never as significant a feature in English drama as it was in the Greek theatre and the plays of Seneca, but the use of this device peaked just before and just after the first period in which the public professional theatres were in operation. The plays featuring choruses in these two periods – pre-1576 and post-1642 – tend to fall into one or more of the following categories: translations of classical literature; plays which were primarily literary rather than dramatic; and plays written with a clear political purpose. The English chorus is primarily derived from the Senecan model, and the pioneering translations of the 1560s played an important role in establishing it as a dramatic technique. Apart from the translations themselves, there are examples of choruses in consciously ‘Senecan’ plays like *Gorboduc*, which begin to establish the device in native English plays.

After the professional theatres became established, the type of ‘political’ play represented by *Gorboduc* became much less visible, as large numbers of new plays were produced. These plays, rather than having any political or didactic intent, were aimed primarily at entertaining a paying audience. During this period, the proportion of plays with a chorus declines quite sharply, and there are clear examples within the plays themselves of the attitude behind this decline. Choric speech is seen as clumsy, and unnecessary for a competent professional theatre company, which can communicate stance to the audience in more subtle ways – or not at all. Stance takes a back seat; what is important is delight. *The Spanish Tragedy* is a clear example of a play which eschews stance in favour of audience pleasure.

Quite apart from the decline in the use of choruses during the Elizabethan and Jacobean periods, the ways in which choruses were used is quite different from the traditional model derived from Seneca and maintained in *Gorboduc*. In plays written for the paying public, the choric function became increasingly complex and
ambiguous. What seems like a way of expressing stance becomes a way of rejecting stance entirely. In case of *Henry V*, the apparently normative stance of the chorus is exposed as something forced onto a much more complex historical reality. Later in the period, the chorus of *The Magnetic Lady* not only rejects the opportunity to express stance, it goes to great lengths in order to combat the ascription of stance to the play by the audience. By the date of this play, the chorus has gone from being a source of moral guidance for the audience to being a disclaimer from the playwright.

Notes
1. In some cases this is apparent from the extant printed text; for example the A text of *Dr Faustus* assigns the second choric speech to Wagner (*Dr Faustus*, Chorus 2 SD1 and note).
2. Figure 1 is calculated from a list taken from *An Index of Characters in Early Modern English Drama: Printed Plays 1500-1660*. This resource provides a list of plays featuring a chorus. The list includes plays in which there is no character specifically designated as chorus but which nonetheless features choric speakers, such as *The Spanish Tragedy*. Figures for the total number of plays in each decade are based on the English Drama component of the Literature Online database. Dates for all plays are those given in *Annals of English Drama 975-1700*.
3. A number of plays from this period, including those listed above, are discussed in Randall (1995).
4. See Randall (1995: 169-175) for a fuller discussion of these plays.
5. It is certain that private performances continued during the Interregnum; Randall (1995) gives examples of plays that were performed in private households (see, for instance, Randall 1995: 49; 166; 287).
6. Boyle (1997: 11) summarises the range of views, and adds that “It is not known and may never be known whether Seneca’s tragedies were performed on stage or otherwise during their author’s lifetime.”
8. For another perspective on the choric apologies, see Danson (1983: 28).

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Attitude and irony in the narrative voices of Jane Austen’s juvenilia

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Abstract
This narratological study deals with the stance of irony in Jane Austen’s juvenilia. It looks for ‘gaps’ between the attitudes of implied authors, narrators and characters, and investigates how these gaps contribute to the irony of the texts. Once it has been established that the implied author has an ‘ironic intent’, the primary question is whether the narrator shares this intent. Some narrators seem to display an ironic attitude towards their characters and make consciously ironic comments, but in other cases the narrator seems totally oblivious of any irony in their narrative; indeed, the very cluelessness of the narrator is sometimes a source of comedy. Austen’s early narrative texts, which constitute the main portion of the juvenilia, can be divided into three categories according to narrative situation: narratives with one heterodiegetic narrator, narratives with one homodiegetic narrator – in this category, ‘Love and Friendship’ is the chief instance – and narratives with multiple homodiegetic narrators. This division leads to the discovery that the attitudinal gaps are to be found between different personae in different categories.

1. Introduction

Narrators can assume any number of different stances with respect to the various propositions they make in their narration: they can, for example, express sincerity, uncertainty, doubt and irony. The ironic stance is one of the more complicated ones. What is it in the narrator’s words that shows that a statement should be interpreted as ironic? And whose is the ironic intent in a literary text? This study deals with a set of texts known for their ruthless irony, namely Jane Austen’s juvenilia.

Between the ages of eleven and seventeen, Jane Austen wrote her first recorded works in three notebooks, which she humorously titled ‘Volume the First’, ‘Volume the Second’ and ‘Volume the Third’, in reference to the popular format for the three-volume novel. After Austen’s death, the notebooks were kept in the private possession of her brothers’ descendants for over a hundred years. Prior to the publication of ‘Volume the Second’ in 1922, the only piece from
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Austen’s juvenilia to have been made available to the public was a short play entitled ‘The Mystery’, printed in the second edition of James Edward Austen-Leigh’s *A Memoir of Jane Austen* (1870). Austen-Leigh apologetically reduces his aunt’s achievement to ‘a specimen of the kind of transitory amusement which Jane was continually supplying to the family party’ (Sabor 2006: xxxix). This condescending attitude to the juvenilia has long deprived them of the critical attention they merit. Among the first to recognise the juvenilia as works with an inherent value were G. K. Chesterton, who in his preface to the 1922 publication of ‘Volume the Second’ compared the youthful Austen to Rabelais and Dickens (Doody 1993: xxxiii) and Virginia Woolf, who found it ‘incredible’ that such an ‘astonishing and unchildish story’ as ‘Love and Freindship’ had been ‘written at the age of fifteen’ (Woolf 1994: 147). In the 1970-80s, some of Austen’s early works came to be highly regarded in feminist criticism, and during the last few decades there has been an increasing demand for critical studies which pay attention to the juvenilia as literary works in their own right, rather than imperfect forerunners to the published novels.

The unorthodox genre and the fierce comedy of Austen’s early texts, astounding mature and sophisticatedly crafted considering the writer’s age, make them intriguing objects of study. Their particular brand of irony, not gently satirising or self-righteously reproving but uproariously merry, is difficult to grasp. There seems to be a ‘gap’, a relationship of distance or contrast, between the attitudes of personae operating on different narrative levels. But these attitudes are elusive – who is laughing, who is being laughed at, whose voice do we hear, whose side are we on, and where is the gap? Focusing on the first two volumes of Austen’s juvenilia, this narratological study investigates the relationships between the attitudes of implied authors and narrators, between the attitudes of narrators and characters, and between the attitudes of different narrators. It analyses how the speakers’ attitudes to what they say manifest themselves, and how the discovered ‘gaps’ between these attitudes contribute to the irony of Austen’s early works.

The central narratological concepts that will be used in this study are ‘homodiegetic narrator’, ‘heterodiegetic narrator’ and ‘implied author’. A homodiegetic narrator tells a story about him-/herself, as opposed to a heterodiegetic narrator, who tells a story about someone else (Genette 1980). The implied author is the image of the author generated by the text; every text has its own implied author, so there is a separate implied author for every one of Austen’s narratives. Even where there is no named narrator, the narrator will not be seen as coinciding with the implied author, as the narrator is, to quote Mieke Bal (1997: 18) ‘that agent which utters the (linguistic or other) signs which constitute the text’, while the implied author has quite a different function, discussed below. Narrators whose gender is not explicitly divulged will be referred to as ‘s/he’; the implied author will be referred to as ‘it’. When the term ‘distance’ is used, it is intended in Wayne C. Booth’s (1961: 155-159) sense of ‘moral’, ‘intellectual’ or ‘emotional’ distance between different personae involved in narration, such as the implied author, the narrator, the characters and the reader, and not in Gérard Genette’s
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(1980: 162-164) sense, in which the narration is more distant from the narrative the more mediated it is.

Altogether, the three volumes of juvenilia encompass twenty-two narrative texts, three plays and one poem. Among the narratives, which are the texts that will be discussed here, a little more than half have heterodiegetic narrators, whereas the rest are written in epistolary form. Three different narrative situations can be said to occur: narratives with a heterodiegetic narrator (for example ‘Frederic and Elfride’), narratives with a homodiegetic narrator (epistolary ‘novels’ composed of letters by only one letter writer, for example ‘Love and Freindship’), and narratives with multiple homodiegetic narrators (epistolary ‘novels’ composed of letters by several letter writers, for example ‘The Three Sisters’).

2. Irony and the implied author

The concept of the implied author was first introduced by Wayne C. Booth in *The Rhetoric of Fiction*. Booth describes the implied author as someone who ‘chooses, consciously or unconsciously, what we read; we infer him as an ideal, literary, created version of the real man; he is the sum of his own choices’ (Booth 1961: 74-75). In *Story and Discourse: Narrative Structure in Fiction and Film*, Seymour Chatman (1978: 148-9) elaborates further on Booth’s concept and states that the implied author, who has to be ‘reconstructed by the reader from the narrative’, ‘establishes the norms of the narrative’. Disagreeing with ‘Booth’s insistence that these [norms] are moral’, however, Chatman sees ‘norms’ as referring to ‘general cultural codes that are relevant to the story’. Thus, the implied author’s norms do not equal the real author’s norms or moral conceptions, as the implied author is not a person but a ‘structural principle’. Gérard Genette (1988: 141) interprets the implied author as ‘the author as I infer him from his text, […] the image that the text suggests to me of its author’, but thinks that ‘the question […] of [the] existence’ of the implied author does not really lie within the field of narratology, as it goes ‘beyond the narrative situation’ (Genette 1988: 137) and that the implied author is ‘in general […] an imaginary […] agent’ (Genette 1988: 145). Mieke Bal (1997: 18), though another non-supporter of the concept, significantly points out that the implied author is ‘the result of the investigation of the meaning of a text, and not the source of that meaning’. This means that an interpretation of the text has to precede an analysis of the implied author.

The ‘implied author’ is obviously a somewhat controversial concept. Many scholars, including narratologists, have questioned the value of speaking of an implied author at all; some have rejected the concept outright. The usefulness of the term, however, is demonstrated by Chatman (1990: 74-75) in *Coming to Terms: The Rhetoric of Narrative in Fiction and Film*, in which he argues that the implied author is ‘the locus of the work’s intent’. ‘Intent’ is W. K. Wimsatt’s and Monroe Beardsley’s term, and Chatman prefers it to ‘intention’, as it denotes ‘a work’s […] “overall” meaning, including its connotations, implications, [and]
unspoken messages’. An advantage of the term ‘intent’ is that it includes aspects of a work not premeditated by the real author and is therefore compatible with reader-response and other types of criticism striving to avoid the ‘intentional fallacy’. Chatman agrees with these ‘constructivist theories’ that reading is a ‘creative act’ and that the reader plays an active part in the ‘actualization’ of the text, but he contends that the text already has a latent intent which ‘each reading […] reconstructs’. His defence of the implied author, he says, is ‘strictly pragmatic’:

[T]he question is not whether the implied author exists but what we get from positing such a concept. What we get is a way of naming and analyzing the textual intent of narrative fictions under a single term but without recourse to biographism. This is particularly important for texts that state one thing and imply another.

Without considering the concept of the implied author, we run the risk of basing critical studies of literary works on biographical facts about the real author that have no relevance for the text; we also open up for arbitrary interpretations based not on the text but on the reader’s preconceptions or personal opinions.

Texts which ‘state one thing and imply another’, and to which, according to Chatman, the concept of the implied author is especially important to apply, are typically ironic texts. In A Rhetoric of Irony, Booth (1974: 10-12) argues that the ironic meaning of a text has to be reconstructed by the reader. This reconstructive process has four steps: ‘reject[ing] the literal meaning’, testing ‘[a]lternative interpretations or explanations’ (for example the author’s having made a mistake), then deciding whether these interpretations are likely in view of what can be inferred from the text in general about the implied author, and, finally, choosing a meaning which, unlike the literal meaning, concurs with the views of the implied author. Hence, irony in literature is closely connected to the concept of the implied author, and more particularly to the communication between the implied author and the reader. While Booth concedes that part of enjoying irony may consist in ‘feeling superior’ to such ‘naïve victims’ as are unable to reconstruct the ironic intent of the text, reading irony is chiefly about ‘finding and comming with kindred spirits’: ‘The author I infer behind the false words […] grants me a kind of wisdom; he assumes that he does not have to spell out the shared and secret truths on which my reconstruction is to be built’. In this way, every individual reader can feel special when reading an ironic text, as if s/he were the only person who understood the implied author’s true meaning – as if the two of them were secretly sharing a joke.

3. **Heterodiegetic narrators**

The narrators of Austen’s narrative sketches are the channels through which the implied authors’ ironic intents are realised. But are the narrators themselves aware
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of the irony? Do they and the implied authors mock the characters together, or are the narrators and the characters both mocked by the implied authors? The following section will look into the relationships between heterodiegetic narrators, implied authors and characters, with examples from the narrative sketches ‘Frederic and Elfrida’, ‘Jack and Alice’, ‘Edgar and Emma’, ‘Henry and Eliza’ and ‘The History of England’.

The narrators often sound very serious and not at all ironic towards their respective subjects. In addition, they solemnly account for the ridiculous and often unrealistic actions performed and sentiments expressed by the characters. One example of this occurs in ‘Jack and Alice’ where Alice and Lady Williams find Lucy lying ‘apparently in great pain beneath a Citron tree’ with her leg broken in a mantrap. Rather than assist her, they ask her to ‘favour [them] with [her] Life and adventures’, to which she answers, ‘Willingly Ladies, if you will be so kind as to be seated’. She then proceeds to tell her life’s story at some length, still lying on the ground (22). In narrating this and similar passages, the narrator is either being ironic, or s/he must understand neither how unrealistically the characters behave nor the comedic effect of that behaviour. This reasoning is reminiscent of Booth’s four steps of reconstruction, but while we know that there is an ironic intent there are two senders of the text on different levels, the implied author and the narrator. The intent is the implied author’s, but is the narrator ‘in on it’?

Narratorial commentary can, according to Chatman (1978: 228-229), be either ‘explicit’ or ‘implicit (that is, ironic). The variety of irony that Chatman focuses on occurs when ‘a speaker carries on a secret communication with his auditor at variance with the actual words he uses and at the expense of some other person or thing, the victim or “butt”’. This victim can be either the narrator, in which case the communication is carried out between the implied author and the implied reader and the narrator is unreliable, or it can be the characters: ‘If the communication is between the narrator and the narratee at the expense of a character, we can speak of an ironic narrator’. There seems to be little reason to suspect the heterodiegetic narrators in Austen’s juvenilia of being unreliable (heterodiegetic narrators seldom are), which should mean that the sender of the communication is the narrator. Furthermore, it is the narrators who narrate the characters’ behaviour in such a way as to make it comical. This means that the narrator must be aware of the irony, and therefore the gap is between the narrator and the story, that is between the discourse level and the story level.

The narrators of the juvenilia employ a conventional novelistic manner of speaking, using literary stock phrases seemingly without considering their relevance to the context. In ‘No sooner had Eliza entered her Dungeon than the first thought which occurred to her, was how to get out of it again’ (‘Henry and Eliza’, 42), for example, the phrase ‘No sooner […] than’ is not only redundant but makes the sentence nonsensical, since none but her first thought on entering the dungeon could have occurred to her ‘no sooner’ than entering. As Mary Waldron (1999: 16) puts it, ‘[c]ommon sentence patterns are constantly used either to create nonsense or to turn conventional moral expectation on its head’; Waldron gives an
example of the latter function from ‘Jack and Alice’, where a family who lead an utterly dissipated life are, contrary to ‘conventional moral expectation’, described as pleasant people despite their vices: ‘The Johnsons were a family of Love, and though a little addicted to the Bottle and the Dice, had many good Qualities’ (14). An example of ‘[c]ommon sentence patterns’ being ‘used to create nonsense’ is the description of Lady Williams, where synonyms are juxtaposed and put in opposition to each other: ‘Tho’ Benevolent and Candid, she was Generous and sincere; Tho’ Pious and Good, she was Religious and amiable, and Tho’ Elegant and Agreeable, she was Polished and Entertaining’ (ibid.).

Nonsense is also often created by comparing two disparate phenomena, for example in ‘like the great Sir Charles Grandison [Lady Williams] scorned to deny herself when at Home, as she looked on that fashionable method of shutting out disagreeable Visitors as little less than downright Bigamy’ (‘Jack and Alice’, 17). Pretending to be out in order to avoid unwelcome company may be regarded as despicable behaviour, but it is clearly not the same as bigamy, and so the narrator must be either utterly confused or having a laugh at Lady Williams’ expense. On other occasions, the narrator presents two circumstances as conflicting when in fact they are not, for example in stating that Mr and Mrs Jones are ‘very tall but [seem] in other respects to have many good qualities’ (15). Unless the narrator has a particular aversion against tallness, this must be construed as an ironic statement.

While it is sometimes difficult to decide whether the narrator is aware of the irony of the text, there are times when it is quite clear that s/he is. Such an instance is the narrator’s referring to Frederic and Elfrida’s threats against Mrs Fitzroy’s life (‘[…] if you refuse to join [Rebecca and Captain Roger’s] hands in 3 days time, this dagger […] shall be steeped in your hearts blood’) as ‘gentle and sweet persuasion’ (10). Further, when the narrator of ‘Jack and Alice’ punningly remarks that Alice, ‘[i]n spite of the wine she had been drinking, […] was uncommonly out of spirits’ (17), it must be inferred that the narrator shares the implied author’s ironic intent, since it is the narrator who creates the pun.

However, despite the attitudinal gap’s being between the narrator and the characters rather than between the implied author and the narrator, there are also many similarities between the ways in which heterodiegetic narrators and characters express themselves. The narrators use the same rhetorical devices (such as syllepsis) and conscious stylistic incongruities (such as tautology) as the characters, and both narrators and characters show more than a little self-admiration. Another very noticeable trait in both the narrators’ and the characters’ usage is the frequent breaches of style. Sentences are typically begun in a conventional literary manner, after which the register plummets to the colloquial, for example in ‘The Masks were then all removed and the Company retired to another room, to partake of elegant and well managed Entertainment, after which the Bottle being pretty briskly pushed about by the three Johnsons, the whole party […] were carried home, Dead Drunk’ (‘Jack and Alice’, 15-16). Peter Sabor calls this ‘[Austen’s] deflationary technique’ (Waldron 1999: 377). The bathetic
breaches of style are one of the hallmarks of the heterodiegetic narrators in Austen’s juvenilia, but they are also performed by the characters.

This similarity in tone between the ironic narrators’ voices and the voices of the characters poses a problem. If the characters are ironic they are consequently aware of the irony, and then it does not make sense to say that the narrators mock them. If, on the other hand, the characters are somehow able to express irony without being aware of it, how can we be sure that the narrators are aware of the irony? After all, the narrators often sound as serious as the characters, and the irony in the dialogues is as discernible as the irony in the narrative voice. The solution to this problem is partly that the narrator, who is the agent that puts the narrative, including dialogue, into words, functions as a mediator of the implied author’s ironic intent. The characters are elements of the story, but they cannot function as mediators between the implied author and the reader. When, at the end of ‘Henry and Eliza’, Lady Harcourt realises that Eliza, whom she and Sir George have adopted and raised, is in fact their biological daughter, she offers her husband the following explanation:

“You must remember Sir George that when you sailed for America, you left me breeding.” […] “Four months after you were gone, I was delivered of this Girl, but dreading your just resentment at her not proving the Boy you wished, I took her to a Haycock and laid her down. A few weeks afterwards, you returned, and fortunately for me, made no enquiries on the subject. Satisfied within myself of the welfare of my Child, I soon forgot I had one, insomuch that when, we shortly after found her in the very Haycock, I had placed her, I had no more idea of her being my own, than you had, and nothing I will venture to say could have recalled the circumstance to my remembrance, but my thus accidentally hearing her voice which now strikes me as the very counterpart of my own Child’s.” (44)

As well as this speech being full of irony, Sir George’s answer, ‘The rational and convincing Account you have given of the whole affair […] leaves no doubt of her being our Daughter’ (ibid.), is clearly ironic, as Lady Harcourt’s account is neither rational not convincing. However, the words that must be reconstructed as ironic by the reader are spoken by a character who has no ironic intent: Sir George is indeed convinced that Eliza is his daughter, and ‘[a] mutual Reconciliation […] [takes] place’ (45). It is not self-evident that it should be possible for the characters’ utterances to express irony while the characters do not themselves intend those utterances to be ironic. The ironic intent is the implied author’s, and the characters can have no plausible motive for uttering the words in which the irony is realised. However, since the narrator mediates between the implied author and the characters, and between the characters and the reader, the narrator can allow the implied author’s irony to shine through the non-ironic characters’ speech and be reconstructed by the reader.

The other part of the solution to the problem of the similarities between the narrators’ and the characters’ voices is that Austen’s irony is not of the type in
which the implicit message is the opposite of what is explicitly stated. The narrator does not suggest that Lady Harcourt’s story is untrue, and so there need be no obvious discrepancy between Sir George’s attitude and the attitude of the ironic narrator. The narrator is very close to the implied author, and they are both distant from the characters. This being so, it may seem incongruous to claim that the attitude of a character resembles the attitude of the narrator. But while the attitudes differ in that Sir George is unaware of the irony while the narrator is very much aware of it, neither of them is suspicious of the truth of Lady Harcourt’s account of her behaviour. If the purpose of this passage had been to show Lady Harcourt as the unreliable narrator of an embedded narrative and her husband as a dupe, it would have been essential for there to be no irony in Sir George’s statement. As it is, the narrator is not concerned with Lady Harcourt’s reliability or Sir George’s reliance on her, and so every opportunity to express irony may be seized, regardless of who gives voice to it.

The reason that the ironic narrators sound perfectly serious is that they mimic the solemn tone of the narrators of sentimental late-eighteenth-century fiction. This has the additional effect of bringing the narrators’ voices close to the characters’, as neither narrators nor characters in sentimental fiction tend to be ironic. When, after the death of her profligate husband, Eliza finds herself penniless and friendless, she comes to the conclusion that she has no alternative but to sell her clothes to save the lives of herself and her two children:

> With tears in her eyes, she parted with these last reliques of her former Glory, and with the money she got for them, bought others more usefull, some playthings for her Boys and a gold Watch for herself.

> But scarcely was she provided with the above-mentioned necessaries, than she began to find herself rather hungry, and had reason to think, by their biting off two of her fingers, that her Children were much in the same situation. (42-43)

The beginning of this curiously brutal passage could have been taken directly from a sentimental novel – before the mention of toys and gold watches, there is nothing which indicates that the narrator is narrating anything but solemnly meant sentimental fiction. While the content of the narrative then makes it clear that the passage has to be read ironically, the narrator’s tone remains that of a conventional and serious narrator speaking in the sentimental style that the text mocks. Doody’s (1993: xxxiv) word for the narrators of the juvenilia, ‘mock-narrators’, seems to imply that the narrators are mocked by someone else; but rather, the metanarrative qualities of the juvenilia allow the narrators to mock themselves, as they are aware that they are part of the narratorial apparatus that they are making fun of. Whereas the characters are earnest in their self-admiration, the narrators’ stance is ironic both towards the characters and towards themselves.
An exception to the heterodiegetic narrators’ ironic attitude is constituted by the narrator of ‘The History of England’. This narrator is significantly more overt than the other heterodiegetic narrators. Notably, s/he freely expresses his/her political opinions: s/he is pro-Catholic, pro-Stuart, and a huge fan of Mary Stuart in particular. The Historian is more easily distinguishable from the implied author than the other heterodiegetic narrators in the juvenilia. Only in certain passages is s/he reminiscent of the other, ironic heterodiegetic narrators, for example when s/he states that Charles I was ‘ever steadfast in his own support’ (188), and that Henry VIII, who was of course dead at the time, ‘happen[ed] to be of the […] opinion’ that Edward VI was too young to govern (182). As a historian, the narrator is less than perfect: s/he trusts Shakespeare’s plays as historical sources (177, 178), uses vocabulary that is quite unsuitable for a historian, and ‘[does] not perfectly recollect’ ‘the particulars of Henry VIII’s reign’ but neglects to look them up (180).

The ‘partial, prejudiced, and ignorant Historian’ is the narrator and not Jane Austen, despite John Halperin’s (1989: 36) claim that ‘the author confesses’ to being ‘partial, prejudiced, & ignorant’. The implied author is clearly not as ignorant as the narrator, and is, unlike the narrator, objective. The narrator refers to some of Austen’s personal acquaintances (183, 184), which may tempt the reader to identify him/her with the real Austen, and ‘The History of England’ has sometimes been interpreted as political propaganda. But if Austen had wanted to write a political text she would surely have been able to argue much more convincingly than her narrator does. The real Jane Austen seems to have shared some of the narrator’s views, but not all,4 which indicates that there is no political message embodied either by the opinions explicitly expressed by the narrator or by the direct opposite of those opinions. When writing, it has to be remembered, the vast majority of real authors are not themselves aware of the distinctions made in narratology between the various personae involved in narration, for instance between heterodiegetic narrator and author, and it is not at all uncommon for narrators to refer to themselves as authors of the works they narrate. Thus Austen’s fictional narrator can be personally acquainted with Mrs Knight and Mrs Lefroy and refer to them in his/her History. Unlike the narrator, the implied author does not divulge its political stance. The text is not ironic in the sense of claiming the opposite of what it says, but it is ironic and so does not claim what it says either. The Historian’s attitude is more distant from the implied author’s than the other heterodiegetic narrators’ attitudes are. For these reasons, this particular heterodiegetic narrator is not ironic, but rather mocked by the implied author.

Among the narratives with heterodiegetic narrators, then, ‘The History of England’ is an exception with respect to the narrator’s attitude. In the other narratives, for example ‘Jack and Alice’ and ‘Henry and Eliza’, the narrator shares the implied author’s ironic stance. Using techniques such as imitating the characters and conventional sentimental narrators, the heterodiegetic narrators mock their characters, thereby realising the implied authors’ ironic intent.
4. Homodiegetic narrators

The narrative sketches in the juvenilia that are not narrated by heterodiegetic narrators are composed of letters, or in some cases of one single letter. Memorable for its two self-centred and self-deceiving heroines Laura and Sophia, the epistolary sketch ‘Love and Freindship’ is probably the best known of all Austen’s juvenilia.

But who the narrators of the epistolary sketches are is not as straightforward as it may at first seem. Chatman (1978: 166) initially claims that not all narratives necessarily have narrators, but that there are cases of ‘“pure” mimesis’ or ‘non- or minimally mediated narrative’ which consist only of the characters’ ‘speech’ and ‘verbalized thoughts’. Letter-writers in epistolary fiction do not, according to Chatman (1978: 170-171), qualify as ‘genuine narrators’: their letters ‘need not tell stories’, and ‘[t]he correspondent […] cannot know how things will ultimately turn out’, nor ‘whether something is important or not’. When Chatman (1990: 115) later retracts his opinion that all narratives do not have narrators, he also claims that narrators do not have to have ‘human personality’, which means that the narrator of an epistolary novel could be some other agent than the letter-writer(s). According to Bal’s (1997: 18) definition of the narrator as ‘that agent which utters the […] signs which constitute the text’, the characters who write the letters that form an epistolary narrative have to be regarded as the narrators of the text. However, while I question the categorical stance which Chatman takes on letter-writers as narrators of epistolary fiction, I do not reject his ideas on the subject entirely. In certain cases of epistolary fiction, the narratorial subject can be said to be found in the selection and ordering of the letters rather than in any of the characters. None of the various letter-writers in ‘Amelia Webster’, ‘The Three Sisters’, ‘Lesley Castle’ or ‘A Collection of Letters’ comes across as the agent in charge of the narrative, and so they are not narrators in every sense of the word. For this reason I will refer to them not as narrators but as ‘narrators’ (within quotation marks) to indicate the arguable inadequacy of the term.

‘Love and Freindship’, however, is a different matter. The narrative is, with the exception of the first brief letter from Isabel entreating Laura to tell the story of her ‘Misfortunes and Adventures’ (103), made up exclusively of letters composed by Laura, who narrates the entire story – there is no real correspondence, only Laura’s narrative. As B. C. Southam (1964: 26) points out, the epistolary format is used in ‘Love and Freindship’ ‘merely […] as a structural device to replace division by chapters’ and the divisions are designed so as to ‘[interrupt] the narrative flow as little as possible’. Laura tells a clearly defined story that occurred a long time previous to the act of narration. She is aware of the story’s ending from the outset and is in control of how the narrative proceeds. There is no sense in which Laura is not the narrator of ‘Love and Freindship’, and she will therefore be treated as a homodiegetic narrator. However, it should be mentioned in this context that Laura the narrator (the older version of Laura, who writes a series of letters to her friend’s daughter) is not identical with Laura the character (the young Laura in
the story). They are two incarnations of the same person, two different personae residing on different narrative levels.

As was stated above, Chatman (1978: 229) speaks of two different types of ‘secret communication’ in implicit narratorial commentary: the secret communication between narrator and narratee at the expense of a character, and the secret communication between the implied author and the implied reader at the expense of the narrator. In the latter case, ‘the implied author is ironic and […] the narrator is unreliable’. Booth (1961: 158-159) explains the concept of the unreliable narrator as denoting a narrator whose ‘norms’ differ from those of the implied author. Booth further states that many reliable narrators are ironic and in that sense ‘potentially deceptive’. This, however, does not qualify them as unreliable.

The norms of the narrator of ‘Love and Freindship’ are to live for feeling and to be above the mundane details of everyday life, but this stance is not recommended by the implied author. Laura’s attitude is positive towards sensibility and negative towards sense, which is the opposite of the implied author’s attitude. Booth states that unreliable narrators often think they ‘have qualities which the author denies [them]’, and Marilyn Butler (1975: 168–169) says of Laura that she ‘pretend[s] to a virtue which Jane Austen wishes to deny [her]’, namely ‘[t]he capacity to feel’. The idea of sensibility is mocked in ‘Love and Freindship’ and the attitude of the text towards sensibility is ironic, but it is not the narrator who is ironic but the implied author. Laura differs from Austen’s heterodiegetic narrators in that her solemnity is not feigned when she pronounces obvious incongruities – for instance, she says that Isabel’s having ‘passed 2 Years’ at a ‘Boarding-school’ in London’, ‘spent a fortnight in Bath’ and ‘supped one night in Southampton’ amounts to her having ‘seen the World’ (105). Similarly, the narrator is sincere in her positive attitude towards the ideal of sensibility, though this attitude is not shared by the implied author, which means that the advisability of such an attitude is undermined. Laura is therefore an unreliable narrator, and the attitudinal gap is between the implied author and the narrator. Yet, it is not Laura’s account of the events that take place which is unreliable, but rather her conception of how these events should be interpreted and evaluated. This is because Laura’s worldview differs drastically from the implied author’s.

Some of the characters side with the narrator and some with the implied author. Juliet McMaster (1989: 144) divides the characters of ‘Love and Freindship’ into Sense (Sir Edward, Augusta, Macdonald, Graham, Lady Dorothea) and Sensibility (Laura, Sophia, Edward, Augustus, Philander, Gustavus). She further remarks that an important difference between these two groups is that whereas the Sense characters can handle irony, the Sensibility characters cannot, although ‘their speeches may […] be ironic for the reader’. In addition to this, it seems that Laura the narrator can no more handle irony than Laura the character. The implied author and the Sense characters are close to each other in attitude, and intend the text (in the case of the implied author the whole narrative, including the Sensibility characters’ speeches, and in the case of the
Sense characters their respective utterances) to be construed as ironic, while the narrator and the Sensibility characters, who are close to one another in attitude but distant from the former group, have no such intent.

The similarity between the Sense characters’ and the implied author’s attitudes can, for instance, be seen in the dialogue between Edward and his sister Augusta near the beginning of the story:

“But do you think that my Father will ever be reconciled to this imprudent connection?” (said Augusta.)

“Augusta (replied the noble Youth) I thought you had a better opinion of me, than to imagine I would so abjectly degrade myself, as to consider my Father’s Concurrence in any of my Affairs […]. […] [D]id you ever know me consult his inclinations or follow his Advice in the least trifling Particular since the age of fifteen?”

“[…][Y]ou are surely too diffident in your own praise –. Since you were fifteen only! – My Dear Brother since you were five years old, I entirely acquit you of ever having willingly contributed to the Satisfaction of your Father.” (110-111)

It is clear from this exchange that the reader is invited and expected to share Augusta’s norms rather than Edward’s: it was imprudent of Edward to marry Laura, and as a good son he should want to contribute to his father’s satisfaction. This does not necessarily mean, however, that the implied author has a categorically negative attitude towards people who want to decide whom to marry for themselves. But Edward marries Laura after literally five minutes’ acquaintance, having refused to marry Lady Dorothea even though he finds her ‘lovely and Engaging’ and ‘prefer[s] no woman to her’ (108) only because it is his father’s idea. The various personae’s similarities and differences in attitude grow even clearer as Augusta continues:

“But still I am not without apprehensions of your being shortly obliged to degrade yourself in your own eyes by seeking a Support for your Wife in the Generosity of Sir Edward.”

“Never, never Augusta will I so demean myself. (said Edward). Support! What support will Laura want which she can receive from him?”

“Only those very insignificant ones of Victuals and Drink.” (answered she.)

“Victuals and drink! (replied my Husband in a most nobly contemptuous Manner) and dost thou then imagine that there is no other support for an exalted Mind (such as is my Laura’s) than the mean and indelicate employment of Eating and Drinking?”

“None that I know of, so efficacious.” (111)

Augusta comes across as a sensible realist, but also as a clever and witty person. Her perspicacity links her closely to the ironic implied author, while Edward’s view of ideal life as imitating a novel of sensibility, his histrionic behaviour and the impracticality and misdirected idealism apparent in his reference to eating and
drinking as ‘mean and indelicate employment’ are reminiscent of the narrator’s worldview.

The narratee of ‘Love and Freindship’ is Isabel’s daughter Marianne. Isabel writes to Laura to ask her to write down the story of her life as a moral example for Marianne, and Laura complies. But, as McMaster (1989: 142) points out, ‘Isabel is far from admiring the youthful Laura’s conduct’ and ‘her scheme in elicting Laura’s narrative is to provide her daughter […] with a negative example, not the positive one that Laura fondly assumes. Marianne as reader is to learn to avoid Laura’s sentimental excesses’. Isabel’s attitude here resembles the implied author’s in her rejection of Laura’s ideals; Isabel and the implied author also both plan to let Laura unconsciously show through her unreliable narrative that her conduct is not morally sound and that it is not to be imitated. However, while Isabel has the serious intention of setting a moral example, the implied author’s intention is to create comedy. The reader laughs at Laura, but her behaviour and her views are so extreme that ‘Love and Freindship’ cannot be seen as an instructive tale applicable to real-life situations.

When Laura and Sophia meet the young girl Janetta, who is engaged to Graham and perfectly happy to be so (a happiness which is shared by both Graham and Janetta’s father, Macdonald), they decide to rescue her, and persuade her that she does not love Graham at all but Captain M’Kenzie – she must be in love with someone else, they reason, or it would not be like a novel. The impressionable Janetta is easily convinced, with the result that she breaks off her engagement and elopes with Captain M’Kenzie, who is, according to Macdonald, ‘an unprincipled Fortune-hunter’ (127). While the narrator sees this event as one promoting Janetta’s happiness and congratulates her friend and her young self on their judicious initiative, the implied author is critical of their behaviour, and thinks that they were wrong to act as they did, since it has very probably spoilt Janetta’s future. More significantly, however, the implied author finds Laura and Sophia’s attitude towards marriage ridiculous. The implied author does not really show much concern for Janetta; it is passive in its critique, but active in its mockery.

The narrator constantly expresses herself using words which subvert the value of the event or action she narrates. When she says that Augustus ‘gracefully purloined’, rather than stole, ‘a considerable Sum of Money […] from his Unworthy father’s Escritoire’ (116), the reference to the action as graceful and to the victim as unworthy turns Augustus into something of a hero rather than a mere thief, which is the implied author’s view of him. Laura then declares that Sophia and Augustus, ‘Exalted Creatures!, scorned to reflect a moment on their pecuniary Distresses and would have blushed at the idea of paying their Debts’; this is further referred to as ‘disinterested Behaviour’ (116). The blatant reversal of conventional moral norms in this passage is strengthened when Laura states that it is ‘unparalleled Barbarity’ (117) and ‘perfidious Treachery in the merciless perpetrators of the Deed’ (116) to arrest Augustus as a debtor. In addition to this, Laura defines the ‘overturning of a Gentleman’s Phaeton’ as ‘lucky’ and says that ‘[i]t was a most fortunate Accident as it diverted the Attention of Sophia from the
melancholy reflections which she had been before indulging’ (128-129). As it turns out, the accident is fatal for Edward and Augustus, and in the long term for Sophia too, as her fainting on the damp ground as a result of her husband’s death proves to have negative consequences for her health. The accident can therefore not be called ‘lucky’ for Sophia in the implied author’s book; yet the narrator defines it as such, as she is primarily concerned with Sophia’s immediate distress in that she is subject to ‘melancholy reflections’.

Though most of the Sensibility characters steal at one point or another, none of them is called a thief or a criminal by the narrator; acts of stealing are always referred to by some name that disregards their immorality, usually accompanied by an approving modifier. When Macdonald discovers Sophia in his library taking money from a drawer, she is, according to the implied author, taking advantage of her kind cousin’s hospitality and stealing from him, instead of showing due remorse after having been an accessory to his daughter’s elopement. According to the narrator, however, she is ‘depriv[ing] him of Money, perhaps dishonestly gained’, which is ‘a proper treatment of so vile a Wretch’ and a ‘well-meant Plan’ (125). Her manner of ‘removing the 5th Bank-note from the Drawer to her own purse’ is described as ‘[majestic]’ (125.). The narrator does not see Macdonald as having the right to enter his own library or to question Sophia’s presence there – his act is an intrusion on her privacy, a violation of her integrity: ‘she was most impertinently interrupted in her employment by the entrance of Macdonald himself, in a most abrupt and precipitate Manner’ (125-126). This causes the ‘justly-offended’ Sophia to ‘call forth the Dignity of her Sex’ and ask ‘the undaunted Culprit […] “Wherefore her retirement was thus insolently broken in on?”’ (126). At this, ‘[t]he unblushing Macdonald without even endeavouring to exculpate himself from the crime he was charged with, meanly endeavoured to reproach Sophia with ignobly defrauding him of his Money’ (126.). The opinion here vented by Macdonald is also the implied author’s stance. The irony takes the form of a communication between the implied author and the implied reader at the narrator’s expense. The implied author and the implied reader both know what is really going on, that Sophia has been stealing from Macdonald, that he is right to accuse her of it, and that she is wrong in calling him insolent.

The characters’ way of expressing themselves further highlights the difference in attitude between the Sense characters and the Sensibility characters. In the dialogue between Edward and Augusta, the difference is clear between her everyday and his dramatic, archaic language. When Edward becomes upset, he even starts calling his sister ‘thou’. Laura does the same when speaking to Macdonald: ‘Base Miscreant! (cried I) how canst thou thus undauntedly endeavour to sully the spotless reputation of such bright Excellence?’ (126). Laura also calls a postilion ‘Gentle Youth’ (118) and refers to Edward as ‘that luckless Swain’ (118.). Augusta, Macdonald and the other Sense characters’ language represents the norm in the characters’ society, while Laura and Edward use the same novelistic language as the narrator. Laura carries her literary language usage a step
further when she gives her ‘mad’ speech, which is, as McMaster (1989: 144) remarks, in iambic verse:

“Talk not to me of Phaetons (said I, raving in a frantic, incoherent manner) –
Give me a violin –. I’ll play to him and soothe him in his melancholy Hours –
Beware ye gentle Nymphs of Cupid’s Thunderbolts, avoid the piercing
Shafts of Jupiter – Look at that Grove of Firs – I see a Leg of Mutton – They
told me Edward was not Dead; but they deceived me – they took him for a
Cucumber –” […] For two Hours did I rave thus madly […]. (Love and
Freindship, 130)

Amazingly, Laura the narrator is able to observe Laura the character in her
madness; she is able not only to remember what she said while delirious, but to
perceive herself from the outside: ‘My Voice faltered, My Eyes assumed a vacant
stare, My face became as pale as Death, and my Senses were considerably
impaired’ (130.). The impossibility of a character, though functioning as two
separate personae on two different narrative levels, being able to perceive herself
wholly from the outside contributes to the irony of this passage and the
unreliability of the narrator, as does the improbability of someone in a severe state
of shock expressing themselves in verse.

Laura’s unreliability as a narrator can sometimes be seen in other, more
sensible characters’ reactions to her conduct. Philippa’s invitation for Edward and
Laura to come and stay with her is answered with their assurance that ‘we would
certainly avail ourselves of it, whenever we might have no other place to go to’
(114-115). Laura does not realise that this reply is rather impolite and does not
think it ‘reasonable’ of Philippa to be ‘displeased’ with it (115). According to the
implied author, however, Philippa’s reaction is perfectly reasonable – it is the
couple’s answer to her invitation that is unreasonable. When Laura tells Isabel
about everything that has happened since they last met, the latter’s face shows
proof of ‘Pity and Surprise’ (135). Laura supposes that Isabel pities her for the
many trials she has been through and is surprised at her wonderful adventures, but
it is implied that Isabel really pities her misguided friend for being so unbelievably
stupid. Laura then says that though her ‘Conduct’ had ‘certainly’ been ‘faultless’,
Isabel ‘pretended to find fault’ with it, but since Laura herself knew that she ‘had
always behaved in a manner which reflected Honour on [her] Feelings and
Refinement, [she] paid little attention to what [Isabel] said’ (135.). Isabel’s attitude
here corresponds to the implied author’s, and the narrator communicates it to the
reader without herself realising its implications.

Another possible gap between narrative levels is presented by the embedded
narratives in ‘Love and Freindship’. McMaster (1989: 142) claims that ‘[t]he many
interpolated narratives within Laura’s narrative suggest that the young [Austen] was meditating (though certainly not solemnly) on narratology’ and that ‘[a]ll the
characters, whether on the side of Sense or Sensibility’ are fascinated by narrative.
The most extended embedded narrative is Gustavus’s tale near the end of the
sketch. He is one of the Sensibility characters, and very close to the narrator in attitude. He too is an egocentric who thinks that he is ‘remarkable’ for ‘an excess of Sensibility’ (138) and that he is entitled to all the advantages he can grab. His life’s story, which he tells Laura, is in many respects a summary of hers. Like Laura, Gustavus left home to pursue a life of adventure, lived extravagantly on stolen money and reacted to the news of his mother’s death only by lamenting the absence of favourable financial consequences for him. This parallel story, in some ways a little more extreme than Laura’s (Gustavus’s and Philander’s mothers starve to death as a consequence of having been robbed by their sons), highlights the theme of selfishness in the primary narrative. Their believed selfishness is central to the Sensibility characters’ sense of identity, but in fact they are deeply selfish. Similarly, they claim to be above money concerns, but the only way in which their unworliliness with respect to financial affairs manifests itself is that, instead of earning or saving money and paying their way, they steal and are in constant debt. The contrast between the characters’ self-images and the image the reader gets from the implied author makes the characters’, often self-congratulatory, references to themselves ironic.

The function of the irony, however, is not to present the Sensibility characters as a negative example. According to Butler (1975: 169-170), ‘[t]he intention in satirizing Laura is above all to expose the selfishness of the sentimental system’. Laura is ‘governed by self-admiration, and aware only of those others so similar in taste and temperament that she can think of them as extensions of herself’. The main characters are, contrary to what the narrator claims, ‘ruthlessly self-interested’, but not ‘insincere’ – they truly believe in the sentimental system and believe themselves to conform to it. Butler states that ‘the contradiction is inherent in the creed: [Austen] wants to show that the realization of self, an apparently idealistic goal, is in fact necessarily destructive and delusory’. But, as has already been suggested, the intent of ‘Love and Freindship’, as of Austen’s other juvenilia, is not predominantly moral. Claudia L. Johnson (1988: 31) touches on a central key to understanding the juvenilia when she says that ‘[i]t is important that we see Austen’s early works as exercises in stylistic and generic self-consciousness and not principally as expressions of personal belief’. As was pointed out above, the young Austen’s implied authors are not primarily concerned with morals; the irony of the texts does not lie in any implication that the opposite of what is explicitly stated should be seen as ‘right’ or ‘true’. While residing on the side of Sense and not on that of Sensibility, the implied author’s point is not that the Sensibility characters’ behaviour is immoral and should therefore not be imitated, but that their immorality is funny. ‘Love and Freindship’ is, according to Johnson, ‘typically read as a fledgling Sense and Sensibility, a scathing satire on the unseemliness of excessive feeling’. But Johnson does not agree with this understanding of either ‘Love and Freindship’ or Sense and Sensibility, as ‘Austen’s parody […] is never so essentially prescriptive’. As Johnson perspicaciously points out, what ‘Love and Freindship’ ‘parodies’ is ‘the destinies inscribed by sentimental fiction, not the perniciousness of sentiment, and to
overlook this layer of detachment in the sketch is to miss many of its most hilarious jokes’. Hence, it is not above all the characters that are mocked, but the system that they try to live by and the consequences of that attempt.

In *The Madwoman in the Attic: The Woman Writer and the Nineteenth-Century Literary Imagination*, Sandra M. Gilbert and Susan Gubar (1984: 115) read ‘Love and Freindship’ from a feminist viewpoint. They find a ‘contradiction between the narrator’s insistent ridicule of her heroines and their liveliness, their general willingness to get on with it’. I would like to substitute ‘implied author’ for ‘narrator’, but the substance of the claim is valid. Laura and Sophia are not so much sentimental as energetic and ambitious. They take control over their own lives and try to get what they want rather than settling for the lot of heroines in conventional novels, to sit passively and wait. Gilbert and Gubar continue,

Laura and Sophia are really quite attractive in their exuberant assertiveness, their exploration and exploitation of the world, their curiously honest expression of their needs, their rebellious rejection of their fathers’ advice, their demands for autonomy, their sense of the significance and drama of their lives and adventures, their gullible delight in playing out the plots they have admired. Gilbert & Gubar (1984: 115-116)

This can be seen as the opposite of the effect that Booth mentions of having villains as narrators in homodiegetic narration. Because we see the story from the narrator’s perspective, Booth (1961: 323) says, we can feel sympathy for him/her no matter how execrable his/her character traits and actions are. Laura, on the other hand, unwittingly presents herself as unsympathetic, and the text does not invite the reader to side with her; but her qualities contrastingly are sympathetic, at least according to Gilbert and Gubar. Regardless of whether or not we see Laura as an ‘attractive’ character, however, it is true that the implied author does not condemn the characters whose views and choices it disagrees with. Though their behaviour is certainly destructive to themselves and to others, Laura and Sophia are products of their society, not an evil force in themselves.

In Gilbert and Gubar’s (1984: 117-119) reading of ‘Love and Freindship’, the story ‘attacks a society that trivializes female assertion by channeling it into the most ridiculous and unproductive forms of behaviour’ and reminds the reader that ‘women have been tempted to forfeit their interiority and the freedom of self-definition for literary roles’. It thus satirises the sentimental system not as an idealistic worldview that can be found in literature and is potentially destructive if applied outside the realms of the novel, but as a way of reinforcing restrictive gender roles in society through literature, as well as a secondary expression of those societal gender roles. Rejecting the findings of those critics who attempted to locate the object of the irony in ‘Love and Freindship’ and the other juvenilia before them, Gilbert and Gubar claim that
Austen demystifies the literature she has read neither because she believes it misrepresents reality, as Mary Lascelles argues, nor out of obsessive fear of emotional contact, as Marvin Mudrick claims, nor because she is writing Tory propaganda against the Jacobins, as Marilyn Butler speculates, but because she seeks to illustrate how such fictions are the alien creation of writers who contribute to the enfeebling of women. (1984: 120-121)

Seen in this way, ‘Love and Freindship’ has something to say about prevailing structures in both literature and society, and the text uses literary satire as a means of getting this message across: ‘By exploiting the very conventions she exposes as inadequate, [Austen] demonstrates the power of patriarchy as well as the ambivalence and confinement of the female writer’ (Gilbert and Gubar 1984: 121).

Although Gilbert and Gubar speak of the real author’s intent, their feminist reading of ‘Love and Freindship’ can prove pertinent within a narratological context. There is no evidence that the intent which Gilbert and Gubar ascribe to Austen was in fact the historical person Jane Austen’s intention when writing ‘Love and Freindship’, but this is beside the point; Gilbert and Gubar convincingly show that through a feminist reading of ‘Love and Freindship’ the text can be constructed as having such an intent.

Doody’s understanding of ‘Love and Freindship’ also follows the feminist tradition. Doody (2005: 114) speaks of Sophia’s attitude towards Macdonald when caught stealing from him as her ‘proto-feminist assertion of her own virtuous integrity’, and sees in the juvenilia a ‘refusal to accept the kind of morality usually presented in novels, hoping to remould […] women […] into a dutiful and fulfilling marriage’. The women in the juvenilia are ‘not dedicated at all to the happiness of others’ – they are busy ‘trying to get everything they can for themselves’ Doody (2005: 117). In this respect, the depiction of women in ‘Love and Freindship’ does not conform to the norm, and the story’s lack of conventional morality in female characters contributes to the presentation of an alternative image of women, albeit not an entirely positive one. On the one hand, both male and female characters are presented as either adhering to or diverging from the conventional moral code, and the implied author sides with the moral characters; the story could therefore be seen as a moral tale. On the other hand, the implied author’s moral stance is purely passive, and the immoral characters are not condemned for their actions or personalities; rather, they are exploited for comic purposes. Furthermore, female characters are given significantly more attention than male characters. As Doody says, Sophia employs a feminist discourse in her defence against Macdonald, and the main characters do conform to the feminist ideal of emancipation. A feminist approach to ‘Love and Freindship’, in short, proves more fruitful than a conventionally moralistic approach.

A key element in ‘Love and Freindship’ which facilitates feminist readings is the female homodiegetic narrator. Granted, the narrator is constantly mocked by the implied author and cannot be regarded as a female role model. A character who is mocked by a narrator or another character could be unjustly mocked, but
anything that is mocked by the implied author is by definition in conflict with the norms of the text. Yet, while the heroine’s conduct is depicted as ridiculous, the fact that the story is seen from her perspective reveals her feminist side. Laura does indeed deserve to be mocked as she embraces the sentimental ideal; however, she does not accept the implications of that ideal for women. Laura goes far outside the traditional role of her gender as she takes initiatives, considers her own needs and wishes before those of her family, travels without male company, and loudly makes her opinion known when she thinks she has been badly treated by male authorities. In one respect especially does Laura go against the attitude prescribed for women: she will not content herself, not settle for less than completely satisfying her curiosity about and appetite for the world and everything in it. These qualities can be seen as amounting to selfishness, but also as evidence of independence, enterprise and courage. Because Laura is the narrator of the story, we see it from her perspective and are able to perceive her strength and everything that is positive in her attitude towards the world as well as what is misguided and ridiculous.

In a feminist-narratological study of *Persuasion*, Robyn Warhol (1996: 26) comments on Claudia Johnson’s (1989) discussion of the sentimental tradition of ailing or dying women as objects seen from the outside as treated in *Sense and Sensibility*. Sentimental novels, according to Johnson and Warhol, ‘emphasize the emotions inspired in men […] by the spectacle of the heroine’s suffering body’. In such narratives, women are completely passive when overcome by illness. In ‘Love and Freindship’, this convention is subverted, as Sophia and Laura’s swoons and bouts of madness are seen from the inside, from the women’s point of view. In ‘Love and Freindship’, women act, they are not observed by men. Even fainting is described as active, as an act of will, which is obvious in Sophia’s dying words to Laura warning her against too frequently indulging in purposeful fainting:

My beloved Laura […] take warning from my unhappy End and avoid the imprudent conduct which has occasioned it… Beware of fainting-fits… Though at the time they may be refreshing and Agreeable yet beleive me they will in the end, if too often repeated and at improper seasons, prove destructive to your Constitution… [---] Run mad as often as you chuse; but do not faint— (132-133)

This way of depicting women as active agents is contrasted in ‘A beautiful description of the different effects of Sensibility on different Minds’, one of the shorter sketches with one single ‘narrator’. The ‘narrator’ of ‘A beautiful description…’ is, in contrast to the narrator of ‘Love and Freindship’, male. In this narrative, the suffering woman is a passive object observed by a man. These two texts exemplify two different ways of revealing and questioning the norm: subverting it, and exaggerating it. Both techniques serve the purpose of bringing to light a phenomenon which is ordinarily taken for granted.
Two of the other sketches with one single ‘narrator’ also deserve some comment. In ‘A Letter from a Young Lady, whose feelings being too Strong for her Judgement led her into the commission of Errors which her Heart disapproved’, there is a discrepancy between the title and the content of the sketch. The title leads the reader to expect a moral tale where the heroine commits a mistake because of an excess of some emotion which would in moderation have been appropriate for a young lady to entertain and then repents. However, the ‘Young Lady’ is in fact a serial killer, and, far from being about to reform, she concludes her letter with the words ‘I am now going to murder my sister’ (223). By thwarting the reader’s expectations, the text creates a gap between the reader’s attitude towards the story before and after having read it, with irony as the result.

In ‘The female philosopher’, the gap is between the ‘narrator’ and the narratee. The ‘narrator’, Arabella, writes a letter to her friend Louisa telling her of a conversation she has recently had:

Louisa Clarke (said I) is in general a very pleasant Girl, yet sometimes her good humour is clouded by Peevishness, Envy and Spite. She neither wants understanding nor is without some pretensions to Beauty, but these are so very trifling, that the value she sets on her personal charms, and the adoration she expects them to be offered are at once a striking example of her vanity, her pride, and her folly. (217)

This poor opinion of Arabella’s supposed intimate friend, so freely offered to the object of it herself, makes Arabella a fantastically rude and thoughtless, though remarkably honest, ‘narrator’. We can only imagine how a recipient of such a letter would respond, but it can be inferred that there is a gap between the attitudes of the letter writer and her correspondent.

In homodiegetic narration, then, there is a gap between the ironic implied author and the unreliable narrator; the secret communication is thus between the implied author and the implied reader at the expense of the narrator. In ‘Love and Freindship’, there is a further gap between the characters who have sense as their ideal and the characters who prefer sensibility. The implied author is close to the Sense characters and the narrator is close to the Sensibility characters, but the implied author’s purpose in mocking the immoral behaviour entailed in conforming to the sentimental system is not to set the reader a negative example, but to create comedy.

5. Multiple ‘Narrators’ in Epistolary Fiction

There are four epistolary sketches with multiple ‘narrators’ in the juvenilia: ‘Amelia Webster’, ‘A Collection of Letters’, ‘The Three Sisters’ and ‘Lesley Castle’. In these narratives, the gaps between the attitudes of the different letter writers, towards each other and towards the subjects of their letters, is a potential
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source of irony, with the exception of ‘A Collection of Letters’, which is a compilation of four separate letters which do not form a coherent story.

The short sketch ‘Amelia Webster’ is, together with ‘Frederic and Elfrida’ and ‘Edgar and Emma’, one of Austen’s very earliest pieces, probably written when she was as young as eleven (Sabor 2006: xxviii). The irony of this story lies in the self-deception and laziness of two of the ‘narrators’, Amelia Webster and Benjamin Bar. Amelia offers cheap excuses such as ‘my Paper reminds me of concluding’ (59) for ending her letter to her friend Maud, when the letter is in fact only a few lines long and she cannot be anywhere near running out of writing space. Benjamin deceives himself into thinking that he is concerned for his fiancée Sally’s health when he chooses a tree which is situated one mile from his house and seven miles from hers as a hiding place for their secret letters: ‘You may perhaps imagine that I might have made choice of a tree which would have divided the Distance more equally […] but as I considered that the walk would be beneficial to you in your weak and uncertain state of Health, I preferred it to one nearer your House’ (59.). It is implied here that Benjamin is in fact lazy and inconsiderate to let Sally, who is apparently seriously ill, risk her health taking long walks to obtain his letters to her. Though this sketch is much shorter than ‘Love and Freindship’, it is clear that here, too, the implied author is distant from and mocks the letter writers.

In ‘The Three Sisters’ there are two ‘narrators’, Mary and Georgiana Stanhope. Mary is extremely mercenary and envious of her sisters, while her younger sister Georgiana is clear-sighted, sensible and observant. Still, Georgiana is not an entirely pleasant person, as she comes up with the plan to trick Mary into marrying Mr Watts, knowing that Mary dislikes him, in order to ensure that neither her other sister, Sophy, nor Georgiana herself is obliged to marry him. She does have a slightly guilty conscience about it, but is satisfied that ‘the circumstances […] excuse’ her behaviour (77). Georgiana’s attitude is very negative and condescending towards Mary, whom she considers greedy and obsessed with fashion, but positive towards Sophy, who is presented as a conventionally good sister. Georgiana and Sophy repeatedly laugh at Mary behind her back, but they are still presented as infinitely more attractive and rational characters than Mary. The implied author is distant from Mary and close to her sisters; however, Georgiana resembles the implied author more than Sophy, because she is wittier and more ironic, whereas Sophy is a more conventionally perfect young lady.

The text thus invites the reader to side with Georgiana and accept her views. The implied author’s stance is that Mary deserves to be subjected to Georgiana’s ‘little deceit’ (77) even though it ruins her life, because, as Georgiana says, ‘Mary is resolved to do that to prevent our supposed happiness which she would not have done to ensure it in reality’ (80). When Mary declares that she hates her intended husband and her mother says it is improper of her, it is the implied author’s stance that the situation is tragic but still humorous. That Georgiana is a reliable ‘narrator’ while Mary is an unreliable one is clear from the Duttons’ reaction to Mary’s attempts to impress them with her forthcoming marriage. Mary wants to ‘[triumph]
over’ her neighbours (85), but Georgiana is ashamed of her behaviour, and it is confirmed that Georgiana’s view of the situation is the more well-founded one, as the Duttons are only surprised that ‘anyone who had Beauty and fortune (tho’ small yet a provision)’ should stoop so low as to marry Mr Watts (86). It is of course Georgiana who interprets the Duttons’ reaction in this way, but the interpretation is supported by their conduct.

The possibilities that Mary sees in marriage are carriages, jewellery, servants, balls and all kinds of amusements, and her idea of a ‘good husband’ is someone who spoils her materially (82-83). Sophy, in contrast, gives voice to another ideal, which constitutes the norm of the text: ‘I expect my Husband to be good tempered and Chearful; to consult my Happiness in all his Actions, and to love me with Constancy and Sincerity’ (83). Though the difference between the sisters’ ideals is striking, most of the irony in ‘The Three Sisters’ lies in Mary and Georgiana’s conflicting views on the events they narrate, and the fact that Mary, unlike the reader, is unaware of the trick Georgiana plays on her.

The epistolary sketch ‘Lesley Castle’ is a story about jealousy between women, but not jealousy over a man – men are largely absent from the plot, two of the most important male characters having died and emigrated respectively. Rather, ‘Lesley Castle’ deals with relationships between women – relationships between friends, between sisters, and between stepmother and stepdaughter. There is a larger number of ‘narrators’ than in the other epistolary sketches: Margaret Lesley, Charlotte Lutterell, Susan Lesley, Eloisa Lutterell and Emma Marlowe.

Margaret is the author of the first letter. Self-knowledge, honesty and modesty are not virtues that characterise Margaret, but on the whole she is not presented as a bad person. There are some implications to the effect that she is perhaps not the most reliable narrator, as she talks about things she cannot know anything about, such as her sister-in-law Louisa’s feelings. She is also sometimes terribly rude to her correspondent, Charlotte, without realising it, notably when she says, ‘How often have I wished that I possessed as little personal Beauty as you do; that my figure were as inelegant; my face as unlovely; and my Appearance as unpleasing as yours!’ (172). In addition to this, Margaret is self-deceptive, which can for example be seen in her reasoning concerning the family jewels. She first ‘wonders how [her step-mother] can […] delight in wearing them’, as ‘an elegant simplicity’ is ‘greatly superior’ to ‘the most studied apparel’ – then it becomes obvious that she in fact resents her father’s having presented his wife rather than his two daughters with the jewels.

Margaret’s friend Charlotte is inadvertently very unfeeling towards her sister Eloisa when the latter’s fiancé Henry Hervey is severely injured shortly before the intended wedding. In a clumsy attempt to console her sister, Charlotte tries to explain why Henry’s misfortune is a worse affliction for Charlotte herself than for Eloisa:
Dear Eloisa (said I) there’s no occasion for your crying so much about a trifle. [...] You see it does not vex me in the least; though perhaps I may suffer most from it after all; for I shall not only be obliged to eat up all the Victuals I have dressed already [for the wedding dinner], but must, if Hervey should recover (which however is not very likely) dress as much for you again; or should he die (as I suppose he will) I shall still have to prepare a Dinner for you whenever you marry any one else. So you see that tho’ perhaps for the present it may afflict you to think of Henry’s sufferings, Yet I dare say he’ll die soon, and then his pain will be over and you will be easy, whereas my Trouble will last much longer for work as I may, I am certain that the pantry cannot be cleared in less than a fortnight. (147-148)

Despite Charlotte’s low level of emotional intelligence, however, she is very encouraging towards her sister: when Eloisa plays the harpsichord she always takes care to cry ‘Bravo, Bravissimo, Encora, Da Capro, allegretto, con espressioné, and Poco presto with many other such outlandish words’ (166). This does show Charlotte as somewhat ignorant, as she obviously does not understand a word of Italian and is not at all knowledgeable about music; but her intention is good nevertheless, and it shows evidence of affection for her sister. Charlotte is also clear-sighted about Susan’s shortcomings even though she is her friend, and she is presented as a reliable judge. Both Margaret and Charlotte have flaws, but neither is condemned for them by the implied author. Though the implied author is not particularly close to any of the characters, Charlotte’s attitude is perhaps closer to the implied author’s than the others’ are, as both she and the implied author are ‘satirical’ – it is with delight that Charlotte remembers her ‘witty’ retort to her sister’s wish that she would ‘[keep] [her] Admiration to [her]self’ and not applaud Eloisa’s musical performances so boisterously: ‘I beg you would be quite at your Ease with respect to all such fears in future, for be assured that I shall always keep my Admiration to myself and my own pursuits and never extend it to yours’ (166.)

Susan, on the other hand, is presented as thoroughly disagreeable, and she is very distant from the implied author. She has bad taste and is biased and vain, without Charlotte’s sense of humour or anything else to compensate for her bad qualities. Like Mary in ‘The Three Sisters’, she admits to thinking her husband ugly, which appears to be an example of grave misconduct in the implied author’s book. Furthermore, Susan is short and hates tall women, which the implied author seems to invite the reader to regard less favourably than the tall Margaret’s speaking disparagingly of Susan’s stature.

The implied author’s attitude to Eloisa is sympathetic, but she is presented as somewhat boring. All the ‘narrators’ are more or less gossipy and preoccupied with the personal appearances of other women, but in comparison to the other characters, Eloisa and Emma are presented as good people. By the time their perspectives are introduced, however, Margaret and Charlotte are firmly established as the main characters. In addition, Margaret and Charlotte are much more interesting and funny – not funny in the sense of ‘ridiculous’, as in the case of Laura and Sophia in ‘Love and Freindship’, but in the sense of making intentional
and amusing jokes. Similarly, they are not flawed in the sense of ‘utterly bad’, but in the sense of ‘human’. These less-than-perfect but attractive characters are not more distant from the implied author than characters such as Eloisa and Emma, though Eloisa and Emma’s conduct and character are presented as being of a higher moral standard. As in many of the sketches, the question of distance from the implied author is not a question of morality for morality’s sake.

The contrasts between the different letter writers’ narratives make the text ironic in its many incongruities. The information given by different ‘narrators’ sometimes does not agree, for example when Charlotte tells Margaret that Susan ‘rouges a good deal’ (154), after which Susan says that Charlotte ‘can witness how often I have protested against wearing Rouge, and how much I always told you I disliked it’ (163). Charlotte astutely interprets the discrepancies between Margaret’s and Susan’s letters: they are both ‘jealous of each others Beauty’ (164). The comedy and the irony of ‘Lesley Castle’ lies in the discrepancy between the different points of view presented by the different ‘narrators’ on the events and characters of the story. Here, the sketch makes use of the specific possibilities of the epistolary genre.

6. Conclusion

The implied authors of all of Austen’s juvenilia have an ironic intent, but the ironic situations of the individual pieces differ according to narrative situation. In the case of heterodiegetic narrators, with the exception of the Historian in ‘The History of England’, who resembles a homodiegetic narrator, the narrator’s attitude is close to that of the implied author and the characters are distant from the implied author, which means that the attitudinal gap is between the narrator and the characters. In ‘Love and Freindship’, which is the only extended narrative with only one homodiegetic narrator, the narrator’s attitude is distant from the implied author’s, while the attitudes of the characters vary so that some are close to the narrator and others are close to the implied author. The crucial gap is between the implied author and the narrator. In the case of multiple homodiegetic ‘narrators’, too, their attitudes vary – some are close to the implied author, while some are distant and others are semi-close. Here, the gap is between the different ‘narrators’. The conclusion that can be drawn from this is that the heterodiegetic narrators’ attitude towards the propositions they make is ironic, while the homodiegetic narrators’ attitude towards their propositions is serious, and the gap between this attitude and the ironic attitude of the implied authors makes the narrators unreliable. The attitudes of the ‘narrators’ of the epistolary sketches vary, but they are usually serious and therefore unreliable.

The heterodiegetic narrators in Austen’s juvenilia employ the tone of a conventional sentimental narrator, and they are therefore not immediately recognisable as ironic. As the heterodiegetic narrators imitate both conventional sentimental narrators and their own characters, the characters’ tone is not very
different from the narrators’. The unrealistic and fundamentally ironic mode allows this – it is impossible to imagine the characters’ reason for speaking as they do, as it would have no purpose if it were not for the implied author’s ironic intent, but the ironic narrator is the linguistic medium that renders their speech and is therefore in charge of how the characters express themselves. The ironic heterodiegetic narrators are in control of the comedy and aware of the humorous aspects of what they narrate, in contrast to homodiegetic narration, where the comedy is often in the narrator’s unawareness of the implications of his/her own narrative. In ‘Love and Freindship’, the division of the characters into the contrasting ideals of Sense and Sensibility creates a chasm between two conflicting worldviews rather than just a gap between two individual personae. The fact that the narrator, who is the mediator between the story world and the reader, is on the side of Sensibility creates a further gap between the narrator and the reader, as the text invites the reader to take the implied author’s stance, that of Sense.

In the epistolary sketches with multiple ‘narrators’, the irony is largely based on the gaps between the attitudes of the different letter writers, who are in varying degree close to or distant from the ironic implied author. Characters such as Eloisa Lutterell and Sophy Stanhope may be ‘good’, but they are not closer to the implied author than their arguably less moral sisters Charlotte and Georgiana: the implied author is not itself that ‘good’, but values perspicacity higher than kindness and adherence to the prevailing moral code. That does not mean that the implied author does not consider it a good thing to be a good person, but the norms of these texts are not predominantly moral, and the irony of the texts is not prescriptive. The really bad characters (Mary Stanhope and Susan Lesley) are more distant from the implied author than the good ones (Sophy Stanhope and Eloisa Lutterell); the implied author is, however, closest to the semi-good characters (Georgiana Stanhope and Charlotte Lutterell). The latter are not immoral in the way that Laura and Sophia are in ‘Love and Freindship’: rather than being completely depraved, they display a balance between winning qualities and human flaws. Moreover, while the implied author reveals its moral stance, its main concern is not morals but comedy; as long as the text is witty and entertaining, the implied author appears not to worry about the moral message it may be construed as putting across.

In her published novels, Austen has abandoned the unbridled burlesque mode of her early writings, but the irrepressible humour of the youthful ironist is always present just below the surface, and the implied authors of Austen’s novels share the essentially ironic stance expressed in her early sketches. An understanding of the workings of attitude and irony in Austen’s juvenilia, therefore, can contribute to a fuller understanding of Austen as a mature writer, in addition to the juvenilia’s constituting an example of how the stance of irony can be expressed in literary narration.
Notes
1. Alexander (2005: 87) questions the practice of preserving spelling mistakes in publications of juvenile writings, pointing out that the spelling of adult writers, when faulty, is always corrected before a work is published. The preservation of the original spelling and punctuation in publications of Austen’s juvenilia has probably given rise to the preconception that the stories are only childish attempts and contributed to many readers’ and scholars’ failure to recognise them as literary works merit serious attention. Nevertheless, this study will follow the convention of not correcting spelling mistakes, and reproduce the orthography as rendered in the Cambridge edition of the juvenilia (Sabor, 2006). Henceforth, incorrect spelling will not be marked ‘[sic]’.
2. Austen was in fact only fourteen at the time of composition, ‘Love and Freindship’ being dated 13 June (Sabor 2006: 141) and her birthday being 16 December.
3. Cf. the distinction between first-person and third-person narrator. A first-person narrator tells a story about him/herself and thus refers to the main character as ‘I’, whereas a third-person narrator tells a story about someone else and thus refers to the main character as ‘he’ or ‘she’. Both kinds of narrators, however, refer to themselves as ‘I’.
5. The narrator status of these ‘narrators’ is doubtful for the same reasons that were given in connection with those epistolary sketches that have multiple ‘narrators’.
6. Bravo/-a = good. Bravissimo/-a = very good. Ancora (It.) = more. Encore (Fr.) = more (used in English as a request for more music). Capro = goat. Da capo = from the beginning. Allegretto = somewhat briskly. Con espressione = with expression. Poco presto = a little very fast. ‘Bravo’, ‘bravissimo’ and ‘encore’ are appropriate interjections at the end of a musical performance, but the other four terms are the composer’s instructions for the musician, some of them slightly misremembered by Charlotte.

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Epistemic modal verbs in Shakespeare and Marlowe

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Abstract
This paper seeks to present the status and the use of modal verbs expressing epistemic stance in the plays of the two most prominent playwrights of Early Modern English period, William Shakespeare and Christopher Marlowe. The study is based on the comparative analysis of the plays written between 1593-1599, and provides an interesting insight into the earlier stage of the development of epistemic modality. The paper presents both descriptive and quantitative data supported by a number of quotations. It considers only those modals which have been used by the authors in clearly epistemic contexts, namely may, might, would, should, and must.

1. Introduction
The aim of the study is to shed some light on the use and the function of modal verbs as epistemic stance markers in the plays of Early Modern English playwrights, William Shakespeare and Christopher Marlowe. In particular, it seeks to investigate whether both writers use the modal verbs in the same manner and with a similar distribution. The plays constitute an especially interesting area of research as they provide a fascinating insight into the language of Renaissance drama. Modality is a linguistic concept which offers a great potential for study. Epistemic modality, the expression of the speaker’s assumptions, judgements, and beliefs, offers a huge potential for a comparative analysis and provides a better understanding of an Early Modern English speaker.

The first part of the paper seeks to define epistemic modality and characterise its distinctiveness from other types of modality. In the second part, each modal is dealt with separately, including a brief review of its historical development and the attested status in the plays of Shakespeare and Marlowe. In the final part of the paper, the reader will find the outcomes of the analysis and the conclusions.
2. Epistemic modality

Linguists traditionally divide English modals into two or three main types. The twofold division offers a distinction between epistemic and non-epistemic, or ‘root’, modality (Coates 1983), whereas the threefold division splits the latter one into deontic and dynamic modality (Palmer 1990, Warner 2009). Regardless this apparent dissidence, there seems to be very little disagreement about the recognition of epistemic modality, which is the most distinct, internally regular, complete, and the simplest type of modality (Palmer 1990: 50).

Epistemic modality seeks to make judgements about the actuality of the proposition in relation to reality. Palmer (1990: 50) calls this type of modality, the modality of propositions, whose function “is to make judgments about the possibility, etc., that something is or is not the case.” Similarly, Coates (1983: 18) points out that epistemic modality “is concerned with the speaker’s assumptions or assessment of possibilities and, in most cases, it indicates the speaker’s confidence (or lack of confidence) in the truth of the proposition expressed.” According to Warner (2009: 14) “epistemic modality typically involves a statement of the speaker’s attitude towards the status of the truth of a proposition: that the proposition is necessarily true, probably true, predicted to be true, etc.” Warner (2009: 14) further points out that such statement may involve “an assessment based on logical inference from evidence (commonly unstated) […], and a paraphrase in such terms or in terms of the speaker’s confidence in the truth of the proposition is often reasonable.” Aijmer (1985: 11) considers epistemic modality as “the speaker’s qualification of the truth of what is said.” All in all, the linguists seem to agree that epistemic modality necessarily involves the biased evaluation performed by the speaker, and this particularity makes epistemic modality typically subjective.

Subjectivity is a fundamental feature of modal, opinion-based utterances. As Coates (1983: 20) claims, very little indeterminacy may be observed in the epistemic category, and “the overwhelming majority of cases are unambiguously subjective.” In other words, using Coates’s (1983: 20) terminology, subjectivity constitutes the core of epistemic modality, whereas objectivity, with merely few examples, is placed at the periphery. Palmer (1990: 50) seems to support this view and notices that “epistemic modals are normally subjective, i.e. the epistemic judgement rests with the speaker.” This important indication complies with Visser (1978: 1768) who uses a term ‘subjective possibility’, and narrows its reference to “an eventuality, contingency or the admissibility of a supposition” with “an element of uncertainty, and occasionally a slight tinge of permission.”

Coates (1983: 20) argues that epistemic modality as a category is relatively distinct from root modality due to the following characteristics:

a. each epistemic modal may be assigned “a comprehensive definition such as ‘epistemic modality expresses the speaker’s reservations about asserting the truth of the proposition’” (Coates 1983: 20);
Epistemic modal verbs in Shakespeare and Marlowe

b. epistemic modals exhibit some grammatical features such as:
   - negation affects the proposition, not the modality (does not apply to suppletive can’t);
   - no past tense forms (apart from might for may in reported speech);
   - have + en affects the proposition, not the modality;
   - the co-occurrence with some syntactic forms (have + en, be + ing, etc.);

As for the lack of the past forms of English epistemic modals, Palmer (1990: 10) explains that this is due to the fact that these verbs are mainly non-factual devices whose function is to “make a judgement about the truth of the propositions” (Palmer 1990: 10). As Palmer (1990: 10) further argues, although it is logically possible to make a present judgement about a past proposition (e.g. ‘John may have been there yesterday’ = ‘I judge it is possible that John was there yesterday’), it is impossible to make a judgement in the past. Hence the lack of the past tense forms of epistemic modal verbs in English.

In the subjective interpretation of epistemic modals Coates (1983: 19) places the verbs on a two-scale model which takes into account not only the inferential and non-inferential element, but also considers the extremes representing confidence and doubt. The confident modals, according to Coates (1983: 19), include must (inferential) and will (non-inferential), whereas the doubtful modals include should and ought (inferential) as well as may, might and could (non-inferential). The following interpretation of epistemic modals is offered by Coates (1983: 19):

- must = from the evidence available I confidently infer that...
- should, ought = from the evidence available I tentatively assume that...
- will = I confidently predict that...
- may, might, could = I think it is perhaps possible that...

Palmer (1990: 50-60) considers epistemic modals in terms of possibility (may) and necessity (must, a semi-modal be bound to). Additionally, the author devotes some special attention to the modal will (indicating a reasonable conclusion), and the tentative forms might, would and should.

Epistemic may indicating possibility is paraphrased by Palmer (1990: 51) as ‘possible that’ and is said to refer to:

1. states in either the present or the future;
2. action in progress (both present and future);
3. habitual activity;
4. a single future action;
5. future time with the progressive form regardless the duration of an action;
6. concession.
By means of epistemic necessity the speaker expresses their strong confidence or belief in the truth of what is being said. Palmer (1990: 53) offers the interpretation of epistemic must as ‘The only possible conclusion is that...’, or with double negation ‘It is not possible that... not...’. Epistemic must, as noted by Palmer (1990: 53) is generally used to relate to:

1. the states or activity in the present;
2. habitual activity;
3. future time (where the context makes epistemic interpretation more likely).

Since epistemic will is the expression of neither possibility nor necessity, Palmer (1990: 57) discusses the verb under a separate section, and explains that “epistemic will refers to what it is reasonable to expect. It can be roughly paraphrased by ‘A reasonable inference is that...’”. The author indicates that the most common reference of the modal is present time, and when it refers to a future action, an ambiguity emerges making it difficult or even impossible to differentiate between epistemic will and the will of futurity, as in:

(1) John will go to London tomorrow. (Palmer 1990: 57)

This obscurity may be overcome by the introduction of the progressive form of the following verb, regardless the duration of an action, in order to denote epistemicity, e.g.:

(2) John will be going to London tomorrow. (Palmer 1990: 57)

A separate section is also devoted by Palmer (1990: 58) to tentative forms might, would and should. According to Palmer (1990: 58), might, the tentative or unreal form of may, is used in exactly the same way, but with a slightly less certainty about the possibility. Would, the tentative form of will, is paraphrased by Palmer (1990: 58) as ‘I should think that...’ or ‘It would be reasonable to conclude that...’. Should does not express necessity, but extreme likelihood, or a reasonable assumption or conclusion (Palmer 1990: 59), and, as the author points out, many cases are not clear, dependent on an ambiguous interpretation as epistemic or dynamic modality.

3. Corpus

The study is based on the analysis of Early Modern English texts constituting a substantial corpus of 282,305 words. Not only has such an extensive material guaranteed reliable statistical calculations, but it also allowed to make additional subdivisions, and consequently provided sufficient space for contrastive
observations. The database consists only of the plays written by Christopher Marlowe and William Shakespeare at the end of the sixteenth century, i.e. between 1593-1599. The collection of Shakespeare’s plays has been further divided into two smaller corpora comprising the tragedies and the history plays.

The plays of Christopher Marlowe:
1. *Dido, Queen of Carthage*
2. *The First Part of Tamburlaine the Great*
3. *The Second part of Tamburlaine the Great*
4. *The Jew of Malta*
5. *Doctor Faustus*
6. *Edward the Second*
7. *The Massacre at Paris*

The tragedies of William Shakespeare:
1. *Titus Andronicus*
2. *Romeo and Juliet*
3. *Julius Caesar*

The history plays of William Shakespeare:
1. *The First Part of King Henry VI*
2. *The Second Part of King Henry VI*
3. *The Third Part of King Henry VI*
4. *The Tragedy of King Richard II*

4. **Analysis**

4.1. *May*
The modal verb *may* is a descendant of the OE verb *magan*, indicating physical ability. Among the lexical meanings listed by the OED one may find ‘to be strong’, ‘to have power or influence’ or ‘to be able to do or be’. At this early stage the modal denotes mainly dynamic values paraphrased as ‘be able to’, and only occasionally interpreted as permissive (Traugott 1972: 72). In the later OE period *may* expressing “objective possibility, opportunity, or absence of prohibitive conditions” (Visser 1978: 1756) starts to be used next to *may* indicating ability. According to Visser (1978: 1754), the ability and power expressed by the verb *magan* depend on the individual intrinsic features rather than outer conditions. This relation makes the verb synonymous to *can*, and prolongs its use as such until the end of the seventeenth century (Visser 1978: 1754). Although the OED fails to mention any epistemic senses of OE *mæg*, Warner (1990: 166) provides some examples, and argues that “*mæg* could be used in epistemic contexts, even if this did not form an important part of its meaning and was partly restricted to contexts which neutralized the epistemic-dynamic distinction” (Warner 1990: 166). This
view seems to be supported by Facchinetti (1993: 216) who also lists the epistemic meanings of the OE verb.

Some more crystal instances of epistemic *may* are encountered from early ME period (Warner 2009: 176). Other references of the verb at this stage include permission, sanction (Visser 1978: 1765), and future possibility (Warner 2009: 176).

During the EModE period *may* exhibits the increasing tendency towards the epistemic value (Facchinetti 1993: 217). Similarly, Warner (1990: 181) observes the expansion of epistemic (and also deontic) sense, as well as the decline of dynamic *may* and the loss of the subject-oriented sense ‘be able’ seized by the modal *can*. The EModE period witnesses also the establishing of optative *may* expressing “a wish whose realisation depends on conditions beyond the power or control of the speaker” (Visser 1978: 1785). Additionally, *may* becomes commonly employed in clauses initiated by *that or lest*, and depending on *fear, afraid, dread*, etc. (Visser 1978: 1784).

In PDE *may* has an indisputable status of an epistemic modal whose function is “to make judgments about possibility, etc., that something is or is not the case” (Palmer 1990: 50). In his earlier work, Palmer (1990: 107) provides an interpretation of epistemic *may* as “‘possible that…’, but with the suggestion that the speaker makes a judgment about what ‘may’ be”, and further notices that the verb occurs in propositions indicating not only activities and actions, but also states.

The interpretation of EModE *may* is troublesome owing to the fact that the period is the witness to the transformation of the verb from dynamic into epistemic and deontic values (Warner 2009: 181). As a result, a number of attested cases constitute epistemic-dynamic hybrids exhibiting a simultaneous projection of the two senses. In order to avoid miscalculation, the ambiguous instances have been excluded, and only the most transparent representatives have been categorised as members of one or the other modality. The distribution of the verbs are given in Relative Frequencies (RF).

The analysis of the corpus has shown that in the plays of Christopher Marlowe epistemic *may* constitutes approximately one fourth (4.16 RF) of all occurrences of the verb, giving way to the prevailing dynamic instances (17.89 RF). The author tends to employ epistemic *may* in order to denote the subjective and fallible conclusion of the speaker, based on some facts or information. The highest distribution of the epistemic modal has been attested in *Dido, Queen of Carthage* (6.14 RF), whereas the lowest in *Tamburlaine the Great* 2 (2.61 RF).

The examples (3-5) illustrate an intensified subjective use of the modal *may*, in which the subjectivity of the judgment is strengthened by the use of the verb *hope* (4) and the adverb *likely* (5).

(3) Returne with speed, time passeth swift away,
    Our life is fraile, and we *may* die to day. (C. M., *Tamburlaine the Great* 1,
    I.ii22)
I hope our Ladies treasure and our owne,
May serve for ransome to our liberties: (C. M., Tamburlaine the Great 1, 1.2.)

And seeing they are not idle, but still doing,
'Tis likely they in time may reap some fruit,
I meane in fulnesse of perfection. (C. M., The Jew of Malta, 2.3.)

In the plays of William Shakespeare the total distribution of epistemic *may* is higher than in Marlowe’s texts, and constitutes one third of all occurrences. Consequently, the discrepancy between epistemic (3.17 RF) and dynamic (9.75 RF) senses of *may* is lower. Interestingly, the analysis of the plays has revealed that William Shakespeare tends to employ epistemic *may* more frequently in the histories (3.33 RF) than in the tragedies (2.93 RF).

Example (6) shows *may* indicating the uncertainty of the supposition. In (7) the subjective conclusion of the speaker is additionally strengthened by the epistemic adverb *perhaps*, which excludes the dynamic interpretation of the modal *may*.

(6) It *may* be so; but yet my inward soul
Persuades me it is otherwise: howe'er it be,
I cannot but be sad; (W. Sh., The Tragedy of King Richard II, 2.2.)

(7) Your grace *may* starve *perhaps* before that time. (W. Sh., Henry the Sixth, Part One, 3.2.)

(8) He *may* mean more than we poor men do know:
These women are shrewd tempters with their tongues. (W. Sh., Henry the Sixth, Part One, 1.2.)

4.2. *Might*
The ancestor the modal verb *might* is the OE verb of Germanic origin *miht* or *mieht* (OED). The verb is originally a past form of *may*, and thus denotes the meanings conveyed by its present counterpart. OE *might* followed by an infinitive expresses “objective possibility, opportunity, or absence of prohibitive conditions in the past” (Visser 1978: 1758).

In the ME period *might* starts to indicate “permission or sanction in the past” (Visser 1978: 1767). The first representatives of this meaning are traced back by Visser (1978: 1767) to the fifteenth century, when the verb is as common as the modal *may*. In questions, however, *might* is felt to be the more respectful and courteous option, indicating hesitation, reluctance or diffidence of the speaker (Visser 1978: 1767).

The EModE period introduces the use of the modal in the structures ‘*might* + infinitive’, or ‘*might* + have + past participle’ in which it is “used to make a suggestion which amounts to a request, to express a, mostly mild, reproach or protest, or to convey a kind of complaint” (Visser 1978: 1764). Since Visser (1978:
1764) encounters only one instance of this meaning in ME texts, *might* of this type may be considered an innovation of EModE period.

Throughout all stages of its development, it is typical for the modal *might* to occur in clauses which depend on verbs expressing hope, wish, pray, desire, demand, beseech, etc., but not earlier than in ME with verb *fear* and the nouns such as *fear, dread, afraid*, etc. (Visser 1978: 1783-1784).

Only a trace of epistemic *might* (six instances equal to 0.47 RF) has been detected in the plays of Christopher Marlowe, as opposed to the more numerous dynamic sense of the verb (2.81 RF). Similarly to *may*, the attested representatives of epistemic *might* express the suspicion or personal judgment of the speaker based on some evidence. The examples (9-11) illustrate Marlowe's use of epistemic *might* with reference to the present (9-10) and the past (11):

(9) *Agidas*, leave to wound me with these words:
    And speake of *Tamburlaine* as he deserves.
    The entertainment we have had of him,
    Is far from villanie or servitude.
    And *might* in noble minds be counted princely. (C. M., *Tamburlaine the Great I*, 3.2.)

(10) What *might* the staying of my bloud portend?
    Is it vnwilling I should write this bill?
    Why streames it not, that I may write afresh? (C. M., *Doctor Faustus*, 5)

(11) The late suspition of the Duke of *Guise*,
    *Might* well have moved your highnes to beware
    How you did meddle with such dangerous giftes. (C. M., *Massacre at Paris*, 3)

Epistemic *might* encountered in the plays of William Shakespeare also denotes the subjective assumption of the speaker based on some facts or data. The distribution of epistemic value (0.47 RF) is much lower than the dynamic one (2.81 RF). Interestingly, the instances are similarly residual in the history plays (0.60 RF) and the tragedies (0.29 RF).

(12) The splitting rocks cower'd in the sinking sands
    And would not dash me with their ragged sides,
    Because thy flinty heart, more hard than they,
    *Might* in thy palace perish Margaret. (W. Sh., *Henry the Sixth, Part Two*, 3.2.)

(13) It must be by his death: and for my part,
    I know no personal cause to spurn at him,
    But for the general. He would be crown'd:
    How that *might* change his nature, there's the question. (W. Sh., *Julius Caesar*, 2.1.)
4.3. **Would**

PDE *would* has developed from the OE preterit form *wolde*, which at this stage “is used almost exclusively to signal volition of the subject in the past, just as *wylle* was used to express volition in the present” (Bybee 1995: 505).

By the ME period *wolde*, particularly with first and second person subject, begins to indicate present context (Bybee 1995: 505). According to Bybee (1995: 508-509), in *Sir Gawain and the Green Knight* the semantic content of hypothetical *wolde* is basically the same as the one of *wylle*, namely the conditions are explicit, whereas with the present uses of *wolde* they are only implied. What is more, some examples provided by Bybee (1995: 509-512) indicate that hypothetical *wolde* may retain some of its lexical meaning, that is hypothetical willingness.

During the EModE period the uses of *would* in present and hypothetical contexts increase, whereas the past use of the verb almost totally disappears (Bybee 1995: 511). The findings of Bybee (1995: 512) show that at this stage *would* is volitional in present contexts, indicating the willingness of the subject (mostly the first person singular). Similarly, *would* in *if*-clauses tends to maintain its volitional meaning. When used with the third person subject, *would* loses its volitional content and conveys a purely conditional meaning (Bybee 1995: 512). This use, however, does not seem an innovation of the EModE period, as Bybee (1995: 512) traces an instance of conditional *would* back to ME period.

The analysis has shown that in the works of both Christopher Marlowe and William Shakespeare epistemic *would* serves to express the judgement which is based on the data available to the speaker, such as previous events or personal experience. Epistemic *would* constitutes merely a residual quantity equal to 1.12 RF in Marlowe, and 3.28 RF in Shakespeare. Additionally, the analysis has shown that epistemic *would* is only slightly more numerous in the histories (3.53 RF) than in the tragedies (2.93 RF).

(14) Sweete father leave to weepe, this is not he:  
For were it *Priam* he *would* smile on me. (C. M., *Dido, Queen of Carthage*, 2.1.)

(15) Nor thou, nor he, are any sons of mine;  
My sons *would* never so dishonour me:  
Traitor, restore Lavinia to the emperor. (W. Sh., *Titus Andronicus*, 1.1.)

(16) If they did kill thy husband, then be joyful  
Because the law hath ta'en revenge on them.  
No, no, they *would* not do so foul a deed;  
Witness the sorrow that their sister makes. (W. Sh., *Titus Andronicus*, 3.1.)

4.4. **Should**

OE *sceolde*, the past form of *sceal* (OED), is an antecedent of PDE *should*. The meaning of OE *sceolde* is “destiny, duty or obligation of the subject in the past, corresponding to *sceal*, which has the same meaning in the present” (Bybee 1995: 504). Similarly to *would*, *should* undergoes an extension of its context onto the
hypothetical use. According to Bybee (1995: 509) this development is enhanced by the lack of clear indication as to the completion of the action. “In Middle English we find many uses of *schulde* to refer to what was to take place, without any implication that it did take place [...]. As with *wolde*, all the conditions necessary for the completion of the main predicate may not be met, so the use of *schulde* is appropriate in a hypothetical conditional” (Bybee 1995: 509). Bybee (1995: 510) provides a number of examples which show that at this stage the modality indicated by *schulde* may continue from the past into the present.

During the ME period the original lexical meaning of *should* denoting obligation or destiny weakens considerably in hypothetical contexts (Bybee 1995: 510). The verb itself does not indicate a past sense unless it is supported by auxiliary *have*. Visser (1978: 1636) provides some examples of *should* denoting epistemic necessity and originating at the end of this period.

In the EModE period *should* becomes increasingly numerous in present and hypothetical contexts. The innovation of this period is “the occurrence of *should* in complement clauses where no past time is signalled or implied” (Bybee 1995: 511). A purely conditional or hypothetical sense is conveyed by *should* in conditional sentences, frequently in first person and *if*-clauses, and rarely in second or third person *then*-clauses (Bybee 1995: 512-513). The evolution of *should* results in the verb expressing weak obligation, a meaning that is close to its present counterpart *shall*.

In Marlowe’s plays epistemic *should* is employed to express the assumption of the speaker based on the knowledge or circumstances, with a moderate degree of certainty which allows fallibility. Epistemic *should* is very scarce in the works of Christopher Marlowe, with only three representatives constituting 0.26 RF.

(17) **Aeneas**
Where am I now? these *should* be Carthage waless.

**Achates**
Why stands my sweete Aeneas thus amazde?

**Aeneas**
O my Achates, Theban Niobe,
Who for her sonnes death wept out life and breath,
And drie with grieve was turnd into a stone,
Had not such passions in her head as I. [Sees Priams statue.]
Me thinkes that towne there *should* be Troy, yon Idas hill,
There Zanthus streame, because here's Priamus,
And when I know it is not, then I dye. (C. M., *Dido, Queen of Carthage*, 2.1.)

William Shakespeare tends to employ epistemic *should* more frequently in the history plays (21.21 RF) than in the tragedies (3.52 RF). The modal expresses the assumption of the speaker concerning the state of the events. Palmer (1990: 134) offers to paraphrase epistemic *should* as ‘it is likely or probable that...’.
(18) SOMERSET
   It is not his, my lord; here Southam lies:
   The drum your honour hears marcheth from Warwick.

WARWICK
   Who should that be? belike, unlook'd-for friends. (W. Sh., Henry the Sixth,
   Part Three, 5.1.)

(19) This, by his voice, should be a Montague. (W. Sh., Romeo and Juliet, 1.5.)

(20) As I remember, this should be the house.
   Being holiday, the beggar's shop is shut. (W. Sh., Romeo and Juliet, 5.1.)

In both Marlowe and Shakespeare (21-24), epistemic should is preceded by the
impersonal construction me thinkes, commonly used in OE and ME periods. This
structure functions as an intentional manoeuvre highlighting the process of sensual
perception and a consecutive mental analysis leading to a deduction and the rise of
certain expectations. The role of perception as a trigger for mental operations is
stressed by Sabatini (1979). The author points out that the OE construction me
thinketh that indicates “far less the mental operation of ratiocination than the idea
of sense perception” (Sabatini 1979: 151). As he further explains “what speakers
are really saying when they utter the expression we think is it appears or seems
thus to us. With the perception of an object or a phenomenon comes the
internalization of mental operation engaged in by the beholder upon reacting to the
stimulus: what we perceive causes us to designate as ... (note factitive import)”
(Sabatini 1979: 151).

The frequency of occurrence of the modal and the impersonal construction in
the works of Christopher Marlowe is relatively low and equals 0.52 RF. The
representatives of this type are equally residual in Shakespeare where they
constitute the total relative frequency 0.71 RF, and are slightly more numerous in
the histories (1.11 RF) than in the tragedies (0.14 RF).

(21) By Mahomet he shal be tied in chaines,
   Rowing with Christians in a Brigandine,
   About the Grecian Isles to rob and spoile:
   And turne him to his ancient trade againe.
   Me thinkes the slave should make a lusty theefe. (C. M., Tamburlaine the
   Great 2, 3.5.)

(22) This is the ware wherein consists my wealth:
   And thus me thinkes should men of judgement frame
   Their meanes of traffique from the vulgar trade,
   And as their wealth increaseth, so inclose
   Infinite riches in a little roome. (C. M., The Jew of Malta, 1.1.)

(23) Methinks a woman of this valiant spirit
   Should, if a coward heard her speak these words,
   Infuse his breast with magnanimity
And make him, naked, foil a man at arms. (W. Sh., Henry the Sixth, Part Three, 5.4.)

(24) But methinks he should stand in fear of
  fire, being burnt i' the hand for stealing of sheep. (W. Sh., Henry the Sixth, Part Two, 4.2.)

4.5. **Must**

According to OED *must* is “originally the past tense of OE *mote*”, which inherited its meanings “from Gothic and Early Germanic *mot- ‘ability, measure, have room for’*” (Traugott and Dasher 2004: 122). During the first stage of its development *must* extends its meaning from weak permission to strong obligation.

In terms of ability, a distinction may be drawn between two different domains, namely the participant-internal and the participant-external ability. The former constitutes the original and fundamental meaning of the verb which had emerged before the participant-external ability developed.

The OE period constitutes the first stage of the evolution of *must*, during which *mote* indicates mainly ability and permission (Traugott and Dasher 2004: 122). Throughout this and the ME period the permissive meaning is still much more common than ability, however, it begins to be restricted mainly to the formulae for prayers, blessings, curses, and oaths. From the second half of the thirteenth century the permissive sense of the verb decreases gradually and is finally lost to *may* at the beginning of the ME period (Traugott – Dasher 2004, Visser 1978). The first occurrences of epistemic *must* are traced back by Warner (1990: 180) to the late ME period. Although *mot* is found in both epistemic and deontic contexts throughout the OE and ME periods, it is gradually replaced by the verb *must* in late ME period (Warner 2009: 174).

In EModE *must* is mainly used as an epistemic and a subjective deontic modal (Kakietek 1972: 63-66). In the plays of Christopher Marlowe epistemic *must* indicating the judgement of a speaker on the proposition which is being uttered is very infrequent. Only two instances (25-26) of this type of meaning have been detected in the corpus constituting the total relative frequency 0.17 RF. The analysis of the corpus has shown that Christopher Marlowe most commonly employs dynamic or ‘neutral’ *must* (12.33 RF), which serves to express the necessity for an action or an event to take place but without imposing an obligation on the interlocutor.

(25) And saw'st thou not
  Mine Argosie at Alexandria?
  Thou couldst not come from Egypt, or by Caire
  But at the entry there into the sea,
  Where Nitus payes his tribute to the maine,
  Thou needs *must* saile by Alexandria. (C. M., The Jew of Malta, 1.1.)
(26) **Knight**

Tut, Jew, we know thou art no souldier;
Thou art a Merchant, and a monied man,
And 'tis thy mony, Barabas, we seeke.

**Barabas**

How, my Lord, my mony?

**Governor**

Thine and the rest.

For to be short, amongst you 't must be had. (C. M., *The Jew of Malta*, 1.2.)

William Shakespeare seems to be as reluctant to employ epistemic *must* (27) as Marlowe. This meaning of the modal is merely residual in both the histories (0.10 RF) and the tragedies (0.73 RF) of the playwright, and constitutes the total distribution 0.41 RF.

(27) My credit now stands on such slippery ground,
That one of two bad ways you *must* conceit me,
Either a coward or a flatterer. (W. Sh., *Julius Caesar*, 3.1.)

5. Findings

In order to detect significant differences in the distribution of modal verbs, two tests for statistical significance have been applied, that is the chi-square test and the *z*-test. Firstly, a comparative analysis of Shakespeare’s and Marlowe’s plays was carried out. The following are the findings of the investigation:

1. a significant difference has been revealed in the distribution of the epistemic modal *would* (*p* > 0.01)
2. both playwrights exhibit no significant differences in the distribution of the epistemic verbs *may* and *might*. (*p* > 0.01)
3. the epistemic modals *should* and *must* had to be excluded and no tests were applied due to the very scarce distribution of the verbs.

Secondly, a comparison of Shakespeare’s tragedies and history plays has been conducted with the following outcomes:

1. no significant differences have been detected in the distribution of the epistemic modals *would*, *should* and *may*.
2. no tests were applied to the epistemic modals *must* and *might* because of the very low distribution of the verbs.
6. Conclusions

The analysis of the plays of Christopher Marlowe and William Shakespeare has shown that both playwrights tend to employ the same modals in order to denote epistemic possibility (may, might, would, should) and epistemic necessity (must).

The fact that no substantial differences have been observed in the distribution of the modals within the tragedies and history plays of William Shakespeare suggests that the Early Modern English modals expressing epistemic stance are not genre-sensitive, and they remain indifferent to the literary category in which they are accommodated.

The epistemic modal must generally exhibits a very low distribution regardless the literary genre or the authorship of the plays. A conclusion may be drawn that perhaps epistemic must is not yet as widespread at the times of Marlowe and Shakespeare as some linguists claim (e.g. Kakietek 1972: 63-66).

The most puzzling results of the analysis regard the epistemic modal would and its asymmetrical distribution in the plays of Christopher Marlowe (1.12 RF) and William Shakespeare (3.28 RF). Marlowe seems to be very reluctant to use epistemic would, whereas Shakespeare employs it more willingly not only in the histories but also in the tragedies. This fact may corroborate that the use of the modal is not yet standardised at the end of the sixteenth century.

In both corpora no clear instances of epistemic will have been encountered. This may be partially explained by the pattern of historical development of the verb. According to Aijmer (1985: 17) the verb will undergoes a transition from volition to futurity and modality so the emergence of epistemic (and deontic) meanings takes place during the final stage of the evolution. A prevailing number of instances detected in the corpus have been categorised as predictive or declarative, as no transparent indication of epistemicity has been identified. This approach follows Visser’s (1978: 1698) attempt at drawing line between modal and temporal will, although Wischer (2008: 140) argues that “futurity is never completely free of modal meanings. It always implies some kind of epistemic modality in combination with the future reference”. The findings of the analysis seem to support the position of Aijmer (1985: 16), who admits that at the early stage of the development of will, when the verb starts to denote futurity, the vagueness between ‘pure’ future and volition can be observed, and the differentiation between the two meanings is not always possible.

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The discursive effects of Spanish impersonals *uno* and *se*.  
A case study of the phenomena of speaker inclusion and female-only reference

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**Abstract**  
In this article, I will compare the discursive functioning of Spanish constructions with *uno* and *se*, which both allow for keeping the agent/experiencer out of focus and for expressing genericity. I will first briefly introduce the main features of both constructions, before presenting their pragmatic effects, as well as their (inter)subjective effects, in more detail. This paper will focus especially on situations where the genericity is restricted, either because the speaker is not included or because only women are represented. Thus, the tension between genericity and specificity will become clear, and the similarities and differences between both constructions will be examined, both from a more formal point of view and from the perspective of the expression of (inter)subjectivity.

1. **Spanish *uno* and *se*: An introduction**

Spanish has a wide range of constructions that allow for keeping the agent or experiencer out of focus, through varied strategies (see among others Kärde 1943, Gómez Torrego 1992, Fernández Soriano & Táboas Baylin 1999, Devis Márquez 2003 for an overview). To the extent in which this defocused agent or experiencer is the speaker or hearer, these strategies hold a unique position in the expression of subjectivity, resp. intersubjectivity. In this paper, I will focus on constructions with *uno* and *se*. Though their syntactic properties are very different (as will be shown), both constructions can be compared from a communicative-functional approach (cf. Malchukov & Siewierska 2011: 2), in that they defocus the agent. In line with Siewierska (2008: 121), “defocusing is used in the sense of diminishing the prominence or salience from what is assumed to be the norm”. Constructions with *uno* and *se* realize this through different strategies.

*Uno* ‘one’ can be used as a numeral or as an indefinite pronoun. We will be concerned with the latter use, where the agent is more vague or ‘underelaborated’ in Siewierska’s terms. This pronoun can occupy a variety of syntactic positions, including subject (1), object (2), prepositional object (3), even with gerunds and infinitives (4). Its semantics implies animacy and even human or human-like
behavior. As we will see, it is therefore more easily linked to the speaker and to the expression of subjectivity.

(1) 
_Si uno estaba con un maestro, entonces ya no podía estar con los demás._
(Macro-corpus ALFAL Mexico)
‘When _one_ was with a teacher, then one could not anymore be with the others.’

(2) 
_Ya los años le hacen a uno sabio._
(CORLEC conversations)
‘Already the years make _one_ wise.’

(3) 
_Entonces, uno psicológicamente trata de sugestionarlo de que el pensamiento de uno y sus razonamientos son verdaderos y son básicos._
(Macro-corpus ALFAL Bogotá)
‘Then, one psychologically tries to influence him that the thinking of _one_ and his reasoning are true and basic (…)’

(4) 
_No hay un placer igual a sentarse uno a leer._
(Macro-corpus ALFAL Bogotá)
‘There is no pleasure equal to _one_ sitting down to read.’

The pronoun _se_ can be used in many different ways (Martín Zorraquino 1979, García 2009), including in reflexive, middle (Maldonado 1999) and passive constructions. However, it always occupies the same syntactic slot with respect to the VP and is, as such, much less mobile than _uno_. In the reflexive use, the agent and patient are coreferential. In all other uses, though, the agent or instigator does not receive a place in the VP, either because the action is conceptualized as having an internal energy – as is the case for the middle voice (Maldonado 1999) – or because the agent is not part of the scene. This study will be limited to cases where the agent is not part of the scene yet where we can imagine an agent for the action expressed through the predicate. This means that reflexive uses or middle uses will not be taken into account but an example as (5), where an agent for _se cobraba_ can be imagined (in this case employees), is included.

(5) 
_En África, se cobraba el cincuenta por ciento más._
(CORLEC conversations)
‘In Africa, 50% more _was being earned._’

Yet, an impersonal reading of _se_-constructions is only possible with verbs that are not inherently pronominal. By contrast, verbs that are always used pronominally, necessarily take _uno_ for the expression of impersonal readings (6) and cannot take a second _se_ in order to obtain an agent defocussing reading (7). The pronominal construction is, of course, grammatical but has no defocussing reading. As the aim of this article is to analyze the alternation _uno – se_, utterances with pronominal verbs have not been included in the analysis, since they do not enter into alternation with _uno_.

(6) 
_No hay un placer igual a sentarse uno a leer._
(Macro-corpus ALFAL Bogotá)
‘There is no pleasure equal to _one_ sitting down to read.’

(7) 
_Ya los años le hacen a uno sabio._
(CORLEC conversations)
‘Already the years make _one_ wise.’
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(6)  Desde que uno se levanta hasta que uno se acuesta. (Macro-corpus-ALFAL Madrid)
‘From the moment one gets up till when one goes to sleep.’

(7)  Desde que se levanta hasta que se acuesta. (constructed exemple)
‘From the moment he/she gets up till when he/she goes to sleep.’

The fact that uno and se realize their defocussing through different formal means is reflected among others in Gómez Torrego’s description of uno as ‘semantic impersonality’ versus se as ‘syntactic impersonality’ (Gómez Torrego 1992). However, I will refrain from using the term impersonality for the following reasons. On the one hand, impersonality covers very different phenomena in different linguistic traditions and languages (see Malchukov-Siewierska 2011 for an overview). On the other hand, impersonality suggests the absence of a person, which is exactly the opposite of the main purpose of this article, namely the study of constructions where a human is involved yet kept out of focus and its consequences for the expression of (inter)subjectivity and stance.

2.  Corpus

Though the syntax of both constructions has been extensively studied, often from a theoretical point of view, data-driven research is lacking, especially as to the pragmatics of both constructions. The data for this study have been taken from spoken Spanish language corpora, namely the Macro-corpus de la Norma lingüística culta de las principales ciudades del mundo hispánico (Macro-corpus-ALFAL) and the Corpus del Español centro-peninsular (CORLEC). The ALFAL-corpus consists of interviews conducted for sociolinguistic purposes, focusing on the interlocutor’s biography and professional history (in a broad sense). The CORLEC corpus includes various subtypes of spoken language. For the purpose of this study, the informal conversation, TV-interviews and TV-debates subsections were employed.

The overall frequency of both constructions in Spanish is very different, the constructions with se being much more frequent than those with uno (see De Cock 2010, 2014). This is mainly due to the fact that the construction with se is also the preferred passive voice in Spanish, whereas the periphrastic passive voice is a marked option. However, frequency may vary greatly according to the genre (see Gelabert-Desnoyer 2008 and De Cock 2010, in press, forthcoming for data concerning the lower frequency in parliamentary debate if compared to various other genres). Nevertheless, also less frequent uses are worthy of attention since they highlight particular features of the construction (see also De Cock forthcoming on some specific readings of person reference). Therefore, this paper will not focus on the most frequent uses (but see De Cock in prep. for a more elaborate quantitative analysis) but rather on the discursive effect of some specific cases that are marked (in terms of low frequency). As a result of the sparseness of the data for some specific uses,
especially those with *uno*, the corpus data will be supplemented with other real-life examples.

3. From defocussing to generalizing

Both defocussing constructions have been associated with generic readings. Neither the construction with *se* nor the construction with *uno* explicitly posit genericity, as would be the case for *todo el mundo* (‘everyone’) or *cada uno* (‘everyone’), yet in the Spanish linguistic literature, both constructions have been linked to generic readings, also through terminological proposals such as ‘omnipersonal’ (Martínez 1989). Both constructions defocus the human involved and, by reducing the specificity of a human agent or experiencer, give way to a generic reading, though this reading is not necessarily automatic. Mainly syntactic features have been analyzed as triggers for a generic reading (see de Miguel Aparicio 1992 and Gómez Torrego 1992 for mainly syntactical and aspectual factors). In the case of *se*, the absence of an expressed agent creates an ellipsis, which may lead to the generic reading that any agent would act this way or that any experiencer would have the same experience. As such, the expression of subjectivity seems erased from the experience and a more personalized stance is avoided. The use of different types of ellipsis for arbitrary readings of the subject or subject defocussing is attested cross-linguistically (Malchukov-Siewierska 2011, Da Milano forthc.). This genericity does not imply universality and, indeed, may be limited in many ways, e.g. via time and space adjuncts (see de Miguel Aparicio 1992, De Cock forthc.b) or various pragmatic factors (De Cock in prep.). *Uno*, however, may be used as syntactic subject and may as such take up the role of the agent or experiencer. The possibility of its acquiring a generic reading is then not related to the absence of an agent or experiencer but to the semantics of *uno* ‘one’.

We will look into the generic reading by focusing on two specific uses of *uno* and *se*. On the one hand, situations where, by means of the (linguistic) context, it becomes clear that the speaker is not included in the reference established by *uno* and *se*. On the other hand, the use of feminine form *una* and of feminine concordance in *se*-constructions, as a case where women may oscillate between adopting a more exclusively feminine stance vs. an entirely generic stance.

4. Speaker inclusion and exclusion

In this section, we will look into the inclusion or exclusion of the speaker, as a means to analyze to which extent we can speak of a truly generic use. The egocentricity of language (see Kecskes-Mey 2008) (or, at least, of some languages) may urge us to interpret agent-defocussing strategies as speaker-referring. Especially *uno* has been very strongly associated to the concept of self-reference or, at least, personal experience (among others Kärde 1943: 3555, Fernández
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Ramírez 1987, Martínez 1989: 60, Mendikoetxea 1999, Flores-Ferrán 2009), whereas this is much less the case for constructions with *se*. Explanations as to why this may be the case are lacking in the literature. I argue that these links may be motivated at a cognitive level with the overall egocentricity of language. Indeed, many phenomena, including the use of deixis, illustrate that the speaker takes him/herself as starting point for any argumentation or description (various contributions in Kecskes – Mey 2008). The importance of interaction participants for the interpretation of impersonals has been documented also for Finnish (Helasvuoto & Vilkuna 2008).

It seems that the presence of an undefined or underelaborated human, as in *uno*, establishes a stronger link with the most directly available human, the speaker. As such, its functioning is more closely linked to the expression of subjectivity. Keeping the human agent or instigator entirely out of the scene, as is the case in constructions with *se*, seems to loosen the desire to interpret the speaker as involved, and profiles the utterance as non-subjective (nor subjective, nor intersubjective). The fact that *uno* is preferred for the expression of mental or emotional states, as in (8), goes along the same lines (Kärde 1943: 34). Conversely, the construction with *se* is associated with genres that require a more neutral stance, such as (written) academic discourse or, in general, the expression of general rules (9).

(8)  *Bueno, a mí esto me parece, en primer lugar, cuando hay que recurrir (...) a esta (...) enfervorización mítica de las muchedumbres, entonces, desde el punto de vista racional, uno piensa que es que los medios lógicos para resolver el conflicto, los medios materiales eh... no están verdaderamente a punto (...)* (CORLEC-TV debates)

‘Well, to me it seems that, in the first place, when one has to use (...) this (...) mythical shaking up of the crowds, then, from a rational point of view, *one* thinks that it is that the logical means to solve the conflict, the material means eh... are not really ready.’

(9)  *Ese verbo no se dice nunca en presente.* (CORLEC-Conversation)

‘This verb is *never said* in the present tense.’

Yet, in some uses of *uno* and *se*, it is clear that the speaker is not the main referent or is downright not included, which goes against the expectations – especially for *uno*. Gelabert-Desnoyer (2008: 418-421) documented some cases of ‘other-referential’ *uno* in parliamentary discourse and newspaper interviews. I will focus on how we can establish the reference of *uno* and *se* and, more specifically, what favors or licenses other-referential uses. In (10), the fact that in the preceding context the grandfather is mentioned, moreover in combination with the same verb (*gustar*) makes it clear that *uno* is referring to him and not to the speaker’s personal experience. This reference is, then, established in the linguistic context. In (11), by contrast, no such explicit mention is made in the nearby context. However, the speaker is presented at the beginning of the debate as a journalist and lecturer
specialist in the topic of drugs addiction and drugs mafia. Thus, his contextual identity (Kerbrat-Orecchioni 2005:157) is established as that of an expert in the matter, not that of a drugs addict. This leads us to interpret the *uno* in (11) not as self-referring.

(10) Bueno, a sudar tinta porque al abuelo no le ha gustado Barcelona. No le ha gustado. Si. No, es que... es que no... es que no **puede gustarle a uno** eh... de la forma que... que tienes que vivir allí. (CORLEC conversations)

‘Well, to sweat blood (litt.: ink) because grandfather hasn’t liked Barcelona. He didn’t like it. Yes. No, it’s… its’ that no…. it’s that **one may not like** eh…. the way that… that you have to live there.’

(11) **Hacemos que la vida del toxicómano, si uno libremente decide serlo es su problema, pero que sea una buena vida.** (CORLEC debates)

‘We make that the life of a drugs addict, if **one freely decides to be it**, it’s his problem, but that it is a good life.’

In both cases, the broader linguistic context of the conversation or debate shows that the speaker sympathizes with the person referred to by means of *uno*. This becomes obvious by the pleas for respect or understanding for the situation of respectively the grandfather (10) and the drugs addict (11). *Uno*’s traditional description as a speaker experience that can be extended to others (*Nueva gramática de la lengua española* - NGLE 2009: 1132), is then stretched a bit further. The speaker can narrate an experience of someone else, while still suggesting it could be extended to others or, at least, that others (including the speaker himself) should be able to imagine themselves in the same position and to show empathy. Such strategies of showing solidarity demonstrate intersubjective functions, in that they include the speaker and hearer in the experience that is narrated, and increase the expressive power of utterances (Scheibman 2007).

As already pointed out, the construction with *se* is much less associated with the speaker than that with *uno*. Nevertheless, it may be interpreted as including the speaker for the reasons mentioned above. Further evidence is that grammaticalized constructions with *se* include the speaker, whilst also seeking the involvement of the audience, e.g. *se sabe* ‘it is (generally) known’ or *se supone* ‘it is supposed, supposedly’ (12). However, *se*-constructions need not include the speaker, as illustrated in (13). The speaker compares manual olive picking in previous times with the current day technique of knocking the branches and harvesting the fallen olives. The speaker exclusion becomes clear in the wider context through the use of *ahora* ‘now’ as opposed to preceding past experience narration. Moreover, the use of a non-specific 3rd person plural in *ponen* ‘they put’ and *varean* ‘they knock, implies speaker exclusion. As a result, the following action of cleaning (*se limpia*) is also interpreted as not including the speaker.
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(12)  
\begin{quote}
  Pero... \textit{se supone} que todos los niños deben de venir a y cuarto. \textit{Se supone}, y nunca. Nunca es... (CORLEC conversations)
  
  ‘But... \textit{it is supposed} that all the children have to come at fifteen minutes past. \textit{It is supposed}, and never. Never it is the case…’
\end{quote}

(13)  
\begin{quote}
  Ahora ponen plásticos, varean un poco el olivo y caen todas las aceitunas en el plástico y luego \textit{ya se limpia} un poco. (CORLEC conversations)
  
  ‘Now they put plastics, they knock the branches of the olive tree a bit and all the olives fall on the plastic and then already \textit{they clean them} a bit.’
\end{quote}

Thus, we see that the tendency to include the speaker may be countered quite easily by contextual factors, even with \textit{uno} which was traditionally described in terms of speaker inclusion. With \textit{uno}, the speaker suggests identification or empathy with the experiencer/agent, though, which is not the case in constructions with \textit{se}. \textit{Uno} has then a much stronger intersubjective effect than \textit{se}.

5. Women only: how generic are female-only forms?

A second subcase is the expression of genericity in a feminine form, more concretely by means of \textit{una} or by means of feminine concordance in \textit{se}-constructions. As in the previous section, the genericity is not universal, since the feminine form limits the potential reference to the subset of females. As we will see, the interaction with the use of masculine forms (which are also used for gender-neutral reference) by women is in addition highly revealing of the tension between self-reference and generic readings realized through both constructions. Moreover, the feminine form \textit{una} is particularly interesting since a feminine form of the indefinite pronoun is absent in various other languages, e.g. English \textit{one}, French \textit{on}, German \textit{Man}, Dutch \textit{men}.

Quantitative research of \textit{una} is difficult in view of its extremely low frequency in corpora. The examples discussed in this section are therefore not only taken from the CORLEC and Macrocorpus-ALFAL corpora but also from other sources (such as weblogs and social media). They show that the use of \textit{una} fully explores the differences between extralinguistic reference and the representation of that reference as developed by the speaker. Current-day descriptions of the use of \textit{una} have gone some length to incorporate the pragmatic functioning of \textit{una}. Thus, whereas earlier work, states that \textit{uno} becomes \textit{una} when the speaker is a woman (e.g. Kärde 1943: 36), both the NGLE (2009) and Butt & Benjamin (1988) adopt a more nuanced view.

NGLE points out that “es normal el uso del feminino \textit{una} cuando una mujer pretende resaltar su subjetividad o destacar su opinión propia” (NGLE 2009: 1132). \textit{Una} can then be self-referring or extend to women in general. It is argued that in Mexico, Central-America and some areas of the Carribean, the use of \textit{uno} for self-reference is habitual (NGLE 2009: 1133).
Butt and Benjamin, on the other hand, consider that “a woman uses *una* if the pronoun refers to herself but *uno* if no self-reference is intended” (Butt & Benjamin 1988: 417). Both works, then, suggest that self-reference privileges the use of *una* whereas generic reference privileges the use of *uno*. Butt & Benjamin take a different position on the geographical variation and point out some examples of Latin-American authors who use both *uno* and *una*, in order to counter the idea that *uno* is privileged in Latin-American Spanish. It should be noted that of the authors they mention, namely Vargas Llosa, Arrufat and Benedetti, only Arrufat has spent considerable time in the Caribbean (namely Cuba), the area related to the use of *uno* for female-only reference by the NGLE. In general, it is virtually impossible to carry out a reliable study of the spread of *uno* vs. *una* in the Spanish-speaking world, because of the previously mentioned sparseness of data for the feminine form.

Example (14), from a Bolivian speaker, would illustrate the tendency of privileging *uno* in Latin-America. The author narrates her personal experience concerning discrimination against women and uses various feminine forms to do so (*retrasada, aceptada, niña*) yet resorts to masculine *uno* and not to *una*.

(14) *Yo nunca he sentido ninguna discriminación, créame. He oído frecuentemente... decía la gente que por ser mujer *uno está retrasada* en algo o no está aceptada. Nunca, ni de niña, sentí ninguna diferencia, ni con mis hermanos.* (Macro-corpus ALFAL La Paz) *‘I never felt no discrimination whatsoever, believe me. I’ve heard often... people said that for being a woman *one is kept behind* in something or isn’t accepted. Never, not even as a little girl, did I feel any difference, nor with my brothers.’*

However, similar examples may be found by European speakers, e.g. (15) taken from a discussion concerning women’s rights and violence against women, that is, topics where the female identity is highly relevant. This intervention illustrates the complex discursive functioning and the interaction between self-reference and generic reference. Given the rather emotional nature of this woman’s intervention as a whole and her previous use of the feminine form of the 1st person plural, *nosotras* ‘we’, it seems strange that she uses *uno* instead of *una*. This may be motivated, though, by the desire to also involve male viewers in her stance and to project her own subjective experience onto the hearers as well. Indeed, throughout this debate, one of the main issues is whether men and women take a different stance on women’s position and representations in society. The female speaker’s use of *uno* may then be an attempt to (re)connect with male interlocutors, and to present a stance that may be shared by men as well, as opposed to only by women.

(15) *Bueno, yo... a mí me parece que la primera concienciación nos corresponde a nosotras, las mujeres. A mí me parece que mientras se sigan prestando, pues eso que ya lo veis ahora mismo, ¿no?, los anuncios en la*
television... programas... en los que uno siente vergüenza de ser mujer, como... como es ese de Tele 5 de por las noches, un día en semana.

(CORLEC debates)
‘Well, I... to me it seems that the first becoming aware is up to us, women. To me it seems that as long as they keep on lending themselves, well, that which you see right now, isn’t it? Television advertisement, programs, in which one feels ashamed of being a women, as is the one on Tele 5 in the evenings, one day in the week.’

However, this attitude is by no means general. In a similar reaction to a campaign against violence against women, a female participant reacts on Facebook (16). In this case, she clearly follows the campaign’s discourse of focusing on violence against women and highlighting women’s fear of attack (possibly also narrating a personal experience) through the use of feminine forms.

(16) Que tiene narices que en pleno siglo XXI aun vaya una con miedo por la noche. (facebook message)
‘It’s outrageous that in full 21" century one still goes with fear at night.’

It is clear that the distinction between self-referring uno/una and generic uno/una is hard to establish because of the complex nature of uno. Indeed, its discursive effect is precisely that an experience may be extended to others (cf. NGLE 2009: 1132). The use of uno by women, is then not problematic, even for female-only reference, but rather directly linked to the discursive effect accomplished by the nature of uno. The fact that female speakers may also resort to using masculine uno is further evidence of the fact that interlocutor inclusion is being sought by means of the indefinite pronoun.

Further, even more indirect evidence, is the fact that the sequence una mismo ‘one self’ may be found in blogs and discussion forums. This sequence would be considered downright ungrammatical in view of the non-concordance between feminine una and masculine mismo by the majority of native speakers and the totality of grammatical literature, yet the mere fact that this type of concordance error is being made suggests that, at least to some native speakers, the link between genericity and gender is not as neat. Indeed, the representation in the interlocutors’ mind is perhaps not clearly delimited or there might even be a diachronic change on-going. However, such diachronic evolution would be even harder to prove, given the sparseness of contemporary data and the even more considerable sparseness in diachronic data, due to the relatively limited historical source and the virtual absence of female authors in diachronic corpora.

The construction with se does not have a feminine equivalent as such, that is, se has no feminine form. However, gender concordance can occur in its predicate, e.g. feminine contenta ‘happy’ (17). As a result, the construction as a whole may be used for female-only reference. The fact that gender expression is situated at construction-level and not at word-level may explain why this female-only use has
remained virtually undescribed in the literature. The construction can be found quite amply, though, once again mainly related to topics that are typically represented as specific for women, such as bodily health, pregnancy.

\[(17)\] \textit{Ya sabemos, cada vez más, que cuando se es feliz y se está contenta, dentro del cuerpo no se necesita nada.} \vspace{0.2cm}

(\url{http://blogs.laverdad.es/anamariatomas/2012/07/27/gorda-si-que-pasa/})

\textquote{‘We already know, every time more, that when one is happy and content, in the body, one doesn’t need anything.’}

Once again, we see that a masculine form may be used with predicates that are typically associated to females, e.g. \textit{se está embarazado} ‘one is pregnant’ in (18). In a case like (18), this is due to the fact that pregnancy is described in a very general way. In some other cases, it may be related to the tendency of considering both mothers and fathers to be pregnant when expecting a child. This is of course not the case for (18), where it is clearly the physical aspects of pregnancy that are at stake.

\[(18)\] \textit{Estas diferencias hacen necesaria la aparición de políticas que busquen garantizar (...) [el] derecho a sentarse en el transporte público si se está embarazado (...)} \vspace{0.2cm}


\textquote{‘Those differences make necessary the appearance of policies that seek to guarantee (...) the right to sit down in public transport if one is pregnant (...)’}

Women may then use masculine forms when narrating female-only experiences, if they wish to present the situation in more general terms and appeal to the male audience as well. This shows then that not the reference itself is at stake, but the representation that women wish to transmit.

6. Conclusions

It has become clear in this study that both \textit{uno} and \textit{se} may be used to conceptualize an experience as generic yet also personal. In order to illustrate this, I have focused on two specific cases where this tension is particularly clear. On the one hand, I have shown that in many cases an experience is represented that is not the speaker’s, even with \textit{uno}, which is traditionally considered as including the speaker’s experiences. I have shown that various contextual factors allow for establishing the reference. \textit{Uno}, with a human subject singled out, does imply speaker empathy even when the speaker is not included, as opposed to the
construction with \textit{se}. As such, \textit{uno} expresses more clearly subjectivity (to the extent in which it involves the speaker) and intersubjectivity (since it attempts to also include the hearer). On the other hand, I have looked into the specific case of the representation of women-specific experiences. It is clear that these are not only represented in the feminine form but also in masculine or mixed forms. This shows the desire to move away from a subjective, exclusively female, to a more intersubjective construction of women-specific experiences. As such, they reveal the tension between the extralinguistic gender reality and the constructed gender, and, ultimately, the overall tension between extralinguistic reference and the representation constructed by the speaker.

Notes
1. I am grateful to the reviewers of the paper for their interesting suggestions. All remaining errors are, of course, entirely my responsibility.
2. I use the following concept of subjectivity: “The term subjectivity refers to the way in which natural languages, in their structure and their normal manner of operation, provide for the locutionary agent’s \textit{expression of himself and his own attitudes and beliefs} associated with social stance and identity” (Lyons 1982: 102, based on Benveniste 1966). Intersubjectivity is then understood as the expression of attention to the attitudes and beliefs of the hearer (Closs Traugott 2003).
3. “The use of feminine \textit{una} is normal when a woman wishes to her subjectivity or distinguish her own opinion.”

Corpora and sources
\textit{CORLEC} = \textit{Corpus del Español centro-peninsular}, directed by Professor Francisco Marcos Marín in the Universidad Autónoma de Madrid with the support of the Agencia Nacional para el Desarrollo de Programas del V Centenario (1990-1993).
\textit{Macro-corpus ALFAL} = \textit{Macro-corpus de la Norma lingüística culta de las principales ciudades del mundo hispánico}. Asociación de Lingüística y Filología de América Latina.

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X. Caballero es distinto de machista, marimacha es distinto de feminista. Todo va en los detalles

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Acknowledging the addressee in spoken interaction
A case study of you know in BBC radio talk

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Abstract
English discourse markers occurring in face-to-face interaction have been the subject of many studies so far. Numerous attempts have been made to investigate you know, one of the most versatile discourse markers (for example, Östman 1981, Schourup 1985, Schiffrin 1987, Fox Tree and Schrock 2002, Müller 2005). This study explores the use of you know in radio talk. Different textual and interactional dimensions of you know are analysed in a corpus consisting of BBC Radio 4 Woman’s Hour excerpts. The analysed data reveals that you know plays a significant role in building or enhancing understanding between speakers participating in radio discussions or interviews: speakers frequently use you know at strategic points in discourse where they are trying to negotiate common ground with their interlocutors and achieve shared understanding of the problems under discussion. You know, as an addressee-centred marker, indicates that speakers participating in a dialogic interaction take into account their interlocutors and are jointly engaged in an intersubjective process of meaning-making.

1. Introduction

Discourse markers in English and other languages have been studied by many scholars coming from different theoretical backgrounds (for example, Fraser 1988, 1990, Erman 1987, 2001, Traugott 1995, Brinton 1996, Andersen 2001, Aijmer 2002, Traugott and Dasher 2002). Brinton (1996: 29) points out that there are approximately twenty different expressions used to refer to discourse markers, among them ‘pragmatic markers’, ‘discourse connectives’, ‘discourse particles’, ‘discourse-shift markers’, ‘hedges’ or ‘interjections’. ‘Discourse markers’ is in fact an umbrella term which encompasses a range of different phenomena. As Blakemore (2002: 1) rightly observes, frequently there is little or no agreement on what is and what is not a discourse marker.

However, apart from questioning the existence of the class of discourse markers, Blakemore (2002: 1) also focuses on the commonalities shared by the members usually included into this broad category: all discourse markers, as the very name suggests, need to be studied at the level of discourse and their meaning should be analysed in terms of what they “indicate or mark” rather than what they
describe”. Moreover, all discourse markers, as she further explains, mark “relationships and connections among units of discourse” (Blakemore 2002: 2). Brinton (1996: 32-35) also observes that the inventory of discourse markers, which she herself calls ‘pragmatic markers’, is very diverse. Nevertheless, she enumerates several characteristics shared by all discourse markers: they are phonologically reduced, syntactically optional, characteristic of spoken informal discourse and they have little or no propositional meaning. Due to their high frequency, discourse markers are also “stylistically stigmatized and negatively evaluated” and “deplored as a sign of disfluency and carelessness” (Brinton 1996: 33).

*You know*, one of the discourse markers most frequently encountered in spoken interaction, has been very often approached as ‘verbal garbage’ or ‘a mere gap-filler in conversation’ (see the references in Fox Tree and Schrock 2002: 729 & Müller 2005: 147). However, many researchers have demonstrated that such uses constitute only a small percent of all occurrences of *you know* (for example, Östman 1981, Erman 1987, Fox Tree & Schrock 2002). In most cases, *you know* serves multiple functions at different levels of discourse (for example, Schiffrin 1987: 316). The multifunctionality of *you know* as well as its frequency and distribution have been studied in various types of informal spoken interaction. For instance, Stubbe & Holmes (1995) discovered that in the case of conversations between middle-class New Zealand English speakers, age and gender do not have any influence over the frequency of *you know*. Jucker & Smith (1998) observed that American university students display a tendency to use *you know* more often in conversations with an acquaintance than in conversations with a stranger, which was also confirmed by Macaulay (2002), who found that Scottish speakers employ *you know* more frequently in conversations between friends than in interviews with strangers.

This study explores the use of the discourse marker *you know* in a rather more formal contextual setting, namely in radio talk. The data for the analysis comes from a corpus of radio talk discussions and interviews extracted from BBC Radio 4 *Woman’s Hour* programmes. Most of the interviews and conversations under investigation are devoted to emotionally complex issues such as love relationships, adoption or parenting (for more details, see section 3.1). The programme guests discuss their personal experiences and share their expertise in different fields. The study looks at how by means *you know* radio talk participants try to negotiate common ground with their interlocutors and build shared understanding of the issues under discussion. In other words, the major research questions of the study may be phrased in the following way:

- How does *you know* function in interactions between *Woman’s Hour* participants engaged in discussions on (mostly) emotionally difficult subjects? In what kind of communicative situations do they resort to the use of *you know*?
- Is *you know* used as a tool that may help interlocutors establish or negotiate common ground and, consequently, facilitate the process of
building mutual understanding? Or does it mostly fulfil other interactional or textual functions?

The present study will attempt to provide answers to the above questions, drawing on the functional characterisation of the discourse marker *you know* by Erman (2001) and exploiting the notions of ‘common ground’ (Clark 1996, Jucker & Smith 1998), ‘intersubjectivity’ and ‘stance’ (Kärkkäinen 2006).

Despite the fact that the study is more concerned with a qualitative analysis, the frequency and distribution of *you know* in Woman’s Hour interviews and debates are also taken into account in the discussion below.

2. **Background**

2.1 *You know* as an object of study

In its literal sense, the expression *you know*, which consists of a second person pronoun (singular or plural) and a verb of cognition, signals the presentation of information that the addressee is aware of or familiar with. However, this apparent meaning of *you know* does not account for the array of functions it fulfils in everyday discourse. Müller (2005: 147) points out that in the research literature, there are approximately thirty different functions ascribed to *you know*, which makes it one of the most versatile and one of the most difficult to describe discourse markers.

*You know* has been in fact frequently juxtaposed with other discourse markers, for example, *I mean* (Schiffrin 1987, Jucker & Smith 1998, Fox Tree and Schrock 2002). According to Schiffrin (1987: 309-311), the functions of *you know* and *I mean* turn out to be complementary: both markers, although they operate in significantly different ways, invite the hearer to pay attention to a certain piece of information provided by the speaker. In addition, as Schiffrin observes (1987: 310), both markers are socially stigmatized and commonly treated as more characteristic of informal conversations between inarticulate speakers. Fox Tree and Schrock (2002:729; see the references therein) report on many studies which indicate that the use of *you know* and *I mean* can indeed reveal a lot about the speakers (interpersonal information) as well as the speaking situation they are involved in (its formality or intimacy, the level of politeness). For instance, a frequent use of *you know* may highlight the need of the speaker to affiliate with a certain social class or age group (Östman 1981) or it may point at a relatively informal speaking environment (Holmes 1990).

Apart from functional complementarity and typically negative social sanctioning, there are more features that may be shared by *you know* and *I mean*: both markers are not tied to any syntactic position in an utterance and, as some researchers claim, their use in discourse is mainly accidental. Fox Tree and Schrock (2002: 729-731), however, reject this argument and provide evidence against, as they term it, ‘random sprinkling’ by proving that the position of *you*
know or I mean in an utterance is very significant and influences utterance interpretation.

2.2 The multifunctionality of you know

As underlined above, you know is multifunctional: it fulfills different functions in different discourse environments. The position you know occupies in an utterance, the way it is pronounced (the intonation pattern, emphasis) or the contextual setting it occurs in are just some of the factors determining the function of you know in a dialogic interaction (see the discussion in Erman 1987, Östman 1981 or Schiffrin 1987).

The apparent multifunctionality of you know has not discouraged some researchers from trying to establish its basic sense. For instance, Jucker & Smith (1998: 194) define you know as an ‘addressee-centered presentation marker’ which is employed by the speaker to invite “the addressee to recognize both the relevance and the implications of the utterance marked with you know”. Fox Tree and Schrock (2002: 728) hold a similar view and claim that the multifunctionality of you know can be reanalyzed in terms of its basic meaning. They suggest that different functions of you know arise from its basic meaning which, according to them, is inviting the addressee’s inferences.

However, apart from those rather bold attempts to account for all potential uses of you know with a single, underlying meaning, a prevailing number of approaches focus on a systematic description of different functional categories of you know. Many researchers investigating discourse markers unanimously state that you know functions at two different planes of dialogic interaction, namely at the textual and interactional levels, where it monitors the discourse and the interaction between discourse participants, respectively (for example, Redeker 1990, Brinton 1996, Müller 2005). For instance, in her study of discourse markers used by native and non-native speakers of English, Müller distinguishes ten different functional types of you know and assigns them to these two parallel levels of spoken interaction (2005: 157-189). The textual functions of you know involve introducing quotations or explanations, signalling approximation, marking lexical and content search as well as marking false start and repair. The interactional functions distinguished by Müller are more hearer-focused: by means of you know the hearer is, for example, asked to activate a shared body of knowledge, imagine a particular scene or situation, and think about the implications originating in a certain contextual setting.

A neat account of different uses of you know at different levels of talk, also an account that will be used in the present study, was proposed by Erman (2001). In a similar vein as the researchers mentioned above, she singles out various functional categories of you know working at the textual and interactional levels of spoken interaction. However, apart from these two planes, which she refers to as ‘domains’, Erman (2001: 1338) also distinguishes one more dimension, namely the ‘metalinguistic domain’. As she points out, the domains are not discrete, with clear-cut boundaries (Erman 2001: 1342). Yet, every use of you know may be
You know and intersubjectivity in radio talk

categorized in terms of its predominant function as belonging to one of these domains and not the other. The functions and subfunctions that you know may fulfil in all three domains are briefly discussed in the sections below.

2.2.1 You know as a textual monitor
You know belongs to the category of ‘textual monitors’ when it fulfils primarily a discourse organizing function, such as building up text coherence or highlighting certain elements of the text. The functions of textual monitors are divided into discourse structuring and discourse editing.

Discourse structuring functions can be observed at two levels, textual and clausal. Those that operate at the textual level include:

- linking sets of independent propositions and marking a topic shift;
- signalling moves between arguments, states/events or modes in the text for the sake of building up coherence of the utterance;
- marking boundaries between different modes of speech, e.g., marking direct or reported speech (you know used for this purpose is called ‘quotative you know’ by Müller 2005: 167),
- inserting a parenthetic comment which serves as an explanation for the hearer (cf. Müller 2005: 164).

Those that operate at the clausal level involve:

- guiding the hearer towards a certain interpretation of the message by asking him/her to accept the information as known or given;
- introducing a change in informative content by means of adding new clauses or correcting and modifying previous discourse (which should not be confused with repair; see Erman 2001: 1342).

Discourse editing functions in turn encompass:

- stalling for time for the purposes of performing either content or lexical search (you know functions as a hesitation marker and usually occurs after function words, determiners or next to other hesitation markers; see Erman 2001: 1344),
- signalling repair (you know functions as a repair marker, which means that it introduces a new sentence after a false start).

2.2.2 You know as a social monitor
You know acts as a social monitor when it is, first and foremost, concerned with meaning negotiation and conversation management. As Erman (2001: 1345) explains:

The fact that negotiating signals of this kind are a prevalent feature of communication is only natural, since one of the strongest driving forces behind
our engaging in conversation is to socialise with one another and to convey our attitudes to and understandings of phenomena around us and in the world.

You know as a social monitor is responsible for:

- turn-taking,
- turn-yielding, which is also a way of calling for an action or confirmation on the part of the addressee,
- securing comprehension, e.g., making sure that the hearer knows which referent is being talked about.

2.2.3 You know as a metalinguistic monitor
Unlike textual or social monitors, you know as a metalinguistic monitor is focused on the message proper and acts as a comment on the implications of the text produced by the speaker. In other words, it is a comment on the discourse and it exhibits modal functions: the speaker expresses his or her “subjective appreciation of the illocutionary force of the utterance as a whole” (Erman 2001: 1347).

By using you know as a metalinguistic monitor, the speaker can:

- enhance the effect of the message by emphasizing his or her authority; as a result, the message gets across in accordance with the speaker’s intentions,
- tone down the effect of the message (you know may act, for instance, as a hedge with a face-saving function),
- signal approximation by appealing to shared knowledge or by giving “the listener/s a rough but sufficiently exact idea about a certain state of affairs for the general purpose of the conversation” (Erman 1995: 144).

2.2.4 You know as a marker of intersubjectivity, common ground and stance
Although Erman (2001) does not explicitly mention the notions of ‘common ground’, ‘intersubjectivity’ and ‘stance’, they underlie the use of you know as a textual, social and metalinguistic monitor. For example, the very act of using you know by the speaker who is stalling for time and searching for appropriate words to facilitate the communicative interaction implies that the speaker is aware of the self and communicative needs of his/her interlocutor. In the same vein, when the speaker uses you know to introduce an additional piece of information, s/he also takes into account the perspective of the interlocutor: the speaker seems to be aware of the fact that the additional comments might come in handy for his/her interlocutor during the interpretative process. Also, in order to use you know as a social or metalinguistic monitor, the speaker, first of all, needs to acknowledge the self of the addressee and needs to make a quick assessment of the addressee’s discourse perspective and state of knowledge. Therefore, you know seems to be inherently intersubjective: it signals the speaker’s attention to the self of the
interlocutor as well as to his/her needs arising in the process of interpreting a verbal message (see Traugott & Dasher 2002: 23).

In the same way as intersubjectivity, the notion of common ground, understood as shared knowledge or a shared set of beliefs between the speaker and hearers (Clark 1996: 12), is entrenched in the use of *you know*. As Jucker & Smith (1998: 197) observe, some discourse markers, among them *you know*, are exploited by conversation participants to negotiate their common ground: speakers, however, do not use them to transfer information directly but to “issue instructions and provide advice as to how information is being processes or is to be processed”. Jucker & Smith further explain:

Such attempts grow out of the speaker’s attempt to reconcile both her own state of knowledge with information provided by the interlocutor and her model of what he already knows with the state of knowledge she hopes to create in him (Jucker & Smith 1998: 197).

*You know* thus functions as a lexical cue for the construction and negotiation of common ground. Importantly, the representation of the common ground in discourse is dynamic: interlocutors engaged in a dialogic interaction create models of each other’s knowledge online and together, in the flow of the conversation, try to determine the state of the common ground (Jucker & Smith 1998: 172).

Apart from being largely intersubjective and oriented towards the negotiation of common ground, *you know* may act as an expression of epistemic stance, which means that it may mark the degree of commitment to what one is saying (Kärkkäinen 2006: 705). For instance, when *you know* is used as a metalinguistic monitor, and more specifically as a hedge, it allows speakers to distance themselves from some of their linguistic choices and reduces the affective impact of the expressions used in the conversation.

3. Data

3.1 Woman’s Hour corpus

The corpus analysed in this research is composed of thirty excerpts from BBC Radio 4 *Woman’s Hour* programmes. The programmes were originally broadcast on BBC Radio 4 between 18th September 2006 and 9th November 2012. As each of the selected *Woman’s Hour* excerpts is a complete conversation on a particular subject between two or more discussants, the excerpts are called ‘discourse events’ (DE). The shortest discourse event included in the corpus lasts 4 minutes 32 seconds, whereas the longest 13 minutes 56 seconds. An average approximate length of an excerpt comes out at 9 minutes 20 seconds. All excerpts together build up a corpus of 4 hours 39 minutes and 37 seconds of radio talk. The orthographic transcription of all excerpts was performed in a word processing software, yielding a word count of 53,323.
Each discourse event included in the corpus is a self-contained whole and exhibits a clear tripartite internal structure: it begins with an opening sequence, which is followed by the main discussion and a short closing sequence. During the opening sequence, which usually takes up less than the first sixty seconds of the programme, the host presents the topic of the discussion as well as welcomes and shortly introduces Woman’s Hour guests. Apart from the opening turn of the host of the programme, the introductory sequence consists of several short turns by different speakers and typically culminates with a discussion-opening question directed at one of the guests. The main discussion is the longest part of the radio discourse event: it is composed of turns produced by the guests and the host of the programme who is responsible for managing the course of the conversation. During the main sequence, the turns of the participants are typically longer, more narrative and elaborate than those produced in the opening sequence, whereas the turns of the hosts are usually short requests for clarification or elaboration. The closing sequence, which again is managed by the host of the programme, is rather short and abrupt as it is usually completed under time pressure. At this point, the host of the programme briefly thanks her guests for their participation and contribution as well as encourages radio listeners to contact the programme and share their reflections on the subject under discussion.

The topics touched upon in Woman’s Hour largely concern women and in many cases are emotionally complex. The analysed excerpts are devoted to issues such as love relationships, parenting, adoption, cancer, depression, loneliness, death of a partner, disability or painkiller addiction. The hosts of the programme and their guests, who are either experts (psychologists, medical doctors, book writers, journalists) or non-experts, share their professional knowledge, describe their innermost emotions and personal experiences, express their opinions on different issues as well as give advice to each other and radio listeners. Throughout all discussions the participants are engaged in a continuous process of achieving mutual understanding and very often some of the participants even show a deeper involvement in the discussions: they become engaged in heated debates where try to convince their interlocutors to change their perception of the subject in question.

3.2 Radio talk – formal or informal interaction?

Woman’s Hour interviews and debates seem to be carefully planned and also partially scripted before they are broadcast live on BBC Radio 4. The creators of the programme choose a particular topic and invite guests willing to visit the BBC studio and participate in an insightful discussion on the selected subjects. Such a set-up of the Woman’s Hour programmes undoubtedly imparts an air of formality and artificiality to the radio talk corpus.

However, despite the fact that Woman’s Hour talk does not have its roots in a natural, everyday environment but is a studio-originated talk, its character resembles the character of ordinary conversation to quite a large extent. Woman’s Hour discussions preserve the effect of liveliness and spontaneity as they are broadcast from beginning to end, in one continuous take. Moreover, regardless of
the fact that the host of the programme monitors the course of the discussion, the whole conversation is by no means planned and fully scripted: each conversation involves mutual cooperation between two or more participants who stimulate one another so that an utterance of each discourse participant affects the future utterances of other participants, including those produced by the host of the programme. Put differently, even though the hosts may have a scenario of the programme prepared beforehand, they never know in which direction the discussion will proceed and how the contributions of individual participants will shape its course.

In addition, when it comes to language register, *Woman’s Hour* interviews and debates display all the features of spontaneous talk that characterize everyday, informal conversation: spontaneous revisions, self- and other-repairs, repetition of words and phrases, reformulations, elaborations, moments of hesitation, long and short pauses (which may be unfilled or filled, when vocalisation such as *umm* or *ehh* are used) or overlapped speech. Naturally, in the *Woman’s Hour* interviews and discussions speakers also use numerous discourse markers such as *well, you know, like, oh* and many others. All these phenomena are the hallmarks of spontaneous talk and definitely constitute an integral part of the communicative enterprise.

4. **Results and discussion**

A quick frequency count yields the number of 273 uses of *you know* in the whole *Woman’s Hour* corpus. However, a closer analysis reveals that not all combinations of *you* and *know* found in the quick corpus search act as discourse markers. Some are used in their literal sense, as in (1), or are parts of larger prefabricated chunks (see Erman 2001), as in (2).

(1) *do you know* what I am talking about? (DE7)
(2) *...and you must soothe them instead of saying to employers, or instead of saying to the right person or your partner: actually, you know what?! I am doing too many things here!* (DE24)

After the exclusion of such examples, the final number of all uses of the discourse marker *you know* in the radio talk corpus comes down to 262 instances, which yields the frequency of 4.91 occurrences per thousand words. This number is slightly higher than, for example, the frequency number in conversations and interviews between middle-class, Scottish speakers of English in the study carried out by Macaulay (2002: 754): the frequency of *you know* in the corpora he analysed came to 3.29 uses per thousand words. In terms of frequency expressed in the number of occurrences per minute, the *Woman’s Hour* corpus yields the number of 0.94 items per minute. This number is in turn lower than, for instance, the frequency of *you know* per minute in informal conversations between American
university students which amounts to 1.2 items per minute (Jucker & Smith 1998: 176).

Obviously, no serious conclusions about the use of *you know* can be drawn from such general comparisons between frequencies per thousand words or per minute reported in different studies: general frequency numbers reveal hardly any facts about the distribution of *you know* in the discourse structure and its functional characteristics. Therefore, the present study does not put much emphasis on the frequency of *you know* in individual discourse events and in the *Woman’s Hour* corpus as a whole, but is more concerned with the functional characterization of *you know* and its distribution at different levels of the discourse event, which are described in the sections below.

4.1 Distribution of *you know*

You know is not evenly distributed across different discourse events in the *Woman’s Hour* corpus. Some discourse events contain as many as thirty instances of *you know*, whereas others contain only one or three occurrences. Such huge discrepancies between frequency numbers for specific discourse events are mainly conditioned by their different lengths, varying numbers of participants engaged in dialogic interaction as well as different topics under discussion (see section 3.1). Naturally, speakers’ personal characteristics, such as their educational or professional background and their personal speaking styles, are also a significant factor influencing the frequency of *you know* in each discourse event (see Östman 1981). Some speakers exhibit the tendency to employ *you know* more often than others when, for example, they take turns, introduce explanatory comments into their talk or perform a lexical search. Nevertheless, the fact that some speakers resort to the use of *you know* many times does not imply that they use *you know* arbitrarily: on the contrary, the analysis of all 262 examples shows that each use of *you know* is motivated by a range of different textual and interactional factors (see the sections below), and is not a matter of random sprinkling (see also Fox Tree and Schrock 2002).

Apart from an uneven distribution at the corpus level, *you know* also exhibits uneven spread within individual discourse events. In all analysed discourse events, there is a strong tendency for *you know* to appear occasionally in the first, introductory parts of radio discussions and occur with a higher frequency at later stages of the conversation. In seventeen out of thirty discourse events, speakers do not use *you know* during the first two minutes of the broadcast talk, i.e. in the opening sequence as well as in the initial parts of the main discussion. However, speakers start employing *you know* at subsequent, more narrative and explanatory stages of the conversation, when they are asked to express their opinion on a certain subject or describe their experiences in more detail (see Östman 1981: 16).

The lack of *you know* at the initial stage of a radio conversation may be observed, for example, in one of the analysed discussions which takes place between the host of the programme and her two guests, a man whose wife had a breast cancer and a clinical nurse who is a specialist at breast cancer care. The first
You know, as illustrated in example (3), appears only after two minutes and forty seconds of the conversation and is used by the female guest as a self-repair strategy. The male guest employs you know for the first time more than sixty seconds later, when he is trying to describe in detail his personal experiences. He uses you know to introduce a comment which provides his listeners with more background information facilitating the reception of his story. Later on in the discourse, you know is used four more times: one more time by the female guest, who employs it as a hedge, and three times by the male speaker, who uses it to introduce a quotation, perform a lexical search and conduct a self-repair.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TIMING</th>
<th>SPEAKER</th>
<th>QUOTATION</th>
<th>FUNCTION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2:41</td>
<td>Antonia</td>
<td>it’s/you know you don’t have to wait through a lot of things to get to it, it’s right there</td>
<td>SELF-REPAIR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3:49</td>
<td>Angus</td>
<td>now you know, we are perhaps a little bit old fashioned but the kitchen was always her area</td>
<td>INTRODUCING A COMMENT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4:11</td>
<td>Antonia</td>
<td>yeah sometimes perhaps it might be a bit of an expectation that you know your partner has to be your mind reader</td>
<td>HEDGE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5:10</td>
<td>Angus</td>
<td>I said your reactions are no longer those of a fighter pilot and you know I’m sorry but it’s the chemo and I’m gonna do the driving otherwise I mean you know it’s an encouragement to know that people haven’t abandoned you</td>
<td>QUOTATIVE HESITATION MARKER</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6:44</td>
<td>Angus</td>
<td>yeah but I mean there are people/you know they are sort of crossing the road rather than confronting someone</td>
<td>SELF-REPAIR</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A closer analysis of this and other discourse events suggests that the frequency of you know is positively correlated with an increasing degree of intimacy between the interlocutors and their growing involvement in dialogic interaction: as the engagement in the interaction with co-participants gets stronger, the speakers are more likely to co-construct and negotiate common ground and try to work out some shared understanding of the issues under discussion. As a result of such dialogic involvement, the speakers more frequently resort to the use of you know which functions as a hearer-oriented marker of common ground (Jucker & Smith 1998). This observation seems to be in line with the findings for final particles in
English presented by Haselow (2012), who noticed that the use of the final particles increases “with decreasing formality of the speech situation” (Haselow 2012: 183).

4.2 You know and its discourse functions
All occurrences of you know in the radio talk corpus were carefully studied and categorised on the basis of their predominant function as belonging to one of the three domains distinguished by Erman (2001). Out of 262 instances, 162 turned out to be textual monitors, 84 metalinguistic monitors and only 16 were used as social monitors. All three functional categories of you know will be characterised and illustrated with examples extracted from the corpus in the sections below.

4.2.1 Textual functions of you know
The group of textual monitors is the most numerous and, at the same time, most heterogeneous as it contains instances of you know which fulfil discourse editing and discourse structuring functions.

Within the discourse editing you know, the most frequent are hesitation markers: in the corpus, there are 32 instances of you know (12% of all occurrences) which appear when the speaker is clearly stalling for time and performing lexical or content search. Two examples where you know functions as a hesitation marker are given in (4) and (5). In both utterances, you know occurs in the middle of the utterance, between function words (determiners that and conjunctions and), and it signals lexical and content search, respectively. Moreover, in (4) you know is accompanied by sort of, another hesitation marker, whereas in (5) you know follows a longer, unfilled pause.

(4) it definitely opened something, it definitely ' helped in that sort of you know that realization. (DE17)
(5) and it gave me a lot of confidence and a lot of belief in myself and ' you know and held me along the way. (DE26)

The use of you know as a hesitation marker may be a signal of speech production problems and other speech disfluencies, but also it may be interpreted as a sign of deep involvement of the speaker in the construction of the communicative process: the speaker wants to use words which match his intentions and are appropriate in the current context. Simultaneously, by using you know, the speaker appeals to his interlocutor to be actively engaged in the co-construction of meaning. In other words, the speaker activates the hearer and asks him/her to actively anticipate the results of the lexical or content search.

You know as a repair marker is used in the corpus 19 times. Most of the repairs are error repairs and restarts, which means that they are employed when a wrong word
or phrase is used, and the speaker wants to start a particular sentence anew. For example, the second *you know* in (6) is a case of an error repair and *you know* in (7) is an example of a restart.

(6) *nothing beats that warm fuzzy you know jelly at the knees moment when a partner tells you that you/you knowthat they love you.* (DE12)

(7) *why/why is she on her own? was it a teenage pregnancy? or is she not able to/you knowwhat’s she done to the man to make him leave her?* (DE16)

Discourse structuring *you know* s are far more frequent than discourse editing *you knows* as there are as many as 111 instances in the whole corpus. Within this numerous group, there are 29 occurrences of cohesive *you know* s: they link independent propositions and arguments or mark topic shift. For instance, in (8) *you know* builds up the coherence of the utterance by gluing two adjacent sentences together. The speaker first describes in detail a dramatic event that took place when her daughter was staying with her father and immediately after that she makes a short, summarising comment which stresses the difficulty of the whole situation her daughter found herself in.

(8) *she would be on the phone in floods of tears, crying, saying that she wanted to come home and that she wasn’t allowed to. and you know she was allowed to speak to me but that was it.* (DE22)

In (8) *you know* fulfils its connective function together with the conjunction *and.* Among 29 instances of cohesive *you know,* there are 13 cases where *you know* follows *and* immediately, without any longer pause in between. In (9), *you know* also ensures the coherence of the utterance, but this time it signals a more significant topic shift and follows the coordinating conjunction *but.*

(9) *it was a terrible thing to say and I did apologize to her. but you know I think this fashion for thinking that it’s really important that we have space to ourselves is not helpful, that’s not what I really enjoy.* (DE9)

Another significant functional subcategory consists of *you knows* which are used by speakers to mark boundaries between different modes of speech. This means that *you know* is employed, for example, when speakers want to signal the fact that they are quoting somebody’s words or recalling somebody’s ideas. In the *Woman’s Hour* corpus, there are 28 cases of quotative *you know.* For instance, in (10), the
speaker is describing a situation when his wife wanted to drive home immediately after chemotherapy, and he tried to talk her out of this idea. The speaker employs *you know* to signal the fact that the words he uses (*it’s the chemo and I’m gonna do the driving*) are not a verbatim quotation, but they rather approximate what he exactly said at that moment. In the current contextual setting, it is not relevant how the speaker formulated his message and what words he precisely used. What is far more important is the very fact that he convinced his wife that because of the negative effects of the chemotherapy, she should not drive. The example in (11) presents another instance of the quotative *you know*. In this case, however, the speaker is not quoting her own words, but she is rather recalling the questions other people asked her.

(10) *well, I just insisted. I said your reactions are no longer those of a fighter pilot and you know I’m sorry but it’s the chemo and I’m gonna do the driving.* (DE13)

(11) *Steve, it’s interesting cause I had a cancer diagnosis.*

   *and people always asked me oh, you know, what have you changed? how have you changed since that happened? and I haven’t changed at all cause I just wanted to get back to being normal, being myself.* (DE15)

Interestingly, the *Woman’s Hour* corpus provides also quite a few instances of *you know* which serves as a signaler of the speaker’s or other people’s thoughts. In narrative parts of the conversation speakers try to act out some situations they themselves or other people experienced. To let their interlocutors have a better understanding of the situation described, the speakers verbalize what they or other people thought and felt at a specific moment. In the same vein as quotations, expressions summarising the thoughts of the speakers or other subjects are introduced into the discourse by means of *you know*. The examples in (12) and (13), both extracted from a discussion about single parenting, represent such a use of *you know*. In (12), one of the conversation participants, a single mother, comments on how she reacts in situations when people show pity towards her. In (13), the second guest, a single father, responds to an observation that single mothers are treated differently than single fathers: single dads receive more support and sympathy, whereas single mums are sometimes approached with a certain kind of inquisitive scrutiny or even dislike. Again, the expressions used by both speakers are rather an approximation of what people might actually think or feel. However, they symbolize a range of different behaviours and responses triggered by and in single parents, such as compassion, sympathy (example 13) or determination (12).
(12) **you just carry on doing the thing that you want to do, and you think you know, I’ll show you.** (DE16)

(13) Host: and a single dad doesn’t get that at all?
    BM: not at all. you think, oh poor guy on his own doing all the little baby things. you know that must be so hard for him, he can’t cope, let’s help him. (DE16)

The next functional category of you know consists of markers which introduce additional commentaries at the level of the discourse event. Erman (2001) calls such interjections ‘parenthetical comments’ and claims that they are necessary for the hearer to fully comprehend the message the speaker is trying to convey. In the Women’s Hour corpus, there are 32 uses of you know which introduce information that the addressee needs to know in order to be able to follow the speaker’s argument. In (14), for instance, the speaker explains that she had rather bad experiences with her mother, but she did not dare to share them with anyone because of the difficulties involved in this process (which she calls a translation problem). The comment the speaker inserts in her utterance concerns the fact that in spite of her professional experience (here I am a psychologist and a writer), she was not capable of analysing and describing her difficult relationship with her mother.  

(14) **oh my mother I think was very difficult and I didn’t/ you know, here I am a psychologist and a writer but I didn’t write about my own mot/ you know apparently/ this translation problem.** (DE27)

Another functional type of you know is also used in explanatory parts of discourse, at points where speakers introduce a change in informative content by means of adding new or modifying previous clauses. In the Women’s Hour corpus there are 13 expressions of this sort. For example, in (15), in order to describe her first fit of pancreatitis and bring this experience closer to her interlocutors, the speaker gives examples of the symptoms she had at that time. However, before she starts enumerating the symptoms, she uses you know in the same way as one would probably use the phrase such as or a colon in written text. Similarly, in (16), the speaker uses you know before he lists a range of counselling activities available to patients who suffer from serious depression. What is significant, neither the list in (15) nor the one in (16) is exhaustive: the speakers provide their listeners with the most relevant examples to increase the amount of informative content embedded in their utterance.

(15) **I woke up that night with all of these sort of symptoms, you know, severe vomitings excruciating pain etc. and then over the next sort of three and a half years I had sort of 40 episodes of acute pancreatitis.** (DE17)
(16) I mean for someone who gets serious depression like me I don’t think talking therapy is enough.
but I think there is a lot of space for you know being offered almost like a sort of a portfolio of options,
you know whether it is take more exercise, better diet, counselling, medication. (DE19)

The last functional category within discourse structuring markers is a group of you knows which guide the hearers towards a certain interpretation of the message conveyed by the speaker. Unlike in the case of modifying you knows discussed above, here speakers assume the existence of a larger body of shared knowledge, and by using you know, they are asking the hearer to accept a certain piece of information as already known or given. Surprisingly, in the analysed data, there are only nine instances of you know which may be assigned to this functional category. Two examples from this group are given in (17) and (18). In both cases the speakers use you know before idiomatic expressions and in both cases they express their hope that the interlocutors will interpret these expressions by activating their linguistic knowledge as well as personal experiences.

(17) and although we have had arguments and you know things that kind of go up and down, we stood very well together, and learned each other’s kind of personalities as we got older and as the relationship developed. (DE24)
(18) nothing beats that warm fuzzy you know jelly at the knees moment when a partner tells you that you/you know that they love you. (DE12)

4.2.2 Social functions of you know
In the Woman’s Hour corpus, in the majority of cases, you know appears turn-medially. There are only eight instances of you know which are turn-initial and fulfil the turn-taking function, and only three uses of turn-final you know with the turn-yielding role. Among you knows functioning as social monitors, there are also five instances whose function may be defined as comprehension securing: speakers use them to make sure that their interlocutors know what they are referring to. A case in point may be the example in (19), where the speaker uses you know to signal the reference to the type of medication she mentioned earlier in the discourse. Similarly, in (20) the speaker, who talks about her involvement in polyamorous relationships, uses you know to introduce the term that has already occurred several times in the discourse event. The use of you know in front of the term highlights its established discourse status and forces the hearers to accept its discourse meaning as shared.

(19) I mean I was certainly physically dependent you know on that medication and then I was sent home with the repeat for fentanyl. (DE17)
You know and intersubjectivity in radio talk

4.2.3 Metalinguistic functions of you know

You know working as a metalinguistic monitor is far more frequent than you know as a social monitor. In the whole corpus, there are 84 instances of metalinguistic you know, among them sixty with an enhancing function, seventeen with an approximating function and only seven working as hedges.

Enhancing you knows mark parts of the discourse which are critical at the discourse event level. They often precede or follow pieces of information not known to the addressee and direct the addressee’s attention to certain points made in the discourse. For instance, in the example given in (21), which has been extracted from a discussion on difficult mothers, you know highlights one of the questions the speaker poses. Importantly, you know appears here together with the expression above all, which also strengthens the impact of the question that follows. In (22), you know again plays an enhancing role. However, this time it appears immediately after a comment expressing a subjective evaluation of a situation (it could be worse) and makes it echo in a current discourse environment. Such uses of you know, where it follows a new, surprising piece of information and acts as a rhetorical comment with a strengthening effect, are relatively frequent and account for approximately 50% of all enhancing you knows.

Another functional subgroup of metalinguistic you knows consists of expressions which appear at points in the discourse where speakers provide the listeners with a rough but, at the same time, sufficiently exact idea of some phenomena under discussion. At these points also the speakers appeal to the hearers to draw appropriate inferences and contribute their own knowledge and reasoning to the argument being made (see Jucker and Smith 1998: 196). In (23), for example, the speaker makes a generalization about the fact that all children, especially girls, experience different kinds of problems at school. However, she does not specify what problems in particular she has in mind: she leaves this gap open and assumes that the listener will fill it in with his/her knowledge about school life and unpleasant school experiences. In (24), Woman’s Hour guests are engaged in a discussion on different responses to life tragedies. One of the participants talks about his personal experiences connected with the fact that he had a stroke. He...
claims that this life threatening condition has not brought about any change in his personality, although he was anticipating some kind of a breakthrough. To refer to the transformation he was waiting for, the speaker uses a rather vague expression of *ecstatic moment*. *You know*, which is used in front of this expression, acts as a marker of shared knowledge and as an appeal to the interlocutor for an appropriate interpretation: the speaker does not specify what he means by an *ecstatic moment*, but he knows that his interlocutors will interpret this expression with ease. Interestingly, both in (23) and (24), *you know* is accompanied by approximative expressions such as *some or kind of*.

(23) it’s all girls go through some kind of you *know* bullying or problems at school. (DE26)

(24) Host: but are you a different person from the person who had this stroke?
R.M.: I don’t think so honestly. I thought very hard about that and when I was in hospital I spent a lot of time lying around in bed waiting for you *know* a kind of ecstatic moment. It didn’t really come. (DE15)

The last functional subcategory of metalinguistic monitors encompasses all uses of *you know* which allow the speaker to distance himself/herself from his/her own lexical choices and which, in effect, tone down the potential negative impact of the message. In the *Woman’s Hour* corpus there are only seven expressions of this type. Most of them act as hedges with a face-saving function. For instance, the utterance quoted in (25), which comes from a discourse event devoted to adoption parties, shows how *you know* helps the speaker to distance herself form the negative term she uses with reference to adoption parties (*cattle market for children*). The example in (26), on the other hand, illustrates how *you know* is used to reduce the impact of an assertion which may be face-threatening towards other discourse participants. Here the speaker refers to a situation in which another discourse participant gave a smack to both of her children when they were misbehaving. The speaker mentions the fact that the punishment might have been stronger than a regular smack, but by saying so, she does not want to accuse her colleague of inflicting too harsh a punishment on her children. Therefore she reduces the force of her assertion by means of two hedges, *you know* and *sort of*.

(25) there’ve been some criticisms of this type of event. people have said it’s just you *know* a cattle market for children. how’ve you found it so far? (DE8)

(26) and clearly they have a relationship in which they trusted their mum and knew that this hit/that it might be you *know* sort of harder than she would normally do because they’d done something particularly naughty. they knew they were safe and they knew that that would be OK. (DE14)
4.2.4 *You know* and figurative speech

Researchers studying metaphor in spoken discourse have noticed that metaphorical expressions are frequently accompanied by different kinds of discourse markers. For example, Cameron (2003: 109) observes that in educational discourse hedges frequently precede or follow metaphors and, as a result, affect metaphor interpretation. *You know* does not appear among the hedges found in educational talk, which Cameron calls ‘tuning devices’ (2003: 109, see also Cameron & Deignan 2003). However, Tay (2010), who studies the role of metaphor in psychotherapeutic talk, observes that *you know* does occur at strategic points in the discourse where speakers deploy figurative speech. Such points in the discourse are called by Tay ‘strategic junctures’ as they usually occur when speakers make important explanatory moves (2010: 460).

The data analysed in the present study seems to confirm Tay’s observations. *You know* in the *Woman’s Hour* corpus also occurs at crucial narrative or explanatory points in the conversation, where the discourse participants are engaged in the process of reducing asymmetry between them and their interlocutors with respect to some body of knowledge. In many cases, those strategic discourse moments are rich in illustrative, metaphorical expressions which are immediately preceded or followed by different discourse markers, among them *you know*. In the whole corpus, *you know* appears in the context of metaphorical or metonymic expressions 36 times, which suggests that there are quite many discourse contexts or, in Tay’s (2010) terms, strategic junctures which favour *you know* as a signaller of figurative language use.

5. Conclusion

The analysis of *you know* in BBC Radio 4 *Woman’s Hour* conversations and interviews confirms that its use is not merely a matter of random sprinkling. On the contrary, *you know* is actually one of the most versatile discourse markers: it is used in different communicative contexts and for different communicative purposes.

In the *Woman’s Hour* corpus, *you know* turns out to be most frequently used as a textual monitor: speakers employ *you know* to make their utterance more coherent, enrich its communicative content, insert a comment or quotation, guide the listener towards a certain interpretation or perform discourse editing functions such as lexical search or self-repair. *You know* also quite often functions as a metalinguistic monitor: it allows the speakers to modify the impact of the overall message by either enhancing its strength or toning it down. Metalinguistic monitors additionally legitimize the use of vague sentences or expressions: the speakers appeal to shared knowledge and, as a result, make listeners partially responsible for an appropriate interpretation of such utterances. In the analysed corpus, there are also discourse contexts where *you know* functions as a social monitor: speakers use
it to take or yield turns, or to point at a referent mentioned previously in the discourse event.

The study of *you know* in radio talk has also shown that there is a strong tendency among conversation participants to use *you know* at strategic narrative and explanatory points in the discourse. *You know* as a textual or metalinguistic monitor occurs mainly when the speakers are talking about their personal experiences or trying to work out a common understanding of the issues under discussion. The use of *you know* is also positively correlated with the degree of intimacy between discourse participants: as they are getting more and more involved in dialogic interaction with their partners, they are more likely to use *you know* to modify critical parts of their utterances. Such a tendency may be connected with the growing need of the speakers to construct and negotiate common ground together with their interlocutors (Haselow 2012). Simultaneously, the use of *you know* at strategic points in the discourse may be motivated by the fact that speakers want their interlocutors to be actively engaged in the joint process of meaning-making and by using *you know*, they allow their conversational partners to contribute their own knowledge and reasoning to the argument being made (Jucker & Smith 1998: 196).

*You know* is clearly used in the *Woman’s Hour* talk at points where intersubjectivity surfaces: irrespective of whether it functions as a textual, social or metalinguistic monitor, it appears at those moments in discourse where speakers take into account their addressees and acknowledge their needs arising in the communication process. It seems, therefore, that apart from being a marker of common ground (e.g. Jucker & Smith 1998), *you know* also functions as a signal of intersubjective discourse behaviours of speakers engaged in dialogic interaction.

**Transcription symbols**

/ truncated intonation unit  
· pause  
· terminating intonation  
? questioning intonation  
· continuing intonation

**Notes**

1. Cameron (2007: 113-114) defines a discourse event as a “contextualized stretch of talking-and-thinking, such as a specific conversation between individuals, with a beginning and an end that indicate a degree of completion and wholeness”.
2. Hutchby (1991: 120) terms it ‘recipient-designed co-participant identification’
3. Erman (2001: 1340) divides discourse structuring markers into those that function at the textual level and those that work on the clausal level, which means that she distinguishes between *you knows* which ensure global and local coherence. As in many cases it is very difficult to draw the line between local and global planes of discourse, this distinction will be largely ignored in the discussion of the discourse structuring functions of *you know*.
4. One more example where *you know* introduces an additional but relevant piece of information is given in the second utterance in (3).
5. The metaphorical expression *commitment to flexible boundaries* denotes the approach to love relationships that is typical of people engaged in multiple relationships.

6. Adoption parties are events where potential adoptive parents and children waiting for adoption have the chance to mingle.

7. See also examples in (5), (17) or (25).

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The interaction between epistemicity and social rank on an online bulletin board

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Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate the close interaction between epistemic and evidential stance verbs on the one hand and social hierarchy and power on the other. It is hypothesized that there is a correlation between the degree and intensity of stance verbs and the social context in which they are generated. The data for the study comes from an online bulletin board, in which members are believed to have formed a virtual community with considerable linguistic and social variation. In order to enable the investigation of stance relative to an extra-linguistic dimension, social status is operationalized and members of the community are divided into three hierarchically distinct ranks: moderators, hosts and casual senders. A dialogical approach to the data suggests the distinct use of epistemic and evidential stance verbs in establishing and maintaining group membership by the three hierarchically different ranks.

1. Introduction
In this study, I investigate the degree and intensity of epistemic and evidential stance verbs on the online bulletin board rsg.net. Rsg.net is a virtual community in which social relations between members of the group are believed to have triggered the emergence of social hierarchy. The establishment of hierarchy and power in the present study is investigated through the notion of stance-taking, which in turn is seen as a channel through which speakers and writers achieve their socio-functional goals and make sense of the world. Thus, rsg.net is considered to be an important site for investigating the construction of group membership and its impact on the way stance is expressed. It is hypothesized that epistemic and evidential lexical verbs are important tools for indicating social hierarchy between members of the community.

Stance in the present study is restricted to the markers of epistemic and evidential modality. The differences between the two modal systems are summarized in Palmer (1986: 8): “[…] with epistemic modality speakers express their judgments about the factual status of the utterance, whereas with evidential modality they indicate the evidence they have for its factual status.” Although the
two phenomena have been noted to represent different construals of knowledge, the present study treats the two types of modality as facets of the same phenomenon, namely epistemicity (Boye 2012) (see Section 2.1 for overview). Therefore, such typical epistemic verbs as think, believe and guess, and evidential verbs as seem, find, and appear, are believed to share features with both conceptual categories. The complement clauses modified by these verbs are referred to as propositions, which represent objects of belief, opinion and evaluation, and that play an equally important role in determining the strength of epistemic commitment and evidential reliability.

Rsg.net displays interactive and conversational language by users whose primary aim is to exchange views and opinions on the topics being discussed (Claridge 2007: 97). The core members of the group have formed strong relationships between one another, and opinions, views and ideas are generously exchanged. However, verbal conflicts and disagreements have become almost an everyday matter on the board, which indicates the members’ constant struggle for recognition and control. To enable the study of epistemic and evidential stance verbs from the perspective of social hierarchy, it is necessary to operationalize the positions various members of rsg.net are believed to hold on the board. This is achieved by establishing social ranks, which divide rsg.net members into three hierarchically distinct groups (see Section 3.2 for the operationalization of social status on rsg.net).

Taking into consideration the close relationship between expression of stance and social hierarchy, the following research question is proposed:

How do members from three different ranks attenuate or reinforce the degree and intensity of epistemic and evidential stance verbs relative to the ranks of their conversational co-participants?

The method adopted for investigating the dialogic realizations of stance-taking on rsg.net relies on the theoretical studies of dialogicality (e.g. Linell 1998; Marková 2003). As a result, three extracts from two conversational threads are studied using an empirical approach to dialogicality, namely dialogical discourse analysis (Marková et al. 2007; Linell 2009). The method makes it possible to simultaneously look at the sequential and thematic organization of epistemic and evidential stance verbs. I therefore attempt to show that power and powerlessness as realized by epistemic and evidential positioning are dialogically generated in the ongoing interaction, and that they are highly dependent on the social status of one’s co-participants.
2. Background

2.1 Epistemic and evidential stance verbs

Epistemic and evidential modality have been found to be frequent in both spoken and written discourse (Biber and Finegan 1989). In fact, in English, modality can be expressed by a number of grammatical and lexical constructions, such as phrases, adverbs, adjectives, verbs, etc. In this study, I specifically focus on the interaction between stance verbs and the immediate context in which they are generated.

Although epistemic and evidential stance in the present study has been referred to as highlighting different construals of knowledge, confusion as to their terminological and conceptual differences has become an extensively studied research field. For instance, Palmer (1986) acknowledges the distinction between notions of commitment and source of evidence, but still brings examples of mixed systems. Chafe (1986), on the other hand, views evidentiality as a large system of expressions that besides marking the source of evidence also make references to attitudes towards knowledge. Aijmer (2009) keeps the two phenomena separate, but acknowledges the properties that are shared by both. Last but not least, Cornillie (2009) considers previous works on the two modal systems to be flawed by the assumption that speaker commitment is a direct outcome of source of knowing, and argues that evaluation of reliability is rather different from evaluation of likelihood.

The present study follows Boye’s (2012) assumption of the existence of a larger descriptive category of epistemicity, which combines the two inherently distinct modal systems: epistemic modality and evidentiality. By treating the two constructions as facets of the same phenomenon, it can be argued that epistemic certainty and commitment can hardly be fully understood without acknowledging the source on which knowledge is built. For instance, just like seem as a traditional marker of evidence has been found to express epistemic necessity (Aijmer 2009: 66), prototypical epistemic markers, such as I think, also have the potential of carrying indications of source.

The two modal systems are often described in terms of their degree of epistemic commitment and evidential reliability. This is frequently visualized with the help of a modal scale on which various epistemic and evidential markers are positioned. The scale is seen as continuous and quantitative, and ranges from ‘negative’ or less certain/reliable to ‘positive’ or as having higher certainty/reliability.¹ The position different epistemic and evidential markers take on this scale is a central issue in the current investigation of assertive and tentative language adopted by users from three different ranks.

When it comes to epistemic meanings, then Nuyts (2001: 110–111) has acknowledged the difficulty in marking the position of mental predicates on this conceptual scale. Nevertheless, the author positions do not know on a mid-scalar position, know on the ‘positive’ and doubt on the ‘negative’ end of the scale. However, Nuyts adds that the scale seems to play a minor role in determining the
semantics of the stance markers, and refers to evidentiality as a concept that eventually determines their meaning. In addition, studying the context in which epistemic and evidential stance markers occur also gives an insight into the emergent meaning of stance (Martin and White 2005; Kärkkäinen 2006).

As opposed to the degree of epistemic commitment, the meaning of evidential expressions is typically described through the notion of degree of reliability. This is primarily exemplified by the categorization of evidential expressions in terms of the source from which knowledge is retrieved. For instance, Boye (2012) makes a distinction between direct and indirect justification, which he in turn divides into various subsets (e.g. first-hand evidence, inferential evidence, reported evidence). Other classifications have been proposed in Chafe (1986), Aikhenvald (2004) and others. What all these approaches have in common is the belief that such subcategories of direct evidence as sensory and perceptual evidence are more reliable than their indirect counterparts (e.g. inference, hearsay). Therefore, such direct evidential expressions as in example (1) are placed higher on the evidential scale than expressions that report inferential evidence, as in (2):

(1)  *I saw a routine she has choreographed with the new CoP [...]*
(2)  *[...] it seems that most of the time some people are highly annoyed with her style and/or overscoring.*

2.2.  *Power and hierarchy in virtual communities*

Computer-mediated communication (CMC) is a relatively new source of research in linguistics, media studies, psychology and other areas interested in human communication. In linguistics, it is a prolific source for studying language change and acquisition, as well as the generation of new and unique social roles and virtual communities. CMC is a cover term for various modes of virtual domains, such as e-mails, instant messaging, chat rooms, and such later additions like social media sites, weblogs and voice-over-IP systems.

Much of the research in CMC has been conducted on the classification of the medium as either spoken or written (e.g. Crystal 2001; Hård af Segerstad 2002; Baron 2003). However, more extensive research on the phenomenon can be found on the emergence of distinct social roles and power relations in such virtual communities, which have led researchers to assume that the social roles assigned to Internet users strongly influence their linguistic behaviour (Postmes *et al.* 2001; Herring 2002). The distinct behaviour apparent in these communities is first and foremost the result of relative anonymity. In domains where anonymity is high, flaming and other types of boorish behaviour is likely to occur. However, in modes where anonymity is low and members have formed a close and tightly knit Internet community, such egalitarian behaviour is less common and problematic. Herring (2002: 137–138) notes that this is more common in asynchronous modes of CMC, where the majority of messages are dominated by a small group of users, and more than anonymity, frequent participation is influenced by perceived entitlement and self-confidence.
In asynchronous modes of CMC, hierarchy is, in fact, built in the domain. The role of a small number of users has been empowered by the institutionalization of their position in the community (Kolko & Reid 1998). For instance, such roles are assigned to moderators in bulletin boards, Wizards in MUDs and operators in IRCs (Internet Relay Chat). These members have employed a managerial role in the domain and, as a result, they have considerable power over the rest of the community. In asynchronous domains, such members are often associated with experience and they are frequently opposed to more novel users, who tend to receive less respectful treatment from the former (Herring 2002: 138). For instance, upon receiving admin privileges, Wikipedia editors have been noted to significantly decrease their use of politeness strategies (Danescu-Niculescu-Mizil et al. 2013: 256). Also, newsgroup hosts have been found to pose a threat to other users’ face wants and to display authority when community rules are not obeyed (Marcoccia 2004: 134).

The interface between stance and social hierarchy has not received as much attention in linguistic research as it deserves. The present study attempts to contribute to the field by investigating the phenomenon in a mode of CMC where the emergence of social hierarchies is likely to occur.

3. Social status on an Internet bulletin board

3.1 Bulletin board rsg.net
The data for the present study is extracted from the Internet bulletin board rsg.net. Rsg.net is a mode of CMC generally referred to as bulletin boards. The board is specialized on rhythmic gymnastics, an Olympic sport where one or more gymnasts manipulate one of five apparatuses to a piece of music. The reason for studying this particular domain lies in its close association with the author of this work. Having been a member of the board for nearly ten years, I have established close relationships with numerous members of the community, which is a great advantage in subsequent data treatment.

Bulletin boards are asynchronous in that messages occur with time constraints and members do not have to be online at the same time. What distinguishes these domains from many other modes of virtual communication is their easy accessibility for all Internet users, or as Claridge notes, “forums […] are part of the public world-wide-web space, look like 'normal' web sites and can be visited and read by any internet user at any time […]” (2007: 88). In fact, their easy accessibility is considered to be the main reason behind the highly heteroglossic and diverse language found in such virtual communities.

The members of rsg.net are believed to have formed a tightly knit Internet community, in which social roles and hierarchies have been established. Crystal’s (2001:156) remark that in bulletin board conversations members are a priori considered to be equal is called into question by assuming that these social roles assigned to the members of rsg.net are factors that most effectively determine their
linguistic behaviour. However, the problem that often arises in most variationist studies on CMC is the absence of such socioeconomic information as age, gender, social class, etc. (Herring 2001: 621). Rsg.net is no exception, as inserting personal information is optional for its users, which results in incomplete and assumingly unreliable user profiles. Nevertheless, as will be demonstrated in the following section, the socioeconomic information available for the researcher is often implicitly present within the boundaries of the virtual community itself.

3.2 The operationalization of social status
In the present section, I demonstrate how the absence of socioeconomic information in CMC can be overcome by uncovering an important attribute in bulletin boards, which makes it possible to operationalize an inherently subjective phenomenon. In order to be able to answer the research question above, social hierarchy and power need to be operationalized among the members of rsg.net. In the present study, the operationalization is achieved by relying on two criteria: (1) the assignment of privileged status based on the members’ contribution to the domain, and (2) their activity and involvement in rsg.net discussions. These two criteria are chosen based on the assumption that institutionalization and activity are the main factors that determine social relationships between members of an online community.

The first criterion, the assignment of privileged status, is applied to the highest rank of the categorization, namely to a group generally referred to as moderators. The second criterion, activity and involvement in rsg.net discussions, is assigned to the following two levels, namely hosts and casual senders (Table 1).

Table 1. The operationalization of social status on rsg.net.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Moderators</td>
<td>users who have been promoted to keep order on the board, number of posts not taken into account</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Hosts</td>
<td>users whose contribution exceeds 700 posts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Casual senders</td>
<td>users who have contributed fewer that 700 posts since joining the board</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In rsg.net, moderators are users who have been given a privileged role by the administrator of the board to keep order in the community. Moderators generally filter offensive and obscene messages and spam, move misplaced posts to relevant thematic groups and ban misbehaving users. The fact that activity plays such an important role in the distinction between hosts and casual senders is based on the assumption that it is above all confidence and readiness that encourage users to frequently engage in the various threads of rsg.net. For instance, Herring (2002: 137–138) has noted that most of the messages in such asynchronous modes of CMC are dominated by a very small group of users, who are often associated with such characteristic features as perceived entitlement and self-confidence. These
members are also believed to possess valuable information about the ‘stars’ of the sport, and they do not hesitate to initiate new threads and contribute to the already existing ones. After a brief investigation of the general activity on the board, a landmark of 700 messages is set to distinguish between the two ranks.

4. **Method and data collection**

4.1 **Dialogical discourse analysis**

The theoretical framework of dialogicality assumes that communicative exchange can only be investigated by looking at naturally occurring and situated language. It is therefore argued that an ‘ideal dialogue’ that is free of any communicative predicaments cannot form the basis for any empirical investigation of discursive constructions (Linell 2009: 5).

A considerable amount of attention in the studies of dialogicality has been paid to shifting the role of individual speakers and writers to social beings, who dynamically take part in the negotiation of social relations in discourse. In addition to being cognitively dependent on each other’s turns in interaction, these social beings are also socially and culturally interdependent with each other’s positions and perspectives. The idea that our conceptualization of the world is at least partially shaped by the dominant views of the community to which we belong has been termed by Marková et al. (2007) as ‘socially shared knowledge’. However, the framing of the Object between conversational participants rarely displays neutral and homogeneous representations. People as social beings are representative of a diverse and heterogeneous array of positions and attitudes towards the world, which often triggers clashes and confrontations of beliefs and opinions.

Conflicts in interaction inevitably lead speakers and writers to the negotiation of power, resistance and social control. Linell approaches power and powerlessness the same way he approaches communication in general: “Power emerges from interaction, and is executed in and through interaction […]” (Linell 2009: 216). Linell also adds that since any contribution to interaction is a social action, it is always accompanied by a power aspect (2009: 215), which means that by overlooking its properties in naturally occurring language, researchers run the risk of missing important indications of the nature of communicative exchange.

When it comes to possible methodological extensions within the framework of dialogicality, Linell notes that it is not the method that makes the analysis dialogical. However, he proposes a list of features that are more appropriate for studying the collective enterprise of meaning-making than others. The author then concludes that one can simply develop his/her own ‘dialogical discourse analysis’ by looking at the dynamics of recurrent themes, features and other internal and external aspects of dialogically constructed communication (Linell 2009: 383–384).
The present study, therefore, adopts the methodological framework called dialogical discourse analysis, which is a slightly modified version of Linell’s own analytical method of the same name. The main difference between Linell’s account and the analysis adopted in the present study lies in the fact that while dialogical analyses are generally applied to larger discourse phases and episodes, or what Linell calls ‘communicative projects’ and ‘communicative activities’, the subject matter of the present study are single instances of epistemic and evidential lexical verbs, which are studied relative to previous and possible following stance markers as used by other members of the speech community. In addition to the sequential organization of the markers, the method also goes into content and studies the tendency of these stance verbs to frame and modify epistemic commitment and attitudes towards evidence with varying degrees and intensity.

4.2 Compiling the corpus

After a thorough investigation of a number of threads on rsg.net, two discussions are chosen for the present study: (1) Why does Merkulova receive so many critics? and (2) Can I still become an Olympian at 19? The threads are chosen for their high degree of controversy and conflict, which in turn trigger a higher number of epistemic and evidential stance verbs. The first thread is about a famous Russian gymnast Aleksandra Merkulova, whose scores in international competitions are believed to be undeservedly high, or as rsg.net members like to call it, the gymnast is over-scored. The second thread touches upon a problem posed by a rsg.net member, whose inquiry about becoming an Olympic gymnast when starting gymnastics trainings at the age of 19 is ridiculed and treated with disdain by the majority of users. Since bulletin boards are characterized by their fragmentary nature, in which case one thread can witness the emergence of multiple conversations and users can be involved in numerous discussions within the boundaries of one thread (Marcoccia 2004: 120), three extracts in which messages address the same issue are retrieved from the two threads to control for topical and thematic homogeneity.

The thread Why does Merkulova receive so many critics? contains 151 messages with 8,678 words. The discussion takes place from 6 June 2012 until 24 August 2012, and was extracted on 6 November 2012. From the thread, two extracts are compiled. The extracts contain 845 words (572 and 273 words each) and 10 messages (six and four respectively). The posts are produced by five members of rsg.net, who are representative of all three hierarchically different ranks. The second thread contains 36 posts with 5,168 words, which have been produced from 13 March 2011 until 29 December 2012, and extracted on 29 May 2013. From this thread, one extract with six messages and 1,338 words is retrieved. Six rsg.net members from all three ranks take part in the discussion. In total, 16 posts with 2,183 words are thoroughly and qualitatively analyzed (see Table 2 for summary). The extracts are transmitted into text files, in which all instances of epistemic and evidential stance verbs are manually identified and studied relative to their pragmatic functions in discourse.
Table 2. A summary of threads retrieved from rsg.net.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Thread</th>
<th>Number of members</th>
<th>Number of posts</th>
<th>Number of words</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Why does Merkulova receive so many critics?</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>845</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Can I still become an Olympian at 19?</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1,338</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sample total</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>2,183</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Although users of rsg.net come from diverse linguistic and cultural backgrounds, the default language of the board is English. However, taking into consideration the complexity of extracting socioeconomic information from a relatively anonymous mode of CMC, I do not attempt to control for regional variation in the present study. Also, in order to study rsg.net threads in their entirety, it is simply not possible to find topics where even the majority of messages are produced by only native speakers of English. The issue is partly solved by treating the language used on the board as a representation of International English or English as Lingua Franca (ELF). The study therefore contributes to the understanding that most of the uses of English occur in contexts were at least some conversational partners are non-native speakers of the language (Seidlhofer 2001: 133–134). Although stance in general is considered to be a largely dialect-dependent phenomenon, due to the constraints of the present study, it is seen as a conceptual tool for expressing one’s ideas, opinions and beliefs from a wide array of cultural backgrounds. Non-nativeness is therefore not treated as a problem, but rather as a resourceful and often unattended aspect of language use (see Seidlhofer 2001 for a thorough discussion in favour of ELF).

5. Results and discussion

In order to study the degree and intensity of epistemic and evidential markers in the messages, social status is determined in the message of the sender as well as the intended addressee. It should be noted, however, that not all posts retrieved from the two threads have an explicitly marked addressee, which means that they are directed at the board as a whole and annotated as $P(ublic)$.

Due to the relatively small sample size, the present study simply attempts to identify the various strategies used to establish group membership with the use of epistemic and evidential stance verbs. The aim, therefore, is not to generalize across the three different ranks, but rather to describe the aspects and features of epistemic commitment and evidential reliability from an interactional and dialogic perspective. In fact, an initial observation shows that differences between the three social ranks are rather negligible. More than rank, the degree of epistemic and evidential stance verbs is dependent on the nature of the communicative situation.
However, a few observations can be made, which are presented in the following sections.

5.1 Rank 3: Casual senders
I start by describing and identifying the underlying features of epistemic and evidential meanings in the messages of Rank 3 users or casual senders. Casual senders, as they are called in the present study, are users who have contributed fewer than 700 messages since joining the board (see Section 3.2). They are therefore regarded as inexperienced and often novel members of the community whose position on the board is hypothesized to be less appreciated than that of their fellow members.

Rank 3 members are present in all three extracts. In fact, four members out of all 11 users are casual senders. This partly disproves some earlier observations that more experienced users of virtual communities are more frequently involved in discussions than their inexperienced counterparts (Herring 2002: 137–138; Marcoccia 2004: 131). In the present case, casual senders are actively participating in the evolvement of all three extracts and even act as initiators of the two threads in question.

At first sight, the examples of epistemic and evidential stance verbs carry rather reinforced and intensified instances of commitment and source of information. However, at a closer look, the presence or absence of intensifying and mitigating markers only show a limited capability for epistemic and evidential stance verbs to be classified as either tentative or authoritative. As the following examples demonstrate, it is crucial to dig deeper into meaning and incorporate the semantic categories of verifiability and argumentativity into the description of epistemic and evidential stance.

In the following paragraphs, I propose a few strategies used by casual senders in establishing group membership and social status through the notion of epistemicity.

5.1.1 Pointing forward in discourse by acknowledging prevalent community views
The first example of a socio-functional realization of stance by a casual sender is what can be called ‘pointing forward in discourse’. The term is retrieved from Kärkkäinen (2003: 128), in which the author associates the expression with sequential slots in which I think introduces and frames a bracket at a boundary. The term can also be encountered in the many studies of dialogicality. According to this view, conversation analyses should not only account for already occurred previous turns, but also look at the cognitive properties behind utterances that are clearly directed ahead in the conversation and that also count as important indications of the dynamics of communicative exchanges (Marková et al. 2007).

The message from which the example is retrieved is the opening post of the thread Can I still become an Olympian at 19? As already established in Section 4.2, mainly due to its controversial request, the message is considered to be a fruitful trigger for a subsequent emergence of various stance strategies. Serving as
the opening post of the thread, the message is directed at all members of rsg.net and therefore does not refer to an explicit addressee. Table 3 presents the message with its metalinguistic information.

Table 3. An example of ‘pointing forward in discourse’ by OlympianRG.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author: OlympianRG</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Posted: Sun, 13-Mar-2011 19:05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post subject: Can I still become an Olympian at 19?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joined: 13 Mar 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Posts: 1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(...)

1. **Ok, I know it sounds old to start RG at age 19, but I am really determined and prepared to work hard.** Over the past few years I’ve become seriously enamored with this sport. I think it's one of the most beautiful sports there is. Please don't be confused by the 'Olympian' in the title. **I know aiming for gold might not be possible, but just getting in the Olympics would already be heaven for me.** I'm a perfectionist at everything that I do. I haven't followed any RG courses yet, as I wanted to focus on school first and my parents wouldn't let me. They said I still ’d have plenty of time after high school. I can already do all the splits with a slight oversplit on the left. I weigh 49kg and am 1.75 meter, which is the same as Anna Bessonova . I can also do a bridge and get my hands to about 15cm of my feet. I got a bit scared when I see people retiring at 23 years old . Why do they do that? Can't they still get better at RG? I would never give up. I'm from Belgium, so I'm looking for the best place to practice and a good coach. Could you guys please help me. **I know it might take years and years to get to my goal, but I'm not a quitter and am prepared to work very hard.** I'm already stretching about 5 hours a day.

As can be seen, the opening post contains five instances of epistemic mental predicates, of which three represent the lexeme *know* (lines 1, 4 and 13). *Know* is generally treated as an epistemic verb with relatively high epistemic certainty. Palmer (2001: 11) calls it a ‘factive predicator’ and Caton (1969: 20) categorizes *know* as one of the expressions of his ‘K-group’, where ‘K’ stands for *know*. Moreover, the propositions being modified contain a number of instances that rather reinforce than mitigate their truth value (the adverb *really*, emotionally charged content words such as *heaven*, etc.). However, when one looks at the argumentative and verifiable value of the propositions, a certain pattern seems to emerge (presented in italics). What is being indicated is that the member uses *know* to frame propositions that first represent generally accepted attitudes in the community and only then present the member’s own perspective on the matter (e.g. *Ok, I know it sounds old to start RG at age 19, but I am really determined and prepared to work hard*). This results in a conversational strategy that significantly minimizes the risk for the speaker to lose his/her face through subsequent imposition by other members. The user therefore first acknowledges the prevalent views of the board and consequently shows awareness of the argumentative and contentious nature of the thread.
5.1.2 The adoption of verbs with non-argumentative propositions
The next feature is exemplified in a post by the casual sender Brivido. Brivido is the initiator of the thread Why does Merkulova receive so many critics? in which the user inquires about Aleksandra Merkulova’s unfavourable position in the gymnastics community (see Section 4.2 for a description). The message is presented in Table 4, in which the post is an answer to a number of entries provided by Rank 2 users, where the latter give insight into the reasons behind Merkulova’s unpopularity.

Table 4. An example of the adoption of non-argumentative propositions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author: Brivido</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Post: Thu, 7-Jun-2012 13:09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post subject: Why does Merkulova receive so many critics?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joined: 19 Apr 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Posts: 23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. It was really interesting to me to see different visions, and arguments, thanks to everyone I just wanted to say that when I wrote “hate” in the title it was because I saw so many insults against here on youtube! It made me so angry, because she's a human being, she's just 16, she worked very hard to be where she is now, and some people presume to blame her gratis like a bad film... It's why I wanted listen you to understand better. So, to resume why a lot of people don't like her: * Merkulova is the little dog of Viner; I think that's right, Viner has always had a favourite gymnast, but we can't do anything, unfortunately... * She'soverscored... I don't know, maybe I'm always optimist, but I can't imagine judges being corrupted :) I think she's not as clean as Charkashyna, or Miteva, but her difficulty level is higher (because the cop is mainly made on the russian gymnasts...) * her smile is fake : of course!! like every gymnast! What gymnast would be able to smile &quot;real&quot; during a so difficult effort?? I also think it contributes to the Merkulova's charisma, her youngness, her innocence, her immaturity, but youngness &amp; innocence are not eternal. cLook at Kabaeva after 2001.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Therefore, in Brivido’s message, the member draws conclusions based on the opinions expressed by rsg.net members thus far. The message contains numerous stance constructions framed by I think (lines 7, 9 and 13). The example shows that these stance markers frame rather strong propositional contents, while in fact, the larger context in which the verb and its proposition are embedded suggest otherwise. The context shows that due to its strategic construal, the stance taken by the casual sender is unlikely to trigger negative responses from other members of the community.

The first I think on line 7 displays a relatively high degree of uncertainty, but little chance for others to disagree with, since it is based on the prevalent views of the community (Merkulova is the little dog of Viner; I think that's right). The second epistemic verb on line 9 precedes a proposition that would receive exhorting replies from the majority of the board if not for the subsequently inserted
conjunction *but* and the proposition *she’s not as clean as Charakashyna and Miteva* in the following clause. This technique partly cancels the proposition in the previous clause and adds to the negative evaluation of Merkulova. With the last *I think* on line 13, the user first expresses sympathy towards Merkulova and her charismatic performances before cancelling the stance with *but youniness & innocence are not eternal*. By doing so, *Brivido* minimizes the argumentative value of his/her propositions. As a result, *Brivido’s* stance is marked as highly tentative and non-argumentative, as it is unlikely to trigger negative responses from other members.

5.1.3 Strengthening of stance verbs after confrontation

As indicated above, the degree and intensity of epistemic commitment and evidential reliability between the three ranks show rather negligible differences. In addition to instability in inter-user communication, the techniques used also have minor differences in messages from the same member. While so far it has been established that the stance constructions adopted by Rank 3 users present rather tentative realizations of the phenomenon, the next example significantly contradicts this view. It also shows how the stance strategies can change after a predicament in a communicative situation occurs. The message in Table 5 is produced by the same casual sender as exhibited in the previous example (*Brivido*), who upon being attacked by the Rank 2 user *_ybalka*_ provides a rather assertive and reinforced answer.

*Table 5.* The use of authoritative stance by the casual sender *Brivido*.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(...)</td>
<td><em><em>ybalka</em></em> wrote: HAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAH</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(...)</td>
<td>Brivido wrote: It was really interesting to me to see different visions, and arguments, thanks to everyone [contracted message, see Table 4 above]</td>
<td>(...)</td>
<td>Brivido wrote:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>^^ Come, it's rather cool! No... really, <em>I don't think</em> judges are corrupted! When</td>
<td>2.</td>
<td>people are angry because their fav gymnast doesn't win, it's normal. But don't call it</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>virtue. However, <em>I think</em> judges are always guided by their unconscious, like every</td>
<td>3.</td>
<td>injustice. However, <em>I think</em> judges are always guided by their unconscious, like every</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>human being. It's natural.</td>
<td>4.</td>
<td>human being. It's natural.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The message provided by *_ybalka* functions as essentially condescending and face-threatening towards *Brivido*. It contains an imitation of laughter followed by the proposition *I would love to live in your bubble!* This, in turn, is followed by a
counterattack by Brivido on lines 1–4. The post contains two markers of epistemic stance: I don’t think on line 1 and its positive form I think on line 3. In the first case, the user re-emphasizes his/her earlier statement about corruption in rhythmic gymnastics (No... really, I don't think judges are corrupted!), in which case the absence of an epistemic marker in an earlier post has been replaced by a construction that displays a high degree of certainty and evaluation. This is mainly exemplified by the presence of the intensifying and truth-attesting adverb really as well as an exclamation mark used to express emphasis. The second epistemic marker on line 3 is another example of I think. In this case, the mental predicate is again accompanied by an adverb (always) that gives weight to Brivido’s position and confirms the user’s beliefs on the matter. The example demonstrates that stance is situated in discourse and emerges in collectively constructed settings, which means that the meaning of epistemic and evidential verbs in discourse can be highly flexible and context-dependent.

5.2 Rank 2: Hosts
As established in Section 3.2, hosts are rsg.net members whose number of contributions to the board exceeds 700 messages. As a long-term member of rsg.net, it can be confidently said that although these members’ role in the community has not been institutionalized as is the case with moderators, hosts are nevertheless active and experienced members of the board, whose frequent involvement in the discussions of rsg.net has earned them an important position in the community. This is also indicated by their frequent participation in the three extracts scrutinized in the present study (four out of 11 users are hosts). The results of the analysis show that similar to casual senders, a relatively wide degree of variety in terms of the degree and intensity of epistemic and evidential stance verbs can also be found in the present category. However, the most significant distinction arises in the emergence of a variety of stance constructions framed as politeness strategies.

5.2.1 The adoption of hedges and mitigation
A number of instances of epistemic and evidential stance verbs in the discourse of hosts display politeness strategies, in which the verbs are used in contexts that show awareness of the addressee’s face wants. The example in Table 6 is retrieved from the thread Can I still become an Olympian at 19? and functions as a reply to the initiator of the thread, the casual sender OlympianRG. It is written by the Rank 2 user *Kalinka*, who goes to great lengths to minimize the risk of endangering the nature of the ongoing speech situation.

The stance verb that does some interesting interactional work in the present example is presented on lines 1–3 (I don’t think with its immediate context), since it is clearly directed at the initiator of the thread. In Kärkkäinen’s classification of the functions of I think in pre-and post-positional slots, the example can be categorized as what the author refers to as the ‘recipient-oriented design of utterances’ (Kärkkäinen 2003: 146). These stance markers typically occur in more
demanding trouble spots in interaction, where speakers and writers have to design and redesign their utterances to adjust to the characteristics of the ongoing discourse. In the present example, the host *Kalinka* hedges his/her proposition with the mental predicate I don’t think. Bublitz (1992: 560) notes the construction to be “an expression of epistemic modality, involvement and politeness used by the speaker to increase the degree of qualification and tentativeness of the underlying proposition” (emphasis added). It is therefore concluded that the member tries to remain on friendly terms with OlympianRG, which is also exemplified by an encouraging assertion preceding the judgment on the first line of the message (It’s never late for practicing the sport you love) and a device for showing awareness of OlympianRG’s face wants on lines 1–2 (I don’t want to be cruel).

Table 6. Hedging and mitigation by the host *Kalinka*.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author: <em>Kalinka</em></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Posted: Mon, 14-Mar-2011 9:09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post subject: Can I still become an Olympian at 19?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joined: 09 Apr 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Posts: 2058</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Location: Cagliari, Italy</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. I suggest you to start RG! It’s never late for practising the sport you love! But (I don’t want to be cruel) I don’t think you will be able to attend very important competitions like Europeans, Worlds and Olympics... Gymnasts who participate to those competitions do RG since when they are child. For example, Russian, Belarusian, Bulgarian and Ukrainian gymnasts start RG at 3, 4 or 5 maximum. But I know that the Italian gymnast Susanna Marchesi started to do artistic gymnastics at 8 and at 11 she started rhythmic gymnastics. Anyway, 19, in my opinion, is too late for going to Olympics. It’s never late to have fun, but not to have that high ambitions. Even if you are quite flexible and thin, you don’t have the handling of the apparatus and the right body technique... But it should not be a problem if you love RG. If you love a sport, it doesn’t matter what goals you will be able to reach. For sure, reaching goals makes you happy, but just enjoy the sport you love!

5.2.2 The case of irony

The strategy scrutinized next is provided by a member with the username Invisible Hedgehog, and shortly follows the post produced by the author of the previous example, *Kalinka*. Similar to *Kalinka*’s reply, this user also avoids taking an explicit stand on the issue at hand, and adopts an epistemic mental predicate to frame a strategy that allows for an implicit construal of negation, namely irony.

As a long-term member of the gymnastics community, the author of this paper is aware of the tendency for gymnasts from highly competitive countries to move to locations where qualifying for title championships is considerably easier. Based on that knowledge, it is speculated that Invisible Hedgehog’s suggestion framed by the epistemic I think (line 1) in Table 7 displays a case of irony. Much research has
been conducted on the nature of ironic utterances and the basic functions these devices have in language (e.g. Sperber & Wilson 1981; Gibbs and O’Brien 1991; Giora 1995). For instance, Giora (1995) has proposed irony to be a form of indirect negation through which it is expressed without an overt negative marker. It can therefore be assumed that the reply posted by Invisible Hedgehog is produced to implicitly suggest the absurdness of the request made by OlympianRG. As a result, Invisible Hedgehog rather tactfully opposes himself/herself to the issue by tackling the sensitive problem present in rhythmic gymnastics.

Table 7. An example of irony by the host Invisible Hedgehog.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author: Invisible Hedgehog</th>
<th>Post subject: Can I still become an Olympian at 19?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Posts: 1717</td>
<td>Location: Ukraine, Kyiv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(...)</td>
<td>1. I think that you can become an Olympian in RG if you move to...something like Marshall islands or other exotic countries and could get the spot as a Tripartile Commission of FIG-NOC-IOC like Cape Verde usually does</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5.2.3 Pointing forward in discourse with strong evaluation

The third example of a socio-cognitive function of stance in establishing group membership is exemplified in the message by the Rank 2 user Aleksandrafan. Here the user deviates from the previously presented examples by two other hosts as well as from a similar strategy encountered in Section 5.1, namely ‘pointing forward in discourse’. Table 8 presents the example in question, in which the message follows two quoted entries by Hoops and Grand Fouettes and Brivido.

The two stance constructions selected for the present discussion are provided on lines 1–2 and 5 (context in italics). The first of these, I know on lines 1–2, precludes the proposition a lot of people don’t like her style. Similar to the example scrutinized in Section 5.1, this construction is particularly interesting from a dialogic point of view, in which it is assumed that speakers and writers are not autonomous individuals operating in enclosed capsules, but rather social persons active in the intricate web of meaning-making. Therefore, Aleksandrafan’s first epistemic stance construction can be interpreted in terms of the dialogic apprehension of possible subsequent messages, where the user shows his/her awareness of people’s attitudes towards the subject matter. Moreover, the user indirectly addresses these people and does so using rather bold generalizations (immature people, a lot of, etc.).
Table 8. Pointing forward with strong evaluation by the host Aleksandrafan.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author: Aleksandrafan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Posted: Wed, 6-Jun-2012 20:26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post subject: Why does Merkulova receive so many critics?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joined: 31 May 2011</td>
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<tr>
<td>Location: Canada</td>
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Hoops and Grand Fouettes wrote: Overscoring.

Brivido wrote: Just because of that? But if she wasn't overscored, would people still hate her?

Aleksandrafan wrote:
1. There will always be immature people who hate a gymnast because of their style, and I know a lot of people don't like her style. She’s more bright and bouncy as opposed to graceful and mature. Not everyone likes that. I remember one person saying a while back that if she wasn't overscored, everyone would be saying how much potential she had. But yes, mostly people hate her because she's overscored. Which I think is stupid;
2. hate the judges or hate the coach, not the gymnast. She's just doing what she's told.
3. Anyway, she's my all-time favourite gymnast. I can't stand gymnasts like Miteva or Kanaeva. I like gymnasts with charisma.

Another important epistemic marker in Aleksandrafan’s post—and inarguably one of the most typical stance markers in the English language—is the mental predicate I think (line 5). Here the user takes a strong evaluative stance, as opposed to the previous mental predicate, where Aleksandrafan rather reflected on the general opinion of the board than on his/her own viewpoints. What is more, I think can be considered as a continuation to an objective construal of public opinion to which the user provides a final evaluative stance. As a result, the proposition the mental predicate I think modifies on line 5 (is stupid) exhibits the writer’s subjective view on the general opinion being expressed on rsg.net. As a result, Aleksandrafan explicitly attacks the users of the board and does so without any mitigating or softening devices to avoid subsequent imposition.

5.3 Rank 1: Moderators

Due to the small number of members whose role has been institutionalized and privileged by the site administrator (12 out of all ~4000 users), the presence of moderators in the 16 messages investigated in the present study is rather scarce. Although moderators are omnipresent in the discussions of rsg.net due to their administrative role in the community, their contributions are usually infrequent and sporadic. As a result, only two messages by two users from Rank 1 are found in the three extracts. Both users have held the position for a number of years and play an important role in the board’s everyday life. They are therefore rightful members of this category.
Interestingly enough, no instances of epistemic and evidential stance verbs can be found in the two relatively long messages produced by these two moderators (394 words in total). This, however, does not mean that the messages are in any way impartial or free of any subjectivity, as can be seen in Table 9. The message functions as a reply to the second post scrutinized in Section 5.1. More specifically, it addresses a stance taken by the casual sender Brivido, the initiator of the thread. The example shows that although no instances of epistemic or evidential stance verbs can be found in the message, Storm’s reply carries various strategies of strong subjectivity and reinforcement of propositional content. In addition, the user’s reply is resolute and even ruthless, and it is exemplified by a variety of special CMC features, such as a long row of exclamation and question marks as well as a repetitive use of capitalized words (e.g. YOU, RUN, EASY, UNFAIR). It is clear that the message is produced with a deluge of emotions and strong opposition towards the statements presented by the Rank 3 user above.

Table 9. A message by the moderator Storm.

Author: Storm
Posted: Fri, 8-Jun-2012 1:53
Post subject: Why does Merkulova receive so many critics?
Joined: 02 Sep 2005
Posts: 4482
Location: Queensland, Australia

Brivido wrote: I don't know, maybe I'm always optimist, but I can't imagine judges being corrupted :/

Storm wrote:
1. !!!!!?????? Maybe YOU are blind because YOUR favourite does win, then is easy for you to think "oh judges of course are fair!" Merkulova RUN, did a real marathon, to get the ball in her EC routine and she got 9.6 as execution. Now, you tell me, is this fairness?? Kanaeva for ages did the chest spin with both hands as help against the rules written in the COP, and she always got it counted. Mitroz and Weber are in the top 10, group A with super EASY routines, placing in front of Staniouta and Ritardinova etc- Is this fair judging? ALL the senior russian turn on almost flat foot most of the times, and they had the Cop changed to suit them. You yourself wrote that the CoP is written for Russian gymnasts: doesn't this sound as the MOST UNFAIR possible thing? is this fine to you? Let's not be ridiculous please. Judges are UNFAIR big times. They are a shameful lot that plays as marionette with no conscience.
6. Conclusion

The aim of the present study was to investigate the strength of epistemic and evidential stance verbs relative to the extra-linguistic dimension of social status on the online bulletin board rsg.net. In Section 3.2, social status was operationalized in terms of two criteria: status and activity. While status determined the highest level of the categorization, namely the group of moderators (Rank 1), activity was responsible for the differentiation between the lower levels, hosts (Rank 2) and casual senders (Rank 3). This resulted in a three-level operationalization of social hierarchy in a mode of CMC, where anonymity often poses great constraints on the successful conduction of socio-cognitive research. The posts produced by the representatives of the three ranks were studied in their dialogical context using the dialogical discourse analysis with an aim to account for the sequential and thematic organization of stance constructions in context.

It should be borne in mind that the goal of the present study was not to draw firm conclusions on the realization of stance constructions by the three ranks, but rather to identify the strategies through which rsg.net members achieve their socio-functional goals in the community. The results indicate that the highest rank of the categorization, moderators, did not use any instances of epistemic or evidential stance verbs to indicate group membership, however, other linguistic strategies were used to display clear authoritativeness.

The lower ranks, hosts and casual senders, whose criteria for group categorization were based on their involvement in rsg.net discussions, adopted epistemic and evidential verb constructions to a much greater extent. To start with, the messages produced by hosts, or the more experienced and active members of the board, used to contain the highest number of politeness strategies framed by epistemic and evidential verbs. The messages were most frequently directed at casual senders, which shows that in addressing novel members of the community, great consideration is paid on preserving amiable relationships and showing awareness of addressees’ face wants.

The investigation of stance constructions as construed by casual senders demonstrates that the degree and intensity of epistemic and evidential verbs cannot be fully accounted for without taking into consideration the semantic constitution of the propositions being modified. For instance, while a number of messages by casual senders displayed what seemed to be a relatively high degree of authority, the content of the propositions drew attention to two semantic properties that suggested otherwise: argumentativity and verifiability. Therefore, at a closer look, the messages were constructed without much chance for members from higher ranks to challenge or question their propositional value.

At the same time, the use of epistemic and evidential stance by hosts and casual senders shows the highest degree of variation in terms of degree and intensity. In addition to instability in inter-user communication, the techniques used also have minor differences in messages from the same member. This suggests the following: rather than the rank of conversational co-participants, the
strength of epistemic and evidential stance verbs seems to be influenced by the communicative situation in which the members are engaged. Therefore, instances where a single speaker from the lowest rank modifies his/her epistemic commitment and evidential reliability from weak to strong within a few messages were also found in the data.

In summary, the results obtained from the dialogical analysis of three rsg.net extracts show that epistemic and evidential stance verbs are important tools for establishing and maintaining group membership. Nevertheless, the adoption of more conversational threads would allow to draw firmer conclusions on the correlation between degree of epistemicity and social status in computer-mediated communication.

Notes
1. The terms ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ here do not convey any attitudinal references to the various points of the scale, but rather make the distinction between certainty / uncertainty and reliability / unreliability.
2. All linguistic examples in the present study are retrieved from rsg.net, and therefore preserved for their grammatical and typographic errors.
3. MUDs are “networked, multi-user virtual reality systems [...]” (Reid 1999: 107).
4. Bulletin board is the preferred term in the present study. However, the terms Internet forum, message board, discussion site, and newsgroup are interchangeably used in the various studies of CMC.
5. In the examples that follow, all instances of epistemic and evidential verb constructions are in bold. In addition, the stance constructions and their immediate context scrutinized in the present study are presented in italics.

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Reid, Elizabeth

Seidlhofer, Barbara

Sperber, Dan & Wilson, Deirdre
Confirmation-demanding tag questions
in fiction dialogue

Karin Axelsson
University of Skövde

Abstract
This paper deals with tag questions to which an answer is demanded by a speaker who is certain about the truth of the proposition but who wants to hear the answer uttered by the addressee. Similar tag questions have previously been described based on data from courtrooms (e.g. Biscetti 2006), where tag questions are typically used by powerful speakers. However, data from the British National Corpus shows that confirmation-demanding tag questions may also be used outside institutional settings and in situations with various power relationships. Most of these examples are from fiction dialogue, where conflicts and confrontations are often depicted. In courtrooms, there is always an audience; however, in fiction dialogue, most confirmation-demanding questions in the data are found in private conversations. Confirmation-demanding tag questions seldom seem to be captured in conversational data, apart from in cases where the speaker wants the answer to be heard by a third party; it is therefore suggested that private confrontations might be underrepresented in conversational data. This paper also discusses functional categorizations of tag questions in general and argues that the unit of analysis should be the whole tag question, i.e. the anchor and the tag taken together, and not just the tag.

1. Introduction

This paper deals with tag questions demanding confirmation from the addressee in a challenging way by a speaker who is certain of the truth of the proposition, as in (1),

(1) “But,” pursued Mahmoud, “there were three women, were there not?”
    “If you say so.”
    “I would like to hear you say so. With your own voice.”
    “Three women, then,” said the chauffeur. (BNC J10 2053–2057)

and makes comparisons to tag questions where the speaker is uncertain and more politely asks for confirmation of a fact he or she is uncertain of, as in (2):
“Felton?” The two ambulance men now exchanged sharp glances, and one of them said, “Robbie Felton?” then added, “Slipped and caught his head on a shovel? Well, well; strange things happen. Let’s get him up.”

“May I come with you?”

“Yes. Yes; they’ll want particulars; somebody’ll have to come. But; – the man hesitated – “you’re no relation, are you?”

“No; I’m no relation.” (BNC AT7 2250–2258)

When speakers are certain about the truth of the tag questions they utter, as in (1), they express clear epistemic stance (see e.g. Biber & Finegan 1989). Tag questions have usually not been regarded as markers of stance, notable exceptions being Keisanen (2006, 2007) and Tottie & Hoffmann (2009a). Keisanen discusses tag questions in spoken conversation using conversation analysis but not in terms of confirmation being demanded, and Tottie & Hoffmann analyse the use of tag questions in non-fiction writing, where, of course, no answers are expected.

The present study is based on data originally retrieved from the British National Corpus (BNC) for Axelsson (2011), but it discusses confirmation-demanding tag questions in more depth and in relation to previous work on the use of tag questions in courtrooms.

The term tag question is in this paper restricted to so-called canonical cases, i.e. where the tag is grammatically dependent on the preceding clause and thus contains an operator, a personal pronoun and, in many cases, also a negation; this means that instances with invariant tags such as eh, right, OK and isn’t that so are excluded in this paper. The following terminology is applied:

(3) It is raining, isn’t it?

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<th>anchor</th>
<th>tag</th>
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<td>tag question</td>
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In the examples of the present paper, the whole tag question is underlined, and the tag is indicated by double underlining. Bold is used to highlight other parts of the examples discussed in the text. Italics cannot be used to highlight parts of the examples, as italics have been used by the original fiction writers to indicate emphasis (see examples (20), (22) and (29)).

Examples (1) and (2) both display reversed polarity, i.e. either the anchor or the tag is negative. In (1), a positive anchor is followed by a negative tag, and in (2), a negative anchor is followed by a positive tag. There may also be constant polarity in tag questions, where a positive anchor is followed by a positive tag. However, constant-polarity tag questions are less common and have a different functional profile than reversed-polarity tag questions; this profile seems to bar them from being used in confirmation-demanding tag questions (see Axelsson (2011: 174–175) and discussions in sections 2 and 4 of the present paper).
Section 2 deals with previous work related to confirmation-demanding tag questions, in particular tag questions used in courtroom settings, and Section 3 discusses functional categorizations of tag questions in general and the unit of analysis. In section 4, the use of confirmation-demanding tag questions in fiction dialogue is described, analysed and compared to the use of similar tag questions in courtroom discourse. The paper finishes with a summary and conclusions in section 5.

2. Previous work related to confirmation-demanding tag questions

Confirmation-demanding tag questions have received little attention in most studies on tag questions based on everyday conversational data (see e.g. Holmes 1982, 1984a, 1984b, 1995; Roesle 2001; Tottie & Hoffmann 2006). However, some studies discussing questions in unequal encounters (Thomas 1989), and in particular, courtroom discourse (Lane 1990, Harris 1984, Woodbury 1984, Biscetti 2006) are relevant in this context as confirmation-demanding tag questions may be expected in such settings.

In her early work on tag questions, Holmes (1982, 1984a, 1984b) discusses tags in terms of politeness and speaker uncertainty. Later, in Holmes (1995: 80–81), she adds a challenging category where tags are impolite and confrontational and “may pressure a reluctant addressee to reply or aggressively boost the force of a negative speech act” (1995: 80). She does not seem to have found any challenging instances in her own data and quotes instead an example from Thomas (1989: 151), where a Superintendent forces feedback from a Detective Constable; here it is shown as (4):

(4) A: … you’ll probably find yourself um before the Chief Constable, okay?
B: Yes, Sir, yes, understood.
A: Now you er fully understand that, don’t you?
B: Yes, Sir, indeed, yeah.

Thomas’s discussion of tag questions is restricted to a dominant participant forcing feedback from a subordinate participant; apart from police data, she also mentions interactions between a headmaster and a child (1989: 150). Holmes finds that a challenging tag may strengthen a face attack, and mentions courtroom cross-examination as a “rich source of face attacks” (1995: 81) by referring to Lane (1990).

Lane (1990) deals with elicitation in courtroom examination in relation to politeness theory; he discusses the use of questions but not tag questions in particular. However, other linguists doing research on courtroom discourse have discussed the use of tag questions in courtrooms in greater detail. Harris (1984) states that court settings differ from most other settings in that “defendants […] are compelled to respond to questions according to constraints which do not apply in
ordinary conversation” (1984: 6). She concludes that “highly conducive forms of questions [e.g. tag questions] are prevalent in a courtroom situation” and that “these are employed both to obtain information and to accuse” (1984: 23). However, her three examples of tag questions, here shown in (5), are presented without context, which makes them difficult to analyse functionally.8

(5) a. everybody else seems to have done something but you don’t they

b. that means you’ve got to pay thirteen pounds doesn’t it

c. you’d better not argue with any foreman in future had you

Woodbury (1984) finds that reversed-polarity tag questions in her data are “used aggressively during cross-examination in order to make innuendos, to accuse, and to cast doubt upon previous testimony” (1984: 223) as in her three respective examples, here shown in (6):

(6) a. Q: You had other headaches, didn’t you?  A: What do you mean I had other headaches?

b. Q: And you bought gifts for other girl friends, too, didn’t you?  A: I don’t remember any other gifts.

c. Q: Come, come, Mr. D. S. H. was no secret at [place of business], was she?

Woodbury (1984) states that “in court, [reversed-polarity tag questions] apparently lose some of their more benign uses” and “[t]he explicit invitation to affirm or deny that is provided by this question form seems to be used as a demand to do so” (1984: 223). She also argues that reversed-polarity tag questions are more controlling than any other questions and that they form the only question type that “qualifies as ‘coercive’”; however, she found relatively few tag questions in her data (0–10% of all questions depending on the type of examination) and concludes that “coerciveness is not a highly prized characteristic in court” (1984: 223). Woodbury briefly mentions that she also found a few constant-polarity tags in her courtroom data, both in “adversary and nonadversary contexts” (1984: 224).

Biscetti (2006) makes a closer analysis of the use of tag questions in courtroom discourse and discusses the functional difference between reversed-polarity and constant-polarity tag questions. She finds that the use of reversed-polarity tag questions in cross-examination does not, in contrast to spontaneous conversation, indicate doubt. Instead, they are used as “a request for acknowledgement/confirmation of some state-of-affairs that is known to him/her” (2006: 222) and “to compel the desired answer” (2006: 217); the information in the answer is “elicited for the benefit of an audience” (2006: 222) inside and outside
the courtroom. Reversed-polarity tag questions display a “challenging, aggressive, intimidating quality” and therefore “tend to be avoided in non-hostile contexts” (2006: 222) in the courtroom. This description is close to the definition of the confirmation-demanding tag questions found in fiction dialogue by the author of the present paper (see section 4). Example (7) from Biscetti (2006: 220) shows the coercive insistence of repeated tag questions:

(7)  
Sumption: You had read the dossier, of course, had you not?  
Gilligan: Yes.  
Sumption: And you realised, did you not, that the dossier had said, in terms, that it reflected the views of the Intelligence Services. You did realise that, did you not?  
Gilligan: The dossier was described as a production of the Joint Intelligence Committee, yes.

As for constant-polarity tag questions, Biscetti finds that these are “neither leading nor coercive” (2006: 231) and may be used both with and without hostility and aggressiveness.  

Apart from studies on authentic courtroom data, Aijmer (1979), who discusses the functions of tag questions based on constructed examples, states that a speaker may use a tag question “in verbal argumentation or for manipulatory reasons” and thus “forces the hearer to signal his agreement” (1979: 12), as in (8), which might very well have been uttered in a courtroom:

(8)  
You were there on the night of the murder, weren’t you?  
(Aijmer 1979:12)

Example (8) might be a confirmation-demanding tag question although more context is usually necessary in order to establish such a function.

Previous work discussing authentic examples of confirmation-demanding tag questions thus all seem to be related to unequal encounters, where a powerful participant requires a response from a powerless participant, most typically in courtroom settings. However, as will be shown in this paper, confirmation-demanding tag questions may also appear outside the courtroom, and clear examples of that may be found in fiction dialogue. Before that, it is relevant to take a closer look at functional categorizations of tag questions in more general contexts and how various challenging tag questions have been categorized.
3. Functional categorizations

The functions of tag questions/tags in more general contexts than courtroom settings have been discussed by many scholars (e.g. Holmes 1982, 1984a, 1984b; Algeo 1988, 1990, 2006; Roesle 2001; Tottie & Hoffmann 2006, 2009a, 2009b; Kimps 2007). However, there is some confusion about what linguistic unit the object of the functional analyses actually is. Holmes (1982) states explicitly that she discusses the various politeness effects of the tags, whereas, in Kimps (2007) and Axelsson (2011), it is made clear that the unit of the functional analyses is the whole tag question. Algeo (1988, 1990, 2006), Roesle (2001), and Tottie & Hoffmann (2006, 2009a, 2009b) do not discuss their choices of functional unit, and sometimes seem to consider the function of the whole tag question and, in other cases, to focus on just the tag. As for the papers discussing courtroom data, Woodbury (1984) refers both to tags and tag questions, whereas Biscetti (2006: 211) defines a tag question as being appended to a declarative, i.e. she discusses the function of the separate tag.

In the present study, the whole tag question is in focus when functions are discussed, not just the isolated tag. Tag questions are probably often selected as a whole, i.e. the tag is not just an afterthought. It is sometimes difficult to decide what meaning a tag would add since a corresponding untagged declarative sentence might be highly unlikely in some contexts. Example (9) shows a tag question where an untagged declarative would have been impossible, as it is not logical for a layman to claim to a doctor that the state of a patient is serious:

(9) “Pneumonia,” he [Doctor Anthony Gillingham] answered softly.
    “Poor Julia.”
    “You’d better get her to the hospital,” said Comfort [the doctor’s sister].
    Julia [Julia Gillingham, the doctor’s sick wife] opened her eyes again and saw Comfort looking around her as though she expected to see men in white coats with a stretcher appearing through the walls. To Julia’s immense but unspoken relief, Anthony shook his head.
    “She’ll do better here, Comfort. There’s Annunziata to look after her – and you, if you’ll stay – and – ”
    “Of course I’ll stay,” she said impatiently. She gripped his wrist. “It’s not dangerous, is it, Anthony?”
    For a moment he was very still. Julia felt too tired and afraid to speak, but she lifted her heavy eyelids again and looked at him. He saw her expression and smiled confidently.
    “No, it’s not dangerous. All right, darling?” (BNC FSC 786–800)

The only alternative in example (9) would have been an interrogative question. The fact that the speaker chooses declarative word order already at the beginning of the utterance shows that she had planned the utterance as a whole. If an untagged
declarative is unsuitable in the context, it is impossible to establish a separate function for the tag. If a meaning or function cannot be decided separately for the tag in some tag questions, it seems logical to always analyse the functions of the whole tag questions. It can be argued that tag questions, i.e. the interrelated combination of a declarative and an interrogative, constitute a sentence type on par with declaratives, interrogatives, imperatives and exclamatives, where tag questions occupy the scale between declaratives and interrogatives (cf. the scale of certainty in Holmes (1982: 50)).

Table 1 gives an overview of the functional categories for tag questions/tags in general contexts in some previous work.

**Table 1.** Functional categories of tag questions/tags (adapted from Axelsson (2011: 56); in turn, partly adapted from Tottie & Hoffmann (2006: 301)

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<td>epistemic modal</td>
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<td>informational invoving</td>
<td>informational confirming</td>
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<td>affective modal</td>
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The four categories of Tottie & Hoffmann (2009b), i.e. *confirmatory, facilitative, attitudinal* and *challenging*, may be seen as a summary of these categorizations. The categories of Tottie & Hoffmann (2009b) are a simplification of the categories of Tottie & Hoffmann (2006), where these researchers merged the very different systems of Holmes and Algeo; the fact that Holmes’s *softening* category is not included in the other systems may be due to the fact that these categorizations are not restricted to the function of the separate tag. Roesle (2001) was the first to test Algeo’s categories on corpus data and, based on her results, she adjusted his system by adding a few categories, among them an *involving* category comparable to Holmes’s facilitative category and a *conspiratory* category, which is relevant in relation to confirmation-demanding tag questions (see section 4). Tottie & Hoffmann (2006) re-used Roesle’s data and were inspired by her categorization.

The ways in which tag questions may be challenging according to Tottie & Hoffmann (2006, 2009b) are very restricted and go back to Algeo (1988), who suggested that tag questions may have *peremptory* and *aggressive* functions. Algeo’s peremptory tags are said to follow “statement[s] of obvious or universal truth”, implying that “everyone knows the truth of the preceding statement, and therefore even someone of the limited intelligence of the addressee must be presumed to recognize it” (Algeo 1990: 446); “the intent – and often the effect – [...] is to leave speechless the person to whom it is directed” (1990: 447) as in (10):
I wasn’t born yesterday, was I? (Algeo 1990: 447)

Aggressive tags, on the other hand, are claimed to follow statements which “the addressee cannot be reasonably expected to know”; “[by] implying that the addressees ought to know what they actually cannot know, the aggressive tag is insulting and provocative” (Algeo 1990: 447), as in (11):

A: I rang you up this morning, but you didn’t answer.
Q: Well, I was having a bath, wasn’t I? (Algeo 1990: 447)

Tottie & Hoffmann (2006: 301–302), as well as Roesle (2001: 65), found tag questions with Algeo’s peremptory and aggressive functions to be very rare both in American and British English everyday conversation. However, the fact that there are very few instances of these two specific challenging uses of tag questions in their conversational corpus data does not necessarily mean that they are actually that rare in real life; confrontational conversations might very well be underrepresented in recordings made for spoken corpora. As mentioned above in section 2, Holmes did not find any challenging examples in her own conversational data.

However, various kinds of challenging tag questions have been shown to be more common in other genres than everyday spoken conversation, viz. in TV series, in fiction dialogue and in computer-mediated conversation. Algeo (1988) had originally found his peremptory and aggressive examples in British TV series; he later added a few examples also from fiction dialogue and real-life conversation (1990: 447; 2006: 299–302). There are also a couple of peremptory and aggressive examples in the fiction dialogue data of Axelsson (2011), but mainly tag questions which are challenging in other ways (for more details, see below). The conclusion in Axelsson (2011) is that problems, conflicts and confrontation are depicted in fiction in order to amuse the readers and catch their interest in the evolving plot; a similar wish to amuse the viewers of certain British TV series might explain why Algeo proposed the peremptory and aggressive categories and considered them to be typically British. Hoffmann et al. (2013) have recently shown that more or less strong challenging uses of tag questions are very common in computer-mediated communication, where anonymity and distance seem to evoke uses that people normally avoid in real-life encounters; a typical example is shown in (12):

You really have nothing to back up your statements, do you? ... That’s sad.

The functional model proposed in Axelsson (2011) is different from the categorizations in Table 1 in several ways. Firstly, it consistently uses the whole tag question as the functional unit. Secondly, it was developed based on fiction dialogue data, which was found to differ from conversational data; however, these differences concern the functional distribution rather than the functional potential, so the model is applicable also on conversational data (Axelsson 2011: 211).
Thirdly, the model is hierarchical and based on dichotomies with a theoretical backing (see Axelsson 2011: 59–88). The model is displayed in Figure 1, below.

Axelsson’s (2011) functional model first makes a distinction between tag questions *exchanging goods and services* (mostly tag questions with imperative anchors, but also a few with declarative anchors) and tag questions *exchanging information* (only tag questions with declarative anchors). The latter are then divided into cases where an answer seems to be expected by the speaker, i.e. *response-eliciting* tag questions, and cases where the addressee is not expected to reply, i.e. *rhetorical* tag questions; the latter may be *speaker-centred*, where “the speaker’s own convictions, assessments etc. [...] are in focus” (2011: 81) or *addressee-oriented*, where “the addressee is crucial” as these tag questions “somehow concern the addressee” (2011: 85).

Such rhetorical uses, where negotiation is indicated but then closed down, for example by the fact that the speaker goes on talking, may be more or less challenging when they deal with the addressee. In fact, Axelsson (2011: 161) finds that various clearly challenging uses are very common among addressee-oriented rhetorical tag questions in fiction dialogue. However, very few of these instances fulfil the criteria of Algeo’s peremptory and aggressive categories; only three clear instances (two peremptory and one aggressive) out of 250 were identified in fiction dialogue (and just one aggressive instance in conversational data, also out of 250 examples) (Axelsson 2011: 166–167). In most challenging addressee-oriented tag
questions, the addressee is instead accused of something as in (13), patronized as in (14), threatened as in (15), or teased as in (16); rhetorical challenging tag questions may also be sarcastic in “mak[ing] an assertion in the anchor which is the opposite of what the speaker actually believes is true” (2011: 162), as in (17):

(13) “Shut up!” Marie was saying, sickened. “I bet you crawled round Bella like that, didn’t you? Didn’t stop you from taking her money though, did it?

– Where is it, then? What have you done with it?”

“I haven’t got it,” said Gazzer. “I told you! It wasn’t me! It was Simon.”

(BNC ACB 2297–2305) (Axelsson 2011: 161)

(14) “Oh, Miss Ferguson and her partner only have a very small practice – just companion animals. I don’t suppose ... ” She glanced at Sophie maliciously, “I don’t suppose you are busy enough to justify employing a nurse, are you?”

Sophie was speechless for a moment, then, just before she could think of an appropriate retort, Dawn gave Giles a brilliant smile and sauntered off.

(BNC JYE 1631–1634) (Axelsson 2011: 163)

(15) He held up the second finger. “You are to tell them nothing. They may offer you money. If you take it, I shall hear, and you know what to expect, don’t you? On the other hand, if you report all to me it may be that I shall give you money. Understand? [...]”

(BNC J10 604–609) (Axelsson 2011: 165)

(16) A hand strokes the back of her neck.

“Boo!”

Rainbow jumps, spilling coffee all over the table and herself. “What the hell did you do that for? Bloody stupid ... ”

“Oooh, edgy are we?” says Naomi, snatching up a fistful of napkins and mopping enthusiastically. She orders a passion fruit tart, a puff-pastry butterfly, and a slice of death by chocolate.

(BNC HGN 1068–1074) (Axelsson 2011: 164)

(17) “As I was saying, we usually dress for dinner – ”

“Well, we can’t ruin an age-old custom for the sake of an absent mistress, can we?” she interrupted as she untwined her legs and stood up to face him. Pain and jealousy had spurred that sarcastic retort. “I’m afraid a very weathered cotton sundress is the best I can muster – ”

(BNC JY4 1919–1922) (Axelsson 2011: 162)

All the challenging uses exemplified in (13)–(17) above are used rhetorically, which means that they cannot be confirmation-demanding; such tag questions have to be sought among response-eliciting cases.
The response-eliciting tag questions in Axelsson’s functional model are first divided into those whose main purpose seems primarily to be conversation-initiating (cf. the categories facilitating/facilitative/involving in Table 1) and those which are confirmation-eliciting, i.e. where the actual confirmation is more important. Confirmation in the latter instances of tag questions in fiction dialogue is not always elicited by an uncertain speaker who politely asks for information in confirmation-seeking tag questions; instead, confirmation-eliciting tag questions in fiction dialogue are sometimes challenging in that a speaker who is already convinced of a fact demands a confirmatory answer from the addressee as in (1) above. These confirmation-demanding tag questions are further discussed in the next section.

4. Confirmation-demanding tag questions in fiction dialogue data

When 250 tag questions from fiction dialogue were analysed functionally for Axelsson (2011), 78 instances were found to be confirmation-eliciting. Most of them matched the stereotypical picture of a tag question being used by an uncertain speaker in order to seek confirmation. However, in other cases, the speaker seemed certain of the proposition in the anchor and demanded confirmation. Confirmation-seeking tag questions concern B-events (Labov & Fanshel 1977), i.e. matters where the addressee is believed to have better information than the one posing the tag questions; in contrast, confirmation-demanding are AB-events in the terms of Labov & Fanshel, i.e. the information is known to both the speaker and the addressee. On closer examination, 25 instances were categorized as confirmation-demanding; none of these instances are from courtroom settings, so the connection to courtroom discourse was just briefly noted (Axelsson 2011: 72) in a reference to Woodbury (1984).

Even if there are no instances from courtrooms in the fiction dialogue data, there are other examples related to law enforcement, as the speaker is a police officer in three instances. The very clear example in (1) above is such as case. Another example comes from the same novel, just a few lines later; example (18) continues where example (1) finishes:

(18) “So where did this other woman come from?”
    The man hesitated.
    “Tell us the truth,” said Owen, speaking for the first time. “And remember that we may already know it. Remember, too, that we do not have to ask you here. I may take you back to the Bab el Khalk and ask you.”
    “I picked her up too,” said the chauffeur.
    “Of course. And where did you pick her up? Not from the salon, was it?”
    “No. I had picked her up first, before going to the salon. She was waiting for me.” (BNC J10 2058–2068)
In (1) and (18), it is quite clear that the police interrogators seem convinced about the facts that they want the chauffeur to admit to be true. Similar to courtroom examination, the speaker primarily wants the answer to be uttered; the information is already known to the speaker, or at least, the speaker wants to make that impression. Ilie (1994) states that a question may be “almost exclusively answer-eliciting, i.e. it does not require information, it requires a verbalized answer” (1994: 80). In example (1), this wish to hear the answer being uttered is reinforced when the police officer says I would like to hear you say so. With your own voice. The third instance involving a police officer is shown in (19); the wording but it still means indicates that the police officer is convinced of the truth of the answer he wants to elicit:

(19) “…but it still means you’ve got iffy papers on this cab of yours, doesn’t it?”
   “I suppose so.” (BNC HW8 1430–1431)

Apart from the three examples above involving police officers, (1) and (18–19), there is just one other example among the 25 confirmation-demanding instances in fiction dialogue where a character posing a confirmation-demanding tag question seems to be powerful based on his or her official position:

(20) “Parmedes, you do realise what you are hearing is highly confidential material, don’t you?”
   “Madam, I was never here!” Parmedes concurred with feeling.
   (BNC AD9 3893–3895)

There is, in fact, a clear example where a normally powerless participant poses a confirmation-demanding tag question to a more powerful participant in an institutional setting: in (21) a private person, Harry Barnett, asks the reluctant psychiatrist Kingdom questions, among them a tag question, in an insistent way about the medical record of an acquaintance who has disappeared:

(21) “Could I at least ask a few questions?”
   “Ask by all means, so long as you understand how limited my freedom may be to answer.”
   Harry took a deep breath and struggled to shape some propositions that would not offend the doctor’s code of ethics. “Heather had a breakdown last year, didn’t she, following the death of her sister?”
   This at least seemed to pass the test. “Yes,” Kingdom replied cautiously.
   “And spent some time in an institution?”
   “She was a voluntary resident at one of the hospitals where I act as a consultant.”
   “She’s been your patient since then?”
   “Yes.”
“The circumstances of her sister’s death must have been very upsetting, but was there anything else which –”

Kingdom held up his hand. “No good, Mr Barnett, facts I can supply. Clinical details I cannot.” (BNC H8T 2347–2361)

In (21), Kingdom has to be regarded as the more powerful in this context as it is he who decides if he wants to answer or not when he is demanded to do so; only as long as Barnett asks about things that he himself is already certain of, the psychiatrist answers.

In the rest of the confirmation-demanding tag questions in fiction dialogue, the participants are outside institutional settings and tend to be on a fairly equal footing. It is not the power relationship between two participants which decides whether a confirmation-demanding or a confirmation-seeking tag question is used, it is the certainty and confidence of the speaker at that very moment. In (22), the same speaker first uses a confirmation-seeking tag question and then a confirmation-demanding tag question to the same addressee:

(22) Meredith had stiffened. She stared at Lucenzo in consternation, sitting erect in the chair, unnerved by a terrible idea that had come into her head. “You don’t think ... there could have been something ... dark in his past that he was trying to hide, do you?”

He didn’t answer for a moment, and it seemed as if he was trying to control conflicting emotions. Even with his practised deception, his uncertainty showed in the depths of his haunted eyes. “Don’t ask.”

“I am! What do you know?” she demanded huskily. “Are you trying to hide something? You do know things about my father, don’t you?” she cried, waiting for his reply in an agony of suspense.

“It would seem that he wanted to conceal his past,” he said, as if grudging her that information. He studied his hand-made shoes thoughtfully.
(BNC H94 2148–2158)

In (22), Meredith’s first tag question is confirmation-seeking, as she seems tentative and uncertain, but when Lucenzo evades answering, she realizes that he knows more than he wants to tell, so she gains confidence and utters another tag question, viz. a confirmation-demanding tag question, where she is certain and requires an answer from him. The latter tag question is clearly confirmation-demanding, something which is reinforced by the use of emphatic do (see also example (20) above).

The fact that a character uttering a confirmation-demanding tag question is quite certain may be indicated also in the linguistic context. The speaker sometimes says something before the tag question which supports such an interpretation: clear examples are I know in (23) and unless I’ve made two and two equal five in (24):
“I know what’s wrong with you. You think I’m screwing him, don’t you?”

Amiss realised he respected Gooseneck too much to lie. He looked at him squarely and said, “Yes.” (BNC HTG 3880–3883)

As soon as they were alone, he said awkwardly, “Look, old chap, you’ve every right to tell me to mind my own business, but unless I’ve made two and two equal five, then I think as your friend I ought to speak up. Something’s happened between you and Pickles, hasn’t it?”

Harry put down the hairbrush with which he had been trying to smooth his unruly curls, and turned to face Madeleine’s brother.

“I don’t know how you guessed, Aubrey, but you’re absolutely right – Madeleine and I love each other. [...]” (BNC FS1 1936–1939)

The speaker’s certainty may also be indicated in a later turn, as in (25):

“[…] But no matter” – his voice rose now – “you’ve got to go there for a time, anyway. And you understand, don’t you?”

“Yes. Yes, Ben, I understand. But at the same time I keep asking, Why? Why?”

“You know as well as I do.” (BNC CK9 2558–2564)

The connection to courtroom discourse is apparent when a speaker using a confirmation-demanding tag question explicitly asks the addressee to admit something, as in (26):

“I got the pictures, Nick. Some beauties, I think.” She was annoyed to hear the slight tremble in her voice.

“Great.” He had tossed his coat over the back of a chair and was pouring whiskies. He handed one to her, looking at her directly.

“You didn’t ask me over here to discuss the pictures though, Harriet – admit it. It’s ... the other business, isn’t it? I take it you did as I suggested and got hold of a paper.”

“Yes.” She gulped at the whisky, then thought better of it. “I’ll get some ice.” (BNC BMW 675–686)

In (27), the addressee’s response is reported in indirect speech; the author’s choice of the reporting verb admitted indicates that the confirmation is to be interpreted as being demanded of her:

Afterwards, Raimondo kissed her again.

“You see? That wasn’t so difficult, was it?” he said, and, when Caroline admitted that it hadn’t been, he said that in that case, would she please agree to do another private showing in mid-afternoon? (BNC JY7 5918–5920)
Some confirmation-demanding tag questions are found in confrontational situations with very strong personal feelings, as in (22) above, as well as in (28) and (29) below:

(28)  “Well, Phena won’t hear it from me! Anyway, I shan’t be here, shall I? I’m to leave in the morning, remember?”
  “And that really rankles, doesn’t it? That’s really what it’s all about, isn’t it? Wanting to stay here. Share in some of the wealth!”
  “No, it is not! I don’t need, or want, your blasted wealth!”
  “Don’t you? [...]” (BNC HGY 2326–2335)

(29)  “I knew you would want to set all to rights,” Rose said softly, smiling warmly at her. “You may easily do so, you know.”
  “How?” Theda demanded, eyeing her visitor with acute suspicion.
  “Dear Theda, you must surely be able to see that for yourself. It is so obvious!”
  “Indeed? We will have it in plain words nevertheless. How does a woman with a large inheritance commonly bestow it on a man? That is what you mean, is it not? I should marry Benedict.”
  “Good God, no!” ejaculated Mrs Alderley, startled. “I had not even thought of it.”
  Theda frowned. “You had not thought of it?”
  “I swear not! It is Benedict who concerns me, yes, but – but that is not the solution I had in mind.” (BNC HGV 3234–3250)

The aggressive component in (28) and (29) may be similar to courtroom situations. However, such private confrontations are not inherently hostile in the way courtroom cross-examinations are; Biscetti states that “[c]ross-examination is hostile because it is reserved for hostile witnesses whose viewpoints, goals and actions are opposite or antagonistic to those of the cross-examiner” (2006: 216).

The reactions to the unexpected answers in (28) and (29), indicated in bold, also show that the speaker who poses a confirmation-demanding tag question regards only a confirmatory answer as successful; confirmation-demanding tag questions are not really open to refutation in the same way as confirmation-seeking tag questions, where the speaker is more or less uncertain about the truth of the proposition in the anchor.

The characteristics of confirmation-demanding tag questions in contrast to confirmation-seeking tag questions are summarized as lists of criteria in Table 2, below.
These criteria for confirmation-demanding tag questions may embrace most of the instances of reversed-polarity tag questions in courtroom cross-examination. However, there is an additional circumstance in courtrooms which is not necessary for confirmation-demanding tag questions outside courtrooms: the audience. Woodbury (1984) stated for courtroom discourse that “questions and answers have consequences for nonspeakers, too: Lawyers (speakers) select question-types in order to influence the judgment of the jury (non-speakers)” (1984: 225). In fact, most of the confirmation-demanding tag questions found in fiction dialogue are uttered when only the two participants themselves are present; most of these conversations are very private.

However, there is a sub-category among the confirmation-demanding tag questions in the fiction dialogue data where an audience is crucial. In five instances, the speaker demands support from another participant to be heard by one or several other persons present, as in (30):

(30) Louise slipped her hand into Martin’s.
    “He’s made a marvellous recovery since he’s been with us in Barbados. I’ve been looking after him, haven’t I, Martin?” The possessive way she looked and spoke was not wasted on Christina.
    “This holiday has been a godsend and couldn’t have come at a better time. I have Louise to thank for that.” He squeezed her hand then let it drop.
    “We’re old friends as well; did Martin not tell you?” the girl pressed.
    Christina shook her head.
    “We go back to when I was a silly little girl of eleven with a schoolgirl crush on Martin. Our families have been friends for years.”
    He looked slightly embarrassed and made no answering comment.
    (BNC FRS 815–826)

In (30), as well as in the other confirmation-demanding tag questions to be heard by a third party, the information in the anchor is addressed to one person, and then the tag is addressed to another person present, who is supposed to support the claim of the speaker in front of the addressee of the anchor. In these cases, the speaker is
certain and demands support from another participant, who may supply this more or less willingly. In (30), Louise challenges her rival Christina by pressing Martin to confirm that she has looked after him well. Such cases resemble the tag questions in Roesle’s conspiratory category, which are “used by the speaker to appear more convincing to a third party” (2001: 36), as in (31):

(31) Well, we went and had lunch didn’t we darling? (Roesle 2001: 36)

However, the term ‘conspiratory’ suggests cooperation planned in advance, whereas in the instances from fiction dialogue, the participant demanded to confirm the claim in the anchor seems rather taken by surprise, as in (30) above. Confirmation-demanding tag questions uttered to be heard by a third party account for eight of the nine instances of confirmation-demanding tag questions in the BNC conversational data of Axelsson (2011: 148–149).

All the confirmation-demanding tag questions in the data of Axelsson (2011) display reversed polarity. Constant-polarity tag questions apparently do not fulfil the criterion that the speaker should be certain; Kimps (2007) describes constant-polarity tag questions as “typically exhibiting a low degree of commitment towards the truth of the proposition by the speaker” (2007: 289). This conforms to Biscetti’s (2006) observation that constant-polarity tag questions in courtroom discourse are not coercive (see section 2): these do not even ask for agreement as “the statements to which they are attached do not put forward the speaker’s own point of view” (2006: 232).

Confirmation-demanding tag questions in fiction dialogue mostly display the pattern positive anchor and negative tag in contrast to confirmation-seeking tag questions, where the pattern negative anchor and positive tag is instead predominant (Axelsson 2011: 147). The assertiveness of confirmation-demanding tag questions might be related to monoglossia and the tentativeness of confirmation-seeking tag questions to heteroglossia (see discussion in Axelsson 2011: 142–143; 147–148).

Another connection between formal features and functions noticed in Axelsson (2011: 147) is that the tag subject you is predominant in the confirmation-seeking tag questions in fiction dialogue, whereas you is the tag subject in only about a quarter of the confirmation-demanding tag questions in fiction dialogue. It is proposed in Axelsson (2001): 147) that this might be connected to the criterion that confirmation-seeking tag questions should be about B-events, whereas confirmation-demanding tag questions concern AB-events. Another explanation might be that the tag subject you is avoided in some confirmation-demanding tag questions in order to make it more likely that a reluctant addressee will actually supply a confirmatory answer. In (18–19), (24) and (27–30), the matter is clearly about the addressee and could have been expressed as a tag question with the subject you, but other more impersonal ways of expression have been chosen instead.
5. Summary and conclusions

Confirmation-demanding tag questions are used by a speaker who is certain about the truth of the proposition in the anchor and who demands a confirmatory answer to be uttered by the addressee. The answer in itself is more important than its content as the speaker already knows, or at least pretends to already know, that the proposition in the anchor is true. Both the confirmation-demanding tag questions and their expected answers thus express epistemic stance.

Confirmation-demanding tag questions may be typical of courtroom discourse but they are far from restricted to such settings. In particular, they can be found in fiction dialogue, as fiction texts are written in order to catch the interest of readers by depicting problems, conflicts and confrontations. There might be two reasons why confirmation-demanding tag questions seldom seem to be captured in corpora of general spoken conversation; firstly, there is probably more confrontation in fiction and courtrooms than in real life outside courtrooms, and, secondly, if there is serious private confrontation in real life, it is not likely to be recorded for corpus research.

In courtroom examination, confirmation-demanding tag questions are used by a powerful participant addressing a powerless participant who, in this situation, is forced to answer in front of an audience. Confirmation-demanding tag questions outside the courtroom, as used in fiction dialogue, are usually part of more private conversations where the power relations may be of different kinds. However, there is a special use of confirmation-demanding tag questions involving a change of addressee between the anchor and the tag; in these tag questions, the speaker demands confirmatory support in the tag from one participant to be heard by a third party to whom the anchor was addressed.

Confirmation-demanding tag questions are challenging, but tag questions may also be challenging in other ways; most of these uses seem to be rhetorical, such as the peremptory and aggressive categories included in several previous functional systems for tag questions.

As for formal features, confirmation-demanding tag questions display reversed polarity; constant polarity seems incompatible with the requirement that the speaker should be certain about the truth of the proposition in the anchor. Moreover, confirmation-demanding tag questions tend to display the pattern positive anchor and negative tag, and the tag subject is less often you than in confirmation-seeking tag questions.

Fiction dialogue has proved to be very useful in discussing the functions of an interactive construction such as the tag question. The preceding and subsequent dialogue provides clues and the authors have added information in the narrative to help readers interpret the dialogue in the way he or she intended. Research using fiction dialogue data is therefore a valuable complement to research on interactive structures in spoken conversation.
Notes
1. URL: http://www.natcorp.ox.ac.uk/.
2. This term was introduced by Holmes (1982).
3. This term is used in e.g. Axelsson (2011).
4. Negative constant-polarity tag questions, where both the anchor and the tag are negative, are also possible but very rare; Axelsson (2011) did not find any such example in fiction dialogue data and only a few in spoken conversation and these examples are “marginal or non-standard in other ways as well” (2011: 120).
5. Axelsson (2011: 119) reports that constant-polarity tag questions constitute about 10 per cent of all tag questions, both in fiction dialogue and spoken conversation.
6. Holmes (1982) used a small conversational corpus of New Zealand English ranging from “the more formal speech of radio and television interviews and classroom discussion to the more casual speech of relaxed conversation” (1982: 41).
7. Both Thomas (1989) and Holmes (1995) include also invariant tags in the data they discuss. There is thus also an example of forced feedback with OK on the first line of example (4).
8. Harris found nine tag questions in her courtroom data; they form approximately 5 per cent of all the questions.
10. Biscetti (2006) also discussed invariant tags in her courtroom data and stated that these are unlikely to be associated with hostility and aggressiveness (2006: 227) and that they are vaguer than canonical tags in having a broader scope (2006: 228). She concludes that “[g]eneral interchangeability of [invariant tags] and [reversed-polarity tags] is therefore untenable” (2006: 230).
11. Aijmer (1979: 12) gives a second example, here shown as (i):
   (i) You were in London in 1969, weren’t you. So it must have been there that you met Professor Jones.
   The tag question in (i) does not expect an immediate answer and is thus used rhetorically; therefore, it cannot be included among confirmation-demanding tag questions according to the definition used in this paper (see sections 3 and 4).
12. Algeo (2006) changed the label for this category into antagonistic.
13. A further complication is that the different functional systems embrace tag questions with different definitions. Holmes (1982) included also invariant tags in her discussion as well as imperative tags. Algeo (1988) mentioned invariant tags and imperative tag questions but neither of them seem to be included in his functional systems (1988, 1990, 2006). Roesle (2001) and Tottie & Hoffmann (2006) excluded invariant tags but may have included imperative tag questions. Tottie & Hoffmann (2009b), which is a study of 16th-century tag questions, clearly included imperative tag questions; they were then put in a separate macro-category called hortatory divided into softening, emphatic and neutral tags. It should be noted that Holmes’s softening category was not limited to imperative tags (Holmes 1982: 58–60; 1990: 82). Kimps (2007) is restricted to constant-polarity tag questions and her categorization is, therefore, not included in Table 1.
14. This distinction draws on Halliday & Matthiessen’s (2004: 108) general distinction between information and goods-and-services.
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Constructing credibility in wine reviews  
Evidentiality, temporality and epistemic control  

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Abstract  
This study investigates the relationship between evidentiality, temporality and epistemic control through detailed interpretive analysis of wine reviews written by Robert Parker, whose outstanding authority in this particular discourse field provides an exceptionally fruitful backdrop for the exploration of credibility in discourse. The material consists of 200 entire reviews, which are divided into units based on differences in temporality, evidentiality and modes of knowing. The analysis takes into consideration linguistic markers realized in the texts as well as implicitness that emanates from general world knowledge and more specific contextual awareness. It is shown in detail how the construction of credibility in this particular instance of persuasive discourse relies on complex interrelations between explicit and implicit features of texts as well as combinations of socio-cultural factors, which taken together result in epistemic control of the depicted events, i.e. an impression that what is communicated is the ultimate truth about the wines. The more general implications of the study are first to contribute to the body of theoretical work that strives to extend the understanding of evidentiality and temporality beyond explicit linguistic markers, and second to promote the approach adopted in this study as a useful complement to other methods used in interpretive discourse analysis.  

1. Introduction  
Knowledge about wine has recently acquired increasing importance in the Western world, an interest that continues to spread among financially prosperous countries all over the world (Silverstein 2003, McCoy 2005). Many of these international consumers rely on wine critics rather than information from producers to determine the quality of wine (Charters 2007), and the authority of critics has therefore increased concurrently with the spreading interest in wine among new consumers with little previous acculturation to guide their preferences. This is natural, given
that deference for authority is an obvious way of shaping our understanding when we access any new domain of knowledge (Orrigi 2007: 185–187).

In this paper, we explore the articulation of authority in the domain of wine epistemology through the investigation of wine reviews written by Robert Parker, who is considered the world’s most influential wine critic. Parker’s writing has been observed to have had an unprecedented effect on the way in which wines are consumed and talked about by aficionados in the wine drinking community. The fact that Parker’s recommendations are followed by so many consumers worldwide has even influenced wine production, since a favourable review by Parker can affect the wine producing estate’s possibility to sell their wine on the more and more globalized wine market (McCoy 2006, Nossiter 2004). This phenomenon is referred to as Parkerization, which in essence means adaptation of the wine to Parker’s preferences, and has been noted to occur particularly in prestigious Bordeaux, where the world’s most expensive wines are produced (see for instance Langewiesche 2000, McCoy 2005, Nossiter 2004). According to the background story (see for instance McCoy 2005), Parker is particularly noteworthy as an authority in the domain of wine, because he was raised on Coca-Cola in Maryland, USA, which means that he lacks wine acculturation as a natural part of his upbringing, and because he lacks formal training in wine tasting. Instead, his reputation as a wine critic relies heavily on his allegedly superhuman capacity to recognize and memorize smells and tastes, which, perhaps surprisingly, has never been officially tested. Parker is particularly noteworthy as a present-day rhetorician, because he is not only the world’s most influential wine critic, but has also been considered the most potent critic of all categories. In Langwiesche’s (2000: 1) words, “[t]he most influential critic in the world today happens to be a critic of wine”.

Parker’s unique power position in the discourse community of wine motivates this linguistic study, which highlights aspects that contribute to the construction of credibility in his wine reviews. The aim of our enquiry is to demonstrate in detail how modality surfaces across a range of formulations in the wine reviews. We argue that modality is not necessarily connected to specific linguistic expressions but may surface across a range of surface forms. In addition, we see modality as intimately bound up with the notions of temporality and evidentiality, all of which contribute to the construction of credibility in discourse. While staged against the backdrop of the discourse community of wine, we see this instance of persuasive discourse as representative not only of wine reviews but more generally of discourse that succeeds to construct credibility in the particular domain where it occurs.

2. Wine epistemology and the wine review genre

In order to explore the construction of credibility in persuasive discourse, it is necessary to understand the context in which it is staged. Section 2.0 therefore
provides a brief outline of the activity of wine tasting and touches on the more general significance of wine critics’ recommendations in the world of prestigious wine.

The wine tasting procedure involves highly complex interactions of sensory perceptions that are related to the requisites and limitations of the human senses. In the tasting situation, the senses are ordered hierarchically so that one can smell the wine without tasting and feeling it, but one cannot experience the taste and mouth-feel without simultaneously smelling the wine. Professional wine tasting relies on the human senses according to a certain pattern. Gluck (2003) describes the wine tasting event as follows:

You pour out the wine. You regard its colour. You sniff around it. You agitate the glass to release the esters of the perfume and so better to appreciate the aromas, the nuances of the bouquet. You inhale those odoriferous pleasantries, or unpleasantries, through the chimney of the taste, the nostrils (the only access to the brain open to the air) and then you taste. You swill the liquid around the mouth and breathe in air so that this liquid is aerated and experienced by up to ten thousand taste buds. The taste buds are arranged in sectors of differently oriented cohesion: one designed to recognize salinity, another alkalinity, another sweetness and so on. They connect with the brain which in turn provides the sensory data, memory based, to form the critic’s view of what s/he is drinking. Some of the wine is permitted to contact the back of the throat, but only a small amount is permitted to proceed down the gullet, so that the finish of the wine can be studied. Then the wine is ejected and several seconds are left to elapse whilst all these sensations are studied and written up as the impression the wine has left is mulled over (Gluck 2003: 109).

The tasting event thus includes five stages: First of all, the visual impression of the wine is considered, second the taster concentrates on the smell of the wine, the nose, and third, the taste and mouth-feel are evaluated. Stage four concerns the “internal” olfactory stage where the wine’s aftertaste is assessed, and finally stage five deals with the finish, i.e. how the wine vaporizes.

The visual experience is in a super-ordinate position compared to all the other senses, since the color of the wine can be observed without interference of other sensory input. Physiologically, vision is also known to be our most consistent source of objective data about the world. Herdenstam (2004: 60) points out that as much as one third of the brain is occupied by the interpretation of visual information, while only 1 % of the brain’s capacity is dedicated to smell, and the senses of smell and also of taste are associated with much more subjectivity than vision. Smell is noted to appeal to emotions, but to simultaneously be an elusive phenomenon from a cognitive point of view (Classen et al.1994: 2–3). Zucco (2007: 161) notes that communication among humans about olfactory perception is complicated by the fact that people are conscious of smells only when these are present: It is not possible to retrieve olfactory stimuli from memory, since olfactory representations are not conceptual, merely perceptual. This characteristic of the
sensory apparatus dates from primate evolution, when humans began to exchange olfactory perspicacity for enhanced colour vision (Goode 2007: 81).

However, wine epistemology involves considerably more than perception of immediate sensory experiences. In order to evaluate the quality of the sensory impressions, the immediate experience needs to be related to an understanding of the relation between the sensory experience and the ways in which the wine has been made in terms of for instance choice of grape composition, place of growth and chemical procedures. According to Smith (2007: 48; 68–69), it is possible for a taster with refined and discerning perceptual capacities to obtain objective information about the wine by paying careful attention to particular aspects of the olfactory and gustatory sensations that the tasting experience gives rise to.

In addition, in order to issue a consumption recommendation, which is the prime objective of wine reviews, it is also of fundamental importance to be able to predict how the wine will develop and whether its future quality will meet the consumer’s expectations. This is of particular importance for the world’s most prestigious wines from Bordeaux, which are well-known for their extensive life-span. Considerable investments are made in so called Bordeaux Futures, wine which is bought while still in barrel waiting to be bottled. Wine reviewers’ predictions, in particular those issues by Parker, play a significant role in the pricing of these wines in the sense that a review from Parker has the power to make or break an estate’s economy, because the price of the wine is fixed based on the critic’s assessment (Gasparotto & Saverot 2012).

A wine review may address all of the events that are mentioned above, i.e. the production event, the tasting event and the consumption event. This is illustrated in Table 1, which displays Parker’s review of Château Trottevieille divided into three parts based on the events dealt with by the text:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Production Event</th>
<th>Tasting Event</th>
<th>Consumption Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>Kudos to proprietor Philippe Casteja, who has produced the finest Trottevieille I have tasted.</em></td>
<td><em>A blockbuster effort,</em> the 2005 boasts an inky/blue/purple color along with aromas of creme de cassis, blackberries, truffles, fruitcake, and toasty oak. Pure and full-bodied with significant extract, tannin, acidity, and alcohol, this stunning wine</td>
<td>should be very long lived. Anticipated maturity: 2012-2030+.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the data that we have used for this investigation, consisting of 200 reviews of Bordeaux and Rhône wines written by Parker, it is worth noting that the tasting event stands out as central, since it is addressed in all of the 200 texts. For a description of the database and the sample under investigation, see Hommerberg...
Constructing credibility in wine reviews

(2011: 77–80). The consumption event is referred to in 90% of the texts, while references to the production event occur in approximately 60% of the reviews.

3. Representation of events in wine reviews

Regardless of discourse domain, a fundamental aspect of our approach is to understand and highlight a number of general requisites which are distinctive of the events that a text represents. Before we explore in detail how Parker’s texts manage to induce credibility in the representation of the particular events addressed in the reviews, we will begin by laying bare the general requisites that underlies our interpretation of the data. The requisites that will be of most crucial importance in the current study are participants and activity, space and time, source of evidence and mode of knowing, the two latter notions based on Cornillie’s (2009) distinction. It should be made clear that these general requisites are understood to distinguish the represented events even in the absence of overt textual markers. Table 2 provides a schematic overview of these requisites.

Table 2. General requisites of the events addressed in wine reviews

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Production</th>
<th>Tasting</th>
<th>Consumption</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Participants</td>
<td>Wine producer and wine</td>
<td>Wine taster and wine</td>
<td>Unknown consumer and wine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Activity</td>
<td>Wine production</td>
<td>Wine tasting</td>
<td>Consumption</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Space</td>
<td>Local space (place of production)</td>
<td>Here</td>
<td>Unknown space</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time</td>
<td>Past</td>
<td>Now</td>
<td>Future</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Source of Evidence</td>
<td>External sources</td>
<td>Writer’s perceptual organs</td>
<td>Intricate system of inferences based on production, tasting, previous experiences</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mode of Knowing</td>
<td>Hearsay</td>
<td>Direct visual, olfactory, gustatory and tactile perception</td>
<td>Expectation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For the production event, the space is local, the event is staged in the place of wine production. The time frame is past with respect to what is understood to be the text’s now: the tasting event. The information can be understood to emanate from external sources, since it is unlikely that Parker himself has participated in the production. The basic mode of knowing underlying representations of the production event can be established as hearsay. The tasting event is the texts’ here and now. It can be assumed that the source of evidence is the writer’s perceptual organs and that the mode of knowing is direct visual, olfactory, gustatory and tactile perception. Since the consumption event deals with the future, the space is
unknown. The source of evidence on which references to ideal future drink time is based is presumably an intricate system of inferences based on production information, the perceptual experience of the wine and previous experiences of similar wines. The mode of knowing can be captured by the term expectation. In the following, we will zoom in on the representation of each of these events in Parker’s reviews and relate the events to the representation of them, exploring facets of the representation that confer credibility on Parker’s texts.

3.1 Representation of the production event
The majority of the reviews in our dataset are initiated by the representation of the production event, which is illustrated in Table 1. In the real world course of events, the production of the wine necessarily precedes the tasting of the wine. Consequently, the reviews in which the presentation of factors that contribute to the resulting quality of the wine precedes the description/assessment of sensory perceptions can be said to be iconic in the sense that the organization of the surface form of the message reflects the real world ordering of events.

We also find reviews where the representation of the production event is fused with the representation of the tasting event, a phenomenon that the following examples illustrate:

(1) The whites include a big, sweet, pear, mineral, pungently aromatic 2004 Hermitage blanc. A blend of 65% Marsanne and 35% Roussanne, it offers abundant quantities of honeysuckle and hazelnut notes…

(2) The finest Certan de May in many years (thanks to the intervention of famed wine consultant Michel Rolland), the dense purple-colored 2005 exhibits notes of camphor, creosote, plums, black cherry liqueur, currants, licorice, and pain grille.

In (1) the wine’s aromatics, presumably perceived during the tasting event, are alluded to before the mentioning of the composition of different grape types, which relates to choices made during the production process. In (2) a general evaluation of the wine’s quality compared to other wines from the same estate is given before reference is made to the oenologist that was responsible for the production of the wine, a process that necessarily must have taken place before there could be any judgement of the wine’s resulting quality.

As indicated by Table 2, the production-related component of the wine review text can be seen to provide a reconstruction of events that took place in the past from the perspective of what is taken to be the texts’ now, namely the description of the tasting event, which will be further explored in Section 3.2. For the readers to accept the speaker’s statement about a past situation, it needs to be perceived as credible and relevant with regard to the issue that is being debated. A rhetorician out for persuasive success therefore needs to exploit available linguistic resources to establish the connection between the past and the moment of speaking. In view of the assumption that tense is the default device provided by language to
locate a statement with respect to time, it is worth observing that the past tense is only used occasionally in the representation of the production event. Instead, if the representation at all involves grammatical markers anchoring it in the past, the perfect is more frequently used, which the following example illustrates:

(3) ...this tiny garagiste operation *has fashioned* a provocative blend of 80% Merlot and 20% Cabernet Franc with 13+% alcohol.

Although the perfect, just like the past tense, locates the state of affairs in the past, the choice of the perfect over the past tense is of rhetorical importance: According to Fairclough (2003:152), the perfect differs from the past in that it involves a link with the moment of speaking. While the past tense merely locates the described event in the past, the perfect indicates that this event had some result that is relevant from the perspective of the speech time. The contrastive effect of the past tense is illustrated in the constructed example below:

(3a) ...this tiny garagiste operation *fashioned* a provocative blend...

As pointed out above, it is of importance for the audience’s acceptance of the speaker’s statement about the past that they interpret it as relevant in regard of the issue that is being debated. One of the linguistic devices drawn on in the dataset reviews to accentuate this is thus the perfect. Another strategy that is frequently employed and which allows the writer to avoid the use of tense completely is ellipsis. Example (4) illustrates an elliptic construction where a link is drawn between the representation of the production event and the tasting event by means of a joint grammatical subject:

(4) *A blend of 85% Merlot (from 70-year old vines) and 15% Cabernet Franc, it exhibits aromas of white chocolate, espresso roast, sweet blueberry and raspberry fruit...*

Through the shared subject (*it*), this elliptic construction establishes a connection between the preceding element, i.e. the reference to the grape varieties that were used to produce the wine, and the wine’s aromatics as they are perceived during the tasting event, which is understood to be the text’s now. The constructed example (4a) below illustrates that although the pronoun (*It*) still invokes a connection, the link is nonetheless considerably weakened when the passage is divided into two separate clauses:

(4a) *Les Asteries is a blend of 85% Merlot and 15% Cabernet Franc. *It* exhibits aromas of white chocolate, espresso roast, sweet blueberry and raspberry fruit...*
While there is an infinite number of details pertaining to the production process that could potentially be included in the representation of the production event, we can expect a selection to be made on the basis of what is deemed most relevant from the point of view of the writer’s experience of the present quality of the wine. The production-related information also functions to bestow credibility on the perceptual experiences that are portrayed in the representation of the tasting event. In our dataset, the most frequently mentioned factors in the representation of the production event are the person responsible for the production of the wine, i.e. the producer or consultant oenologist, and the composition of different grape types that the wine was made from. Furthermore, it is interesting to note that in the vast majority of the occurrences in the data set where the wine makers or producers are mentioned, their proper names are used. Proper names have been noted to have the rhetorical function of reinforcing the stability of the person that is being talked about (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca 1969:294, Perelman 1977:116). In addition, an accompanying epithet has been observed to further stabilize the construction of a person. Example (5) exemplifies this phenomenon in Parker’s texts:

(5) No one in Bordeaux has made greater progress in taming the extraordinary potential of this noble terroir than Alain Vauthier, an obsessed perfectionist if there ever was one.

It is not unusual that the portrayal of these protagonists is complemented by a description of actions that they have performed or are performing. In (5), for instance, Alain Vauthier is reported to have been “taming the extraordinary potential of this noble terroir”. Examples (6)–(7) provide further illustrations of the promotion of the producer as an important factor in the representation of the production event:

(6) Proprietor Patrick Maroteaux, president of Unions des Grands Crus Classes, is pulling out all the stops to make Branaire as alluring as several of the Leovilles and Ducru Beaucaillou…

(7) Young Stephan Chabord is trying singlehandedly to resurrect the image for sparkling wines from St.-Peray.

It is worth taking note of the use of the present progressive in these occurrences, which has the function of conceptualizing the producers’ hard work as an on-going activity that is not delimited to the production of the particular wine that is being reviewed. All these aspects contribute to the construction of these characters as heroes in Parker’s texts. In this respect, Parker’s writing can be said to contribute to transference of legitimation from the authority of inherited institutional traditions to the authority of persons with expert skills. According to Mueller at al. (2009), such legitimation is of importance in the eyes of consumers, since it bestows the product with what they refer to as ‘credence’.
Another frequent type of information provided in the reviews’ representation of the production is the combination of grape types from which the wine was made. While delivered as purely factual information, the presentation of the component parts that go into the blend reinforces the presence of these parts (Perelman 1977:99), encouraging the audience to focus on the exact proportions of different grape types included in the blend:

(8) Bellevue is a blend of 52% Cabernet Sauvignon, 30% Merlot, 15% Petit Verdot, and 3% Carmenère.

While studies on wine recognition have revealed that wine experts tend to base their identification of wines on grape variety (Solomon 1997), it is not likely that even the most experienced and discerning of experts should be able to come up with the exact percentage figures that Parker’s texts include based solely on immediate perception. Although this is not overtly mentioned, a commonsensical interpretation is that the information included in the representation of the production event has been provided by the estate whose wine is being reviewed and/or accessed through other external sources. A few of the dataset texts provide cues to this effect, which is illustrated in (9) below, where the source of information is mentioned explicitly:

(9) ...13% alcohol (according to the proprietor, Madame Denise Gasqueton).

The detailed representation involving exact numbers functions to signal that the information is not accessed via the writer’s perception but instead via a report on the wine’s production provided by the producer, even where the source of evidence is left implicit. In terms of Cornillie’s three categories of modes of knowing, the evidence underlying the representation of the production event can be said to be based on hearsay, the source of the mode of knowing being external to the writer. Although hearsay is generally regarded as the least reliable source of evidence according to Viberg’s (2001:1306) reliability hierarchy, the kinds of evidence on which the representation of the production event is based can nonetheless be understood to be incontestable, generally available facts that can be verified by a sceptical reader. Parker’s representational choices can therefore be said to invite collaboration with the intended audience in the sense that they construe the prospective readers as a reasonable group, requiring verifiable evidence in order to be convinced.

3.2 Representation of the tasting event

We now proceed to consider the representation of the tasting event in Parker’s reviews. As noted above, the part of the text devoted to the tasting event generally follows the representation of the production event. It is worth emphasizing that the rendition of the tasting event can be seen as central to the wine reviews in view of the fact that while the production and consumption events are not always
addressed, the tasting event is referred to in all of the 200 dataset reviews. Example (10) below illustrates the representation of the tasting event in the dataset reviews:

(10) Its inky/blue/purple hue is accompanied by scents of blueberries, white flowers, and black currants. Deep and rich, with a wonderful minerality, abundant nuances, fresh acidity, and stunning concentration…

As illustrated by this text, the representation of the tasting event involves in turn the visual impression of the wine, i.e. inky/blue/purple hue, the olfactory impression, which is captured by means of the expression scents of blueberries, white flowers, and black currants, and the gustatory input represented as deep and rich, with a wonderful minerality, abundant nuances, fresh acidity, and stunning concentration. It is worth noting that the ordering of the presentation follows the stages of the tasting event (see Section 2), beginning with the visual impression before moving on to the olfactory and finally the gustatory perception. The representation of the tasting event can therefore be said to be iconic, which has previously been observed to be a typical feature of the disposition of the wine tasting note (Silverstein 2003, Herdenstam 2004, Hommerberg 2010, 2011, Paradis 2010, Caballero & Paradis 2013, Paradis & Eeg-Olofsson 2013).

However, although all the stages of the wine tasting procedure are addressed in this particular instance, scrutiny of the entire data set makes it clear that this is not the case in all of the reviews: The wine’s palate (taste and mouthfeel) is the sensory impression most frequently mentioned. References to the wine’s gustatory impression appear in 95% of the texts. Instances involving the olfactory impression are found in 90% of the data set reviews. References to the visual impression of the wine are less frequent: only about 50% of the reviews include a report concerning the wine’s appearance. It is also worth noting that while descriptions of the wine’s nose as well as portrayals of the wine’s palate can occur by themselves, thus making up the entire representation of the tasting event, descriptions of the wine’s appearance only occur together with one or both of the other components.

In terms of time and spatial location, the representation of the tasting event is understood to make up the texts’ ‘here’ and ‘now’. An exploration of the dataset shows that this aspect is grammatically marked by means of the present tense in 197 of the 200 texts, which is illustrated by the following example:

(11) The 2005…exhibits a deep ruby/purple color along with notes of sweet, mineral-laced black cherries…

The present tense can be seen as the default device used by speakers of the English language to locate a statement in the here and now. According to Langacker (2009), the use of the present tense entails conceptualization of the situation that is being described as coinciding with the time of speaking, a phenomenon that he associates with the concept of epistemic immediacy, i.e. mentally experiencing present-time states and events in terms of epistemic control (Langacker 2009:202).
In a similar vein, Brisard (2002:265) argues that the English present tense relies either on direct perception of a state of affairs, coinciding with the time of speaking, or on generality: a state that is always present “out of time”. Fairclough (2003:152) refers to this phenomenon as the “timeless present”. Consequently, we take the use of the present tense in Parker’s representation of the tasting event to have the communicative potential to draw the intended reader into the describer’s perceptual experiences, since the direct perceptions are presented as if they coincide with the speech event as well as with when the text meets the reader, thereby making the space–time construction universal. It is worth taking note of the fact that the writer thus makes use of the resources made available by the English language in order to conceptualize the tasting event as a shared experience, or put in Tindale’s terms ‘a common cognitive environment’ (Tindale 2004).

As observed by Thibault (2004), a typical feature of what he refers to as the genre of the tasting note is a high degree of ellipsis, and an element that is frequently elided in portrayals of the tasting event is in fact the finite verb. As a result, renderings of the tasting event are often untensed. The following example, which is taken from the British wine magazine Decanter, provides an illustration of this phenomenon:


Just like the representation of the tasting event that was reproduced in (10) above, the review from Decanter also follows the stages of the wine tasting ritual, i.e. the rendering of the visual impression (Dark ruby. Deep.) is followed by a depiction of the wine’s smell (Precise notes of fruit and spice. Complex and inviting.) and finally the gustatory observations are reported (Dried plum character and a nutty, savoury palate.). The exclusion of the finite verb nonetheless makes this text different from the rendition reproduced as (11).

Although Thibault’s (2004) analysis suggests that genre-aware readers automatically infer a present tense finite form of the verb be to complement such elliptic instances, this inference nonetheless requires a cognitive effort on the part of the audience, while Parker’s presentational strategy requires no such effort. Instead, unless they make a conscious attempt to uncover the fact that what is being described is a snapshot of the writer’s personal perceptual experience at some specific moment in the past when the tasting event took place, readers are likely to be drawn into the shared writer/reader experience that the text sets up, since the present tense evokes a state that is always present, out of time, as a stable component of our conception of reality (Brisard 2002, Jaszczolt 2009). In other words, the formulation suggests that the addressees will have the same experience of the wine if/when they taste it (and every time they taste it) since the qualities are presented as permanent attributes of the wine (Hommerberg & Paradis 2010a, 2010b). The generality effect of the simple present can be illustrated by rephrasing the example above in the present progressive:
(11a) The 2005…is exhibiting a deep ruby/purple color along with notes of sweet, mineral-laced black cherries…

Just like the simple present, the progressive also portrays the state of affairs as being directly available to the speaker at the time of speaking. The progressive does however not carry the implication of generality that goes with the simple present. The choice of aspect is therefore of rhetorical significance for the construal of the tasting event as a joint writer-reader enterprise.

According to Thompson (2004:54) it is important to examine the validity claims made by writers/speakers because this is an indication of the ways in which they achieve their purposes, i.e. negotiate with or manipulate their audiences. Fairclough (2003:164) proposes that such epistemic commitments made by writers are important aspects of how they express their textual identities. Following Thompson and Fairclough, we see the use of the present tense in Parker’s texts as a persuasive strategy employed by the writer to convince his audience about the acuteness of his descriptions. This aspect of the text contributes to the construction of an authoritative textual persona as well as a world view according to which the properties of the wine are stable irrespective of taster and tasting situation. In other words, the description is conveyed as a general, timeless truth.

In contrast to the Decanter text and many wine reviews from other sources, Parker’s texts are always tensed, and in the vast majority of the representations of the tasting event in the dataset reviews (197/200), it is the simple present tense that is used. Our scrutiny of the dataset reveals only one occurrence of the past tense, which is reproduced below:

(13) …the 2003 Crozes-Hermitage blanc from Albert Belle was acidified, tart, and green.

This example involves a clearly negative assessment of the wine. The past tense functions to express epistemic distance (Langacker 2009), i.e. the perceptual event is presented as a remembered ‘now’ rather than a ‘now’ that is directly accessible to the speaker at the moment of speaking. From this perspective, the impression is that the responsibility that the speaker is prepared to take for the validity of the statement is restricted to a specific event in the past, i.e. if tasted at another specific moment, this wine may well give rise to a different experience.

In addition, this use of the past tense also has the communicative potential to direct the audience’s attention away from the state of affairs that is being described, thereby depicting it as unworthy of their attention. An examination of the use of tense in representations of the tasting event in 1000 reviews from The Wine Advocate shows a handful of occurrences where the past tense is used, all of them occurring in texts with negative orientation, which (14) and (15) illustrate:

(14) There is not much to get excited about here. The 2003 Côtes du Rhône Villages was clipped and shallow.
(15) The 2004 Crozes-Hermitages was of average quality with high acidity, vegetal personality, and little texture or concentration.

Viberg (2001:1295), who has studied perception verbs specifically, distinguishes between the following types: Experiencer-based verbs, which are further subdivided into Activity (Peter smelled the soup) and Experience (Peter smelled garlic in the soup), and Phenomenon-based verbs (The soup smelled of garlic). There are no clear occurrences of the Phenomenon-based type, i.e. ‘the wine smelled of black currants’. However, (16) below could perhaps be taken to illustrate the Experiencer-based type, although the Experiencer has been omitted.

(16) Tremendous purity (a hallmark of this vintage), full body, moderate tannin, and superb freshness and precision are found in this stunning Cotes de Castillon.

In the entire dataset, there are only two occurrences which allow for the reconstruction of an implicit Experiencer, either by means of the addition of a by-phrase, i.e. are found by the wine taster or by transforming the passive clause into a corresponding active clause, i.e. the wine taster finds… However, still according to Viberg (2001:1294), it is not unusual that situations are described without any indication of the perceptual source. This is clearly the presentational technique preferred by Parker, which is illustrated in (17) – (22).

(17) Sensual and disarmingly charming, the dark ruby/plum-colored 2003 possesses superb fruit in the nose along with a big, sweet candied black cherry attack…

(18) …this wine offers sweet cherry and currant fruit

(19) The deep ruby/purple-tinged 2003 reveals an evolved, precocious bouquet displaying this cuvee’s tell-tale minerality…

(20) …the 2005 […] boasts super intensity, a deep, full-bodied, powerful palate, silky tannin, beautiful purity, a fragrant perfume, and a mineral-laden backbone with moderate tannin.

(21) Aromas of crushed rocks, sweet cherries, dried herbs, and notions of raspberries and blacker fruits jump from the glass of the 2003 Canon-de-Brem.

(22) Deep, sweet black currant fruit interwoven with smoky herb, graphite, and licorice aromas emerge from this delicious, supple, fleshy 2003.
Except for the two occurrences of Experiencer-based perception verbs exemplified by (16) above, it is a characteristic feature of Parker’s texts that the tasting event is construed as taking place without the participation of the writer, i.e. “the description is made independent of the describer” (Potter 1996:150). This way of depicting reality has two rhetorical functions: First, it draws attention away from the fact that what is reflected in the text is a subjective impression of reality. Second, it engages the recipients in placing them in the same position as the writer in the role as remote sensors (Potter 1996:150). The persuasive power of this type of description lies in the fact that it rules out alternative descriptions. Yet, according to Potter (1996:98, 106), a description can always be ‘otherwise’: “any description counters a range of alternative descriptions”.

The presentation in the descriptive-evaluative unit has been found to adopt a God-like, omniscient perspective. There is no indication of the mode of knowing or source of evidence on which the generic, temporally unrestricted descriptions are based. If an effort is made, based on our world knowledge, we can nevertheless infer that the qualities that make up the descriptions have been revealed by the writer during the tasting event, i.e. the presentations are reconstructions of the impressions that the wine has made on his senses of vision, smell, taste and mouthfeel. If we compare the evidence provided in the representations of the tasting event to the formulations used to reconstruct the production event, we find a number of differences which can be seen as indicative of the fact that the information provided in this thematic unit has been accessed via sensory perception rather than through external sources. As observed in the preceding subsection, the representation of the production event includes numerous occurrences of exact renderings (e.g. 14% alcohol; 6,500 cases produced or a blend of 58% Cabernet Franc and 42% Merlot). Instead of providing such exact specifications, the representations of the tasting event are less determinate. For the visual impression, we find the following type of renditions:

(23) *Its inky/blue/purple hue* is accompanied by scents of blueberries, white flowers, and black currants.

In addition to colour worlds like blue or purple, which denote only the colour shade, inky can also be seen to refer to the clarity of the wine’s appearance, suggesting opaqueness. Alongside this type of colour definitions, the colour descriptions in the data set also occasionally draw on associations with gemstones (ruby and garnet) to capture the appearance of the wine in terms of both colour shade and clarity. Except for plum, which occurs quite frequently as a colour descriptor in the dataset, fruit words are not used to designate the colour of the wines, despite the existence of a great variety of berries and fruits in different nuances that would be appropriate for the descriptions of wine colour.

The type of colour specifications provided in representations of the tasting event can be contrasted to The Natural Color System (NCS), which has been developed for objective communication about colour nuances, providing a technical code for
each nuance in the spectrum. Drawing on this system, it would be possible to capture for instance the degrees from brick red to purplish red as follows: S3060–Y90R (brick red) – S3060–R20B (ruby/purple) – S3060–R40B (inky/blue/purple). Such technical renditions are however avoided in Parker’s texts, which confirms the idea that the evidence is based on a human experiencer perspective rather than a report based on technical evidence provided by an external source.

While fruit words are not made extensive use of in the colour descriptions, they are pervasive in the representations of the wines’ smell. In the majority of the dataset reviews that include a reference to the wine’s smell, these depictions are instantiated in terms of more or less elaborate lists of physical objects referring to aroma as well as bouquet:

(24) Its inky/ruby/purple color is followed by sweet aromas of spring flowers interwoven with black cherries, cranberries, cassis, plums, and hints of forest floor, wet rocks, and new oak.

All of the items included in the characterization of this wine’s aromatics are physical objects with relatively stable spatial properties. However, it is conceivably not the visual characteristics of these objects that are being drawn on but instead another property, namely their smell. As observed above in relation to the descriptions of the wines’ appearance, the scientific terminology of chemistry, which provides exact formulae to describe odour components, for instance 1-octen3-ol, is however avoided in the representation of the tasting event. This feature of the presentation confirms that it has been provided by a human experiencer rather than registration of chemical properties assisted by technical equipment. According to Todd (2010:54) chemical terms are unhelpful in the communication of perceptual experiences.

In the vast majority of the data set texts, the disposition of the representation of the tasting event follows the sequencing of the wine tasting procedure so that the gustatory impression of the wine is presented after the visual and olfactory impressions. As mentioned in Section 2, the gustatory dimension involves not only taste but also the touch of the wine against the tongue and palate as well as its weight in the mouth, i.e. what is referred to as the wine’s body. In addition, the gustatory stage also involves an internal olfactory dimension, the so called aftertaste, as well as the finish, i.e. the wine’s vaporization after it has been swallowed/ejected. It is however often difficult to determine which of these gustatory dimensions are being addressed by the linguistic items used in the depictions of the tasting event.

An overall observation is that the default representation of the gustatory impression of the wine is different from the portrayal of the wine’s olfactory dimension in that it draws more clearly on scales of presence of the invoked qualities from high to low degrees of presence. This phenomenon is signalled linguistically by reliance on adjectives or adjective-noun combinations rather than lists of nouns denoting physical objects, which were observed to be the preferred
option for the portrayal of smell. Examples (24) and (25) provide illustrations of this feature of the gustatory descriptions in the dataset:

(24) Deep, full-flavored, muscular, textured, and rich with light to moderate tannin in the finish, this lavishly rich, full-bodied effort…

(25) … combination of huge richness, incredible tannin levels, record breaking alcohol levels, and very good acids.

Lehrer (1975, 1983, 2009) has established several scales that are relevant for the description of wine taste: Acidity (from sour to flat) Sweetness (from cloying to dry), Astringency (from hard to soft) and Body (from heavy to light). Good wines are supposed to display a balance of these gustatory dimensions, in which case tasters perceive the wine as harmonious. According to Lehrer (2009:165) there is however a lack of general reference norms when scalar judgements about wines’ gustatory properties are made, and how we perceive the interrelation of these dimensions is a consequence of our educational as well as personal backgrounds.

Throughout this outline of the representation of the tasting event in the dataset reviews we have indicated that the evidence underlying the presentations is based on the writer’s sensory experience, a feature that distinguishes this part of the text from the representation of the production event, where the evidence is taken to be provided by external sources. In terms of Cornillie’s (2009) divisions, the mode of knowing can be understood to be direct perceptual evidence, even if there is no indication of this in the text. Cornillie’s division involves a distinction between visual and sensorial evidence. The mode of knowing of sensorial evidence can be further subdivided into olfactory, gustatory and tactile perceptions. The modes of knowing of visual and sensorial evidence have been considered in the construction of the reliability hierarchy of evidentials (Viberg 2001). The degree of reliability forms a hierarchy from the perceptual modality of vision, which is known to be more or less invariable across human beings, and so intersubjectively reliable, through auditory evidence to the perceptual modalities of smell, taste and touch, which are known to be most subjective and which are therefore regarded as less reliable sources of evidence, since they are not intersubjectively invariant. It should however be borne in mind that the credibility of Parker’s wine descriptions is underscored by the widespread belief that his “sense of taste and smell must be extremely special” (McCoy 2005:141). Based on Parker’s media image, it is therefore likely to be interpreted as a more reliable reflection of reality when Parker describes a wine as having the aromas of for instance camphor, creosote, plums, black cherry liqueur, currants, licorice, and pain grille than if another random wine consumer would say the same thing.
3.3 Representations of the consumption event
We will now consider the representation of the consumption event. Caballero (2007) suggests that the issuing of predictions in wine reviews may include references to prospective consumers, information about the wine’s consumption span as well as a recommendation of dishes that are believed to go well with the wine. In Parker’s reviews, the representation of the consumption event typically includes exclusively a reference regarding the wine’s recommended consumption span, a specification that is provided in 90% of the dataset reviews. This specification, while providing information about the future development of the wine, can also be seen to entail a recommendation to the intended audience to actually take action and consume the wine during this period, an idea which is supported by the fact that negatively oriented reviews are not endowed with a drink time specification.

Paradis’ (2009a, 2009b) investigations of the linguistic encoding of drink time recommendations in The Wine Advocate show that the information in this part of the review is normally delivered in one of three linguistic formats; as declarative constructions, as imperatives and in the form of noun phrases. In Paradis’ (2009b) investigation, comprising 200 reviews of which 170 included drink time recommendations, 68% of the drink time specifications are declaratives, while imperatives make up 25% and noun phrases are rare, only occurring in 7% of the reviews selected for the investigation. While the ratio of noun phrases is slightly higher in the dataset investigated here, the distribution over linguistic constructions nonetheless displays similar proportions, the most frequent construction type being declaratives (61%), followed by imperatives (22%) and noun phrases occurring in 17% of the representations of the consumption event. The imperatives as well as the noun phrase constructions are illustrated in (26) and (27) below:

(26) Drink it over the next decade.

(27) Anticipated maturity: 2013-2026

Paradis (2009a) provides further subcategorization of declarative constructions, which shows that 28% of the declaratives are middle constructions, 32% are passive constructions and 40% are made up of other types of simple declaratives. These three categories are illustrated by means of examples (28)–(30), which are taken from the material that is currently under study.

(28) It should drink well for 5-6 years.

(29) …it can be enjoyed over the next 10-15 years.

(30) It is […] capable of lasting 15-20 years.
Comparing the results of the current study with Paradis’ study, the proportions are relatively stable. Paradis (2009a), who concentrates specifically on the occurrences in the data of middle constructions, proposes that these constructions constitute the linguistic manifestation of the complex interpersonal nature of recommendations, i.e. that the speaker tells the addressee what to do for the benefit of the addressee rather than the speaker himself. In a similar vein, Lassen (2003:282) distinguishes between the directive types of ‘demand’, which is beneficial to the speaker, and ‘offer’, which is understood to benefit the addressee. Thompson (2004:47) proposes that the subtype of ‘offer’ has a strong tendency to be articulated by means of modalized expressions. In accordance with these ideas, it is worth noting that the imperatives are different from the other types of constructions occurring in the representations of the consumption event, since they can be seen to imply exclusion of the speaker from the group that is being addressed by the recommendation. The presupposed participant in the imperative can be made visible by means of the addition of a tag question (see Halliday & Matthessen 2004:109), a testing method that is illustrated in (26a) below:

(26a) Drink it over the next decade, will you?

Alternatively we can add an imagined addressee’s response to this directive as “Yes, I will” or “No, I won’t”. Noun phrases as well as middle constructions and other types of declaratives, including passives, are not suggestive of such a restriction, but position both the writer and the addressee in the same group as possible future consumers of this wine. Noun phrases such as (27) have no mood structure, and consequently do not enable the addition of tag questions or recipient responses. The declaratives in examples (28)–(30), however, can be tested by highlighting the Mood of the clauses in the following way:

(30a) It is […] capable of lasting 15-20 years, isn’t it? (Or alternatively: Yes, it is/No, it isn’t)

Importantly, while the real world consumption event presumably involves the intended addressee of the reviews, the formulations used to represent the consumption event highlight a property of the wine rather than involving an active human participant. Van Leeuwen (2008:66, 2009:156) captures this phenomenon by means of the term ‘deagentialization’, which accentuates the idea that the linguistic construction represents actions as brought about in other ways than by human agency. According to Paradis (2009b:70), middle constructions are particularly useful for expressing recommendations: They can be seen as iconic in the sense that they foreground the Undergoer of the event (in this case the wine) and background the Actor (the potential future consumer).

A feature that distinguishes the representation of the consumption event from the representation of the production and consumption events is that the mode is irrealis since what is being dealt with is predictions of the future, i.e. events that
have not yet taken place. All statements about the future involve an element of
potentiality, i.e. just because something is possible or even likely to become true,
there is still a chance that it may not (Jaszczolt 2009:33). Any representation of the
future therefore involves restriction in epistemic certainty. For instance, the
imperative constructions involve epistemic uncertainty in that the recommendation
that they instantiate can be taken up or not by the audience to which it is directed.
While the restriction in epistemic certainty can be taken for granted as a self-
evident aspect of the fact that the texts deal with future time as well as unknown
space, it is interesting to note that this is linguistically encoded in various ways in
the dataset. In addition to verbs whose main function is to express epistemic
modality, like should and can (see for instance (28) and (29)), the representation of
the consumption also includes a number of other textual cues which are indicative
of this restriction in epistemic certainty: The time specifications are often
imprecise, which is illustrated above in (28)–(30). Further examples of such
linguistically encoded restrictions in epistemic certainty are provided by (27),
where the item anticipated emphasizes the uncertainty of the future, and (30),
where capable indicates that while the wine has the necessary requisites, there is no
absolute guarantee that it will actually develop in the predicted way.

It is also of interest to consider the kinds of evidence that underlie
predictions of the future. Based on our world knowledge, we can be rather certain
that Parker is not in possession of a time machine that allows him to travel into the
future and experience the quality of the wine with his senses in for instance 20
years from now. So how can credibility be achieved by Parker when he predicts the
consumption span of the wines that he recommends? As observed above in relation
to the representations of the production and tasting events, the majority of the
formulations used to capture the consumption event lack overt markers of
evidentiality. However, elliptic constructions are frequently employed, which
connect the representation of the consumption event with the representation of the
tasting event.

(31) Long, rich, and moderately tannic with surprising weight, it should drink
beautifully for 7-8 years...

In (31), the description of the wine’s taste and mouthfeel is textually linked to the
prediction of its consumption span through the shared subject (it). The elliptic
construction therefore functions as a clue suggesting that part of the evidence on
which the prediction is based is derived from the tasting experience itself. In the
constructed example below, the link between the tasting event and the consumption
event is weakened:

(31a) Bolaire 2005 is long, rich and moderately tannic with surprising weight. This
wine should drink beautifully for 7-8 years...
However, according to Deroy (2007:108–109), it does not result in sufficient credibility to base predictions about a wine’s future development on the immediate experience that it gives rise to from the perspective of the present. This is because there are several different possibilities of future development of for instance a wine that is presently perceived as dull: It can either stay dull or it can evolve so as to provide a more, or even a very, pleasurable experience when it matures. In order for such predictions to be perceived as credible by the addressees, they need to rely on the writer to have some additional knowledge that is not exclusively derived from the particular experience at hand, but based on a capacity to compare the present experience to previous experiences with similar phenomena. Although there are no overt signals in (26)–(30) indicating that the prediction relies on inference-based knowing, other dataset reviews occasionally include evidential markers indicating inference from previous experiences, which the following example illustrates:

(32) Based on previous vintages, it will undoubtedly require 10-12 years of cellaring…

Although there are a few instances where explicit reference is made to previous experiences, in the unmarked case this information is left implicit. In these cases, the plausibility of the prediction rests on the audience’s contextual knowledge about Parker’s longstanding experience with other wines of the same type. According to McCoy (2005:116), Parker possesses precisely the kind of experience that is required in order for his audience to perceive his predictions as credible: “Parker’s secret weapon was his ability to mentally compare the wine in front of him with all the other wines of the same type he’d ever tasted over the years”, i.e. 10,000 wines a year for more than thirty years.

4. Discussion

In Section 3, the goal was to provide examples of textual reconstructions of the three events given on the horizontal axis of Table 2, i.e. the production event, the tasting event and the consumption event, and to analyse the different parts in the light of how credibility is achieved. In this section, we shift the perspective to the parameters of the vertical axis of Table 2 and describe the most pertinent insights of the above reconstructions from the point of view of temporality and spatial frame (4.1), modes of knowing and evidentiality (4.2) and participants, agentivity and deagentialization (4.3).
4.1 Temporality and spatial frame
Based on world knowledge, it was assumed to be a basic requisite of the production event that it took place in the past with respect to the speech situation. It is however unusual that past temporality is textually encoded by means of a past tense verb. Instead, it is often left up to the reader to infer the temporal determination of the production event. A variety of different representational strategies are found in the representation of the production event, for instance the perfect as well as verbless extensions, both of which function to highlight the relevance of the presentation of past and local space-times for the immediate speech situation.

Normally following the representation of the production event in the texts’ surface form, the representation of the tasting event stands out as the texts’ here and now. In an overwhelming majority of the data set texts, a present tense verb serves the purpose of locating the presentation of the perceptual event temporally. The portrayal of the perceptual experience in note form without a tensed verb, which has previously been observed to be a characteristic feature of wine tasting notes (see Thibault 2004), is thus avoided. By means of the present tense verb, the reader is drawn into the writer’s perceptual experiences, which are conceptualized as immediately accessible to the writer at the moment of speaking. In addition to creating shared attention, the present tense in these presentations functions to portray the described experiences as a situation that is always there, irrespective of taster and tasting situation, i.e. a universal truth. It therefore requires a conscious cognitive effort on the part of the addressee to conceptualize the described situation as a particular person’s perceptual experience at a specific moment in time and space.

The surface form of the texts usually closes with a representation of the consumption event, often realized in terms of an estimation of the wine’s ideal consumption time. A basic requisite of the consumption event is that it is temporally anchored in the future. This is realized by means of lexical as well as grammatical markers, which serve the purpose of locating the message in an epistemologically uncertain would-be reality and hence to decrease the degree of epistemic certainty with which the message is communicated.

The notion of temporality that is adhered to in the present study is not tied to specific items with temporal marking as their only function. Instead, in accordance with Fairclough’s (2003:151–154) ideas of the representation of time and place, the intention has been to show that temporality can be left implicit to be inferred on the basis of contextual cues.

4.2 Modes of knowing and evidentiality
The division of the dataset reviews into three parts, based on their representation of three different events, also involved a discussion of the different types of evidence underlying the representation. For analytical purposes, a distinction was made between the mode of knowing and the source of evidence. As point of departure for the discussion, we assumed that the evidence underpinning the representation of
the production event is not based on the writer’s personal experience from taking part in the production of the wine but on evidence that emanates from sources that are external to the writer, conceivably the producer. The mode of knowing can therefore be established as hearsay. While this phenomenon is only rarely realized by means of overt markers in the texts’ surface form, the exploration of the material shows that the representation often involves detailed technical specifics, which correlates with the commonsensical idea that it is based on external sources and not a perceptual experience.

As pointed out in Section 3, the tasting event is fundamentally distinct from the production event in terms of evidentiality and modes of knowing. Based on contextual understanding, we assumed that the mode of knowing informing the sensory descriptions is direct visual, olfactory, gustatory and tactile perception and that the source of evidence is the writer’s own senses of vision, smell, taste and mouthfeel. The representation of the tasting event was however not found to include overt markers, e.g. in the form of perception verbs, signalling the mode of knowing. Neither is there any explicit mentioning of the fact that the writer’s perceptual organs constitute the source of evidence on which the information is based. The credibility of the sensory evidence is underscored by the widespread tales of Parker’s extraordinary sensory capabilities, i.e. contextual knowledge that is not derived from the particular texts included in our dataset.

Finally, the part of the texts devoted to the representation of the consumption event has been found to rely on the mode of knowing of expectation. Based on contextual understanding, the assumption is that the source of evidence on which the expectation builds is an intricate system of inferences based on information about production-related aspects as well as direct sensory perceptions and wide-ranging previous experience with the development of similar wines. This is however rarely expressed overtly in the text. Contextual knowledge about Parker’s activity as a wine taster as it is presented by the author on The Wine Advocate webpage as well as in the media helps to create credibility with respect to this mode of knowing.

4.3 Participants, agentivity and deagentialization
The representation of the production event reveals a great deal of variation as regards the grammatical constructions that are used to present the information, involving a number of non-finite clauses that are grammatically linked to, and function as circumstantial extensions of, the constructions used to represent the tasting event. This strategy allows the presentation to be highly condensed, leaving implicit the production process as well as the participants. Where the process is realized in the form of a finite verb, action verbs with the wine producers in the role as strongly instigating agents stand out as characteristic of the representation of the production event.

Furthermore, the tasting event is most frequently instantiated as state rather than activity, despite the fact that the real world tasting event involves the taster as an active participant. In addition to typical state verbs, metaphorical expressions
are found, where the wine or components of the wine perform a more or less personified role as agent. In other words, it is typical for the agentivity involved in the real world tasting event to be transferred from the human participant to the affected entity, i.e. the wine, in representations of this event. Representations of the tasting event therefore have a strong tendency towards deagentialization, which serves the rhetorical function of drawing the addressee into the described event as fellow experiencers.

Transferred agentivity was also found to be characteristic of the representation of the consumption event. Although the event that is represented by the text involves the future consumer of the wine, human participants are not represented in the texts’ surface form. Instead, the action is transferred from the human participant, i.e. the future consumer, to the participant that is going to undergo the action, i.e. the wine, which is portrayed as performing a more or less active role in the future consumption event. The event is thereby deagentialized.

5. Conclusions

The exploratory exposition offered in this paper has strived to illuminate the construction of credibility in the discourse of wine through detailed study of a particular, extraordinarily influential individual’s texts. The textual cues that have been brought up in the discussion justify a number of general conclusions regarding this critic’s capacity to induce credibility among his readers. Parker can be understood to possess extensive practical wisdom, which contributes to the construction of credibility. Dissection of the perceptual experience into component parts, which was found to be a characteristic trait of the representation of the tasting event, highlights the writer’s ability to make such fine-grained organoleptic distinctions, moulding a discursive persona of reliable expert taster. The credibility of the detailed renderings of the tasting event is substantiated by the widespread tales of Parker’s perspicacious senses of smell and taste, which are abundantly available as contextual information in numerous publications about Parker’s outstanding olfactory and gustatory capabilities. While overt markers of evidentiality are generally not provided in the wine reviews themselves, the surrounding background story provides the source of evidence with ample credibility despite the fact that smell and taste perceptions in general are known to be volatile and inconsistent across humans. The portrayal of the tasting event in the investigated material procures a meticulous discursive persona dedicated to giving exact witness statements, not only about the sensory effects that the assessed wines have had on his acute perceptual organs, but also about the objective, taster-independent qualities of the assessed wines. Exact factual renderings of technical details about the wines’ production contribute to moulding a scrupulous persona.

The representation of the tasting events as detailed, decomposed sensory witness statements depicted as being immediately accessible to the writer at the moment of writing places the audience in the same position as the writer in the role
as remote sensors. The generalizing effect is achieved by means of deagentialization, i.e. transitivity patterns where the wine rather than the taster stands out as the more or less active participant, while the taster, whose sensory organs are conceivably experiencing the perceptions in the real-world tasting event, is eclipsed in the text. The conceptualization of the tasting event as a joint writer-reader experience is reinforced by means of linguistic resources such as temporal marking that functions to provide a representation of the wine that is stable irrespective of taster and tasting situation, thereby laying the foundation for shared reader/writer attention on, as well as joint enjoyment of/dissatisfaction with, the tasting experience.

The division into several olfactory components simultaneously endorses a particular conceptualization of a wine’s smell, thereby encouraging the putative audience to share the writer’s decomposed olfactory perceptions. The representational arrangement involving present tense verbs and transitivity patterns of deagentialization, which is employed by the writer to capture the tasting event, draws attention away from the fact that what is reflected in the text is an individual’s subjective impression of reality at a specific moment in time. This type of depiction involves a validity claim that rules out alternative descriptions, elevating the writer’s personal perceptual experiences to the status of universal truths.

While the dataset of wine reviews is the only aspect of the present topic that has been directly accessible for investigation, the presentation has continuously strive to show that in order to capture aspects that contribute to the construction of credibility, both explicit and implicit cues need to be taken into consideration. Increased knowledge about the topic has been acquired by relating the close analysis of linguistic forms to general world knowledge and specific contextual understanding. We conclude that it is only in the light of such extra-linguistic knowledge that we can arrive at satisfactory interpretation of the communicative potential of linguistic form.

The choice of material for this study is justified on the basis of the extraordinary influence that Parker has had as the number one guru of the wine world, whose reviews are known to have the potential to make or break prestigious wine estates by suggesting to consumers which wines they will want to obtain and consume. While the explorations undertaken in this study have thus been delimited to texts written by one single author in the discourse domain of wine, his status as the world’s most influential critic of all categories (Langewiesche 2000) justifies the employment of this particular data as an instance of a more general phenomenon, namely how credibility in discourse is achieved. We argue that the model we have outlined and exemplified in this study is more widely applicable to any instance of authoritative discourse in which individuals identify themselves as having the right to exercise the power to lead others, be it politicians, management gurus, priests or consumer experts. In terms of analytic methodology, we also argue that the approach to the data presented in this paper provides a fruitful complement to other methodologies for discourse analysis. In Hommerberg (2011,
submitted) the current approach to the analysis of representations functions to inform argumentation analysis, and Hommerberg & Don (in press) reveal the importance of awareness of the general requisites of events in relation to analyses employing the Appraisal model.

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Stancetaking in the discourse on risk identities construed

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Abstract
The paper explores how stances taken by different communicative actors contribute to their identity construction in the discourse on risk. The theoretical framework for the research synthesizes social constructivist approaches to discourse, embracing elements of critical discourse analysis, poststructuralist studies of discourse and discourse psychology. The data for the analysis are taken from the recent media debate of the medical risks of breast and ovarian cancer, triggered by Angelina Jolie’s public announcement of her double mastectomy. The texts for analysis appear in the form of a personal narrative (as a formative mechanism in the construction of self and reality) and on-line commentaries (revealing how identities are conceptualized via stance-taking in virtual communication). In this study, linguistic resources of stancetaking in narratives and commentaries that resonate with them are analyzed.

1. Introduction

In the recent decades, there has been extensive debate in the media about various ecological risks, health risks or risks of emerging technologies such as genetically modified food, mobile phones, human genetic research, and human cloning. However, the news of American celebrity Angelina Jolie’s mastectomy as a way to avoid the risk of breast and ovarian cancer has created an unprecedented case when a discourse production did not just make a piece of international news out of a personal health problem, but also became a reason for worries for many women all over the world. Due to active media involvement in this discussion, the meaning of a particular risky situation gained socio-cultural significance. “Modern society has become a risk society in the sense that it is increasingly occupied with debating, preventing and managing risks that it itself has produced” (Beck 2006: 332).
Researchers in many disciplines have argued that speech behavior in risk communication should be seen as a product of situated interaction, though the understanding of the dynamics of interactive processes of risk perception and conceptualization, as well as the dynamics of communication in the risk discourse situations, remains underdeveloped. In this article, we examine the situated nature of identity construction in risk discourse. The paper proposes a conceptual framework for analyzing the construction of identity in risk discourse as a product of stancetaking. A hypothesis, put forward in this work, consists in the suggestion that personal and social identities are constructed as different constellations of diverse stances (epistemic, affective and interactional) and are conditioned by the type of the situations of risk. It entails that personal preoccupation with medical risks, individual health choices, positions and responsibilities may foreground social aspects of mass media manipulations in modern Western societies.

Many discourse psychologists share the view that self, or identity, is “the product rather than the source of linguistic practices” (Bucholtz & Hall 2005: 585). Identity is not pre-existent, inherent or interiorized, but emerges during the processes of interaction. The identities of the subjects of risk communication are classified according to their epistemic status, that is, the level of their knowledge about the object of discussion, as well as linguistic and extralinguistic peculiarities of the surrounding context. Thus, expert identities, lay (non-expert) identities and mediator identities are distinguished. Usually expert stances are taken by the specialists in the area discussed – scientists, medical doctors, chiropractors. Mediator identities are constructed by the journalists who enable and control the conversational flow of the event. Lay identities that are in the focus of this study are characteristic to the immediate participants of the risk situation, as well as to the ordinary people, which take part in a discussion.

It is also assumed that people construct their identities through narratives. The identity constructed in a narrative is seen as the complex ongoing process of stancetaking, while the concept of stancetaking is approached as an interactive and dynamic discursive phenomenon. Research has tended to focus on the ways stances are constructed in terms of linguistic features, including some structural and formal qualities, and how these features are related to social interaction. Among the objectives of this study is the description of the ways stances on one and the same problem (namely, the risk of getting cancer) are taken by discourse participants under different communicative conditions; and how these stances become the important part of identities, constructed by these discourse participants during their communicative activities.

This inquiry also appertains to the phenomenon of resonance in communication (Niemela 2011), where resonance covers the process of discussing the same story by different participants on different occasions, namely a first-hand telling in the form of narrative and Internet commentaries, triggered by it. Resonance, displayed on lexical, semantic, and syntactic levels of interaction, is analyzed. The emphasis is on the linguistic devices used by participants to take their stances according to the object of their discourse interaction, as well as for
aligning or disaligning with the previous stances of their communication partners, and thus, constructing the corresponding identities. The aim is to investigate how people’s stances are co-coordinated, co-adjusted and co-constructed in discourse, and then result in creating their identities.

Focusing on the issue of risk of breast and ovarian cancer as the object of stancetaking, this study examines the linguistic resources the stance-takers use to verbalize their certainty or uncertainty in the expressed propositions (epistemic stance), as well as their emotional and evaluative attitude towards the problem discussed (affective stance). It must be acknowledged that the present chapter is rather a demonstration than an exhaustive analysis, the purpose of which is to manifest how the link between stance, identity and risk discourse could be researched, outlining the framework and illustrating the possible directions for further research. The use of a specific case study is meant to elucidate the more general point that identities are discursively and dynamically constructed in interaction with sociopolitical contexts.

2. Theoretical background

A general theoretical background for this research synthesizes socially constructivist approaches to discourse analysis, consisting of critical discourse analysis, poststructuralist studies of discourse and discourse psychology. In the post-modernist model, speakers use discourse to construct versions of the world which are variable, functional and consequential (Potter & Wetherell 1987). A fundamental assumption of psychological discourse analysis is that language is inseparable from the processes of thinking and reasoning. It is constructive in the way people use language to construct their unique versions of the world using words that are culturally, ideologically and historically available to them, and consequentially this relies on socially shared meanings (Billig 2001). Before outlining a framework for the analysis, we briefly consider the three main concepts relevant for this study, namely identity, stance and risk; how they are linked and why they may be examined in a critically oriented way.

2.1 Identity and stance

There is an ample amount of literature on constructing identity in discourse. In the present study, we draw on Bucholtz & Hall (2004) in their understanding of identity as an outcome of the social semiotics of practice, indexicality, ideology, and performance. Identity is accomplished ‘through the production of contextually relevant socio-political relations of similarity and difference, authenticity and inauthenticity, and legitimacy and illegitimacy’ (Bucholtz & Hall 2004: 382). Bucholtz & Hall (2004) provide an approachable conceptualization of the situational construction of identity in discourse, taking into account social, cultural and contextual factors. They state in their other work that “identity may be linguistically indexed through labels, implicatures, stances, styles or linguistic
structures and symbols. Identity is the social positioning of self and other” (Bucholtz & Hall 2005: 585).

Every utterance encodes a speaker’s stance, and recognizing intended stances is crucial for identity construction and, thus, effective communication. A speaker’s stance includes subjective expressions of the speaker’s attitude towards the object of conversation, his/her mood, evaluations, perspective, point of view and opinion. Stances are reflected at different levels of language: lexis, grammar, style, and pragmatics. Stance as fairly recent object of inquiry has been subject to analysis in sociolinguistics, pragmatics, and discourse studies. Stance cannot be associated with particular linguistic markers, but includes different linguistic features and their combinations. For instance, adverbials, modals, evaluative adjectives and nouns, complement clauses and predicates have been researched as indexing stance (Biber & Finegan 1989; Ochs 1993; Precht 2003).

The term ‘stance’ has been used in a number of different ways in the literature related to discourse. There is no consensus among scholars in terms of their approaches to the investigation of stance, but many of them are related to the study of the available resources for expressing thoughts and feelings in the course of interaction between individuals. For example, Biber & Finegan (1989) define stance as “the lexical and grammatical expression of attitudes, feelings, judgements, or commitment concerning the propositional content of a message” (Biber & Finegan, 1989: 124). These lexical expressions of stance mark evaluation, affect, certainty, doubt, hedges, emphasis, possibility, necessity and prediction. Ochs (1990, 1996) identifies ‘stance’ as one of four dimensions that organizes the relation between language and culture. She defines stance as “a socially recognized disposition,” making a distinction between epistemic stance as “a socially recognized way of knowing a proposition, such as direct (experiential) and indirect knowledge, degrees of certainty and specificity,” and affective stance as a “socially recognized feeling, attitude, mood, or degree of emotional intensity” (Ochs 1990: 2).

We see that all the definitions of stance that have been mentioned above differ from one another with respect to which mental phenomena are considered to be involved in stancetaking. Some of them include attitudes, feelings, and judgments, whereas others include commitments and assessments of the proposition, but all the mentioned approaches focus on the expression of individual speakers or writers rather than on the interactive relations, which are specifically relevant for this study.

There are many researchers who have observed the interactional nature of stancetaking. For example, Johnstone (2009: 30) states that stance “has to do with the methods, linguistic and other, by which interactants create and signal relationships with the propositions they utter and with the people they interact with”. Scherer (2005: 695-729) states that stances “spontaneously develop or are strategically employed in the interaction with a person or a group of persons, colouring the interpersonal exchange in that situation”. Scherer (2005: 705-706) continues “Interpersonal stances, are often triggered by events, […], shaped by
spontaneous appraisal, affect dispositions, interpersonal attitudes, and strategic intention”. Keisanen (2007: 177), in her study of the role of tag questions in the act of positioning oneself, comes to the conclusion that stance is an “interactional achievement, […] an intersubjective rather than primarily a subjective phenomenon. In fact, interaction can be seen as a starting point for taking a stance. Stance can be treated as “an articulated form of social action” (Du Bois 2007: 137) or as “the act of positioning oneself in the social act of discourse” (Precht 2003: 239-257).

The view adopted here is close to that of Du Bois, who sees stance as an interactional phenomenon, as “a public act by a social actor, achieved dialogically through overt communicative means (language, gesture and other symbolic forms), through which social actors simultaneously evaluate objects, position subjects (themselves and others), and align with other subjects, with respect to any salient dimension of the sociocultural field” (Du Bois 2007: 163). Stance is treated here as a dynamic phenomenon constructed interactively in communication through a sequence of stance-takers’ contributions realized in a multimodal manner. Discourse stance has epistemic and affective dimensions, the expression of which strongly depends upon the previous contributions of other communicants. The stances, including the stances on risk, are shaped through the interaction between people in different speech events. That is why it is necessary to outline the characteristics of discourse situation, which is seen here as a situation of risk.

2.2 Risk and stance
As Zinn (2010) points out, linguistic analysis of risk could enrich sociological and psychological research of this phenomenon. In the discourse situations that have been analyzed, the notion of ‘risk’ is an important part of stancetaking. Risk, according to the ‘world risk society’ perspective (Beck, 2006), is seen as both a real risk and a social construction of possible harm. In the modern “systems theory approach”, risk is understood as being constructed by attributing (expected or observed) negative outcomes to decisions (Zinn 2010). Risk receives a subjective interpretation in the present study, and therefore ‘positive’ or ‘negative’ connotations of taking risks directly depend upon the stances of the communication participants. The way that stances on risks are constructed linguistically is analyzed with regard to semantic categories of risk such as ‘danger’, ‘hazard’, ‘choice’, ‘chance’, harm’, ‘possibility’, ‘victim’, ‘risky situation’, ‘beneficiary’ etc. Fillmore & Atkins’ (1992) analysis of “the risk frame” further helps us understand the different aspects of theoretical approaches to risk as the object of human interaction.

As Luhmann (2005: 307) argues, risks have to do with expectations, which can be more or less (un-)certain. Expectations are linked with knowledge and experiences of the past, and they can be developed to the representations of everyday knowledge and personal experiences. On the other hand, expectations also refer to epistemic stances, as they have to do with the knowledge of the speaker (or writer). What one considers to be risky depends not just on one’s
knowledge but on one’s sociocultural and individual values (evaluations), and thus, speakers take their affective stances, which are co-constructed and co-coordinated in interaction with other participants.

3. Data and methodology

3.1 Data
As the focus of this research is on identity as a cluster (manifold) of stances, taken by acting subjects on risk, the concept of RISK becomes the unifying topic for the data under analysis. Therefore, the material included personal stories of people who described either their own experience associated with the risk of getting cancer or that of their friends, relatives, etc. The analysis is based on observations of the ways these people constructed their identities as the survivors or the decision-makers in a risk situation.

The data were drawn from two types of sources: personal narratives accessible via Internet – blogs (as a formative mechanism of non-expert self-identification in discourse) and blog commentaries (revealing how identities are conceptualized via interactive stance-taking in virtual communication). The material for illustration (a case study) was taken from the recent media debate on the medical risks of breast and ovarian cancer, triggered by Angelina Jolie’s revealing the news of her double mastectomy in her personal narrative entitled “My Medical Choice” in The New York Times, as well as 1712 on-line comments (approximately 230, 000 words).

3.2 Analytical framework
The supposition about the situated nature of identity construction implies the necessity of identifying certain discourse situations as the situations of risk. In order to achieve this end, it was essential to devise a prototypical conceptual model (scenario) of the risk situation meant to serve as a basis for further analytical moves. FrameNet (Baker et al. 1988), based on a theory of meaning called Frame Semantics, deriving from the work of Fillmore et al. (2003), offers its version of the RISK situation model. This model served as a basis for the analysis of stance and identity, framed by the situational context of RISK. In agreement with the objectives of the given research, the FrameNet model of the situation of risk is further elaborated by introducing the metacommunicative level, or that of discussing the situation of risk, and specifying the alternative scenarios of its development.

The analysis started with studying personal narratives as a powerful source for constructing self-identity in discourse. This study is based on the assumption that identities built by people in their narratives are individually and socially constructed. Merill (2007: 7) understand narrative as “a bridge between the individual and society”. Narratives are social, they are local, national and global; they are simultaneously products of individual and society, and individual and
society are their products (Merill 2007: 1). Local narratives resonate with the
global ones; they are seen as a formative mechanism in the construction of self and
reality.

The analysis of the process of stancetaking proceeds with regard to its
interactive nature in the social network media and Internet blogs, where the
participants are discussing the same problem, but in different conversational
patterns. They coordinate their stances (a) to the remarks of the previous speakers,
as well as (b) to the opinions expressed in the narratives that actually triggered the
discussion. The Internet discussions are studied with the main analytic focus on the
resonating elements participating in stancetaking activity between the conversation
participants. In the study of identity in the context of discussion Internet forum, we
follow Myers (2010) who argues that in their stancetaking, bloggers are interested
in marking their position relative to others rather than in a collective discussion.
For Myers stance-taking is not just about having an opinion on any given topic, but
using this opinion to align or disalign with someone else interactionally.

3.2.1 Modeling the risk situation
Linguistic analysis of the phenomenology of risk has a multidisciplinary character
and is realized in the paradigm of subjective tradition which allows the
conceptualization of this phenomenon as an important part of reality reflection by a
subject. Image of an object or an event is rather a subjective attitude of an
individual towards it than a reality. It also includes a motivational and evaluative
positioning as well as a background assumption of a subject. Hence, the analysis is
based on the ways of verbalizing the concept of RISK in the English language,
which allowed determining the content of its interpretive sphere.

![Figure 1. A model of the RISK situation scenario](image)

The elaborated model served a starting point for analyzing stancetaking as a
decision making process in the situation of risk. Thus, the main constituents of the
RISK scenario are: the acting SUBJECT (as a stance-taker in the situation of RISK)
and the SUBJECTS who comment on the situation (as stance-takers on the situation
of RISK), CHOICE (the act of decision-making or stance-taking, including epistemic
and affective components) and CHANCE (presupposing danger, loss, harm or
benefits, gain, success). Figure 1 presents a unified model that exploits in a
synergetic way the advantages of different semantic RISK frames offered by
FrameNet\textsuperscript{2}, and depicts the dynamic development of the RISK situation where a subject must take a stance:

FrameNet provides the knowledge basis needed to identify the RISK frame and semantic roles in the RISK situation. In frame semantics, a frame corresponds to a scenario that involves an interaction and its participants, where participants play some kinds of roles. Thus, based upon the FrameNet, the scenario or dynamic model of the situation of RISK was designed. The Fillmore’s RISK model was elaborated by introducing a meta-communicative element to it, which allowed not to just analyze the specific characteristics of the RISK situation, but also to align them with a broader social context.

Keeping in mind that a situation of risk is always a situation where the subject has to make some kind of a decision, and this decision usually presupposes some verbal output – the subject makes a choice either in an interaction with other subjects or as a way of interior contemplating pros and cons. This process of making a choice is seen here as the act of stancetaking towards risk. In the model presented above the acting subject (the stance-taker) after having realized he / she is in the risky situation, has to make a choice (to choose a stance on risk). If we take Angelina Jolie as the acting subject, it is clear that all her actions are aimed at avoiding the risks of breast and ovarian cancer about which she was warned by the experts. At the same time, she takes many other risks, for instance: (a) the risk of losing her beauty and attractiveness for millions of her fans around the world; (b) the risk of side effects after surgery; (c) the risk of physical pain; (d) the risk of being maimed, etc. Here we deal with the case when in her effort to avoid some virtual (probable) risk the subject is facing multiple real risks and still takes her stance towards the situation following the expert advice. The discourse analysis of risk stancetaking in Jolie’s personal narrative allowed us to trace her own perspectives of the events as a way of her identity construction.

3.2.2 Personal narrative

Personal narrative is one of the most fruitful discursive devices through which people picture themselves and the world around them, as well as enable other people envision them. Social psychologists noticed that much of our life is recounted through stories. Stories are fundamental units of human interaction, they are closely connected to our capacity to acquire, manage and communicate knowledge. In Ricoeur’s (1990: 54) understanding, narrative imitates human action and therefore, allows the contemplation of human existence. A narrative is understood here as a story which is typically told (written) by a teller to give an account of events to one or more recipients in order to perform a social action.

The role of narrative in a person’s presenting the episodes of his / her life in the form of a story was summarized by Bernstein (1990: 55): “One of the ways human beings assess and interpret the events of their life is through the construction of plausible narratives. Narratives represent events not as instances of general laws but rather as elements of a history where a continuing individual or collective subject suffers or brings about dramatic, i.e. meaningful, change”. From
this point of view, narrative is a present construal of the events that happened in the past, and an identity of a teller (of a subject of both a narrative and the real event) is also seen as constructed in the flow of the discourse. Stances, or positions (Harre 2003: 697) play an important role in the dynamics of self-identification in a narrative, for “the speech-act force of this or that speech action is dependent on the positions that the actors acknowledge each other to be speaking or acting from” (Harre 2003: 699).

No matter that narrative may be treated as a fixed object, frozen on a paper or a computer screen, we still think it is best described with the metaphor of “a flowing stream” (Chafe 2003: 673), since natural communication is a dynamic process. As the narrative develops, close attention must be paid to the dynamics of stancetaking, as it may help to follow the unfolding of the events. We assume that the analysis of stances, constructed in personal narratives, should be fulfilled considering their dynamic nature and progression, which in Chafe’s terms (Chafe 2003: 675-680) are represented as “navigation by topic, navigation by schema, and navigation by interaction”.

4. Analysis. Constructing a lay identity in a personal narrative

The narrative discussed in this study, presents elements of both personal narrative and a media narrative. This is partly connected to the fact that the incident was an official media event, and the teller was a world-known celebrity. Therefore, it involved dissemination in other official and unofficial media by a variety of journalists, commentators, experts and ordinary people, circulating through broadcasting networks, the Internet, social networking, cell phones and other new media and communication technologies. The fact that the event under study concerned a celebrity, and that narration was published in a national newspaper facilitated its subsequent spreading all over the world. Hundreds of videos about the incident under study can be found on YouTube. Hundreds of articles written by experts taking opposing stances on the discussed events are published in different media. Thousands of comments made by bloggers in interactive media develop a teller’s stance, expressing their own supporting or oppositional stances.

Angelina Jolie constructs her personal as well as her social identity in the described narrative by taking individual and socially-meaningful stances. Her personal stance can be defined as:

– the stance of a responsible mother and brave woman, wishing to avoid the risk of cancer

While her social stance could be formulated as:

– the stance of an empowered citizen, wishing to help other women in similar risky situations.
Both these stances have interactive nature and include epistemic and affective aspects, which are indexed through various language means.

4.1 Navigation by topic
If we refer to identity as a discursive construct, the notion of ‘a discourse topic’ plays a key role in the process of identity construction in a narrative. A topic in this sense is “a coherent aggregate of thoughts introduced by some participant in a conversation, developed either by that participant or another or by several participants jointly” (Chafe, 2003: 674). Usually topic has a clear beginning, and it’s been developing as long as the speaker (writer) wants it to, and sometimes he / she does that in an interaction with other communicants.

The appendix includes the full text of a personal narrative “My Medical Choice”, written by Angelina Jolie and published in The New York Times. Topic usually appears in the initial stage of the narrative, where the spatial, temporal and epistemic orientation of the speaker is offered, which in this case is treated as an epistemic stance. In the present narrative, the topic is mentioned already in a title as “My Medical Choice”, which explicitly verbalizes one of the specific ontological features of risky situation – the necessity of making an uncertain choice in order to get some benefits, with the possibility of getting both benefits and losses. The way in which discourse topics are introduced and developed is often referred to as discourse progression (Verschueren 1999: 140). The central topic of this narrative could be defined as ‘risk of getting breast cancer’. Several peripheral discourse topics are hierarchically subordinated to the central one: ‘mother’s illness’ (paragraph 1), ‘faulty gene’ (paragraph 2), ‘estimated risk of cancer’ (paragraphs 3, 4), ‘a proactive decision’ (paragraphs 5, 6), ‘benefits for others’ (paragraph 7), ‘surgery’ (paragraphs 8, 9, 10), ‘care for children’ (paragraph 12), ‘the partner’s attitude’ (paragraph 13), ‘encouraging other women’ (paragraphs 14, 15), ‘the affordability of BRCA tests’ (paragraph 16), ‘why the story was not kept private’ (paragraphs 17, 18).

4.2 Navigation by scenario
Following the topic development, the progressive organization of the narrative stance can be observed. According to the above-mentioned model of the prototypical risk situation scenario, the teller finds himself / herself in the situation of risk when he / she faces some kind of danger (discomfort) and realizes the necessity to make a decision in order to change the situation for the better. The conceptualization of the discourse situation as a situation of risk is realized here through the use of numerous lexical units belonging to the lexico-semantic frame RISK: ‘risk’ (used 9 times in the narrative), ‘choice’ (5 times), ‘chance’ (3 times), ‘fear’ (3 times), ‘decision’ (3 times). The rhetorical structure of the narrative is built around these lexical units in the form of justification and explanation of the teller’s decision making, which is treated here as her stancetaking. In the justification for her stance to undergo double mastectomy, she introduces the main argument in terms of an attempt to explain to herself and to her children the early
death of her mother and their grandmother. Then she gives evidence for the risks awaiting for her. The teller strengthens her argument by pointing out the consequences of her behavior for herself, her family and a lot of other women around the world.

Stance expression in discourse has several dimensions that very often are inseparably connected: epistemic stance, affective stance, interpersonal stance. In his/her epistemic stance the speaker (writer, teller) expresses his/her knowledge with regard to the content of his/her speech, including the degree of certainty/uncertainty in the expressed proposition and his/her commitment to the truth of the proposition. The expression of epistemic stance can be signaled in a narrative or conversation by the use of different lexical and grammatical features. For instance, such evidentiality markers as certainly, surely, seemingly, evidently, etc. express (un)certainty, doubt and commitment, while epistemic markers I believe, I guess, and I know express the speaker’s epistemic stance and relate his/her speech to the interlocutor(s), thus demonstrating the interactive nature of stance. Linguistic expression of epistemic stance can hardly be studied without relating it to the expression of affect, as there is a fundamental human need to express emotions and evaluations. There are many studies claiming that stance has at least two main dimensions: epistemic and affective. Affect includes the categories of feeling, mood, disposition, attitude, emotion, and can be expressed by various verbal and non-verbal resources. Some of the linguistic features of affective stance include lexical (lexis with emotive connotations), syntactic (e.g. change of word order, inversion, repetition, emphatic constructions, cleft-sentences, interjections) and stylistic devices (epithets, simile, metaphor, hyperbole, antonomasia, irony etc). I offer that we shall analyze the linguistic representation of epistemic stance in the given narrative and then proceed with the analysis of emotional and evaluative components of affective stance, taken by the teller towards the notion of risk.

4.2.1 Epistemic stance
Epistemic stance is expressed in the studied extract by various linguistic means. The degree of knowledge of a teller ranges from complete ignorance through uncertainty and probability to utter certainty in the rightness of the taken decision in the risky situation.

(1) We often speak of “Mommy’s mommy,” and I find myself trying to explain the illness that took her away from us. They have asked if the same could happen to me. I have always told them not to worry, but the truth is I carry a “faulty” gene, BRCA1, which sharply increases my risk of developing breast cancer and ovarian cancer.

In example (1), which is the second paragraph of the text, the speaker starts with claiming her desire to find the necessary answer to the questions set by her mother’s premature death “I find myself trying to explain the illness that took her away from us”. In this utterance the teller explicates her position at the moment
when she realized herself in a situation of risk and tried to find some way out of it “I find myself trying to explain...” In the next sentence the modal verb ‘could’ in sentence ‘the same could happen to me’ intensifies her wish to enhance her epistemic status. And then she finds a sad answer she sought, expressing her commitment to the truth of the proposition concerning her risk of getting cancer: “but the truth is I carry a “faulty” gene, BRCA, which sharply increases my risk of developing breast cancer and ovarian cancer”.

(2) My doctors estimated that I had an 87 percent risk of breast cancer and a 50 percent risk of ovarian cancer, although the risk is different in the case of each woman.

(3) Only a fraction of breast cancers result from an inherited gene mutation. Those with a defect in BRCA1 have a 65 percent risk of getting it, on average.

In examples (2) - (3) the teller makes another attempt to enforce her epistemic status by mentioning the expert opinion and referring to it, naming numbers – the strategy which serves an intensification of certainty in epistemic stance: My doctors estimated that I had an 87 percent risk of breast cancer and a 50 percent risk of ovarian cancer, although the risk is different in the case of each woman. <...> Those with a defect in BRCA1 have a 65 percent risk of getting it, on average.

In example (4) the teller starts her statement with the epistemic verb “to know’, expressing her certainty in regard to the object of discussion (which is ‘risk’):

(4) Once I knew that this was my reality, I decided to be proactive and to minimize the risk as much I could. I made a decision to have a preventive double mastectomy. I started with the breasts, as my risk of breast cancer is higher than my risk of ovarian cancer, and the surgery is more complex.

She attempts to assure her audience of her confidence in future actions: “I decided to be proactive and to minimize the risk as much I could”. The sentence “I made a decision to have a preventive double mastectomy” may be interpreted as the climax of the narrative, as this was actually the “choice” which was announced in a title of the narrative and which the teller is trying to justify in her story. CHOICE is a key concept of a RISK situation model, and it is a key notion of this narrative. A narrator turns to verbalizing her possibility of choice in a risky situation not once, for instance: “I made a strong choice” (paragraph 12), “you have options” (paragraph 14), “to make your own informed choices” (paragraph 14), “I choose not to...” (paragraph 17). According to the model of RISK situation the phase of CHOICE or decision-making is the moment when a RISKING SUBJECT takes his / stance in the situation of risk, which later will possibly offer a CHANCE. CHANCE as
an element of a risky situation model is also very clearly explained in the Jolie’s narrative: “have the chance” (paragraph 1), “increase the chance” (paragraph 8), “have strong options” (paragraph 17), “to take control of” (paragraph 19).

As a result of her decision-making, Angelina Jolie refuses to take a risk of getting cancer in the future, but at the same time she faces the risks of pain and physical sufferings (it causes some pain and a lot of bruising, but it increases the chance of saving the nipple) (paragraph 8), though they are not as scary as the fear of cancer. In examples (5), (6), (7), (8) (corresponding to paragraphs 6-9 of the narrative) the teller describes the process of surgery after her decision to undergo the double mastectomy to avoid the risk of breast cancer.

(5) On April 27, I finished the three months of medical procedures that the mastectomies involved. During that time I have been able to keep this private and to carry on with my work.

(6) But I am writing about it now because I hope that other women can benefit from my experience. Cancer is still a word that strikes fear into people’s hearts, producing a deep sense of powerlessness. But today it is possible to find out through a blood test whether you are highly susceptible to breast and ovarian cancer, and then take action.

(7) My own process began on Feb. 2 with a procedure known as a “nipple delay,” which rules out disease in the breast ducts behind the nipple and draws extra blood flow to the area. This causes some pain and a lot of bruising, but it increases the chance of saving the nipple.

(8) Two weeks later I had the major surgery, where the breast tissue is removed and temporary fillers are put in place. The operation can take eight hours. You wake up with drain tubes and expanders in your breasts. It does feel like a scene out of a science-fiction film. But days after surgery you can be back to a normal life.

Later she justifies her decision by the phrase: “My chances of developing breast cancer have dropped from 87 percent to under 5 percent” (paragraph 11), again resorting to numbers as a means of intensifying one’s epistemic status. Thus, the markers of epistemic stance, used in the analyzed narrative, can be grouped into the following classes:

1. verbs: e.g. ‘know’, ‘acknowledge’, ‘decide’, ‘hope’, ‘want’, ‘see’, ‘feel’;
2. modals: e.g. ‘can’, ‘could’, ‘may’, ‘need’;
3. adjectives: e.g. ‘possible’;
4. nouns: e.g. ‘reality’;
5. phrases: e.g. “I find myself trying to explain”, “I choose”, “It is my hope”. 
We see that the variety of expressive resources for marking epistemic stance is scarce, which can be explained by the fact that lay-persons are more emotional in their stancetaking than experts and mediators.

4.2.2 Affective Stance
The stancetaking in paragraphs (6-9) is highly emotional; it includes a lot of linguistic expressions of affective stance which are used to colorfully depict all the hardships and pains the teller passed through: “You wake up with drain tubes and expanders in your breasts. It does feel like a scene out of a science-fiction film” (example 9 – paragraph 9):

(9) Two weeks later I had the major surgery, where the breast tissue is removed and temporary fillers are put in place. The operation can take eight hours. You wake up with drain tubes and expanders in your breasts. It does feel like a scene out of a science-fiction film. But days after surgery you can be back to a normal life.

Strategic use of morphological transposition of a pronoun ‘you’ here fulfills the functions of solidarisation and intimization with the readers. Such stylistic expressive means as emphatic ‘does’ and simile ‘like a scene out of a science-fiction film’ are used to underline the emotional strain of the utterance.

Moreover, then the teller arrives to the positive evaluation of her deeds: “the results are beautiful” (paragraph (10), “we knew this was the right thing to do for our family” (paragraph (13), and verbalizes her emotional state – “I am very happy that I made…” (paragraph (11), “I am fortunate to have a partner <…> who is so loving and supportive”; and her feelings – “I do not feel any less of a woman. I feel empowered that I made a strong choice <…>” (paragraph (12):

(10) Nine weeks later, the final surgery is completed with the reconstruction of the breasts with an implant. There have been many advances in this procedure in the last few years, and the results can be beautiful.

(11) I wanted to write this to tell other women that the decision to have a mastectomy was not easy. But it is one I am very happy that I made. My chances of developing breast cancer have dropped from 87 percent to under 5 percent. I can tell my children that they don’t need to fear they will lose me to breast cancer.

(12) It is reassuring that they see nothing that makes them uncomfortable. They can see my small scars and that’s it. Everything else is just Mommy, the same as she always was. And they know that I love them and will do anything to be with them as long as I can. On a personal note, I do not feel any less of a woman. I feel empowered that I made a strong choice that in no way diminishes my femininity.

(13) I am fortunate to have a partner, Brad Pitt, who is so loving and supportive. So to anyone who has a wife or girlfriend going through this, know that you
are a very important part of the transition. Brad was at the Pink Lotus Breast Center, where I was treated, for every minute of the surgeries. We managed to find moments to laugh together. We knew this was the right thing to do for our family and that it would bring us closer. And it has.

The narrator often resorts to explicating her emotional state using direct nominations of feelings: “a word that strikes fear into people’s hearts”, “a deep sense of powerlessness” (paragraph 7), “I am very happy”, “do not need to fear” (paragraph 11), “I love them”, “I do not feel” “I feel” (paragraph 12), “I am fortunate” (paragraph 13). All the cited linguistic resources can be treated as a part of affective stancetaking.

4.2.3 From personal identity to social identity

It must be mentioned that by stancetaking in this narrative the teller not only constructs her personal identity as a brave woman and a responsible mother, but also frames herself as a conscientious citizen who cares about other women’s health. In example (14) which corresponds to paragraph 7, we observe the shift from the personal identity construction to the social identity designing, which is expressed in a sentence: “But I am writing about it now because I hope that other women can benefit from my experience”.

(14) But I am writing about it now because I hope that other women can benefit from my experience. Cancer is still a word that strikes fear into people’s hearts, producing a deep sense of powerlessness. But today it is possible to find out through a blood test whether you are highly susceptible to breast and ovarian cancer, and then take action.

The use of the stance marker “I hope” can be interpreted as an expression of the personal expectations of a speaker concerning the legitimacy of her actions, as well as the opportunity to share this hope with others. Then she continues in paragraph (11): “I wanted to write this to tell other women that the decision to have a mastectomy was not easy” and in paragraph (14): “For any woman reading this, I hope it helps you to know you have options”. In paragraph (17) (example 15) Jolie explicitly points to the reasons of making a public story out of a personal health problem:

(15) I choose not to keep my story private because there are many women who do not know that they might be living under the shadow of cancer. It is my hope that they, too, will be able to get gene tested, and that if they have a high risk they, too, will know that they have strong options.

At this point, I would advance a proposition that the stance produced by a celebrity-teller in a media narrative, not only motivates a lively public discussion,
but also serves as a social signal which may influence the perceptions and interpretations of numerous participants in communication.

4.3 Navigation by interaction
Since stance often implies having a relation to one’s interlocutor(s), taking a stance means positioning with regard to the object of discussion or the participants of the discourse interaction. Thus, stance is a subjective phenomenon, but at the same time it is a useful resource for creating intersubjective relations in discourse. In my navigation by interaction I offer to investigate how online bloggers use language to take stances. I suggest that narrative published in a national newspaper inevitably causes interaction online or cross-reader resonance. Resonance is closely tied to the intersubjective nature of stancetaking in dialogic interaction, and can be observed in the readers’ commentaries.

The commentaries after the Jolie’s narrative are extremely large in number, which testifies the strong resonance triggered by this publication. The readers of the newspaper or the bloggers (respondents) have a choice to support a stance-taker of the narrative or not. Their comments explicitly recognize the incident, the problem and the teller’s stance, aligning or disaligning with it. Such discursive actions are seen as their stancetaking in discourse. The respondents’ positioning in each case is very different.

We suggest only a short extract from the analyzed material to illustrate the interactive nature of stancetaking:

(16) howardb42006
stupid girls. Watch Angelina get hit by a car. Breastless.

(17) coldmemories1
People eventually die, either with cancer or with a piece of muffin got stuck in the middle of a gullet. If I were her, I'd just keep living with this disease without giving away any part of my body. This decision is desperately insane… Especially, since it's coming from a beautiful woman like her. But, now it's too late…. She can't have them back

(18) komalati
I THINK THIS THINGS ARE SO SO PERSONAL FOR WOMEN - YOU DONT TELL THE WORLD U ARE GOING TO CHOP URE TITTIES ---
<…>

(19) homemadeheartattack
Angelina Jolie is a clinically diagnosed and admitted psychopath. Psychopaths think nothing of self mutilation and mutilation of others, since their thrill seeking (and pain) threshold is beyond what normal human beings can comprehend. She has mutilated herself and others in the past and continues to do so in various forms for attention and energy. This story is
most likely fabricated by her for attention, deflection away from some scandal like a boob job or purchasing babies adoption scandals.

(20) mynameisjacob0
no she isn't

(21) Crystal Howard
I am also BRCA 1 positive and lost my mother to ovarian cancer when she was only 43. The day of her funeral, I got a call telling me I had the gene. I had a hysterectomy at 24 and this past november, I had the double mastectomy. I do not regret it at all. I have a daughter I want to be here with. If you are not in the shoes of the one you judge, your input is worthless. I have 2 video diaries on my channel of it if you're interested in hearing my story.
(JohnnyMavers
So, you are insane as well. Brava (((.

(22) widddershins
I'm sorry to learn of the loss of your mother, Crystal. I'm glad you recognize the "input" of these ignorant fools for the worthless drivel it is!:

As we see in examples 16, 17, 18, 19 (cues 1-4) all the respondents disalign with the Angelina Jolie’s stance, and only the utterance in example (20) expresses disagreement rather with the previous stance-takers than that of the narrative’s author. Some of the respondents take their stance towards Jolie’s announcement about her double mastectomy; some of them take stances according her actions; others express their opinions concerning the risks in general. For example, howardb42006 (example 16) does not explicate his attitude towards the mastectomy, but he implies it in his statement about probability of risk and danger for anyone – healthy or not. There are no linguistic markers of epistemic stance in this utterance, but affective stance (attitude and evaluation) is marked by lexical means (stupid girls), ironic supposition used in an imperative (watch Angelina get hit by a car) and detachment in elliptical construction (Breastless). In the next cue (example 17) the respondent also chooses not to take a narrative stance, resonating with the previous utterance and supporting the stance taken by its author: “People eventually die, either with cancer or with a piece of muffin got stuck in the middle of a gullet”. He (she) verbalizes her own stance, being empathetic with the teller, putting herself to Jolie’s place, but disagreeing with her decision: “If I were her, I'd just keep living with this disease without giving away any part of my body”.

In cue (18) the respondent uses the epistemic stance marker “I think” to construct his stance not towards the act of mastectomy itself, but towards the fact it was made a piece of public news. He / she also uses graphical device of capitalization as a means to emphasize the exclamatory tone of the statement. In contrast to this, in the following utterance (example 19) we see the stancetaker’s
negative assessment of the teller herself, rather than her actions. The respondent is very emotional: he / she uses lexical units with rude and offensive connotations (clinically diagnosed and admitted psychopath), accuses the teller of being abnormal (Psychopaths think nothing of self mutilation and mutilation of others, since their thrill seeking (and pain) threshold is beyond what normal human beings can comprehend), antisocial (She has mutilated herself and others in the past and continues to do so in various forms for attention and energy) and deceiving (This story is most likely fabricated by her for attention, deflection away from some scandal like a boob job or purchasing babies adoption scandals).

In cue (20) the position in favor of A. Jolie’s decision is indexed by the direct disagreement with the previous bloggers: “no, she isn’t.” In certain cases, respondents bring in biographical details or other information about their personal experiences under similar circumstances, like in (21): I am also BRCA 1 positive and lost my mother to ovarian cancer when she was only 43. The day of her funeral, I got a call telling me I had the gene. I had a hysterectomy at 24 and this past november, I had the double mastectomy. She then explicates her stance by using “I do not regret it at all”. By assessing the teller’s actions positively or by justifying them, responders are positioning themselves as their supporters and followers. With the aim of affiliation with the stance-taker, the respondents may use emoticons and punctuation, which position them as aligning or disaligning with the previous stance: examples 22 and 23.

5. Conclusions

It was shown in this study that discursive identity construction is of a situated nature. It was demonstrated that identity is construed as a constellation of epistemic and affective stances in a particular discourse situation, namely that of risk. The situational approach made it possible to investigate the dynamics of transition from a personal to social identity construction.

Human beings tend to communicate their experiences, perform certain social actions and take stances in the form of personal narratives (stories). Narratives are produced in order to fulfill some important social acts, such as problem-solving, trouble-telling, decision-making, action-justification, etc. Thus, the stories are told to take stances on various social phenomena, including health risks or some other unusual events or troubling actions. Hence, personal narratives were studied here as instances of stancetaking in the discourse risk situation.

A prototypical scenario of the risk situation was modeled, and the speech behavior of the participants of such situations was examined. The analysis was based upon the assumption that the phase of CHOICE in a RISK situation scenario coincides with the stancetaking activities of the situation subject.

In a case study presented in this chapter, Angelina Jolie is the acting subject of the situation of risk. The analyzed narrative deals with the process of Jolie’s decision making in a situation where she estimates her risks of breast cancer and
justifies her actions meant to take control of the risks. As a result, it was established that the speech behavior of the participants of the discourse risk situation reflects the process of their decision making which is treated here as a complex and interactive social activity of stancetaking.

The constellations of stances taken by people in their personal narratives constitute their identities, which usually turn out to be lay identities. The lay identity construed by Angelina Jolie in her narrative is both personal and social, built through the agency of different stances taken by her during her discourse activities. The linguistic manifestation of her discourse identity construction was researched, through which it was demonstrated that building their lay identities people rather take affective than epistemic stances.

Stancetaking is an interactive phenomenon, though interaction should not necessarily be direct. Nowadays, online social networks and blogs allow people to actively communicate with each other in a virtual space. The resonance as a mechanism of stancetaking through the Internet mediated interaction was studied. We have had a look at some of the linguistic resources speakers have at their disposal for aligning or disaligning with the stance expressed in a narrative. The analysis of the resonating stancetaking showed that interlocutors continually rethink, recycle, co-ordinate and co-construct their stances in interaction with each other, resonating with each other as well as with the author of the narrative and, thus, contributing to the stancetaking process.

Appendix

“My Medical Choice”,
Comments: http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/14/opinion/my-medical-choice.html
Last accessed 30 October, 2013):

(1) My mother fought cancer for almost a decade and died at 56. She held out long enough to meet the first of her grandchildren and to hold them in her arms. But my other children will never have the chance to know her and experience how loving and gracious she was.

(2) We often speak of “Mommy’s mommy,” and I find myself trying to explain the illness that took her away from us. They have asked if the same could happen to me. I have always told them not to worry, but the truth is I carry a “faulty” gene, BRCA1, which sharply increases my risk of developing breast cancer and ovarian cancer.

(3) My doctors estimated that I had an 87 percent risk of breast cancer and a 50 percent risk of ovarian cancer, although the risk is different in the case of each woman.

(4) Only a fraction of breast cancers result from an inherited gene mutation. Those with a defect in BRCA1 have a 65 percent risk of getting it, on average.

(5) Once I knew that this was my reality, I decided to be proactive and to minimize the risk as much I could. I made a decision to have a preventive double mastectomy. I started with the breasts, as my risk of breast cancer is higher than my risk of ovarian cancer, and the surgery is more complex.
On April 27, I finished the three months of medical procedures that the mastectomies involved. During that time I have been able to keep this private and to carry on with my work.

But I am writing about it now because I hope that other women can benefit from my experience. Cancer is still a word that strikes fear into people’s hearts, producing a deep sense of powerlessness. But today it is possible to find out through a blood test whether you are highly susceptible to breast and ovarian cancer, and then take action.

My own process began on Feb. 2 with a procedure known as a “nipple delay,” which rules out disease in the breast ducts behind the nipple and draws extra blood flow to the area. This causes some pain and a lot of bruising, but it increases the chance of saving the nipple.

Two weeks later I had the major surgery, where the breast tissue is removed and temporary fillers are put in place. The operation can take eight hours. You wake up with drain tubes and expanders in your breasts. It does feel like a scene out of a science-fiction film. But days after surgery you can be back to a normal life.

Nine weeks later, the final surgery is completed with the reconstruction of the breasts with an implant. There have been many advances in this procedure in the last few years, and the results can be beautiful.

I wanted to write this to tell other women that the decision to have a mastectomy was not easy. But it is one I am very happy that I made. My chances of developing breast cancer have dropped from 87 percent to under 5 percent. I can tell my children that they don’t need to fear they will lose me to breast cancer.

It is reassuring that they see nothing that makes them uncomfortable. They can see my small scars and that’s it. Everything else is just Mommy, the same as she always was. And they know that I love them and will do anything to be with them as long as I can. On a personal note, I do not feel any less of a woman. I feel empowered that I made a strong choice that in no way diminishes my femininity.

I am fortunate to have a partner, Brad Pitt, who is so loving and supportive. So to anyone who has a wife or girlfriend going through this, know that you are a very important part of the transition. Brad was at the Pink Lotus Breast Center, where I was treated, for every minute of the surgeries. We managed to find moments to laugh together. We knew this was the right thing to do for our family and that it would bring us closer. And it has.

For any woman reading this, I hope it helps you to know you have options. I want to encourage every woman, especially if you have a family history of breast or ovarian cancer, to seek out the information and medical experts who can help you through this aspect of your life, and to make your own informed choices.

I acknowledge that there are many wonderful holistic doctors working on alternatives to surgery. My own regimen will be posted in due course on the Web site of the Pink Lotus Breast Center. I hope that this will be helpful to other women.

Breast cancer alone kills some 458,000 people each year, according to the World Health Organization, mainly in low- and middle-income countries. It has got to be a priority to ensure that more women can access gene testing and lifesaving preventive treatment, whatever their means and background, wherever they live. The cost of testing for BRCA1 and BRCA2, at more than $3,000 in the United States, remains an obstacle for many women.
I choose not to keep my story private because there are many women who do not know that they might be living under the shadow of cancer. It is my hope that they, too, will be able to get gene tested, and that if they have a high risk they, too, will know that they have strong options.

Life comes with many challenges. The ones that should not scare us are the ones we can take on and take control of.

Notes
1. I would like to thank Dylan Glynn and one anonymous reviewer of this chapter for their very helpful and constructive comments. The responsibility for any remaining mistakes or inaccuracies is mine.
2. For further information on the FrameNet project and the semantic frame of RISK, see https://framenet.icsi.berkeley.edu/fndrupal/

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Discourse markers of emotional expressiveness in charismatic rhetoric

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Abstract
The study examines the role emotional expressiveness plays in charismatic rhetoric. The combination of psychological content analysis and critical discourse analysis provides a perspective on the use of emotionally charged categories, such as adverbial intensifiers, expressions of feeling and qualifiers, across different contextual variables. The research is based on 18 important political speeches of three most charismatic American presidents over the last 50 years, namely John F. Kennedy, Ronald Reagan and Barack Obama, and six speeches of the least charismatic president of the period – Gerald Ford. Since emotion-related categories (adverbial intensifiers and expressions of feeling) influence perceptions of speaker’s extraversion and emotional stability, charismatic politicians are expected to employ them moderately and adjust their use to the contextual demands. Meanwhile, the use of qualifiers does not only demonstrate the anxiety level of a speaker, but it also displays the degree of his or her decisiveness.

1. Role of emotional expressiveness in perceptions of charisma

Charisma is not limited to a specific trait of character or behavioral pattern of a leader. It is rather a constellation of various psychological features and behavioral models which leaders should skillfully employ in order to build up relationship with their potential followers. Klein & House (1995: 183) claim that “charisma resides not in a leader, nor in a follower, but in the relationship between a leader who has charismatic qualities and a follower who is open to charisma, within a charisma-conducive environment”.

However, various researchers share different perspectives on defining charismatic qualities. Bass (1989: 46) argues that charismatic leaders generally exhibit such attributes as extraordinary emotional expressiveness, self-determination, and freedom from internal conflict. Conger & Kanungo (1989: 325) claim that the distinguishing attributes of charismatic leaders include vision, emotional expressiveness, articulation skills, high activity level, and exemplary behavior. For Verčičč & Verčičč (2011: 17), charisma means “a perceived ability of
an individual to be a good communicator, inspiring and visionary, honest and reliable, attracting other people’s attention and dominant in uncertain situations”.

As we may see, leaders’ ability to efficiently express their emotional state plays an important role in attributions of charisma. Friedman, Riggio & Casella (1988: 204) go as far as to defining personal charisma as “a dramatic flair involving the desire and ability to communicate emotions and thereby inspire others”. Leader’s emotional expressiveness is directly linked to extraversion, which is one of the Big Five personality traits. Extraverts are often characterized as assertive, active, energetic, upbeat, talkative and optimistic individuals (Judge, Piccolo & Kosalka 2009: 865). Friedman, Riggio & Casella (1988: 207) prove that extraversion, emotional expressiveness and good “social actor” skills “can contribute to favorable first impressions above and beyond the effect that physical attractiveness has on judgments of initial likeability”. Furthermore, the optimistic view of the future allows extraverts to emerge as group leaders, to be perceived as “leaderlike”, and to exhibit behaviors consistent with the transformational model of leadership (Judge, Piccolo & Kosalka 2009: 865). The link between the two is illustrated in Deluga’s (1998) argument that “transformational charisma depends on the intense emotionality of the leaders, who appeal to higher order needs of followers, thus generating subordinate awareness and commitment to the organizational mission”. A meta-analysis of the Big Five personality traits (Bono & Judge 2004) reveals that extraversion positively influences perceptions of charisma. Friedman & Riggio (1981) found that extraverts and charismatic individuals are able to infect others with their emotions, presumably because they are more engaging and tend to be more emotionally expressive (Bono & Ilies 2006: 320). To denote the phenomenon, the researchers use the notion of “mood contagion”, defining it as “a process by which the emotions expressed by one individual are “caught” by another” (Bono & Ilies 2006: 320). Similarly, Lindholm (1992: 290) argues that “the charismatic appeal lies in the capacity of a person to display heightened emotionality and in the reciprocal capacity of the audience to imitation and corresponding sensations of altered awareness”.

Bono & Ilies (2006: 320) propose that charismatic leaders express more positive emotions, though they acknowledge that “even the most positive or charismatic leaders may use negative emotions (e.g., anger towards outgroup members) to energize followers, especially during times of threat”. Developing Bono & Ilies’ (2006) ideas, Damen, van Knippenberg & van Knippenberg (2008: 2598-2599) state that leader displays of high arousal positive affect (enthusiasm) will lead to higher attributions of charisma than will leader displays of low arousal positive affect (relaxation) or both high and low arousal negative affect (anger and sadness).

Another Big Five personality trait associated with skillful use of emotionally charged categories is emotional stability. Judge, Piccolo & Kosalka (2009: 865) claim that “emotionally stable leaders are calm, relaxed, consistent in their emotional expressions, and unlikely to experience stress, anxiety and jealousy”. Low scorers in the trait tend to be insecure, worried, and emotional (Hogan,
Curphy & Hogan 1994). Leaders who exhibit emotional stability are likely to remain calm and cool-headed in moments of crisis, be patient in personal and followers’ development, and recover quickly from failures (Judge, Piccolo & Kosalka 2009: 865). Since the trait is positively related to self-confidence and low neuroticism (Hogan, Curphy & Hogan 1994), similarly to extraversion, it also positively influences perceptions of leader’s charisma by the audience.

However, the question still remains which expressive channels are the most efficient in transmitting the information about the emotional state of the speaker. It would be logical to assume that emotional expressiveness is in direct co-relation with the frequency of expressions of feeling. Nevertheless, “it is striking how weakly emotion words predict people’s emotional state” (Pennebaker, Mehl & Niederhoffer 2003: 571). For instance, in natural daily speech emotions are better conveyed by means of intonation, facial expression and other non-verbal cues (Pennebaker, Mehl & Niederhoffer 2003: 571). Besides, Bass (1989: 47) claims that emotional expressiveness is non-verbally revealed through “fluid, outward-directed cues, such as speaking rate and fluency; outward-directed gestural fluency and smiles; and cues of body emphasis along with contact with the body and inward gestures”.

When it comes to verbal communication, Weintraub (2003: 149) lists the following transmitters of emotions: I/we ratio, adverbial intensifiers, direct references, expressions of feeling, and personal references. It should be noted that in political communication the arsenal of expressive means is even more sophisticated as language of politics is rich in metaphors, creative expressions, irony, rhetorical questions and other stylistic devices. Politicians prefer to reveal their emotional tone in a more exquisite manner as it contributes to the memorability of the messages they utter. At the same time, while being less elaborate, direct indication of emotions may be used to create an image of a simple and “down to earth” leader, whose communication style is based on honesty and non-fear to talk about one’s emotional state in public. It accentuates “human” side of a politician in contrast to one’s institutional nature as an office-holder.

While studying verbal emotional expressiveness, the researcher should be aware of the fact that emotion words may often become source of deception and manipulation. Pennebaker, Mehl & Niederhoffer (2003: 569) claim that several studies “found slight but consistent elevations in the use of negative emotion words during deception compared with telling the truth”. In general, Pennebaker, Mehl & Niederhoffer (2003: 571) prevent scholars from starting studies which would be based exclusively on the natural production of emotion words.

The present research is aimed at identifying emotionally charged verbal patterns in charismatic rhetoric. That is why it will focus on three categories of psychological content analysis, which are related to a speaker’s emotional expressiveness, namely adverbial intensifiers, expressions of feeling and qualifiers.

Adverbial intensifiers and expressions of feeling are discourse markers of affective stance, while qualifiers are associated with epistemic stance. The difference between the two is defined by Ochs (1996: 410), who claims that
“affective stance refers to a mood, attitude, feeling, and disposition, as well as degrees of emotional intensity […] whereas epistemic stance refers to knowledge or belief vis-à-vis some focus of concern, including degrees of certainty or knowledge, degrees of commitment to truth of propositions”.

In terms of personality traits, adverbial intensifiers and expressions of feeling may be directly linked to the level of the speaker’s extraversion whereas their consistent use may demonstrate whether the speaker is emotionally stable. Since mean scores of qualifiers reveal anxiety level of the politician, they will also provide information on emotional stability of the speaker.

Thus, the hypothesis of the research is that the charismatic American presidents will have similarly moderate scores of adverbial intensifiers and expressions of feeling, which will be sufficient for emotional motivation of the followers, but will not reveal high level of anxiety. At the same time the scores of qualifiers are presumed to be similarly low in the charismatic speeches, since it will position the presidents under study as emotionally controlled and decisive speakers.

2. Methodology

The principal method employed in the current study is psychological content analysis. Gavrilova (2004: 136-137) argues that the major aim of psychological analysis is to decode political text through selecting the repeated signs (words, meanings), which will allow the researcher to track unconscious basic information, which is hidden in the text. Pocheptsov (2001: 407) treats the whole approach as “an attempt to infer about non-verbal characteristics of the leader, based on verbal characteristics of his or her texts”.

Psychological content analysis was originally developed by Walter Weintraub. Though it proved to bring valid results regarding the speaker’s personality characteristics, the method in general was largely ignored by academic community and its systematical application may be mostly found in Weintraub’s works. Tausczik & Pennebaker (2010: 26) acknowledge Weintraub’s psychological analysis as “the first truly transparent text analysis method”, the results of which were consistently related to important outcome measures. The fact that up to date there are only few studies focusing on the application of psychological content analysis increases the practical value of the research.

Employment of psychological content analysis rests upon three assumptions: 1) speakers’ cognitive and behavioral characteristics are reflected in their communication style; 2) when a speaker is put under mildly stressful conditions (e.g. during the interview), his subconscious choice of words and grammatical structures will mirror his psychological coping mechanisms; 3) personal preferences in the choice of grammatical structures as well as speaker’s personality characteristics are characterized by a slow rate of change (Weintraub 2003: 139).
In the analysis of political speeches Weintraub (2003) focuses on a number of categories: personal pronouns *I*, *we* and *me*, *I/we* ratio, negatives, qualifiers, adverbial intensifiers, expressions of feeling, retractors, explainers, creative expressions, direct and non-personal references. In its original form all the occurrences of the categories should be manually coded by naïve judges, that is to say, people without any professional background in linguistics or psychology. The mean scores of each category are to be counted per 1000 words. Afterwards, low, moderate or high frequencies of the categories are used to draw inferences about personality characteristics of the speaker.

In order to simulate free speech under mildly stressful conditions, Weintraub (2003) selects spontaneous speech samples of politicians, such as transcribed news conferences and personal interviews. The difference between frequent and infrequent use of categories is defined through comparison of the scores with the average scores of seven post-WWII American presidents (Weintraub 2003). However, the current research is focused on prepared political speeches of American presidents. Furthermore, though the author of the paper attempts to rigorously follow Weintraub’s (2003) definitions of the categories, emotionally charged lexicon is prone to a considerable coder’s bias. That is why in the research relative limits have been established for the mean scores of these categories. When the average frequency does not supersede 5 units per 1000 words, it is considered to be low, moderate range is contained within 5 to 10 units per 1000 words, and the scores above 10 units per 1000 words are treated as high.

Since charismatic speakers share certain personality attributes, it should be reflected in the commonalities of their linguistic styles. Thus, the hypothesis is formulated as follows: political speeches of charismatic leaders who belong to the same historical period (in the present research – second half of the 20th – beginning of the 21st centuries) and to the same political culture (in the present research – the USA) will contain common verbal patterns, which will mirror the personality characteristics of the politicians under study. Due to the fact that the study focuses on emotional expressiveness in charismatic rhetoric, it will attempt to trace similar verbal patterns with regard to the use of adverbial intensifiers, expressions of feeling and qualifiers.

Adverbial intensifiers include all the adverbs that make statements sound stronger. Weintraub (2003: 146) claims that “adverbial intensifiers add color to a speaker's remarks” and “when used frequently, they produce a dramatic, histrionic effect.” However, speakers who use very few adverbial intensifiers are perceived by listeners as dull and bland (Weintraub 2003: 146). Thus, it is assumed that charismatic leaders must balance the amount of adverbial intensifiers in their speeches in the way that is sufficient for emotional expressiveness of the speech, but does not demonstrate extreme levels of anxiety:

Proposition 1: The speeches of charismatic presidents will include equally moderate frequencies of adverbial intensifiers.
Yet another category associated with emotional expressiveness is the frequency of expressions of feeling. Weintraub (2003: 145) offers to score not all the linguistic units somehow associated with feelings (as it is done by sentiment analysts), but only the “clauses in which the speaker attributes feelings to himself or herself”. As “low expressions of feeling scores reflect an aloof, cool verbal style” (Weintraub 2003: 145) and high scores reveal anxiety, it is supposed that charismatic leaders should strike a balance in the usage of expressions of feeling:

**Proposition 2:** The speeches of charismatic presidents will include equally moderate frequencies of expressions of feeling.

At the same time anxiety significantly increases average frequencies of qualifiers, whereas in prepared speeches politicians tend to use this category less frequently (Weintraub 2003: 143-144). Qualifiers serve as fillers, words and phrases that are used when speakers are searching their memories for more informative words and, as such, they include expressions of uncertainty, modifiers that weaken statements without adding information, and phrases that contribute a sense of vagueness or looseness to a statement (Weintraub 2003: 143-144). Taking into account that high scores of qualifiers are associated with anxiety and that the current study is based upon the sample of prepared speeches, it is presumed that:

**Proposition 3:** The speeches of charismatic presidents will include equally low frequencies of qualifiers.

Due to the fact that the identification of all the three categories heavily depends on the context and it is nearly impossible to provide exhaustive lists of units within them, the results are considerably influenced by a coder’s bias. In order to increase stability reliability which is defined as “the extent to which the same text is coded the same way more than once by the same coder” (Insch, Moore & Murphy 1997: 14) the speeches of the American presidents under study have been analyzed by the same coder twice. Thus, at least partially, the author has tried to meet the recommendation that “if hand-coded, consistency of accurate classification should be verified by assessing reproducibility (inter-rater) reliability and stability reliability (test-retest by the same coder)” (Insch, Moore & Murphy 1997: 15). Furthermore, psychological content analysis is complemented with some recommendations from Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA). The CDA advocates (Schäffner (1996), Fairclough (1995), Wodak (1996)) claim that political discourse should be studied in relation to the context in which it was uttered and that every linguistic unit should be viewed critically. The present research includes presidential speeches on different topics and delivered in front of different audiences, which will demonstrate whether the use of emotionally charged categories is stable across various contextual variables. In general, combination of psychological content analysis and CDA should be perceived as an attempt to
integrate qualitative and quantitative perspectives on political discourse analysis in one research.

3. Sample

Since one of the major aims in the study is to find common verbal patterns in charismatic rhetoric of different political leaders, 18 speeches of three most charismatic American presidents over the last 50 years, namely John F. Kennedy, Ronald Reagan, and Barack Obama, have been analyzed with the use of psychological content analysis. In order to specify whether these patterns are exclusively characteristic of charismatic politicians or whether they are typical for American presidential discourse in general, the corpus also includes six speeches of the least charismatic president of the period – Gerald Ford.

The time span of 50 years has been chosen due to the fact that presidential discourse in the USA as well as political communication in global terms underwent some serious changes in the 20th century. According to Seyranian & Bligh (2008: 61), the major molding factors that caused this transformation includes “increased media exposure and public scrutiny, the beginning of oral traditions, more frequent speeches, and changes in presidential motives and qualifications”.

It should be noted that the current research does not attempt to provide any new charisma ratings of American presidents, since the findings of several earlier studies in the field are believed to be completely reliable. One of them was performed by Fiol, Harris & House (1999) and identified Theodore Roosevelt, Franklin Roosevelt, John F. Kennedy, and Ronald Reagan as the most charismatic American presidents of the 20th century. In this study eight reputed political historians were asked to evaluate all the presidents beginning with Theodore Roosevelt through Ronald Reagan as charismatic, non-charismatic, or uncertain, based on their relationship with cabinet members.

Seyranian & Bligh (2008) extended the research and included all the 20th century American presidents through George Bush J. However, in their study ten political scientists were required not only to provide a dichotomous measure of presidents’ charisma (charismatic or not charismatic), but also to assess them with the help of seven-point continuous scale (1 – not charismatic at all, 7 – extremely charismatic). Thus, presidents who were in the top 75% quartile of ratings across presidents, or above 4.63 were identified as the most charismatic and the list included Theodore Roosevelt (M=6.30), Franklin Roosevelt (M=6.10), John F. Kennedy (M=5.60), Ronald Reagan (M=5.50), and Bill Clinton (M=4.90) (Seyranian & Bligh 2008: 60).

The assessment of Barack Obama’s charisma is provided in Williams et al.’s (2012) research. In their study 414 undergraduate and graduate students from four American universities rated Barack Obama’s attributed charisma, employing eight items from the Multifactor Leadership Questionnaire. The primary focus was made on assessing leader’s influence on followers through emotional attachment and
identification with the vision. For each charismatic item a seven-point scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree) was employed. With reliability coefficient of 0.93, the aggregated data evaluated Barack Obama’s attributed charisma at the level of 5.14.

The fact that three American presidents (Kennedy, Reagan and Obama) have similar ratings of charisma (5.60, 5.50 and 5.14 respectively) and that their presidencies took place in the same historical period (second half of the 20th – beginning of the 21st century) makes their speeches a trustworthy material for the research and increases the validity of possible findings. The candidacy of Gerald Ford as the least charismatic president over the last 50 years was also taken from Seyranian & Bligh’s (2008) research, which evaluated his charisma at the level of 2.20.

At the same time, it should be acknowledged that some of the charismatic presidents’ speeches are more successful than the others, though they may cover similar topics, be delivered in front of similar audiences and within the same time period. In order to unravel the mystery of outstanding rhetorical eloquence of charismatic presidents and likeability of their speeches, the current research focuses on the finest and most well known samples of their addresses. Both Ronald Reagan and John F. Kennedy had six speeches included into the index of the 100 most significant American political speeches of the 20th century (Lucas & Medhurst 2009). Since, to the author’s knowledge, there are no comparison studies of different speeches of Barack Obama and Gerald Ford with regard to their “greatness”, six speeches of each president have been selected on the basis of two criteria: 1) they should be well known and represent major landmarks in their presidential career; 2) the types of audiences, speeches and context variables should match the ones of John F. Kennedy and Ronald Reagan.

In order to control the influence of contextual variables on the use of emotional categories in the speeches, the latter have been grouped into six subsets: 1) first inaugural addresses, 2) candidate speeches, 3) speeches delivered abroad, 4) speeches related to foreign policy issues, 5) university commencement addresses, and 6) miscellaneous. Nevertheless, finding ideal matches in terms of context is rather challenging, if possible task. For instance, Speech 1 subset includes “Remarks on Taking the Oath of Office as President” by Gerald Ford, though it cannot be regarded as a typical inaugural address, since Gerald Ford was never elected as President or Vice President of the United States by the Electoral College.

Candidate speeches include “Houston Ministerial Association Speech” by John F. Kennedy, “A Time for Choosing” by Ronald Reagan, “A More Perfect Union” by Barack Obama, and “Remarks upon Accepting the 1976 Republican Presidential Nomination” by Gerald Ford. Again, it should be noted that while “A Time for Choosing” is mentioned in the index of the 100 most significant political speeches of the 20th century, it was delivered by Ronald Reagan in 1964, or 17 years before taking the president’s office, to support Barry Goldwater, then a candidate for presidential post. Another reservation concerns the candidate speech...
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by Gerald Ford, which was delivered when the latter was already an incumbent president.


Speech 5 set contains university commencement addresses by John F. Kennedy, Barack Obama and Gerald Ford. As Lucas & Medhurst’s (2009) index does not include any commencement address by Ronald Reagan, his “Evil Empire” speech, delivered at the Association of Evangelicals, has been referred to this set.


The research includes the political speeches with different context characteristics, such as venue, audience, and topic, in order to determine the stability of certain leadership traits. Thus, it follows Hermann’s (2003: 206) recommendation that “by examining different aspects of the context such as the topic, audience, and whether the focus of attention is on the domestic or international domains, we can learn if leaders are sensitive to certain cues in their environment and not to others”. It may be especially helpful while studying emotionally charged categories since it gives the researcher insights into whether leaders may adapt their public image to the situation they find themselves in, in which way they are likely to change their behavior and what contextual features may cause such change (Hermann 2003: 206).

4. Results and discussion

4.1 Use of adverbial intensifiers

Adverbial intensifiers, expressions of feeling and qualifiers belong to the emotionally charged categories within which it is difficult to compile complete lists of category units. The task becomes even more complicated taking into consideration that there is no consensus regarding the definition of the categories.

For instance, Athanasiadou (2007: 555) treats the category of adverbial intensifiers rather broadly, defining them as “adverbs that express extent or intensity”, which include maximizers (completely), boosters (very much), approximators (almost), compromisers (more or less), diminishers (partly) and
minimizers (*hardly*). Moreover, the author argues that the statements may get intensified through the use of focus modifiers which express emphasis: additives (*also, too, even*), exclusives (*only, merely*) and particularizers (*exactly, just*) (Athanasiadou, 2007: 556). Jeong (2005: 6) shares yet another perspective, naming *very, only, every, never and always* as “the five most commonly used intensifiers”. The latter perspective raises some serious concerns as *every, never and always* more naturally fall into the category of adverbs of frequency and adverbs of time respectively.

In order to solve this categorization problem, the researcher uses Weintraub’s (2003: 146) definition of intensifying adverbs as the ones increasing the force of a statement. Thus, the research focuses on the use of amplifiers, which include maximizers and boosters, and restrictives, namely exclusives and particularizers. Weintraub (2003: 146) names *very, really, such and so* as the most commonly used adverbial intensifiers. The other examples of the category in the research are the following:

(1) I am talking about genuine peace […] not *merely* peace for Americans but peace for all men and women, not *merely* peace in our time but peace in all time (Kennedy, “American University Commencement Address”).

(2) The truth is that a freeze now would be a *very* dangerous fraud, for that is *merely* the illusion of peace (Reagan, “Evil Empire”).

(3) I have never been *so* naive as to believe that we can get beyond our racial divisions in a single election cycle or with a single candidate, *particularly* – particularly a candidacy as imperfect as my own (Obama, “A More Perfect Union”).

The speeches of the three charismatic American presidents contain the following average scores of the category of adverbial intensifiers: 6.8 – for John F. Kennedy, 6 – for Ronald Reagan and 8.4 – for Barack Obama (see Table 1). However, the speeches of non-charismatic Gerald Ford contain similar to the charismatic presidents overall average score of the category – 8.2.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>John Kennedy</th>
<th>Ronald Reagan</th>
<th>Barack Obama</th>
<th>Gerald Ford</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Speech 1</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>11.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speech 2</td>
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<td>7.1</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>5.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speech 3</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>7.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speech 4</td>
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<td>4.3</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>5.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speech 5</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>14.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speech 6</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall mean</td>
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<td>6.1</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>8.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Range</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>9.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1. Analysis of adverbial intensifiers in the speeches of 4 American presidents (units per 1000 words)
An interesting observation is that, regardless of the topic of the speech or the type of the audience, the mean scores of intensifying adverbs vary insignificantly in the speeches of charismatic presidents (see Table 1 and Figure 1).

For example, standard deviation of intensifying adverbs mean scores for the speeches of John F. Kennedy is 1, of Ronald Reagan – 1.6, of Barack Obama – 1.7. The respective index of Gerald Ford is 4. The range of the mean scores is 3.1 for Kennedy, 3.4 for Reagan and 4.4 for Obama. The range of respective scores in the speeches of Gerald Ford outnumbers those of charismatic presidents manifold and is measured at the level of 9.4. With this consistency in mind, we may conclude that in charismatic rhetoric the frequencies of intensifying adverbs do not depend on the context and are characteristic of particular communication style of a politician.

Though standard deviation of intensifying adverbs mean scores in the speeches of the charismatic presidents is rather low, it is possible to track the following pattern – the university commencement addresses contain the highest mean scores of the category. For instance, while addressing university students, John F. Kennedy uses adverbial intensifiers with the frequency of 8.1 units per 1000 words, Barack Obama – 10 units per 1000 words. The mean score of the category in the university address of non-charismatic Gerald Ford is even higher – 14.5 units per 1000 words. It may be explained with the need to establish an emotional contact with a younger audience, so the employment of adverbal intensifiers makes the speech more expressive.
Intense emotionality explanation is also supported with the fact that the highest scores of the category for Ronald Reagan are in his “Evil Empire” and “The Shuttle “Challenger” Disaster Address” – 7.7 units per 1000 words in both speeches.

Adverbial intensifiers contribute to the overall emotional expressiveness of the speech; they make it more emphatic and vocally attractive. Usually, adverbial intensifiers are especially accentuated, which creates pitch variability that is “positively related to dynamism and is generally thought to lead to positive favorability ratings” (DeGroot et al. 2011: 682). Pitch variability is a component of vocal attractiveness, which is “a relevant aspect of the leader prototype” (DeGroot et al. 2011: 681) and “a good predictor of leadership effectiveness behaviors” (DeGroot et al. 2011: 687). Nevertheless, the abuse of adverbial intensifiers by a politician reveals high levels of anxiety, so it is important to find a balance in the usage of this category.

In general, the findings prove Proposition 1, since the mean scores of intensifying adverbs in the speeches of charismatic presidents are similarly moderate. At the same time non-charismatic Gerald Ford has almost identical mean score of the category, so it cannot be regarded as a distinguishing category of charismatic versus non-charismatic rhetoric.

4.2. Use of expressions of feeling

Though expressions of feeling cannot be regarded as a sole and universal category on the basis of which the emotionality of a speaker may be evaluated, their frequencies in political communication still indicate the level of politician’s extraversion.

The category of feeling expressions required employment of CDA approach as the coder counted not only the cases when president directly describes his personal feelings (see, for example, (4)), but also the cases when he speaks about the feelings of Americans as a nation and America as a state, thus implying that as president of the country and as a representative of his nation he shares the feelings with his compatriots (see, for example, (5), (6) and (7)):

(4) I’ve always had great faith in and respect for our space program (Reagan, “The Shuttle “Challenger” Disaster Address”).
(5) What we have already achieved gives us hope – the audacity to hope – for what we can and must achieve tomorrow (Obama, “A More Perfect Union”).
(6) The torch has been passed to a new generation of Americans […] proud of our ancient heritage, and unwilling to witness or permit the slow undoing of those human rights to which this nation has always been committed, and to which we are committed today at home and around the world (Kennedy, “Inaugural Address”).
(7) The United States gladly subscribes to this document because we subscribe to every one of these principles (Ford, “Helsinki Address”).
The mean scores of expressions of feeling are the following: John F. Kennedy – 10.3, Ronald Reagan – 7.7 and Barack Obama – 8.8. Non-charismatic Gerald Ford has similar overall mean score of the category – 9.1 per 1000 words (see Table 2).

Table 2. Analysis of feeling expressions in the speeches of 4 American presidents (units per 1000 words)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>John Kennedy</th>
<th>Ronald Reagan</th>
<th>Barack Obama</th>
<th>Gerald Ford</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Speech 1</td>
<td>16.6</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>17.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speech 2</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>8.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speech 3</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>7.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speech 4</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>8.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speech 5</td>
<td>14.2</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>11.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speech 6</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>21.5</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall mean score</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>9.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Std. Deviation</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Range</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>19.9</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>16.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The difference of overall mean scores of feeling expressions between Kennedy and Reagan should not be perceived as an indicator of extraversion/introversion division. First of all, expressions of feeling are not the only category of analysis associated with emotional expressiveness and extraversion. Secondly, the aforementioned difference is rather small. Thirdly, Winter et al. (1998: 238) acknowledge that, though both Reagan and Kennedy are extraverts, their motivational profiles are significantly different. For John F. Kennedy extraversion is combined with high affiliation motive, which results in unconflicted pursuit of wide-ranging interpersonal relationships, while extroverted Ronald Reagan has low affiliation motive, meaning that he is well-regarded and adept at interpersonal relations, but not dependent on them (Winter et al. 1998: 238).

The results also demonstrate that, while the adverbial intensifiers appear to be a sort of constant in a politician’s communication style, the variance of expressions of feeling is immense throughout the speeches (see Table 2 and Figure 2, below).

For instance, the index of standard deviation is 4.9 for John F. Kennedy and 3.7 for Barack Obama, while the respective figure for Ronald Reagan is even higher – 7.2. The mean scores of expressions of feeling in the political speeches of non-charismatic Gerald Ford are characterized with a similar standard deviation – 5.5. The range of mean scores is significant for all the four presidents under study: Kennedy – 12.1, Reagan – 19.9, Barack Obama – 10, and Gerald Ford – 16.6.
John F. Kennedy has the highest score of expressions of feeling in his “Inaugural Address” (16.6) and “American University Commencement Address” (14.2) whereas the lowest scores on this category are in “Civil Right Address” (4.5) and “Cuban Missile Crisis Address” (6.1). The latter may be explained with the assumption that in times of severe crisis people expect their leader to be cool-headed and strong-willed and base his decisions on pure rationality.

Though Weintraub (2003: 145) describes Ronald Reagan as the person possessing “cool, unflappable speaking style […] which] was due, in part, to his infrequent use of expressions of feeling”, out of 24 speeches under study the highest score of expressions of feeling is in Reagan’s “Shuttle “Challenger” Disaster Address” – 21.5:

(8) Nancy and I are pained to core by the tragedy of the shuttle Challenger (Reagan, “Shuttle “Challenger” Disaster Address”).
(9) We know of your anguish. We share it (Reagan, “Shuttle “Challenger” Disaster Address”).

Frequent use of the feelings category may be interpreted as an endeavor to unite the nation at the moment of national tragedy and to express empathy to the people who lost their relatives. In the case of Ronald Reagan the effect from abundant use of expressions of feeling is amplified, taking into account emotionally reserved speaking style of the politician, which becomes evident after Diagram 2 analysis. If
disregard Reagan’s emotional “outburst” in “Shuttle “Challenger” Disaster Address”, the frequency of expressions of feeling in his speeches is considerably lower than that of other two charismatic presidents and Gerald Ford.

Out of the three charismatic presidents Ronald Reagan also has the lowest score of expressions of feeling – 1.6 in “40th Anniversary of D-Day Address”. This speech was delivered during presidential trip abroad, so it was not essential for Reagan to establish an emotional bond with his audience as he focused on the feelings of the veterans that were standing in front of him, but not on his own emotions.

Barack Obama used expressions of feeling most frequently in his “Inaugural Address” (15) and “Commencement Address at the University of Notre Dame” (11.1), while the lowest score in this category is in “Nobel Prize for Peace Acceptance Speech” (4.6). Similarly, Gerald Ford has the highest score of expressions of feeling in “The Remarks on Taking the Oath of Office as President” (17.6) and in “Commencement Address at Chicago State University” (11.9). Ford’s “1975 State of the Union Address” has the lowest frequency of the category – 1 per 1000 words, which may be partially explained with a rather routine nature of this kind of presidential speeches.

It should be mentioned that for all the four presidents the inaugurals contain relatively high scores of feeling expressions (John F. Kennedy – 16.6, Ronald Reagan – 9.4, Barack Obama – 15, Gerald Ford – 17.6). A possible explanation of this regularity may be that an inaugural is the first speech delivered by a politician in a new position of a national leader, so the emotional upheaval president experiences cannot be disguised and finds its manifestation in his communication style.

It is also possible to track certain pattern in the use of expressions of feeling in the university commencement addresses. Due to the fact that these speeches are delivered in front of a specific target audience – students and graduates, for whom emotional appeal often overshadows the pragmatic content of the speeches – frequent use of expressions of feeling facilitates establishing connection between politician and younger followers. That is why the commencement addresses under study have the second highest frequencies of expressions of feeling after the inaugural speeches – John F. Kennedy (14.2), Barack Obama (11.1), Gerald Ford (11.9).

Another observation concerns the variance of frequencies in the category of feeling expressions. Though all the three charismatic presidents have somewhat similar overall average scores on this category, throughout the speeches the frequencies vary greatly. Thus, it may be concluded that the use of this category is context-bound, which makes it difficult to draw general assumptions about the leader’s personality. Besides, there is no significant difference in the use of the category by charismatic presidents and Gerald Ford. In general, the findings do not prove Proposition 2, according to which the speeches of charismatic presidents contain equally moderate scores of expressions of feeling, since the overall mean
score of the category in the speeches of John F. Kennedy is higher than the scores of other three presidents under study.

4.3 Use of qualifiers

In contrast to intensifying adverbs, qualifiers are used to de-intensify the statement, make it more vague and uncertain. In linguistic literature these units are also referred to as hedge words or fuzzy concepts (Lakoff 1973). Fraser (2010: 22) defines hedging as "a rhetorical strategy, by which a speaker, using a linguistic device, can signal a lack of commitment to either the full semantic membership of an expression (propositional hedging), or the full commitment to the force of the speech act being conveyed (speech act hedging)".

Hedging may be used for a variety of reasons. First of all, it prevents speaker from sounding impolite, offensive or arrogant (Fraser 2010: 30). Besides, hedging may be employed when a speaker does not know the exact details, when he wants to avoid full responsibility for his words or when his aim is to avoid direct answer to an unpleasant question (Fraser 2010: 26). Moreover, it may be used to create an informal atmosphere or establish rapport with a stranger, to imply shared knowledge or appear conciliatory in order to appease opposition (Fraser 2010: 26, 31-32). Finally, deliberate hedging may be interpreted as the strategy to conceal the truth or convey the powerlessness and elicit sympathy (Fraser 2010: 32).

Since the interpretation of hedging highly depends on the communicative context, it is difficult to create clear-cut lists of hedge words (Fraser 2010: 23). Lakoff compiled a list of about 70 hedge constructions, having included very, particularly, especially, really and some other words, which are used for reinforcement (Lakoff 1973: 472). At present the notion of reinforcement is excluded from general understanding of hedging concept (Fraser 2010: 22).

Though hedges and qualifiers often fulfill the same pragmatic functions and include the same linguistic units, linguists treat phenomenon of hedging more broadly than qualifying is defined by Weintraub. For instance, examples of hedges also encompass impersonal pronouns (one, it), tag questions, agentless passive, concessive conjunctions (whereas, even if) etc.

There are some contradictions as for which units should fall into the category of qualifiers even among scholars, who treat qualifying separately from hedging. For example, Jeong (2005: 6) enumerates but, if, may/might, I think, often, probably, and though as the seven most commonly used qualifiers. Here the discrepancy arises as, according to Weintraub, but is the most commonly used retractor (also called adversative expression) (Weintraub 2003: 144). Inclusion of if, though and often into the category of qualifiers also would contradict Weintraub’s (2003) definition of qualifiers.

In this research Weintraub’s approach to defining qualifiers is used. Among the most commonly used qualifiers in the study there are modal verbs may/might, phrases with the pronoun some, use of should in if-clause, epistemic verbs (appear, seem), modal adverbs (perhaps, probably), modal adjectives (possible, probable), adverbs (nearly, almost), construction I think:
For while this year it may be a Catholic against whom the finger of suspicion is pointed, in other years it has been – and may someday be again – a Jew, or a Quaker, or a Unitarian, or a Baptist (Kennedy, “Houston Ministerial Association Address”).

If I should lose on the real issues, I shall return to my seat in the Senate (Kennedy, “Houston Ministerial Association Address”).

Perhaps some of you read recently about the Lubbock school case (Reagan, “The Evil Empire”).

I think I understand how Abraham Lincoln felt (Reagan, “The Evil Empire”).

It would seem that someplace there must be some overhead (Reagan, “A Time for Choosing”).

[…] that includes nearly 7 million American Muslims in our country today (Obama, “A New Beginning”).

While low scores of qualifiers are negatively related to speaker’s anxiety, they also positively influence the perceptions of leader’s decisiveness. The current study demonstrates that the scores of this category for the three charismatic American presidents are identical: John F. Kennedy – 6.5, Ronald Reagan – 6.1, Barack Obama – 6.5 (see Table 3 and Figure 3, below).

Table 3. Analysis of qualifiers in the speeches of 4 American presidents (units per 1000 words)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Speech</th>
<th>John Kennedy</th>
<th>Ronald Reagan</th>
<th>Barack Obama</th>
<th>Gerald Ford</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>2</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>2.4</td>
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<td>Range</td>
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<td>5.3</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Gerald Ford uses qualifiers less frequently – his overall mean score is 3.8. While the charismatic presidents were expected to have lower scores of qualifiers, the results show that these scores may be regarded as moderate ones. It means that Proposition 3 is not supported in this research.

There may be two possible explanations of Ford’s scoring less than charismatic presidents on the category of qualifiers. First of all, extremely low amount of qualifiers indicates a rigidity of a political leader and significantly decreases space for verbal maneuvering. Secondly, though Gerald Ford is not regarded as a charismatic politician, he may still possess such personality trait as decisiveness.
It should be mentioned that under stress people tend to use qualifiers more frequently, so prepared speeches, which are the subject of the current research, are supposed to contain relatively low scores of this category. John F. Kennedy has the lowest scores of qualifiers in “Inaugural Address” (3.6) and in “Cuban Missile Crisis Address” (2.4) (see Table 3 and Diagram 3). The lowest score for Ronald Reagan is in his first “Inaugural Address” as well – 2.4 per 1000 words. Barack Obama uses qualifiers the least frequently in his “Inaugural Address” (4.5) and in “A New Beginning” speech, delivered at Cairo University (3.5).

Figure 3. Frequencies (axis 0Y) of qualifiers in different speech sets (axis 0X)

As an inaugural address is the first speech delivered by a president in the office, low scores of qualifiers in the inaugurals are explained with the president’s need to position himself as a strong leader, who is confident in every word he utters, is ready to take decisive actions and has a clear vision of the policies he is to pursue. The same logic applies when political leaders need to deal with crisis situations which bear considerable threat to national security as it was the case with Cuban Missile Crisis.

Gerald Ford follows similar pattern in the infrequent use of qualifiers. His “Inaugural Address” does not have any qualifier, whereas second lowest result of the category is in “Helsinki Address before the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe” – 1.8 units per 1000 words. The highest mean scores of qualifiers are in Kennedy’s “Houston Ministerial Association Speech” (13.6), in Reagan’s “Shuttle “Challenger” Tragedy Address” (7.7) and in Obama’s “Nobel Prize for Peace Acceptance Speech” (8.9). High qualifiers scores in the speeches
Delivered in the times when politicians were not yet elected as presidents (13.6 – John F. Kennedy, 7.1 – Ronald Reagan, 8.7 – Barack Obama) demonstrate lower decisiveness levels of politicians while running as candidates. It goes in line with Williams et al.’s (2009: 81) claim that “for the incumbent, decisiveness and attributed charisma share considerable variance in follower evaluations […] whereas for challengers […] decisiveness and charisma may still be relatively separate cognitive categorizations”.

The highest level of qualifiers for Gerald Ford is in his “Commencement Address at Chicago State University” – 9.3. Obama’s “Commencement Address at the University of Notre Dame” also contains rather high score of qualifiers – 8.3, whereas the use of the category in Kennedy’s “American University Commencement Address” is lower – 5.5.

In general, the use of qualifiers/hedges permits a proposition to be recognized as an opinion instead of a clear affirmation, thus offering room for negotiation and discussion (Vázquez & Giner 2008: 174). It contributes to flexibility of communicative style of politicians. The research proves that the speeches of charismatic leaders contain similar scores of qualifiers. Low to moderate use of qualifiers allows charismatic politicians to be perceived as decisive leaders, at the same time leaving enough room for debating and reconsideration of previously made statements. Nevertheless, qualifiers fulfill an important pragmatic function as a rhetorical strategy. Their total elimination or extremely low scores in political speeches will be counterproductive as it will result in a categorical and rigid image of a politician, while not compensating it by increased perceptions of decisiveness. The scores of qualifiers tend to be low in the inaugural addresses and in the speeches which deal with security threats for the country. At the same time, candidate speeches of charismatic leaders are likely to contain high scores of the category.

5. Conclusions, limitations and avenues for the future research

Perceptions of politicians’ charisma depend on their ability to motivate potential followers, to unite them around a common vision and to instill confidence that with joint efforts the mission may be achieved. A bond between a leader and followers is established, not in the last place, through the use of certain communication patterns.

The present research demonstrates that skillful use of emotionally charged categories plays an important role in political discourse. Politicians need to learn how to balance the content of their speeches emotion-wise so that the target audience perceives them as confident and emotionally stable personalities while their speeches remain dynamic, appealing to the public, and efficient in transmitting the overall mood and more subtle emotional cues to the potential followers. The need to strike a balance in the use of emotional categories explains
why most of the speeches under study contain moderate mean scores of intensifying adverbs, expressions of feeling and qualifiers.

The American presidents under study have similar scores of adverbial intensifiers, but charismatic presidents tend to employ the category more consistently than non-charismatic Gerald Ford. Though the mean scores of feeling expressions are similar for all the four presidents in absolute terms, it is possible to notice a difference in the use of the category by John F. Kennedy and Ronald Reagan. Moreover, the mean scores of the category vary significantly, depending on the type of the audience or the topic of the speech, which proves that politicians need to be flexible in their employment of emotional categories. The mean scores of qualifiers are identically moderate in the speeches of charismatic presidents, while the respective score of Gerald Ford is much lower. Low scores of the category are positively associated with decisiveness, but a positive aspect of moderate employment of qualifiers is that they also provide additional space for verbal maneuvering.

All in all, political leaders and their speech-writers should carefully craft their speeches in terms of emotional content and that the present research may be used to develop certain speech-writing recommendations. A positive development in the sphere would be to verify whether there exists cause-and-effect connection between specific scores of emotional categories and public perceptions of speakers’ extraversion, emotional stability and decisiveness. Another way to improve the research is to involve more coders so that the role of coder’s bias is diminished. Besides, the use of spontaneous speech samples of politicians as well as additional focus on the role of non-verbal communication in emotional expressiveness may provide us with a more profound insight into politicians’ personalities.

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A corpus-based look at zero correspondences
Realizations of epistemicity in a cross-linguistic perspective

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Abstract
An extensive amount of authentic language data in contrast and ample collective intuition are only a few points of advantage to be mentioned that parallel translation corpora can offer to those interested or involved in contrastive linguistic or translation studies research. Types and degrees of equivalence between various linguistic expressions in different languages is another aspect that can be viewed as a matter of concern and interest both for linguists and translators. Corpus-driven contrastive methodology has already been proved to be an efficient and reliable tool capable of diagnosing the language-specific multifunctionality of various non-propositional linguistic items (discourse markers, modal expressions, etc.). Most of the research carried out has been mainly concerned with a bilingual contrast (Aijmer 1996, 1997; Løken 1997; Johansson 2001, 2007; Aijmer & Altenberg 2002; Aijmer & Simon-Vandenbergen 2003; Hasselgård 2004, 2007; Ebeling, Ebeling & Hasselgård 2013) and one of the key observations made was the relatively high percentage of zero correspondences. The present paper will deal with the data collected from four groups of languages: Germanic, Baltic, Slavonic and Romance. The focus will be on the English verb seem, a so-called broad spectrum epistemic-evidential marker which can also have an interpersonal function (Johansson 2001; de Haan 2007; Grisborne & Holmes 2007; Aijmer 2009), and its zero-translation correspondences in the target languages under study. No evaluation or assessment of the translation quality and translators’ strategies will be made; translations are used as empirical data for a cross-linguistic study of language in use.

1. Introduction

Zero-translation correspondence ((Ø)-correspondence) of various non-propositional linguistic items (discourse markers, modal expressions) across languages is not a new issue in linguistics. The lack of formal correspondence in translations of various epistemic expressions from English into Swedish was observed by Aijmer (1996, 1997, 2007), from English into Norwegian (Løken 1997; Johansson 2001; Hasselgård 2004, 2007), from English into French (Defour et al. 2010; Simon-Vandenbergen & Willems 2011), from English into Portuguese
(Ebeling 2007), from Swedish into English and English into Swedish (Aijmer & Altenberg 2002) and from English into Lithuanian (Usonienė & Šolienė 2010). Zero-correspondences have been found both in the target language (TL) and in the source language (SL) (Løken 1997; Aijmer & Simon-Vandenbergen 2004; Johansson 2007; Ebeling 2007; Ebeling, Ebeling & Hasselgård 2013).

Zero correspondence in the present paper will be regarded as the cases in a TL with no linguistic expression found that could convey information coded by the expression under study. Compare the following matches found for the English verb seem in the following example:

(1) EN_{orig} "... but she still seems to think you're going to be expelled ...".
LT_{trans} "... bet ji vis tiek Ø įsitikinusi ['is convinced'], kad jūs būsite pašalinti."
PL_{trans} "... ale ona wciąż Ø myśli ['thinks'], że was wyrzucą ...".
RU_{trans} "... no ona vs'o ravno Ø boitsja ['is afraid'], čto vas isključ'at ...
ES_{trans} "... pero ella todavía Ø cree ['thinks/believes'] que te van a expulsar.

As can be seen in the given example, the English mental verb think has a translation correspondence in the four languages illustrated, however seem is lost in translation. Thus, Ø-correspondence equals absolute omission both in terms of form and content (with no compensation), which is seen as absence of a target correspondence in translation. This is the first type of Ø-correspondence, namely TL-Ø. The second type of Ø-correspondence is SL-Ø, which is the insertion of a certain expression in TL when there is no corresponding expression in SL. Compare the following examples where the English original contains an idiomatic expression and no verbs of seeming/thinking, while the translations have a seem/think cognate:

(2) EN_{orig} "Muggles do know more than we give them credit for, don't they?"
LT_{trans} – Žiobarai tikrai ne tokie kvaili, kaip mums atrodo ['seems to us'], tiesa?
PL_{trans} Ci mugole chyba potrafią więcej, ni nam się wydaje ['seems to us'].
RU_{trans} – Požaluj, mugli umejut pobol’še, čem my dumaem ['we think'], pravda?

The meaning of give somebody credit for has been compensated to a certain extent by seeming and thinking verbs.

Non-zero translation correspondence is a fairly broad category which is very much dependent upon the categorial status of a linguistic expression. In the case of multifunctional expressions with non-propositional meaning, one cannot expect
cognates as the only translation correspondence even if they exist. There will always be a choice between expressions which belong to the same semantic functional class. In the present analysis, it is expressions of epistemicity (Boye 2012), therefore cross-linguistically we can expect a broad variation of stance markers (epistemic and evidential adverbials, raising verbs, complement taking predicates, etc.). In the following examples, the SL evidential adverbial obviously is not considered to have Ø-correspondence in the five TLs:

(3) **EN** orig “Busy time at the Ministry, I hear,” said Mr. Malfoy. “All those raids ... I hope they’re paying you overtime?” He reached into Ginny’s cauldron and extracted, from amid the glossy Lockhart books, a very old, very battered copy of “A Beginner’s Guide to Transfiguration”. “**Obviously not.**” Mr. Malfoy said. “Dear me, what’s the use of being a disgrace to the name of wizard if they don’t even pay you well for it?”

**LT** trans (...) – Atrodo ['it seems/apparently'], ne, – nusprendė.

**PL** trans (...) Jak widać ['as (can be) seen'], chyba ['probably'] nie – oznajmil.

**RU** trans (...) Tak i dumal ['so I thought'] – nie plat’at, – konstatiroval mister Malfoi.

**ES** trans (...) Es evidente ['it is evident'] que no – rectificó.

**FR** trans (...) Apparemment ['apparently'] pas, dit-il.

All the expressions in the five TLs contain nearly the same epistemic qualification and they are regarded as translation correspondences of the SL *obviously*. They are all indirect evidentials and the source of information is inference based on conceptual knowledge.

All the linguists who come across the Ø-correspondence phenomenon try to find a reason which could explain the given kind of gap. As a rule mention is made of the following factors:

a. language-specific conventions and collocations or idiomatic language expressions (Aijmer & Altenberg 2002: 38; Hasselgård 2004).

b. desemanticization of linguistic expressions (meaning bleaching) when they undergo grammaticalization or pragmatization (Johansson 2001: 243; Aijmer 2007: 54). Consequently conceptual meaning bleaching in this case implies acquisition of grammatical or pragmatic functions, which means that purely functional correspondences might be expected in a target language.

c. redundancy or overuse of various discourse markers or epistemic-evidential markers in SL (usually English) leads to a certain reduction of expressions in TL because there might be other functional clues in the
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context (Aijmer 2007: 50) or because they “do not add anything to its propositional content” (Aijmer & Altenberg 2002: 33).
d. discourse markers with procedural meaning are helpful but dispensable elements in the context (Aijmer 2007: 51).
f. a kind of compensation for Ø-correspondence might be provided in the surrounding context (Johansson 2001: 238-241; Hasselgård 2004). Within this perspective it seems relevant to explore the role of extended context and its importance for the compensation of the meaning of seem which may appear to be lost within the boundaries of one sentence in translation.

The purpose of the present analysis is to check the validity of the claims made, i.e. to find out whether our cross-linguistic data can offer evidence which could support or reject the factors observed by many linguists. For this purpose the contrastive analysis will focus on the multi-faceted English verb seem and its translation correspondences in Baltic, Slavonic and Romance languages. The English verb seem is notorious both for the broad range of functions it develops (from evidential (de Haan 2007; Gisborne & Holmes 2007; Aijmer 2009; Cornillie 2009) to epistemic (Usonienė 2000), and to hedging (Hyland 1998; Varttala 2001) and for its high percentage of zero-correspondences in a cross-linguistic perspective: English – Norwegian (Johansson 2001) and English – Swedish (Aijmer 2009). Both studies have yielded similar results regarding its zero correspondences: 11% of zero correspondences in English - Swedish translations (Aijmer 2009) and 13% in English - Norwegian translations (Johansson 2001). Our cross-linguistic study presents the zero correspondences of the verb seem in translations from English into Lithuanian (LT), Polish (PL), Russian (RU), Spanish (ES) and randomly French (F) and German (DE). The seven language data contrasted belong to four language groups: Germanic, Baltic, Slavonic and Romance languages.

As repeatedly claimed by researchers into the questions of multifunctionality (cf. Aijmer & Simon-Vandenbergen 2004, Aijmer et al. 2006), more empirical studies in different languages are needed, as insights from several languages can help to reveal the semantic and functional potential of a particular linguistic item. Thus the method employed is a corpus-based contrastive analysis.

A contrastive analysis based on multilingual translation corpora employed in many cross-linguistic studies not only helps decode the semantics of linguistic items in source and target languages, but also reveals cross-linguistic differences and similarities on lexical, syntactic grammatical and conceptual levels (cf. Aijmer 2001, 2007; Simon-Vandenbergen & Aijmer 2002; Aijmer & Simon-Vandenbergen 2003; van der Auwera, Schalley & Nuyts 2005). “Translation paradigms” (Aijmer 2007) composed of correspondences of the source items found
A corpus-based look at zero correspondences

in the target text help define complex and multidimensional semantic-pragmatic profiles of those linguistic units, the semantics of which is not easily interpretable within the limits of one language or within the introspection of one linguist. In this respect multilingual translation corpora prove to be a very useful resource for the linguist as “the texts produced by translators can be treated as a collection of informants’ judgements” (Noël 2002: 158).

2. Data and method

A special parallel one-direction corpus of the second book in the Harry Potter series by J.K. Rowling, *Harry Potter and the Chamber of Secrets*, and its translations into Lithuanian, Russian, Polish and Spanish, has been compiled for this study. Quantitative and qualitative analysis was carried out to find out frequencies and look for an explanation for the cases of Ø-correspondences. The size of the corpus is roughly 400,000 words (see Table 1).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>HP2 corpus</th>
<th>Number of words</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>English original (EN&lt;sub&gt;orig&lt;/sub&gt;)</td>
<td>86,102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuanian translation (LT&lt;sub&gt;trans&lt;/sub&gt;)</td>
<td>63,996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polish translation (PL&lt;sub&gt;trans&lt;/sub&gt;)</td>
<td>77,051</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian translation (RU&lt;sub&gt;trans&lt;/sub&gt;)</td>
<td>77,534</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spanish translation (ES&lt;sub&gt;trans&lt;/sub&gt;)</td>
<td>92,228</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Though occasional references are also made to the French and German translations of the book, they were not subjected to a detailed analysis. We are aware of the limitations that inevitably appear when the analysis is based on books translated by only one translator in each language. It is, of course, possible that in such cases some of the translation correspondences could be the result of the translator’s idiosyncratic choices or mistakes. However, the focus of the present paper is on the cases when more than one translator has chosen to omit *seem* in the target language; hence the omission can hardly be ascribed to translation idiosyncrasies alone.

The text in the original was automatically searched for all affirmative and negative cases of the verb *seem* (except *seemingly* and *seeming*). The corresponding sentences were manually traced in all target texts and the extended context was analysed in order to identify translation correspondences of all *seem* cases.

3. Findings and discussion
The total number of seem cases in the HP2 was 95. There is a certain variation in the number of zero correspondences of seem between the languages. The highest number of omissions has been noted in the Russian language (60%). The translator into Lithuanian omitted seem in 56% of all seem cases, whereas the percentage of seem omission in Polish and Spanish is 47% and 31% respectively. A relatively high percentage of seem omissions (24%) in Lithuanian translations has already been noted in a previous study (Usonienė & Šinkūnienė 2013) based on a large bidirectional translation corpus of 1,572,498 words and composed of texts translated by 8 translators. The same study reports the results of a pilot analysis of Lithuanian, Russian and Polish translations of seem in the first book in the Harry Potter series, with an equally high percentage of seem omissions in all three languages (LT – 38%, RU - 34%, PL - 44%). This suggests that Ø-translation correspondences are by no means a rare or accidental phenomenon in the case of the choice of translation correspondences for the English verb seem.

All in all, there are 10 cases (11% of all seem translations) when seem is omitted in all four target languages in the HP2. Further on we will focus our analysis mostly on those 10 instances of seem zero-correspondences.

As could already be seen in (2), one of the reasons for seem omission in translations into the four languages are idiomatic and figurative expressions that are difficult to render into another language. Consider one more example of this type of seem omission in (4):

(4) EN<sub>orig</sub> Saturday afternoon seemed to melt away, and in what seemed like no time, it was five minutes to eight, and Harry was dragging his feet along the second-floor corridor to Lockhart’s office.

LT<sub>trans</sub> Šeštadienis Ø tirpte ištirpo, ir Ø štai jau be penkių minučių aštuočios.

Literal: ‘Saturday has [‘meltingly’] melted away and now it is already five minutes to eight.’

PL<sub>trans</sub> Sobotnie popołudnie Ø mijał o szybko i zanim się spostrzegli, Ø była za pięć ósma.

Literal: ‘Saturday afternoon was moving away quickly and before they noticed, it was five minutes to eight.’

RU<sub>trans</sub> Ostatok subbotnego dnja Ø isparilsja neizvestno kuda, i čerez ničtožnyj, kak pokazalos’, promežutok vremeni bylo uže bez pjati vosem’.

Literal: ‘The rest of Saturday vanished somewhere and in a trivial, as it seemed, period of time it was five minutes to eight.’

ES<sub>trans</sub> La tarde del sábado Ø pasó en un santiamén, y antes de que se dieran cuenta, Ø eran las ocho menos cinco.

Literal: ‘Saturday afternoon passed in a flash/in the blink of an eye and before they realized it, it was five to eight’
The first occurrence of *seem* in (4) contributes to the description of time rapidly flying away, which is created by *melt away*, and in spite of the fact that *seem* is lost in all four target languages, all the language-specific correspondences have managed to preserve the feel of vanishing time with the help of various language-specific expressions (e.g. LT<sub>trans</sub> *tirpte ištirpo* ‘meltingly melted away’; ES<sub>trans</sub> *pasó en un santiamén* ‘passed in a flash/in the blink of an eye’).

Another reason for Ø-correspondence which has been already observed by linguists in previous research is the so called “doubling of function” (Aijmer & Simon-Vandenbergen 2003: 1153) when the meaning of the omitted SL expression in one way or another is conveyed by other lexical or grammatical expressions, thus rendering *seem* redundant in the target text. (5) is an example of functional blending, when the marker of comparison *like* in the source language creates the atmosphere of an unreal impression which in several target languages is conveyed with the help of *seem* cognates, namely *wydawać się* in Polish and *parecer* in Spanish), whereas in Russian and Lithuanian, the translation correspondences are epistemic comparative markers ‘as if/like’. The continuation of the description of the subjective impression of the experiencer in the SL is coded by means of the verb *seem*, but the translators have chosen not to use any epistemic evidential markers in the four TLs to modify the proposition – apparently, the impression described as that of being in a furnace was considered strong enough. At the same time the perceptual situation seems to be factual enough not to trigger any doubts about its veracity. The combination of these factors may have resulted in the replacement of *seem* with *was* in all four languages, e.g.:

(5) EN<sub>orig</sub> Harry stepped in, his head almost touching the sloping ceiling, and blinked. *It was like* walking into a furnace: nearly everything in Ron’s room *seemed to be* a violent shade of orange: the bedspread, the walls, even the ceiling.


PL<sub>trans</sub> Harry wszedł do środka, prawie dotykająca głową pochylęego sufitu, i gwałtownie zamrugał. *Wydawało mu się* [‘seemed to him’], że wszedł do pieca – niemal wszystko Ø *było* [‘was’] tu pomarańczowe: narzuta na łóżku, ściany, nawet sufit.

RU<sub>trans</sub> Garri в кошель, почт касаюсь го лежаного наклонного потолка, и заморгал. On *kak bydlo* [‘as if’] вкощ в пекку: почт всъ в комната Rona Ø *bylo* [‘was’] bezumnovo oranževogo cveta – pokryvalo na krovati, steny, daże potolok.
When Harry entered, with his head almost touching the sloped ceiling, he had to close his eyes for an instant. It seemed to him that he was entering an oven, because almost everything in the room was intensely orange: the quilt, the walls, even the ceiling.

The French translation follows the same pattern of *seem* omission with only the first indicator of the subjective impression being present:

(6) Ftrans  
*Il avait l’impression d’avoir pénétré dans une fournaise: presque tout, dans la chambre de Ron, Θ avait [‘had’] une couleur orange clair: le couvre-lit, les murs, et même le plafond.*

Johansson’s study of Norwegian translations of *seem* show a similar pattern of doubling of function when *seem* occurs with mental verbs in the adjacent surroundings of the expressions analyzed in the context (Johansson 2001: 239) thus creating a semantic merge. The same pattern has been observed in our data as in (7):

(7) ENorig  
*Yes, I think, Dumbledore might have guessed... Dumbledore never seemed to like me as much as the other teachers did...*

PLtrans  
*Tak, myślę, że Dumbledore coś podejrzewał. Byłem ulubieńcem wszystkich nauczycieli, tylko on jeden nigdy mnie Θ nie lubił.*

RUtrans  
*Да, думай, Думблдор догадывался... Думблдор никогда не любил меня так, как все остальные учители...*

EStrans  
*Sí, creo que Dumbledore podría haberlo adivinado. A Dumbledore nunca Θ le gustó tanto como a los otros profesores...*

LTtrans  
*Taip, Dumbldoras, ko gera, atspejo. Jis niekad manęs Θ nemėgo taip, kaip kitą mokytojai...*  
**Literal:** ‘Yes, possibly, Dumbledore has guessed... He has never liked me the same way as other teachers have...’

In Polish, Russian and Spanish translations, *think* has been preserved in the first sentence, but *seem* has been omitted in the second sentence as it is the continuation of the subjective opinion of the speaker which has already been coded by the mental verb *think* and the use of an extra marker therefore seems to be redundant. The Lithuanian translation is slightly different as the tentativeness of both sentences is conveyed by means of an epistemic adverbial *ko gera* ‘possibly’. In this case both verbs are lost, yet a strong overtone of epistemic qualification has been preserved. Thus, omission of a correspondence in the TL will be referred to as Θ-target correspondence.

It seems worthwhile looking at a similar case of Θ-correspondence found in the SL, i.e. Θ-source correspondence which is illustrated in (8):
(8) **EN**<sub>orig</sub>  
*Harry! I think* Myrtle’s grown fond of you!  
**PL**<sub>trans</sub>  
*Harry! Coś mi się wydaje* [‘to me it seems’], że Marta się w tobie zakochała!  
**LT**<sub>trans</sub>  
*Hari, man rodos* [‘to me it seems’], *Mirta tave įsižiūrėjo!*  
**RU**<sub>trans</sub>  
*Kažėtsja* [‘it seems’], *Mirtl v teb’ja vljubilas’!  

As can be seen, the source correspondence of the target *seem*-cognate expressions in the three languages is the English *I think*. Other target *seem*-cognate expressions (Ø-source *seem* correspondences) in TLs are various markers of epistemicity: *might be, as though, going to, something* (marker of imprecision), *I guess/expect, etc.* These are the cases of Ø-source *seem* or the cases of the target *seem*-cognate insertion in translation, which makes up in total about 43% of all the correspondences in the concordance of the target Lithuanian *atrodo/rodos* ‘it seems’ and as many as 79% of the target Russian *kažėtsja* ‘it seems’. The English source *I think* makes up 24% of the correspondences of the target Lithuanian *atrodo/rodos* ‘it seems’ and 53% of the target Russian *kažėtsja* ‘it seems’. The choice between the two types of correspondences seems to be very much dependent upon language-specific preference in language use. All the languages under study have thinking and seeming verbs and both of them can be used to code speaker’s subjective opinion. However languages seem to differ in the frequency of realization of the potential available. It is not infrequent that the translators prefer seeming to thinking verbs in the TL.  

While mental verbs like *think* and *believe* frequently result in a semantic merge with *seem*, other perception verbs also appear to cause epistemic redundancy in translation. Though the correspondences of the source verbs *look* and *seem* in (9) demonstrate various translation strategies in TLs, each of the target correspondences results in a strong/less strong or weak reduction of epistemic qualification:

(9) **EN**<sub>orig</sub>  
Hermione emerged from between the bookshelves. *She looked irritable and at last seemed ready to talk to them.*  
**PL**<sub>trans</sub>  
Pomiędzy dwoma rzędami półek pojawiła się Hermiona. *Wyglądała na rozdrażnioną i w końcu Ø gotową do rozmowy z nimi.*  
**RU**<sub>trans</sub>  
Germiona vynyrnula otkuda-to iz-za polok. *Vid u nee byl razdražennyj, zato ona nakonec Ø soizvolila pogоворit’ s nimi.*  
**ES**<sub>trans</sub>  
Hermione surgió de entre las estanterías. *Parecía disgustada pero Ø dispuesta a hablarles por fin.*  
**LT**<sub>trans</sub>  
Iš tarpo tarp lentųų išlindo Hermiona. *Ø Buvo suirzusi ir bent kartą Ø nusiteikusi su jais šnektės.*
Literal: ‘Hermione emerged from between the bookshelves. She was irritable and at least once was ready to talk to them.’

In Polish, Russian and Spanish, only a correspondence for *look* is provided as an expression that combines both the meaning of *look* and *seem* in the target text. It codes the speaker’s judgement based on visual evidence. In Lithuanian, it is not possible to speak about any epistemic compensation in the context, as translation correspondences for both *look* and *seem* have been omitted in TL and the tentativeness of the visual impression has been lost.

Translation correspondences in (10) are another example of a unanimous choice of the four translators to omit *seem* when it appears in the immediate context of the verb *think*.

(10) EN<sub>orig</sub>  “That’s what I told Ginny,” said Percy fiercely, ‘but she still seems to think you’re going to be expelled, I’ve never seen her so upset, crying her eyes out <...>.

PL<sub>trans</sub>  To samo powiedziałem Ginny – oświadczył Percy – ale ona wciąż Ṁ myśli [‘thinks’], że was wyrzuca , jeszcze nigdy nie widziałem jej tak zrozpaczonej, oczy sobie wypłakuje.

RU<sub>trans</sub>  I imenno èto mne prishlo’ objasnèt’ Džinni, – voskilknul Persi s negodovaniem, — no ona vsë ravno Θ boïtsja [‘is afraid’], čto vas iskljuèat, ja èše nikogda ne vidìl ee takoj rasstroennoj, ona vse glaza vyplakala ...

ES<sub>trans</sub>  – Eso es lo que dije a Ginny – dijo Percy con contundencia –, pero ella todavía Θ cree [‘thinks/believes’], que te van a expulsar. No la he visto nunca tan afectada, llorando amargamente.

LT<sub>trans</sub>  Džinei aš taip ir sakiau, bet ji vis tiek Ο įsitikinusi, kad jūs bûsite pasalinti. Niekad nemačiau šitaip nusiminusios, greitai akis išverks.

Literal: ‘That’s what I told Ginny, but she is still convinced that you are going to be expelled. I’ve never seen her so upset, crying her eyes out.’

While *seem* in the original English sentence adds a tentative evidential epistemic dimension resulting from inference based on visual evidence, the translation correspondences present various interpretations of *seems to think*. In Polish and Spanish, both *seem* and *think* are blended into one *myśli* ‘thinks’ or *cree* ‘thinks/believes’, the Russian translator has chosen *boïtsja* ‘is afraid’ and in the Lithuanian translation we have the predicative participle *įsitikinusi* ‘is convinced’. All four translations lose the aspect of tentativeness, while the Russian and Lithuanian translations communicate an even stronger message as compared to the intended message in the original. Though it is tempting to ascribe such translation choices to a certain type of carelessness on the part of the translator, it might also be the result of differences in the conceptualisation of the situation. The existence
of clear evidence of Ginny’s distress (‘I’ve never seen her so upset, crying her eyes out’) may have resulted in the translators’ interpretation of the perceptual situation as factual, hence the omission of seem.

Alternatively, these choices could also be related to culture-specific pragmatic behaviour patterns such as hedging. Seem is frequently listed as a hedge especially in English academic discourse studies (Hyland 1998; Varttala 2001; Salager-Meyer 1997, inter alia). This is hardly surprising, as academic writing in English generally tends to be “cautious in making claims, with considerable use of mitigation and hedging” (Hyland 2011: 181). Contrastive research, mainly in the academic discourse field, has shown that many cultures do not hedge to the same extent as the Anglo-American native speakers (see, for example English-Serbian (Trbojević-Milosević 2010), English-Bulgarian (Vassileva 2001), English-Lithuanian (Šinkūnienė 2011), among others). Though hedging is mostly linked to the academic discourse context, Low claims that hedging or mitigation is generally a basic part of British culture (Low 1996: 23). It might therefore be expected that this cultural trait would also be reflected in literary fiction; however it might not be reflected in translations in accordance to cultural patterns of other languages. Example (11) which is a clear illustration of hedging intentions in the original sentence is rendered with no compensations for the tentativeness of the proposition into Lithuanian, Russian and Polish:

(11) EN<sub>orig</sub> I noticed, in my search of the park that considerable damage seems to have been done to a very valuable Whomping Willow.

       LT<sub>trans</sub> Apžiūrėdamas parką pamačiau, kad Ø padaryta didelė žala labai vertingam Gluosniui Galiūnui.

       PL<sub>trans</sub> Przeszukując park, zauważyłem, że bardzo cenna wierzba bijąca Ø została poważnie uszkodzona.

       RU<sub>trans</sub> Pri osmotre parka ja zamečili, čto značitel'nyj ušerb Ø byl nanesen ves'ma cennoj Drakučej ive.

       ES<sub>trans</sub> He percibido, en mi examen del parque, que un ejemplar muy valioso de sauce boxeador parece haber sufrido daños considerables.

It is only Spanish that uses a semantic cognate of seem in the translation. In his comparative study of English and Spanish research articles in the field of Clinical and Health Psychology, Martín-Martín (2008: 147) observes that hedging “is favoured by the writers in both languages [Spanish vs English], although a slightly higher tendency was reported in the English research papers”, thus it seems that hedging is not a very alien pragmatic strategy for the Spanish. So far as, for example, the German language is concerned, Salager-Meyer (2011: 36) observes that “research papers written in German and English by German authors <...> show a higher degree of hedging and of tentative affective statements than papers written in English by English-speaking writers”. It seems therefore that hedging is also not
a strategy that is avoided in the German language – the translation of (11) into German also preserves the tentative feel created with the help of scheint ‘seem’:

(12) \textsc{De}_{\text{trans}} \quad \text{Wie ich bei meinem Kontrollgang durch den Park feststellen mußte, scheint eine sehr wertvolle Peitschende Weide schwer beschädigt worden zu sein.}

In her cross-linguistic analysis of epistemic modality markers in English, Norwegian and French Vold (2006) concludes that the French use fewer of those markers compared to the two other cultures. Salager-Meyer et al. (2003: 232) quote Sionis (1997: 211) who refers to the “exaggerated self-confidence of French academics” and make the conclusion that this is the reason why they “sound arrogant to their Anglo-Saxon counterparts”. It might be not a coincidence that the clearly hedged context of (13) is left unmodified by the marker of tentativeness in the French translation:

(13) \textsc{Fr}_{\text{trans}} \quad \text{Au cours de mes recherches dans le parc, j’ai constaté qu’un saule cogneur d’une valeur inestimable \textit{a} avait subi des dommages considérables, poursuivit Rogue.}

Of course, these are only a few cross-cultural studies that have investigated fairly limited data, but the role of cultural impact on hedging transfer in translation might be worth examining in greater detail and with more data.

4. Concluding observations

The results of the analysis clearly demonstrate that in a cross-linguistic perspective, despite the same or similar potential of linguistic inventory in different languages, there does exist a great difference in what authentic language use reveals (cf. van der Auwera, Schalley & Nuyts 2005; Usonienė & Šoliienė 2010).

The present findings fully support some of the basic observations made by the scholars engaged in the parallel corpora-based studies. The cases of merge and blending discussed in the present analysis are in line with the claims made regarding the presence of “clues in the context” or language-specific expressions and conceptualisations, which explains the redundancy and reduction of seem in translations into other languages. Choice of expressions which are functionally similar and contextually close to seem may integrate seem itself either because they are semantically/ functionally overlapping with seem (e.g. \textit{I think}) or because a certain build-up of uncertainty and “saturation” of tentativeness seem to take place. Thus, the context adjacent to seem might play a crucial role in the translator’s choice of a particular linguistic item to compensate for the reduction of seem. The
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fact that there is an absolute overlap of Ø-seem correspondence cases in four different languages, which constitutes 11% of its translation concordances, can be used as evidence to support the viewpoint that omission of seem is not incompetence or an accidental whim of the translator.

The findings seem to be also indicative of culture specific patterns of pragmatic behaviour. Since seem frequently acts as a hedge, a high number of Ø-correspondences in the TLs could be the result of different hedging conventions. For language communities that are not so prone to hedging, certain perceptual situations may seem too factual to be modified by seem, which might be another reason for its omission.

Looking from a more general perspective, seem cognates in the languages analysed are not raising verbs and the range of their meaning shift is not identical across the languages studied. This only reconfirms that grammatical categories and functions do not have identical straightforward correspondences across languages.

The English verb seem, a broad spectrum marker of epistemicity, is a raising verb, thus it is more grammaticalised than its cognates in Lithuanian, Polish and Russian. In Spanish, as Bolinger observes the Spanish parecer ‘seem’ functions as an auxiliary in the constructions with the infinitive “Juan parece haber perdido el dinero” (Bolinger 1991: 38), which runs in parallel to the behaviour of the English verb seem (as a raising verb) both syntactically and semantically. Consequently the percentage of Ø-correspondence of the Spanish parecer ‘seem’ is 31%, which is much lower as compared to that in Baltic and Slavonic languages (~45%). More reliable results could be expected when using a larger corpus with more translations into various languages and translations made by a larger number of different translators.

Notes
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[English]

[French]

[German]

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Constructing stance by means of attribution
How is the ‘evaluative space’ filled in science popularizations in English?

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Abstract
This chapter presents a study on the relation between the introduction of authorial voices in science popularization articles and the construction of the journalists’ stance. Science popularizations are polyphonic texts which, similarly to other media genres, are typically constructed by relying on other voices apart from the journalist’s. When an external voice is being introduced in the text, there is a transition area between the voice which was speaking so far and the new voice. In this chapter it is claimed that this transition area functions as an evaluative space which can be potentially used by journalists to include their own stance towards the information presented. In order to support and illustrate this, we present an analysis of some of the elements in the evaluative spaces which are found when journalists introduce authorized sources by means of direct speech constructions in popularizations in the British press. Our results show that journalists of these texts construct their stance by two different means, either overtly through the use of reporting verbs and evaluative expressions, or covertly by blurring the boundaries between their voices and the voices from experts.

1. Introduction

If we wondered how people learn about science and scientific achievements once schooldays are left behind, we would conclude, as Hyland does (2010: 118), that most people access scientific knowledge through the media rather than through other types of information sources, including popular science books. Probably for this reason, nowadays daily newspapers have started to include, as they have been doing for ages with other special-topic sections such as economy or entertainment, specialized science sections where scientists or special journalists make scientific achievements public. These popularization articles are steadily increasing their production in the press and their evolution into this unprecedented visibility can be related to the view that popularizations are essential to fill what Calsamiglia and López Ferrero (2003: 147) have defined as “the traditional gap” between the scientific community and the lay people, thus acting as what Moirand (1997) considers a meeting point, or “la rencontre entre science et médias” or “modes
Thus, in doing so, science popularizations may be said to have a unique character within the wide range of genres that we can find in newspaper discourse.

This paper focuses on how popularizations construct stance along the narration of the scientific findings. Our aim is to see if there is a rhetorical construction of authorial stance that can be associated to the journalist’s introduction of speech attributed to external sources in this type of text in particular. The rationale here is that the introduction of an external voice requires some transition from the current voice (typically the journalist’s) to the new one, and that this transition can be defined as an evaluative space. In this respect, popularizations seem to present a fruitful potential because, as Hyland posits, journalism, politics, and media discourses “are likely to yield the richest crop of explicitly evaluative examples” (2005: 175). Therefore, we are interested in studying how external sources of attribution are introduced by science journalists in the text to see if (and how) they use the precedent evaluative space to contribute to the construction of argument. We will argue that journalists construct stance in those evaluative spaces by two combined means, namely by (either covertly or overtly) evaluating the situation expressed by the external source (the attributee of the information signalled as reported), and also by covertly blurring the boundaries between his/her voice and the attributee’s voice so that the readers cannot establish clearly who is speaking. In order to support and illustrate this, we present an analysis of the features of the evaluative space opening when journalists introduce other people’s voices by means of direct speech (re)presentations in the narration of the scientific findings, in a corpus of sixty-six popularization articles from The Guardian newspaper.

2. Popularization articles as discourse

Popularization articles are written by either scientists themselves or science journalists, i.e. journalists specialized in either a specific field of science or also in the popularization process itself, who have a variety of aims. As Connie St. Louis, chair of the Association of British Science Writers, has pointed out in an interview for the blog ‘The lay scientist’ (Robbins 2011), science journalists are expected to contribute original reporting, to provide context to their readers, to challenge statements made by university press officers, or even just to add informed opinion to their reports and, in this sense, they are not particularly different from the rest of what Martin and White (2005) call “correspondents” in that we do not expect them to be absolutely ‘invisible’ in the text, as is the case with the reporters of ‘hard’ news.

On the other hand, although most descriptive studies on popularizations take a contrastive perspective aimed to highlight differences between research articles and them, in order to analyse if and how stance is constructed, popularization articles are better described per se. The rationale for this is that contrastive studies
often approach popularizations as second-rate texts which are considered just simplified and more-easily-digestable versions of research articles. As Myers has pointed out, there is a common assumption that, unlike popularizations, the texts which are addressed to peer specialists are “something else, something much better: scientific discourse” (Myers 2003:265). In this sense, Myers also points out that people tend to assume that “there are two separate discourses, one within scientific institutions and one outside them, and that information is translated from one of these discourses to the other” (Myers 2003:266). Our position here is that a more fruitful approach for the sake of description is to take them as “a discursive reconstruction of scientific knowledge to an audience other than the academic one” (de Oliveira and Pagano 2006: 628). From this perspective, popularizations constitute a certain (re)contextualization of scientific knowledge that shares features of both newspaper and scientific discourse, being at the crossroads of them along their respective continuum lines of potential (re)contextualizations (Elorza 2011), and whose characteristic features include (and also share with other newspaper and scientific genres) that the presentation of others’ words is central. Semino (2009) has suggested that this textual polyphony (Ducrot 1986) is present in newspapers not only because journalists are seldom direct witnesses or actors of the events they are narrating, but more importantly because “what count as ‘new’ is often what people say rather than what they do” (Semino 2009: 447, emphasis original). Therefore, the construction and development of popularizations rely on the combination of different voices, which help structure and organise the text. Voices combine in such a way that the writer’s voice is taken as the “unmarked” option within the systematic framework of options available, whereas the other voices are introduced in the text by some of the available options of speech (re)presentation.

The flow of voices so typically found in this type of discourse follows what De Beaugrande (1991: 237) calls the “good reason” principle, by which it is the unmarked option of interpretation of who is speaking in each moment along the text which is chosen “unless there is good reason to choose otherwise”. This means that both writers and readers tacitly accept that, unless some explicit directions for alternative interpretations are given or implied, the voice speaking in the text is the writer’s. Additionally to the question of who is speaking, another relevant issue is the alignment or the position of the journalist with what is being narrated or, in other words, how the journalist’s voice as a news narrator is constructed, showing thus his/her personal stance.

3. The analysis of stance as argumentative evaluation in the ‘evaluative space’

Hunston and Thompson (2000: 6) contend that evaluation has three different functions, namely to express the writer’s opinion, to construct and maintain relations between writer and reader, and to organize the discourse. In this sense,
Hunston argues that evaluation plays a vital role in constructing the ideological basis of a text because it locates writer and reader in “an ideological space” which is “constructed both by the way the world is labelled […] and by the way the argument is constructed” (2000: 205). In this so-called “evaluative space” the writer can “report the propositions without being committed to their validity and can thus prepare for the contrast between the general view and his own” (Thompson and Ye 1991: 369). The question we want to answer is how this ideological space is constructed when the journalist ’gives voice’ to an external source of information by introducing in the text somebody else’s speech (re)presented in the text as Direct Speech (DS henceforth).

In our study, we consider stance a cover term which includes, along Conrad and Biber’s (2000) interpretation, a variety of meanings, thus taking it as “the overt expression of the speaker’s attitudes, feelings, judgements, or commitment concerning his/her message, including the indication of the speaker’s degree of commitment towards the truthfulness of the message” (Bednarek 2006: 25) so that these meanings relate to the certainty of a proposition, its reliability (or not), the writer’s comments on the source of information, the writer’s attitudes or value judgements, or also the manner how the information is presented (Conrad and Biber 2000: 56). As these meanings can be constructed by a wide range of linguistic means, stance is not easily perceived. Bondi and Mauranen point out how, “[a]s readers and writers, we seem to be vaguely aware of evaluation being constructed in texts we encounter and produce; it is harder to tell exactly how this happens, that is, which linguistic means are involved, and which (if any) are not” (Bondi & Mauranen 2003: 269). Therefore, the analysis of stance presents methodological difficulties because, as Silver argues, even though there has been a recent interest in the multiplicity of ways in which evaluation is expressed in language, “[g]eneral categories or markers are rethought and broken down as they are made to pass through the analytic sieve of experimental work from a host of linguistic perspectives” (Silver 2005: 360). Categories include epistemic, attitudinal and style stance adverbials (Conrad and Biber 2000), patterns as the ones discussed by Hunston and Sinclair (2000) in their “local grammar of evaluation”, components as the three considered by Hyland (2005: 178), namely evidentiality, affect and presence, which includes hedges, boosters, attitude markers and self-mentions, as well as other grammatical devices described by Biber (2004: 112), namely modals and semi-modals, stance adverbials (including attitudinal adverbials, non-factive adverbials, factive adverbials and likelihood adverbials) and complement clauses (that complement clauses and to complement clauses), not to mention all the classes and subclasses considered by Martin and White (2005) in their appraisal model.

Another symptom of the elusiveness of this concept is also manifest in the variety of terms overlapping, namely stance (Biber 2006; Conrad and Biber 2000), evaluation (Bednarek 2006; Hunston and Thompson 2000) and appraisal (Martin 2000; Martin and White 2005), which require further clarification in order to
describe the approach adopted to carry out the analysis, as we are only concerned with a specific type of evaluative process.

As Bednarek (2006: 24-25) explains, evaluation is not only used as an alternative term to stance, but also as a “technical category”, a discourse organizer consisting of the logical connection between clauses by means of the pattern SITUATION+EVALUATION, as in ‘I saw the enemy approaching’ [SITUATION]. ‘This was a problem’ [EVALUATION] (Hoey 2000: 29), where the SITUATION clause gives a description and the EVALUATION clause “tells us something about the writer’s thoughts, feelings and interpretations in connection with this situation” (Bednarek 2006: 25). This type of pattern, as Hoey explains, is typically found in scientific discourse: “The more normal practice in scientific argumentation is that either an evaluation is offered and then a reason for that evaluation and basis follow, or the situation is presented first and then evaluated” (Hoey 2000: 32).

Our concept of evaluation is based on Winter’s conception that any clause gives “two kinds of fundamental information, what is known and what is felt” (in Hoey 2000: 32). Although this concept of evaluation relies on a clausal relationship, in our view it can also be fruitfully applied to analyse other units which are also linked by means of logical connection, such as the interpersonal relation established between the journalist’s voice and the attributee’s voice in the text, as in Example 1 below, in which the first clause presents a SITUATION, the second clause presents the EVALUATION, and the subsequent quotation, consisting of a series of clauses, makes explicit the BASIS for the previous EVALUATION:

(1) Preventing EE2 from having environmental or health effects is difficult, however. “Ethynyl estradiol is a very potent chemical,” said Professor Susan Jobling of Brunel University. “It is designed to have effects in the human body at very low levels. That means it will also have a significant impact in the environment.” (TG_53_ENG)

In this example, the adjective difficult is used to evaluate the possibilities of “Preventing EE2 from having environmental or health effects” and the BASIS for this EVALUATION is constructed by rephrasing (part of) the elements already present in the SITUATION: [EE2 + environmental or health effects] → [Ethynyl estradiol + effects in the human body + impact in the environment]. At the same time, we can see that, whereas we can say that the words used as BASIS are attributed to Professor Jobling, it is not that clear whether the SITUATION and the EVALUATION have also been uttered by her, or rather by the journalist. The fact that the BASIS is the only element of the pattern presented as DS implies that a change has been produced in the current voice speaking. The problem is that although the inverted commas mark the presentation of words unmistakably attributed to Prof. Jobling, the commas would not tell us if that voice was already uttering the previous words as well. The ambiguity on the voice who is speaking at a certain time along the text is interpreted here on the basis that, at least in English, the different possibilities for presenting others’ speech in the text are not clear-cut
categories, but rather envisaged more accurately as distributing along a cline of speech (re)presentation (Leech and Short 1981; Semino, Short and Culpeper 1997; Semino and Short 2004; Semino 2009).

On the other hand, Example 1 presents an evaluation which is made explicit so that readers can identify that a claim has been made and, therefore, as Hoey (2000: 32) points out, the claim can be potentially questioned by the readers. However, he also posits that a “potentially contentious evaluation” can be “deliberately defused of its power to create argument by its placement at a rank lower that the sentence”, in what he calls “the Emperor’s new clothes gambit” (Hoey 2000: 33), and which operates likes this: “where the evaluation takes the form of the premodification of a noun as opposed to the complement position in a sentence, it is more readily regarded by writer and reader as given information or common ground. It is therefore for this reason also less subject to careful scrutiny” (Hoey 2000: 33), an example of which can be found below:

(2) Until now, the earliest evidence of humans in Britain came from Pakefield, near Lowestoft in Suffolk, where a set of stone tools dated to 700,000 years ago were uncovered in 2005. More sophisticated stone, antler and bone tools were found in the 1990s in Boxgrove, Sussex, which are believed to be half a million years old.

“The flint tools from Happisburgh are relatively crude compared with those from Boxgrove, but they are still effective,” said Stringer. (TG_22_ENG, our emphasis)

Writers, therefore, have the means to control what information is presented as open to discussion or rather as taken for granted. In Example 2, that the stone, antler and bone tools are “more sophisticated” is not presented as ‘new’ questionable information but is just part of the topic of that sentence, the new information being their finding in Boxgrove in the 1990s. However, it is interesting that the function of the quotation in relation to this previous information is to ‘intensify’ the comparison in terms of sophistication, just introduced in the evaluative space preceding the quotation, being both, evaluative space and quotation, lexically cohesive by associating “sophisticated” and “relatively crude”. Within the argumentative pattern, we can say that the quotation is used as BASIS for the EVALUATION, as was the case in Example 1. This evaluative space, consequently, can be used to introduce evaluation which is questionable (explicit, overt evaluation), but also evaluation which is taken for granted (covert evaluation).

Other ways of presenting taken-for-granted information in narrative reports also include the use of illocutionary reporting verbs, as the verb “fear” in Example 2 above. The rationale here is that, although reporting verbs such as say only function as introducers of the reported speech, either DS or not, there are verbs which also add some force to the presentation of the speech. In Semino and Short’s (2004) classification, these verbs are identified with speech presentations under the category of “Narrator’s representation of speech acts (NRSA)”, which is outlined
like this: “Reference to the speech-act value or illocutionary force of an utterance (often with an indication of the topic)” (Semino 2009: 448). However, in Example 2 above, the verb 

*feared* is used by the journalist to add information about how the attributees (“the biologists”) *feel* about the information attributed to them, what Sanders (2010: 229) describes as an “implicit viewpoint” constructed by means of a verb of emotion.

Reporting verbs do not necessarily refer to the wording produced in a language event, but also to the thoughts produced (mindsight verbs), as well as to the writing when the language event has been produced in written form. As Sanders points out, “in direct and indirect representation mode it is the reporting verb that indicates whether the represented utterance was spoken or thought. In free indirect representation mode, the context will have to clarify this” (Sanders 2010: 229). In this sense, free indirect speech (FIS henceforth) does not behave in the same way as DS or IS, as it seems to present a higher degree of implicitness or reliance on other contextual and co-textual elements.

Focusing on how argumentation is constructed in the British press, Smirnova (2009) has studied the use of reported speech as one of the elements employed by journalists to construct newspaper argumentation. In her study, she has focused on both the syntactic structures used to introduce reported speech as well as the semantic characteristics of those structures, being able to identify two broad groups, namely literal structures, which incorporate the quoted utterance as “belonging to someone else and [aiming] at a verbatim reproduction of the initial message”, and liberal structures, characterized by “greater freedom of reproduction of reported words” (2009: 82). More interestingly, she has also identified a third type of what she has called combined structures, which are less frequent in her corpus than the other two but which present a mixed pattern, as in the following example:

(3) John Jackson of the Scottish Development Center for Mental Health insisted the unit would not pose significant risk to the community: “There hasn’t been one single case across the UK of a patient escaping from a medium-care unit and they function very safely”. (in Smirnova 2009: 82)

In order to gain deeper insight on how stance is used by journalists to construct ‘polyphonic arguments’ in popularizations, our focus has been placed on the analysis of this type of structure in particular. Our study focuses on the formal and functional relations between the evaluative space defined in the text preceding and introducing DS, and the DS itself because, as Smirnova posits, both syntax and semantics are “important for the reader’s persuasion and determine the role of reported speech in argumentative discourse” (2009: 88).
4. **Speech (re)presentation in newspaper discourse**

With the purpose of classifying the different ways how journalists have introduced other voices in the popularizations studied, our analysis relies on Semino and Short’s (2004) classification of speech (re)presentation, as summarised in Semino (2009: 448), which distinguishes the following main categories along the cline of available options, presented in Table 1, below.

According to Caldas-Coulthard (1994: 303-304) when writers of news use both DS and IS to report what others say, they do it to implicate reliability and legitimation of the information. However, this constant “recursiveness” referring back to what others said may make the real facts happening in the real world be blurred or distorted and what is transmitted in news may be as fictionalized as any work of fiction. She points out that in the case of direct reports, as we have mentioned before, the author is providing the text with features of reliability and faithfulness to the original speech event. In the case of indirect reports, however, the narrator is integrating the words of others into his or her own discourse, so he or she is in complete control of the words of others and there is “not even the pretence that the voice of the character is heard” (1994: 304). Nevertheless, it could be argued that in both DS and IS the narrator is always controlling the information he or she is including and faithfulness to the original words uttered can always be questioned.

| Table 1. Cline of speech (re)presentation categories (from Semino 2009) |
|-------------------|----------------------------------|
| **Category**      | **Example**                      |
| Narrator’s representation of voice (NV) | *talks in Germany* |
| Narrator’s representation of speech acts (NRSA) | *as Mr Putin threatened retaliation* |
| Indirect speech (IS) | *the Foreign Office announced it was ceasing cooperation with Russia on a range of issues...* |
| Free indirect speech (FIS) | *The Bishop of Wakefield [...] said that [...] such practices were “utterly disgusting and blasphemous”. They were not recognizable as part of any Anglican creed.* |
| Direct speech (DS) | *Foreign Secretary David Milliband told MPs: “The heinous crime of murder requires justice.”* |

This “factional” world which is created in news reports is therefore understood by Caldas-Coulthard as a meeting point for fact and fiction. Reporters are supposed to be reporting facts happening in the real world but the very act of reporting implies that the information presented may be distorted and appear ‘fictionalised’. And this is the case for both the use of DS and IS as devices for reproducing other people’s words. De Oliveira (2007) and de Oliveira and Pagano (2006) state that journalists make use of direct quotations for three main reasons. The first reason is that quotations present the quoted authors, in this case scientists, as superior to the
writers who are popularizing them (2006: 644). The second reason is that, contrary to what happens with indirect speech, quotations limit the journalist’s possibilities of appropriating the voices of the sources they are quoting. On the third place, and this is where our study mainly revolves around, journalists make use of quotations because they create a discursive distance or a gap, which we have identified as a space for evaluation. However, de Oliveira and Pagano argue that, even if this space for evaluation is created, “it does not contribute to the subversion of social and cultural differences” (2006: 644), because there are some rhetorical conventions associated to the scientific genre which make it difficult for the journalist to appropriate that space for his or her own purpose. As they point out, there is some status ascribed to scientific knowledge so that journalists need to make it clear whose voice belongs to whom.

5. Study and method

In order to carry out our study we compiled and analysed a corpus consisting of 66 random science popularization articles published between the years 2010 and 2012 in the electronic version of the British broadsheet *The Guardian* (www.guardian.co.uk). We carried out a quantitative and qualitative analysis. We first searched for all the occurrences of DS in the different articles of our corpus and then we analysed them in relation with their precedent text to isolate the occurrences of Smirnova’s combined structures. Then we analysed and annotated the texts according to the type of speech (re)presentations they were, the explicit evaluative elements they contained in the part preceding the DS, and the type of reporting verb they presented to introduce the DS. As to the type of speech (re)presentations, only three of the four possible types were identified, namely NRSAs, ISs and FISs. It seems that, at least in the case of popularizations, the pattern NV + Q is not used.

The reporting verbs were classified according to their illocutionary force (or absence of it). We relied on Thompson’s (1994) classification of reporting verbs, and also considered *mindsay* verbs (such as *think* or *believe*) as well. In total, two groups of reporting signals were identified, namely those which constituted a neutral report, and reporting signals involving some kind of stance. Below is a summary of the types of reporting signals identified:

Neutral reporting signals:
- Neutral reporting verbs (typically *say* or also *tell*)
- Reporting verbs indicating how the message fits in (typically *add* or *continue*)
- Reporting verbs showing whether a report is of speech or of writing (verbs such as *chat* or *converse* vs. verbs such as *scribble* or *write down*)
- *Mindsay* reporting verbs (such as *think* or *believe*)
- **Reporting adjuncts (typically according to)**

Reporting signals involving some kind of stance:
- Reporting verbs showing the speaker’s purpose (such as *suggest* or *warn*)
- Reporting verbs showing the manner of speaking (such as *weep* or *worry*)
- Reporting verbs showing what was said through the reporting verb (such as *deny*)
- Reporting verbs drawing attention to the speaker’s or writer’s words (such as *refer*, *call* or *describe*)
- Reporting verbs showing your attitude towards what you report (such as *note*)
- Reporting verbs showing that you do not accept responsibility (no cases of this were found)
- Reporting verbs showing the effect of what is said (such as *show*)

Therefore, by identifying in the corpus all the cases of DS and then analysing the reporting signals present in the precedent text identified as their evaluative space, we could classify two broad groups with four different patterns according to the features of the evaluative space, which we describe below.

The goal pursued in this study is to analyse the use of stance in the evaluative space in order to see if significant features can be found in how journalists introduce Direct Speech in the narration of scientific findings, especially in reference to the use of reporting signals as related to different conceptions of stance. These refer to stance when it is constructed in discourse either as evaluation, along Winter’s conception, which is used rhetorically to build up the argument, or rather if it is used to introduce the journalists’ own judgements or positions towards the information given, particularly when rephrasing what the scientists say as a way of explanation to the readers of popularizations.

Assuming that a greater presence of the journalist in the text represents a stronger mediation on his/her part between the scientists responsible for the findings narrated and the readers of the popularizations, and that this will correspond to a higher frequency of reporting signals before introducing DS, our hypothesis is that it is possible to distinguish when the journalist is taking active part in the construction of the argument or just mediating by explaining to the readers what the scientists say by analysing the relation of reporting signals between the evaluative space and the quotation part in the complex units labelled here as RRs and RIs, and which will be discussed in the next section.
5.1 Types of combined structures in popularization articles

5.1.1 Quotation without previous evaluation (Q)
According to de Oliveira (2007) and de Oliveira and Pagano (2006), quotations are “rhetorical resources” (de Oliveira and Pagano 2006: 629) which are used to reproduce in an exact way the words uttered by others. Thompson (1996) argues that they are the best option to reproduce a language event which presents a high degree of faithfulness to the words originally expressed and also that they provide the text with some features of reality and drama. In line with this view, Caldas-Coulthard (1994) also posits that they make the text more lively. At the same time, we consider that in these cases there is no distance negotiation between the journalist and the attributee or, in other words, that the preceding text introducing the DS has not been used as an evaluative space but only for stating who the attributee is and that some speech (or thought) is being introduced.

(4) A spokeswoman for the Department of Health said: “We are currently considering how to ensure the public gets the best advice on this issue, given that there are risks as well as potential benefits from taking aspirin” (TG_05_ENG).

5.1.2 Partial quotation (PQ)
Also called ‘embedded quotation’ by Semino and Short (2004), this type is described as a distinctive feature of news reporting which can be seen as “the result of attempting to achieve maximum effectiveness and vividness in the shortest space possible” (Semino 2009: 452). In popularizations we can distinguish two different types according to their communicative function:

1. Partial quotations used by journalists to ‘label’, as in (5):

(5) Barker said the work was “the oldest unequivocally dated rock art in Australia” and among the oldest in the world (TG_61_ENG).

2. Partial quotations used to introduce scientific jargon, as in (6):

(6) Henshilwood’s team said the tools were evidence for an “ochre-processing workshop” run by early humans, who gathered the colourful mineral oxides from sites about 20 miles away” (TG_24_ENG).

Being generally more discrete units than clauses or propositions, at least in the cases in our corpus, PQs are not necessarily preceded by an evaluative space, as in Example 5. In our view, although fitting in the formal category of DS, they do not function as a necessary element in the argumentative pattern SITUATION + EVALUATION but just as part of it, and hence in our view they do not have the potential to construct newspaper argument in themselves.
5.1.3 Rephrasing as reformulation (RR)
The journalist rephrases the words uttered by others and then he/she includes a quotation to support or illustrate the previous rephrasing. In this case, the unit of analysis we took into account was both the rephrasing done by the journalist, which includes a reporting verb, and also the quotation (reporting clause with reporting verb and reported clause with the words uttered by the original source of information). In these occurrences the evaluative space and the quotation present very clear lexical cohesion by reformulating the information, as in the example below. However, when evaluation is presented, it is often covertly made, e.g. by means of a reporting verb with illocutionary force. RRs tend to present a pattern where the DS functions as BASIS for the EVALUATION previously introduced, as in the example below, and therefore, the DS seems to be used to support what the journalist has said.

(7) Experts said new diesel engines spew out fewer fumes but further studies are needed to assess any potential dangers. “We don’t have enough evidence to say these new engines are zero risk, but they are certainly lower risk than before,” said Vincent Cogliano of the US Environmental Protection Agency. (TG_58_ENG)

In this case, the journalist reproduces the words uttered by the external source of information but, as Caldas-Coulthard explains, “it is misleading to say that in DS the reporter is NOT in control. If the quotation is introduced by an illocutionary verb of saying –claim, propose, suggest, the reporter explicitly interferes with the report, while, if the quotation is introduced by a neutral verb of saying –say, tell – the reporter abstains from explicitly interfering in the report” (Caldas-Coulthard 1992: 65, emphasis original). Therefore, the writer’s stance or the distance negotiated between writer and attributee is crucially signalled by means of the reporting verb used.

5.1.4 Rephrasing as Intensification (RI)
The evaluative space contains some explicit evaluation of the information but this time there is no rephrasing.

(8) Many biologists fear that the infection, known as white-nose syndrome, could spread to Britain, with devastating consequences. “It is a real worry and we keep a very close eye out for any sign of the disease, but so far, happily, we have not seen a sign,” said Worledge, partnership officer for the UK Bat Conservation Trust. (TG_31_ENG)

In these cases, the evaluative words used by the journalist are not present in the quotation so that the question arising is whether it is the journalist who is responsible for them, or rather the attributee of the DS.
6. Results and Discussion

In Table 2, we present the total number of occurrences of structures containing DS which appear in the science popularizations analysed, including the combined structures (Smirnova 2009) which we have identified as RRs and RIs respectively. The table also shows the number of occurrences of each group together with the cases where a reporting signal appears to introduce the DS. The difference between the use of a reporting signal and the lack of such signal is significant ($p<0.001$).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reporting Signals</th>
<th>Number of Occurrences</th>
<th>Row Totals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Quotations (Q)</td>
<td>179 (161.07) [2.00]</td>
<td>184</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partial Quotations (PQ)</td>
<td>59 (69.16) [1.49]</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rephrasing as Reformulation (RR)</td>
<td>41 (39.39) [0.07]</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rephrasing as Intensification (RI)</td>
<td>9 (18.38) [4.79]</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Column Totals</td>
<td>288</td>
<td>329</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Most occurrences in the corpus are cases of DS where the preceding space has not been used for evaluative purposes, the journalist simply introducing the words uttered by others. This finding is consistent with Smirnova’s (2009). However, the interest of our results lies in the RR and RI cases where the evaluative space has a more salient function. 45 occurrences are RR, where the evaluative space contains either a reporting verb with illocutionary force or what we have termed so far ‘ambiguous’ cases, as the example below, in which the highlighted information in the evaluative space cannot be univocally attributed to any of the three potential sources (Wallworth, the journalist, or if we just look at the immediately precedent person introduced in the narration, even David Hannan).

(9) Wallworth commissioned filming by underwater cinematographers, including the Emmy award-winning Australian David Hannan who shot around three-quarters of it. **The film is strange and beautiful to look at and will be even more incredible for viewers as it will be shown at planetariums across the world.**

“People will think they are in space, think they are moving through stars,” said Wallworth. (TG_46_ENG)

In Example 9, the structure immediately preceding the quotation does not fit clearly in any of the categories of Semino and Short’s classification, as it could be interpreted as IS but also as FIS. In our view, it is this ambiguity within the evaluative space which has the potential for constructing stance in an overt way, blurring the limits as to which voice is speaking. On the other hand, we find 21
occurrences of RIs, where the evaluative space explicitly presents some kind of evaluation, either questionable or not, in the sense pointed out by Hoey (2000), and which could be either an evaluation to the situation presented in the quotation, or an evaluation of the situation presented in the very evaluative space, the quotation being the reason or the basis for the evaluation, as happened in Example 1. The presence of those cases labelled as ambiguous is of one third of RRs (35.5% of the total) and also of one third of RIs (33.3%), which suggests that this could function as a pattern in these combined structures.

As we stated before, we also analysed the different functions of the reporting verbs which appear in the science popularization articles introducing quotations and sometimes also the previous rephrasing done by journalists. In the graphics included below, we present the functions of reporting verbs according to Thompson’s (1994) classification as they are associated with the different functions of quotations previously identified.

Figure 1. Neutral reporting verbs

If we have a close look at Figure 1 above, it can be seen how most cases (more than 80%) of Quotations (Q) belong to the use of the neutral reporting verb say. There are also some other functions that the different reporting verbs present, but the percentages are not significant if we compare them with the one showed by say.
With this verb, and according to Thompson (1994: 34-36), the journalist simply wants to signal that he/she is reporting what others said without including any further information about the speaker’s purpose or manner when uttering the words.

In the case of Partial Quotations (PQs), it is worth noting that again more than half of the cases belong to the use of the neutral verb say (more than 50%). This is so because with PQs journalists either want to ‘name the world’ or they include some words belonging specifically to some area of science and which are difficult to explain (scientific jargon). If we compare Qs and PQs, we can see how the variety of reporting verbs and their associated functions is greater than in the previous one. This seems to suggest that PQs are less stable that Qs, which seem to present quite a simple pattern, which is consistent with Semino’s interpretation that embedded quotations can be “found in all forms of non-direct speech presentation apart from NV” (2009: 452).

![Figure 2. Reporting verbs introducing stance](image-url)

Although in the part of the RRs corresponding to the evaluative space the most frequent verb is say, it is interesting to note that there is an important percentage which belongs to the use of reporting verbs showing the speaker’s purpose. Although with the use of these verbs what the writer shows is the purpose conveyed by the original utterer of the words, it is actually your interpretation of the purpose that you give (Thompson 1994: 36-38). In the majority of cases, the writer seems just to try to convey the information accurately, but there are some cases in which the original purpose of the speaker is quite different from the one
conveyed in the reporting verb used by the journalist. With the use of these verbs, the presence of the journalist is much higher than in the previous cases analysed of Qs and PQs.

If we compare the evaluative space and the quotation part of RRs, it can be seen how the majority of occurrences of reporting verbs belong to the neutral *say*. What is interesting to remark is that the different types of reporting verbs used in the quotation part is less varied than in the rephrasing. This could be explained by the fact that in the quotation part the journalist is being more neutral and his/her presence is less prominent than in the rephrasing part, where he/she uses his/her own words to transmit the information included in the quotation.

With respect to RIs, it is worth mentioning that in more than half of the cases this rephrasing carried out by the journalist presents no reporting verb. This lack of reporting verb might be due to the fact that the presence of the journalist is much higher and stronger than in the previous cases studied. He/she is including his/her own evaluation of the information and thus his/her voice is more prominent. This absence of reporting verb indicates that in a way, the journalist is not rephrasing any information which anticipates what is being said in the DS; it is rather as if the DS is introducing new information which makes the argument develop. It is also worth mentioning the absence of the neutral verb *say* as another indicator of the more prominent presence of the journalist.

Nevertheless, in the quotation part of RIs, it could be seen how the situation explained above changes. In this part, the journalist brings to the text the actual words uttered by the original source of information, and to do so he/she makes use of the neutral reporting verb *say*. The journalist does not want to convey any feelings or any evaluation and that is why in the reporting clause introducing the quotation he/she decides to use a neutral reporting verb. The journalist takes advantage of the ‘evaluative space’ created between his/her own voice and the voice of the experts, but in the quotation part he/she signals explicitly that he/she does not want to evaluate in any way the information presented. In this way, we can conclude that the transition between the journalist’s voice and the DS is less smooth than in RRs.

Although this study has been at a small scale and would require a greater bulk of data, the data shown in Tables 1 and 2 reveal that there are significant differences between the evaluative space in RRs and in RIs. Considering whether the reporting signals used are neutral or involving some kind of stance, we can see that journalists clearly rely more often on neutral report. However, when stance is present in the evaluative space preceding DS, we think that it is also possible to interpret that the journalist is taking active part in the construction of the argument when there is a mismatch between the use of reporting signals with stance in the evaluative part and in the quotation part (RIs), and similarly, that the journalist is acting mainly as a mediator explaining to the readers what the scientists say, when there is a balance between the reporting signals used in the evaluative space and in the quotation part (RRs).
7. Conclusions

In this paper, we have aimed at a better characterization of how journalists construct stance in science popularization articles in the British press. Out of the potentially available ways of constructing it in this type of text, one of the most frequent ones involves the use of external sources to construct newspaper argument, allowing journalists to either present other people’s stance towards the information presented but also their own. Within this polyphonic construction of argument, we have paid attention to those cases which constitute a transition from the journalist’s voice to the introduction of other voices in his/her narration, thus concentrating in what Smirnova (2009) has called combined structures.

In the combined structures used by journalists in popularizations, the evaluative space preceding the introduction of a new voice can include evaluation which contributes to the development of the argument but, as we have seen, this evaluation can be presented not only as questionable by readers or explicitly overt, but also more covertly as taken for granted. Through our analysis we have also seen that in this evaluative space voices are blurred. The claim to be made is that if voices cannot be clearly identified, thus the evaluative space can be potentially used for introducing journalists’ stance that can be covertly ascribed to an external voice. In this sense, we can conclude that in popularizations of the kind analysed in this study the construction of stance in relation to the introduction of external voices in the text is realized by two combined means. Firstly, journalists can introduce explicit evaluative elements in the evaluative space overtly but, more interestingly, they can also introduce covert evaluation, as taken for granted, either by means of evaluative adjectives or other stance markers in a ‘non-questionable’ syntactic position or by means of reporting verbs with illocutionary force. Secondly, stance is potentially constructed in the evaluative space by blurring the voices speaking in a fashion that the evaluation can be ascribed to the external voice but also to the journalist, so that the responsibility for what is said is kept unclear.

On the other hand, and beyond the initial purpose of our study, our analysis of the combined structures has also revealed that partial quotations do not seem to constitute necessary elements in the construction of argument, so their raison d’être could rather be related to options lexically connected with the popularization situation in relation to the newspaper readership, something which has not been the focus of this study but which clearly requires further attention.

Our analysis of how journalists construct meaning when giving voice to external sources of information may contribute to shed light on the kind of discursive evaluative devices which are employed by science journalists when trying to add informed opinion to their reports, at least in the context of the British broadsheet newspaper analysed. However, further research needs to be done in this topic, especially by analysing this same phenomenon in a larger sample of popularization articles in the British press in order to be able to find out more about those cases which in the present study have been classified as ambiguous,
especially (but not only) those cases of free indirect speech where the boundaries between the different voices present (the journalist’s voice and the external voice) are blurred in the rephrasing or “liberal part”. Finally, this analysis can also be applied to contrastive studies of science popularization articles in the English and other languages in an attempt to better characterize how stance is constructed within the evaluative space across cultures.

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Constructing stance by means of attribution

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Abstract
The present study is a quantitative, corpus-based analysis of epistemic stance verbs in British and American English. The predicates under investigation are the first person singular present tense occurrences of think, believe, suppose (UK), and guess (US). The specific focus falls on how these expressions are construed in use and what functional components characterize their individual usage profiles. A further goal of the analysis is to establish cross-dialectal differences in the semasiological structure of the verbs and their onomasiological relations. The data comprise approximately 500 occurrences of the lexemes, extracted from spontaneous and highly dialogic online diaries of LiveJournal (Speelman 2005). The method employed here is known as profile-based or multifactorial feature analysis (Geeraerts et al. 1994; Gries 2006; Glynn 2009; Divjak 2010). It consists in manual annotation of the contextualized examples for a wide spectrum of formal and semantic features, subsequently followed by multivariate statistical modeling. This qualitative and quantitative analysis allows us to reveal the behavioral profiles of the epistemic stance verbs.

1. Introduction
Epistemic stance predicates, such as think, believe, suppose or guess, express the subject’s mental state relative to a given aspect of reality and moderate variably the information thus conveyed. By using these verbs with their full epistemological load, the speaker signals taking an epistemic stance, thus approaching the surrounding world from a subjective/personal perspective. In so doing, the subject impacts upon and molds the interactive reality by making a statement about the world encompassing it. The speaker performs this act in a manner that suits his/her purposes, while simultaneously bearing in mind the expectations and needs of the interlocutor(s).

All this takes place in an intersubjective/interpersonal space, which can be described as a space of “mutual coordination of cognitive states” (Verhagen 2005: 28). Given this social context, epistemic stance, rather than being exclusively internal to the speaker, is “emergent” and “dynamic”, being dialogically or
interactively conditioned (Kärkkäinen 2006: 700ff., 2007: 183; Du Bois 2007: 140ff.). Rather than hinging uniquely on how reliable the information conveyed in the utterance is to the speaker, any epistemic stance is also highly sensitive to the intersubjective situation, which is why, in different speech events, the same statement can be marked by different epistemic means of varying pragmatic force to respond to the social context (Fox & Clifford 1991, as discussed in Kärkkäinen 2003: 24). This is to say that once such a subjective statement emerges in and from the interactive event, it becomes inter-subjective and negotiable. The expressions encoding mental states are, therefore, employed to modalize the picture of reality projected in the utterance and to inform the interlocutor of how subjective and credible the projection is and how strongly the speaker feels about it.

At this juncture, a number of observations should be made in light of the discussion in the relevant literature. As Kärkkäinen (2006: 705) puts it, expressions of epistemic stance are markers of the “degree of commitment” and “attitudes” to the statements expressed. Likewise, Sanders and Spooren (1996: 247), in their experimental approach, have demonstrated that “epistemic modifiers” differ with respect to the “degree of certainty” and “degree of subjectivity” they express, with mental state predicates, such as think or believe, which make overt reference to the conceptualizer, being “subjective” and “semicertain”. In a similar vein, Boye (2012: 5) defines epistemic modality in terms of “degree of certainty or degree of commitment … corresponding to the notion of epistemic support”. In Boye’s (ibid.) understanding, which is akin to the broad definitions of epistemicity adopted in Aijmer (1980) or Palmer (1986), epistemicity is conceived of as a “descriptive supercategory” subsuming both epistemic modality and evidentiality, the latter concerning “(epistemic) justification, evidence or source of information”. A slightly different view is expressed by Nuyts (2000: 22) when he says that epistemic expressions are indicators of the estimated probability “that a certain state of affairs is/has been/will be true (or false) in the context of the possible world under consideration”. However, epistemic modality, as pointed out by Kärkkäinen (2003: 17f.), concerns knowledge and belief, rather than the notion of truth. In usage-based linguistics, truth conditions are not employed in semantic analysis.

There is a wide spectrum of linguistic means available for the expression of an epistemic stance. Depending on the context of formal, conceptual and social determinants and constraints, and depending on how certain the speaker is of the occurrence of the state of affairs, s/he may choose various lexical as well as grammatical means for inter-subjective expression. For example, by selecting one of a number of synonyms of I think or possibly by omitting any epistemic marker moderating a given assertion, s/he changes the character of the speech event and the expressive strength of the statement. As Scheibman (2002: 67) points out, such “formulaic expressions” as I think or I guess, apart from playing an epistemic role, may also “act to mitigate assertions or disagreement in conversation”. The role of these “conventionalized” epistemic phrases is to “organize expression of the speaker’s point of view or carry out negative politeness strategies in interactive discourse” (ibid.). In this context, epistemic markers have been referred to variably
as “expressions of stance”, “hedging devices”, “boosters”, “attenuators”, or “pragmatic force modifiers” (Kärkkäinen 2003: 22), which reflects the roles they play in discourse.

Let us take example (1) below (from the Corpus of Contemporary American English) to illustrate this.

(1) *I think most of the truly developing countries are not doing their own climate modeling.*

The sentence projects a certain picture of reality regarding the developing world and does so from a subjective point of view, as introduced by means of *I think*. This predicate may well be taken to be the most common and typical expression of epistemic stance, as it refers explicitly to the conceptualizer and designates an “interior cognitive process” (Kärkkäinen 2006: 700). Replacing this epistemic stance verb with another near-synonymous item will change considerably the meaning of what is said. This is because, as Aijmer (1997: 18) indicates, there is a gradation of epistemic expressions along the parameter of “reliability of knowledge”, ranging from such phrases as *I am sure* through *I believe*, followed by *I think, I suppose, and I guess.* The high position of *believe* in this gradation scale of certainty is supported by what Fortescue (2001: 33) states, namely that “what one ‘knows’, one ‘believes’ to be true”. The only difference with respect to *know* is that *believe* is more likely to be employed when, objectively speaking, “there is less perceptibly anchored evidence for” one’s knowledge, which, from a subjective standpoint, is, nonetheless, well grounded (Fortescue 2001: 34f.).

In light of this cline, using *I suppose* or *I guess* in lieu of *I think* would make the statement in (1) increasingly less forceful, while the use of *I believe* would add more epistemic strength and credibility. On the other hand, if the complement of *I think* in (1) were to stand on its own as an independent statement without any subjective moderation by epistemic means, it would take on an objective character, thus becoming an impersonal statement about the world. Such uses represent what Langacker (2009: 235) refers to as the “default-case situation where the speaker uses a finite clause without qualification as a statement of her own, actual epistemic assessment”. Another aspect that would affect the import of the utterance in (1) is changing the position of the predicate by moving it to the end of the sentence. Such a move, only possible in the case of “non-factive predicates” (Aijmer 1997: 7), parenthesizes the verb and, by way of a process referred to as “pragmaticalization” (Aijmer 1997: 7) or grammaticalization (Thompson & Mulac 1991; Traugott 1995: 38), takes off its epistemic load, yet without objectifying or impersonalizing the statement. Such parenthetical uses of otherwise epistemic stance verbs serve to “soften” the proposition expressed (Aijmer 1997: 20f.; Scheibman 2002: 68).

The various expressions realizing the abstract category of THINKING are semasiologically complex. This has been discussed in the relevant literature mostly with respect to *think*. As Aijmer (1997: 11) posits, the pragmaticalized uses of
think issue from the polysemy and prototypical organization of the predicate, a view that is consonant with that proposed by Hopper and Traugott (1993), as recognized by Aijmer (1997). This focal center of the category is identified by Aijmer (1997: 12) as ‘cogitation’, inferentially extending to the other four senses of think proposed by the author, namely, ‘belief’, ‘opinion’, and ‘intention’. The process that this extension is predicated upon is posited to be metaphoric (Aijmer 1997: 12): “speakers view the formation of an opinion or belief in terms of thinking and borrow the verb think to express the new meanings”. However, the metaphoricity of such semantic extensions is questionable. In fact, the reasoning behind processes of this type would proceed along metonymic lines, not metaphorical. More specifically, it is a case of taking the process to represent the product, a classic instantiation of the conceptual metonymy PROCESS FOR PRODUCT. This is in conformity with Fortescue’s (2001: 32ff.) general proposal that the different senses of epistemic verbs are metonymically underlain. Fortescue (2001: 35) also indicates that the semantic structure of think, rather than being prototypically arranged, should be regarded as organized around a “core meaning” constituting “the lowest common denominator” shared by all the usages of the category. Fortescue (2001: 31) identifies three senses for think, which he phrases the “natural ‘seams’ in our conceptualization of this domain”, i.e., evaluative, propositional (belief-based) and contemplative. The distinction here between the evaluative and belief-based correlates with the differentiation introduced by Preisler (1986, as cited in Aijmer 1997: 10) “between think ‘find’ expressing a subjective attitude and think ‘believe’”.

There are two more aspects with regard to the conceptual make-up of epistemic stance expressions that warrant our close attention, namely, subjectivity and negotiability. Let us discuss the latter concept first. More often than not, it so happens that when a personal opinion is formulated in the interpersonal sphere, it may well be open to negotiation and possible reformulation or co-formulation between the interlocutors. Whether this indeed is the case will depend on the nature of the statement and its formal contour. Langacker (2009: 232ff.) focuses on the latter aspect, conceiving of negotiability in relation to the notions of “polarity” and “illocutionary force”, which together constitute “an interactive system”. The latter concept is defined as concerning “the validity of the proposition expressed by the basic clause” and is factorized into the following “basic values”; question, negative, affirmative (with emphasis), and neutral (non-emphatic) positive (after Langacker 2009: 232). The last three elements, which are of relevance to us, pertain to “polarity”. As Langacker (2009: 234) puts it,

a negotiable proposition (…) involves an epistemic assessment – on the part of a virtual conceptualizer – concerning the existence (…) of the profiled relationship. Whether the speaker identifies with this conceptualizer and subscribes to the assessment depends on how the basic clause is used and interpreted at higher levels. As one facet of this higher-level organization, the proposition expressed is subject to negotiation and evaluation concerning its
possible validity. Polarity and illocutionary force represent interactions at this level. Their incorporation in a basic clause results in an elaborate clause reflecting the speaker’s epistemic stance in regard to the proposition.

To exemplify the notions introduced here, let us consider the constructed examples below (based on Langacker 2009: 231):

(2) Kate says that he will come, but I guess he won’t.
(3) Possibly, he may come, but I don’t think he will.
(4) Surely, he is coming.

The basic clause expressing the negotiable proposition is highlighted in bold and it designates the event encapsulated in He will come/is coming/may come. All the three sentences are related to the future, but they differ in terms of epistemic modality and assessment of the likelihood of the proposition. Sentences (2) and (3) are both contrary to the actual conceptualizer’s stance, while (3) is truly an assertion of the speaker’s personal opinion.

An “indication of non-negotiation” is that the predicate is not negated or put into the interrogative mood (Langacker 2009: 246). To elaborate on that, the verb should also be used in a non-emphatic context. To illustrate this point, Table 1 provides the examples offered by Langacker (2009: 233):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Negation</th>
<th>Affirmative</th>
<th>Positive</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>modals</td>
<td>He will not come</td>
<td>He WILL come</td>
<td>He will come</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>have</td>
<td>He has not come</td>
<td>He HAS come</td>
<td>He has come</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>be</td>
<td>He is not coming</td>
<td>He IS coming</td>
<td>He is coming</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>do</td>
<td>He did not come</td>
<td>He DID come</td>
<td>*He did come</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As noted by Langacker (ibid.), the ungrammaticality of the sentence He did come, where did is unstressed, is due to the fact that do as an auxiliary is only used when the existence of the state of affairs predicated in the basic clause is a matter of “explicit concern”, i.e.:

in cases of questioning, negation, and affirmation, which all involve the consideration of alternatives. It fails to appear in the unmarked situation where the speaker merely directs attention to the clausal proposition, with no felt need to negotiate its validity. In other words, do indicates that existence (occurrence of the profiled relationship) is somehow being negotiated. Instead of just being presented, it is specifically being viewed in relation to other options. (Langacker 2009: 233)

Verbs in simple tenses and non-emphasized positive utterances, in situations “where neither a modal, have, or be, is warranted, and where the existence is
merely being presented rather than being negotiated”, are used without any auxiliary, as in *He came*, which would be the ‘default’ and ‘unmarked’ assertion put forward by the conceptualizer-cum-speaker.

The other aspect of epistemic expressions concerns the notion of subjectivity. This concept is entangled in a complex theoretical discussion, whose influential beginnings are marked by Benveniste’s (1971: 224) statement that subjectivity concerns “the capacity of the speaker to posit himself as ‘subject’” and that it is determined by the “linguistic status of a ‘person’”, which, in turn, is constituted dialogically (ibid.). More specifically, for Benveniste (1971: 226ff.), subjectivity can be said to be grounded in “the exercise of language” and, thereby, in intersubjectivity. Some of the other discussants point out that subjectivity relates to the ever-increasing emotive and attitudinal presence of the speaker in the utterance (Lyons 1982; Traugott 2003, 2010), to the speaker’s (inter)subjective-awareness and the interlocutors’ “mutual coordination of cognitive systems” (Verhagen 2005), or to the extent and nature of the evidential basis of the statement, which can thus be construed as accepting “responsibility” or, perhaps, co-responsibility for the opinions expressed (Nuyts 2012). The notion of subjectivity that we are going to concentrate on here is derived from Langacker’s Cognitive Grammar and is considered by most to be divergent from the other approaches. In this framework, subjectivity is contrasted with objectivity, both of which are understood in terms of what Langacker (1985, 1987, 1999) refers to as a vantage point. Elements that are “put onstage as a focused object of conception” receive an objective construal, whereas those remaining “implicit” and “offstage” are construed subjectively (Langacker 1999: 297). Such subjective elements are marked by “attenuation” of the syntactic subject’s conceptual control, which is transferred to the conceptualizer (ibid.). As Langacker (2006: 28) puts it, “active control by the onstage, objectively construed grammatical subject gives way to experiential control (mental access) on the part of the offstage, subjectively construed conceptualizer, the subject of conception”. Subjective construal and increasingly strengthened control by the conceptualizer can be illustrated on the basis of sentences such as *Morocco has a lot of sun* or *She’s going to cry*, in both of which the grammatical subject is “no longer the locus of” (Langacker 2006: 20) possession or the driving force behind motion, respectively. The relations designated by *be going to* and *have* are thus relegated to the background of conceptualization, acquiring the property of “transparency” with respect to the subject or object of the utterance. More specifically, this means that their subject comes to serve as a “reference point”, supplying “mental access” to the complement (ibid.). For a more in-depth discussion of Langacker’s theory of subjectivity, see Krawczak (in press).

To recapitulate, epistemic stance expressions offer insights into the speaker’s personal view on reality, constructed dialogically in the interpersonal space of interaction. These expressions enable the speaker to shape the unfolding picture of the world and coordinate, as Verhagen (2005) notes, the communicative situation and its mental representation inter-subjectively. Depending on the intersubjective
context and the degree of certainty entertained by the subject with respect to his/her opinions, the epistemic means chosen and the construal of the scene will vary massively so as to do justice to the subjective immersion and intersubjective grounding of the statement made. That being so, from a descriptive point of view, “epistemic meaning” can be regarded “as a functionally anchored cognitive phenomenon” (Boye 2012: 5). It serves to express the speaker’s internal perspective on the surrounding reality and, in doing so, it is inter-subjectively conditioned by a complex set of functional or intentional factors.

This study attempts to examine this cognitive and functional conditioning of epistemicity. More specifically, it considers one of the most basic means of stance-taking, the predicate think, and its near synonyms, believe, guess (US) and suppose (UK), in their most typical use, i.e., the present tense first-person singular occurrences. Such uses of mental state predicates are viewed as playing a performative function (Nuyts 2001; Diessel & Tomasello 2001; Verhagen 2005), whereby the speaker “‘performs’ an epistemic evaluation” (Verhagen 2005: 108). The choice between such different lexical ways of marking the speaker’s epistemic stance is determined by a range of (inter)subjectively motivated variables pertaining to the semantic and grammatical profile of the utterance. We will here concentrate, from a cognitive corpus-based perspective, on a number of cognitive and functional characteristics of stance-taking, delineated in section 2, with a view to identifying the usage profiles of the four predicates, which will be possible through the application of multivariate methodology. From a more coarse-grained perspective, this investigation into the structuring of epistemic stance will allow us to gain a glimpse into how stance-taking and “metarepresentation” are construed (Nuyts 2000: xvi). It will also enable us to explore the intersubjective dimensions of the speaker’s epistemic positioning.

Let us now clearly stipulate our hypotheses with regard to the expected tendencies displayed by the epistemic stance expressions under analysis. On the basis of the above observations, it can be assumed that the verbs think and believe are more likely to be used in contexts where the speaker’s standpoint is strong, fully profiled, and intrinsic to the subject. The two other expressions, guess and suppose, on the other hand, which are cross-dialectal equivalents, are hypothesized to tend toward contexts in which the speaker’s view of reality is much weaker in its subjective importance or immersion and intersubjective grounding. By the same token, they are more likely to be used with statements whose epistemic and evidential status is difficult to judge, e.g., those pertaining to the future or to other subjects’ internal states. This is because in such cases, the speaker does not, for the time being, have and may well never gain direct epistemic insight and so can only approximate the postulated reality on the basis of available indirect inferences.
2. Methodology, data and analysis

The methodology used in the present study can be broadly described as usage-based (Bybee 1985; Langacker 1987, 1988; Geeraerts et al. 1994; Croft 2000; Tomasello 2000). Such an approach assumes that usage is the driving force of language and that units that reoccur frequently across many individual usage events become reinforced (Langacker 1987, 1999). Following Langacker (1987: 494, 1988, 2000: 1ff., 2008: 241), who coined the term usage-based in his seminal 1987 volume, we can state that a symbolic unit emerges for the individual from interaction through the process of entrenchment or reinforcement of semantic and/or phonological features recurrent in many usage events. This process of reinforcement decontextualizes, schematizes and generalizes the input to reveal salient common features, which are interactively useful. There are a number of important methodological consequences of this theoretical framework (after Geeraerts 2010):

(a) Conceptualization, i.e. contextualized meaning, is central to language;
(b) Language is inherently dynamic and heterogeneous;
(c) Language is described probabilistically in terms of “statistical tendencies”, rather than rules.

Another crucial related methodological consequence “is that the psycholinguistic units with which people operate are identified through observation of their language use” and the frequency of the investigated units across many usage events (Tomasello 2000: 62). In other words, it is possible to reveal the conceptual structure behind language structure by analyzing its contextualized use both qualitatively and quantitatively. That being so, this study employs observational data derived from corpora and submits them to qualitative annotation, which is followed by statistical modeling. This specific usage-based approach can be described as corpus-based usage-feature analysis (Geeraerts et al. 1994; Gries 2006; Glynn 2009; Divjak 2010). Let us consider the methodological aspects of the present study more closely.

Approximately five hundred examples of the first-person present tense uses of the verbs in question were extracted from dialogic online diaries of LiveJournal (Speelman 2005) for British English (think, believe, suppose) and American English (think, believe, guess). The nature of the source of the data ensures a comparatively conversational character of the language used. The data were subsequently subjected to meticulous manual annotation for a range of formal, semantic, and functional usage-features. The annotation schema was established on the basis of relevant literature presented in section 1 as well as on two previous studies of epistemic mental state predicates, Krawczak & Glynn (2012) and Krawczak & Kokorniak (2012). For ease of presentation, the variables that are taken into account in the present context are listed in Table 2 and then explained as well as exemplified.
Let us now discuss the factors one by one and provide some illustrative sentences. Epistemic type and epistemic class both concern the specific function performed by the predicate in the utterance. In other words, the question to be posed here is what the predicate does, other than marking epistemic stance or modality: does it convey the speaker’s conviction, opinion, intention or maybe it expresses a prediction? Convictions, which concern personal life, and opinions, which relate to public reality, may be perceived as independent of time in the sense that they can deal with present, past, and future aspects of reality. While intentions and predictions are both future-oriented. The other category, epistemic class, subsumes evaluations and propositions, which are non-evaluative. This variable is more general in its scope than the previous one and draws on Fortescue’s (2001: 31) tri-partite distinction, with the exclusion of what he phrases “mulling over”, which is an activity, not an epistemic stance marker, and so is not applicable here. Let us look at some examples to understand better the distinctions drawn here.

(5) I really do believe I can accomplish a great deal with a big grin (Conviction)
(6) I just think the lyrics and song are both really fookin’ good (Opinion)
(7) Well, Revenge of the Sith is tonight so I do believe that I will go and nap so that I may be awake to witness the wonder that is evil (Intention)
(8) But, in my heart, I believe my chances with Sawaii-san are better than with the other three, which says a whole lot about my confidence levels. (Prediction)
(9) But I guess sometimes it would be nice to hear you tell me i make you happy... (Evaluation)
(10) So, I believe I have decided to go to New York. (Proposition)

The distinction between convictions and opinions is based on the criterion of whether the information expressed concerns the external world, in which case it is more prone to be an opinion, or the speaker him-/herself. In the latter instance, conviction, which is also typified by a higher degree of engagement, is more likely. Intentions and predictions are both oriented toward the future, with the difference

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**Table 2. Annotation Schema**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factors</th>
<th>Features</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Epistemic Type:</td>
<td>Conviction, Intention, Opinion, Prediction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Epistemic Class:</td>
<td>Evaluation, Proposition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Epistemic Mode:</td>
<td>Real, Irreal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argumentativity:</td>
<td>Argumentative, Non Argumentative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evaluation:</td>
<td>Positive, Neutral, Negative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emphasis:</td>
<td>Emphatic, Non-emphatic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negotiability:</td>
<td>Negotiable, Non-negotiable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Profiling/Construal:</td>
<td>Objective, Subjective</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Verifiability:</td>
<td>Verifiable, Non Verifiable</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---
that the former involve the domain of volition. Finally, evaluative statements assess a given aspect of reality, as experienced by the subject, whereas propositions lack this characteristic.

The next factor is epistemic mode, which is further subdivided into real and irreal. This variable has to do with what kind of situation is projected in the utterance. Is it real or does it pertain to the future or imaginary world conjured up by the speaker? It is a relatively straightforward category, which can be evidenced by the examples below:

(11) *I love you guys and I think it's funny that we're all going through the same thing.* (Real)
(12) *Then me, amanda and dixon went to town, sat on a bench for a while granny racing, then we met some old guy who told us that all his teeth had got knocked out when he got hit be a fifteen decker bus!!! LMAO!!! i mean... like what? they dont exist lol!! and if they did, i mean i think itd do more than knock out ur teeth really! lol..* (Irreal)

Sentence (11) speaks of an actual situation that the speaker and his/her interlocutors are experiencing. It is, therefore, real. Example (12), on the other hand, first makes it clear that the circumstances described are impossible to have arisen and then, in addition, it uses the second conditional, which renders the projected event even further hypothetical.

Argumentativity, which comes next in Table 2, is interrelated with another variable, namely, verifiability, as they are both concerned with the nature of the knowledge that the speaker shares with the interlocutor. Depending on which predicate is selected to mark the epistemic stance, what formal and socio-semantic features characterize the utterance, and, of course, what epistemological reserves are tapped into, the statement may be amenable to verification and possible challenge.

(13) *this is a really long post but i havent posted in a while so I would think that you would enjoy it eh?* (Argumentative)
(14) *I think that you are one of the most amazing people I've ever met, and you are going to make so many positive changes to this fucked up world.* (Non Argumentative)
(15) *i completely bombed my first quiz. i really do think i got the lowest score in the class AND i was the last one to turn it in.(Verifiable)
(16) *Still, I believe we are limited only by the constraints of our own belief* (Non Verifiable)

Sentence (13) is explicitly interactive, establishing a dialog with the addressee and possibly opening the statement up to negotiation. For example, one of the recipients might be disappointed with the length of the post, given the long inactivity of the author. It must be noted, however, that the question with which the
sentence finishes can be read as a purely rhetorical device, whereby the speaker
does not really invite any specific reply. This, nevertheless, does not preclude its
occurrence. The sentiment expressed in (14), on the other hand, is a personal
evaluative opinion which cannot be questioned or negated because it is entirely
subjective. Now, when we turn to the verifiability of the knowledge predicated by
epistemic stance verbs, we can see how in (15), the information can be confirmed
or disproved, for instance, by asking other classmates. In (16), in turn, the speaker
makes a statement belonging to the category of personal convictions or beliefs. It
does not refer to confirmable and tangible reality and it has no evidential
foundations.

The next two variables that we will discuss are both based on Langacker’s
(1987) theory of Cognitive Grammar. The first, referred to as negotiability, is
related to the two above factors, but is contingent on some formal characteristics
of use, as discussed in the previous section. The other factor drawing on the
Langackerian framework concerns subjective or objective profiling or construal,
and, as already stated in section 2, it has to do with the construal of the epistemic
event along the dimension of perspective. The examples below, coming from the
present dataset, illustrate the distinction between negotiable vs. non-negotiable and
objective vs. subjective uses of epistemic stance verbs:

(17) I HAVE BEEN ILL MOST OF THE YEAR TO THE POINT WHERE I
WANTED TO KILL MYSELF, I DONT SUPPOSE IT BOTHERS YOU TOO
MUCH. (Negotiable)

(18) it was pretty fun. some things were on my mind, so there were some intense
parts. i thought we were gonna die on the zipper. but I guess thats what
makes it soo fun. (Non Negotiable)

(19) I honestly do believe that things would be better if people just took time to
ASK what was going on instead of just relying on a news update from a site
(objective)

(20) i cant believe kat and i started drinking margaritas at chipotle at 3pm on
saturday and drank until we went to sleep. actually, I can believe it.
(subjective)

In sentence (17), the speaker expresses a very strong opinion with respect to
another person’s emotional attitude in an overt manner. This statement can be
taken up by the addressee, challenged, and thus renegotiated, as the speaker does
not have direct access to other subjects’ emotional states and so may formulate
incorrect judgments. In (18), on the other hand, it is the speaker’s internal and
personal perspective on what constitutes pleasurable experiences for him or her,
which, in itself, others may agree with or not, but there is no real room for
negotiation. Turning now to the examples illustrating the two types of profiling, we
can see how in sentence (19) the epistemic stance marker believe is fully profiled
and is used to express the speaker’s strong belief with regard to the particular
aspect of reality, whereas in (20), the speaker juxtaposes the two profilings of the
predicate. First, believe is used subjectively without its full conceptual content. Rather than introducing the speaker’s stance, it is employed as a pragmatic marker in the function of an emphaser that signals surprise. This is corroborated by how the speaker contrasts this semantically weakened, but discursively strengthened use with the fully profiled epistemic usage in the second part of the utterance.

The remaining two variables are much less complex in terms of their theoretical underpinnings. Evaluation of the event predicated by the epistemic stance marker can be positive, negative or neutral, as illustrated in the sentences below.

(21) *I firmly believe that the last few moments of that episode are some of the most powerful I've ever seen on television.* (Positive)
(22) *i think its horrible for someone to be racist!* (Negative)
(23) *Furthermore, I believe that RadioStar SF will be performing at noon...* (Neutral)

The other factor, emphasis, relates to whether the utterance contains any accentuating features such as the use of intensifying adverbs or adjectives, the presence of swear words, capitalization, or emphatic negative and affirmative statements. The utterance in (17) serves as a perfect example of an emphatic statement. It is capitalized and the speaker is clearly strongly engaged emotionally vis-à-vis the content of the message.

The data tagged for all these variables were submitted to exploratory and confirmatory statistical modeling in the form of correspondence analysis (Glynn 2014) and logistic regression analysis (Speelman 2014), both methods used extensively in present-day research into synonymy and polysemy (e.g., Arppe 2008; Divjak 2010; Glynn & Fischer 2010; Glynn & Robinson 2014). The application of these statistical techniques enables us to reveal verifiable “patterns of use” (Glynn 2009, 2010) that are indicative of the “behavioral profiles” (Gries 2006) of the four epistemic stance expressions relative to their respective dialect and the formal as well as conceptual-functional usage features discussed above.

3. Results

This section presents the results of the multifactorial analysis in two steps. Firstly, an exploratory method in the form of a multiple correspondence analysis is used to identify usage patterns typical of the lexemes relative to dialect and a range of functional features specified in section 3.1. As a second step, a confirmatory method of polytomous logistic regression is applied to verify the descriptive precision and predictive power of the analysis and the identified usage profiles. Before considering the results identified by means of the two statistical methods, let us discuss briefly the techniques.
Correspondence analysis is a multivariate technique allowing us to explore the data in search of patterns of language use (Glynn 2014: 443). It visualizes the results by reducing a multidimensional space into two dimensions in which the distance between data points representing specific characteristics of use is indicative of the degree of association (ibid.). The confirmatory method of polytomous logistic regression employed here has been developed by Arppe (2008) to deal with linguistic research questions regarding the use of multi-level categories such as the many near-synonyms of think. The results are presented in the form of a table that lists all the levels of the explained variable and all the features of the explanatory variables, i.e., factors used in the analysis to account for the behavior of the investigated category. The table also provides estimate values for each level of the explained variable in relation to each feature of each explanatory variable. In addition, it identifies the statistically significant values by not parenthesizing them. The overall performance of the model can be evaluated on the basis of a number of measures that are informative with respect to whether the analysis and the results are descriptively precise and predictively powerful. That said, we can now look at the results, starting with the correspondence analysis.

3.1 Exploratory analysis: Stance predicates and functional usage context

The plot in Figure 1, below, visualizes the interactions between the epistemic stance predicates in relation to the dialect and a number of functional/intentional characteristics of usage: (i) argumentativity, (ii) verifiability, (iii) construal, (iv) epistemic type, and (v) epistemic class. This multifactorial relational space reveals three clusters of usage patterns for the epistemic stance verbs. Before focusing on them individually, there is one general observation to be made. The map of manifold interactions of usage features in Figure 1 clearly shows that the lexemes believe in British and American English and, to an even greater degree, think in the two dialects form their respective clusters regardless of their linguistic setting. While suppose and guess, claimed to be cross-dialectal equivalents, emerge as distinct in use. Let us now consider the fine-grained structuring of the plot and discuss the three specific clusters emerging in it.

First, in the upper part of the plot, believe in British and American English and guess are grouped together, with the latter lexeme lying between the two dialectal exponents of ‘believe’. UK uses of believe and US occurrences of guess are both distinctly associated with statements expressing opinions that are susceptible of verification <Verifiable> and whose content can, therefore, be subject to debate <Argumentative>. Believe in American English, on the other hand, is related to propositions that convey the speaker’s intentions and, to a lesser degree, convictions. The latter feature is a data point lying on the x axis, which means that it is equally attracted to US believe and UK suppose. The lexeme believe in American English is also characterized by subjective construal, which means that unlike its British counterpart or, interestingly, unlike guess, it is here shown to be more prone to be bleached of its conceptual import. This is evidenced by examples such as (24), (25) or (26).
In the first sentence, the speaker uses *I can’t believe* as a purely emphatic discursive marker, rather than an epistemic stance expression, which is further corroborated by the juxtaposition with the second sentence, where s/he demonstrates that there is no disbelief involved. Likewise, in (25) and (26), the expression serves pragmatic purposes of introducing emphasis, rather than stance-taking.

These findings come as a surprise for two reasons. Firstly, it was not expected that *guess* would appear in the usage context of *believe*. As pointed out at the end of section 1, the former verb was hypothesized to belong, along with *suppose*, to predicates weaker in their epistemic stance marking. Whereas, *believe* and *think*, when juxtaposed with the other pair, were assumed to be stronger in this respect. In light of these two assumptions, it would seem more natural for *guess* to be closer in use to *suppose*. The other related reason why the plot brings unexpected results is that, in accordance with the above assumptions, *believe*,

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**Figure 1.** Interaction of the mental predicates relative to dialect and the functional context of use

(24) *I can’t believe* Kat and I started drinking margaritas at Chipotle at 3pm on Saturday and drank until we went to sleep. Actually, *I can believe it.*

(25) *I can’t believe* I’m actually getting a tattoo...

(26) *I can’t believe* this semester is already almost over. *I am so fucking glad. It sucked.*
especially when juxtaposed with guess in the context of the same dialect, should not be closely associated with semantically faded uses. Instead, it should be fully profiled in terms of its epistemic force.

As we move down in the plot to the right-hand bottom quadrant, the next clustering emerges for suppose in British English. The lexeme is associated with statements expressing predictions that are impossible to verify <NonVerifiable> at the moment of speaking and which are, therefore, not an object of debate <NonArgumentative>. The usage feature <Conviction>, which, as already mentioned, lies at the x axis separating the upper and lower right-hand quadrants, is equally shared between UK uses of suppose and US occurrences of believe. This usage profile corresponds to the hypothesis put forward in section 1 and positing that a prediction is likely to be formulated by means of a verb that is weaker in its epistemic stance load. The usage associations emerging for suppose are illustrated by the following examples:

(27) until i find some friends I don’t suppose there is alot of point writing stuff... will update when there is someone to read things (NonArgumentative)
(28) Maybe it's the music that has awakened me now. I don’t suppose it really matters what has. (NonVerifiable)
(29) Libertines album out the morrow! and I can't go anywhere to buy it because I have no money til Thursday, what a sob story I am. But still, I've waited this long I don’t suppose a few more days will hurt. (Conviction)

Finally, in the left-hand quadrant, the lexeme think, regardless of the dialect, is linked to evaluative statements <Evaluation>, which, given the relative distance between the respective data points, is not a distinct association. This predicate is also the most prone to be objectively construed <Construal: Objective>, thus carrying its full semantic load, whereby the speaker takes a conscious epistemic stance on a particular aspect of reality. This finding supports the hypothesis that think is the most basic and prototypical predicate to express the subject’s mental state and so is the most likely to occur most commonly in fully profiled uses. It must be pointed out, nonetheless, that this correspondence does not emerge as a pronounced property, as the feature <Construal: Objective > is not in the immediate context of think and seems to tend toward the left-hand upper quadrant of the plot. Think is also close to one more feature, namely, <Prediction>. However, this characteristic is located in the right-hand quadrant of the plot, where suppose forms its grouping of usage features. It is, therefore, shared by the two lexemes. The usage profile that has thus emerged for think is exemplified below.

(30) i honestly dont think sean could do any better...cause i dont think it gets any better than you! (Evaluation, objective construal)
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(31) o well its ok!! tonite i really wanted to do sum10 with gregg but i really don't think its gunna happen since hes so caught up with everything else no i sound really mean but hes tired after work n just feels like chillin but i wanted to ask him to go to see house of wacks with me (Prediction, objective construal)

In (30), the speaker makes an evaluative statement with respect to somebody else’s performance capacities, with the predicate think clearly profiling in the full semantic range the mental stance in this regard. Similarly, in (31), the stance-taking predicate is semantically fully expressive of the speaker’s predictive opinion, which concerns the coming evening.

3.2 Confirmatory analysis: Stance across and within linguistic contexts

Having identified through the exploratory analysis what usage patterns are associated with which mental state predicate, we can now establish how accurate and predictive they are. This is done by means of a polytomous logistic regression analysis, which determines the predictors that best explain the usage of the epistemic stance markers. Table 3 shows the positive and negative associations for each predicate in relation to its respective linguistic context.

Table 3. Confirmatory Analysis: Epistemic stance predicates relative to dialect

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Non Argumentativity</td>
<td>-0.9706</td>
<td>-0.541</td>
<td>0.531</td>
<td>-0.066</td>
<td>0.226</td>
<td>1.248</td>
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<tr>
<td>Evaluation: Neutral</td>
<td>-0.266</td>
<td>0.368</td>
<td>-0.067</td>
<td>0.230</td>
<td>0.298</td>
<td>-0.665</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Evaluation: Positive</td>
<td>-0.182</td>
<td>0.7014</td>
<td>-0.565</td>
<td>-0.891</td>
<td>0.065</td>
<td>0.158</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Non Emphatic</td>
<td>-0.439</td>
<td>-0.538</td>
<td>1.026</td>
<td>3.536</td>
<td>-1.059</td>
<td>0.548</td>
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<tr>
<td>Epistemic Mode: Real</td>
<td>-0.281</td>
<td>0.9765</td>
<td>0.733</td>
<td>-1.016</td>
<td>-0.8174</td>
<td>-0.015</td>
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<tr>
<td>Epistemic Type: Intention</td>
<td>-1.036</td>
<td>0.782</td>
<td>0.111</td>
<td>-0.558</td>
<td>0.244</td>
<td>0.803</td>
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<tr>
<td>Epistemic Type: Opinion</td>
<td>-1.051</td>
<td>-0.286</td>
<td>0.674</td>
<td>-0.9285</td>
<td>0.410</td>
<td>1.036</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Epistemic Type: Predict</td>
<td>-1.048</td>
<td>0.337</td>
<td>1.861</td>
<td>-0.558</td>
<td>-0.335</td>
<td>0.501</td>
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<tr>
<td>Epistemic Class: Proposition</td>
<td>0.827</td>
<td>0.6897</td>
<td>-0.003</td>
<td>-0.7694</td>
<td>-0.335</td>
<td>-1.529</td>
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<tr>
<td>RL-Negotiability: Non Neg.</td>
<td>-0.388</td>
<td>-0.784</td>
<td>19.4</td>
<td>1.401</td>
<td>-0.8145</td>
<td>-1.017</td>
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<tr>
<td>RL-Subjectivity: Subjective</td>
<td>-0.311</td>
<td>0.324</td>
<td>0.563</td>
<td>0.452</td>
<td>-0.372</td>
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<tr>
<td>Verifiability: Verifiable</td>
<td>0.9299</td>
<td>0.408</td>
<td>0.728</td>
<td>-1.297</td>
<td>-0.708</td>
<td>-1.344</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Null deviance: 1669 on 2820 degrees of freedom
Residual (model) deviance: 1254 on 2742 degrees of freedom

Nagelkerke R²: 0.6034302
McFadden R²: 0.2484116
C statistic: 0.7150314
Before discussing the features that are associated with or disassociated from the predicates, let us briefly consider the formal side of the table. Column 1 lists all the usage features taken into account in the model, while the following six columns provide the estimates for each epistemic stance predicate in its dialectal context in relation to each usage feature. We are only interested here in the unparenthesized values, as they are the ones that have proven significant in predicting the use of the verbs in question (with the alpha level set at \( p < 0.05 \)). The positive scores represent association, whereas the negative values indicate disassociation. The overall performance of the model can be evaluated on the basis of the pseudo R\(^2\) scores as well as the \( C \) statistic value, provided at the bottom of the table. The R\(^2\) measures are both good, with the relevant literature quoting 0.3 and 0.2 as satisfactory for the Nagelkerke R\(^2\) and McFadden R\(^2\), respectively (Lattin et al. 2003: 486; McFadden 1979: 307). The \( C \) statistic measure is lower than what the rule of thumb suggests as an indicator of a predictive model, i.e., 0.8 (Baayen 2008: 204). However, given that it is a multinomial logistic regression analysis, involving as many as six independent levels, the model’s goodness-of-fit is satisfactory.

We can now look at the results, starting with the two verbs argued to be epistemically more expressive, namely, *believe* and *think*. Considering the estimates, it is clear that *believe* in British English is disassociated from non-argumentative statements expressing opinions. It is associated, in turn, with propositional statements whose epistemic content can be verified. In American English, on the other hand, the predicate is predicted by positive evaluation, negotiability of the proposed state of affairs, and statements expressing propositions that concern the real world. These patterns of associations can be illustrated by the following examples.

(32)  *I believe* Whitsunday/Pentecost Sunday is a Catholic holiday, celebrating the descent of the Holy Spirit upon the Apostles and Disciples. (UK *believe*: proposition, verifiable)

(33)  *I honestly do believe* that things would be better if people just took time to *ask* what was going on instead of just relying on a news update from a site. (US *believe*: negotiable, proposition)

(34)  *I really do believe* that high school was a great time and I sometimes wish it hadn't ended so quickly. (US *believe*: positive evaluation, epistemic mode: real)

Now, when we look at the coefficients for *think* in Table 3, we can see how, in British English, it is related in use to emphatic and negotiable epistemic contexts where the speaker makes evaluations, rather than propositions. It also occurs in circumstances where the conceptualized situation concerns the future or an imagined world and is thus technically not real. In American English, in turn, *think* is associated with non-argumentative statements expressing personal opinions which are negotiable but not verifiable, and which are objectively construed. The
last point is important, as it demonstrates that this most prototypical and basic epistemic stance predicate is fully profiled in terms of its semantic content and is not used in semantically weakened contexts. This finding confirms what we have seen in the correspondence analysis.

(35) The world could have stopped at that moment and I don't think I would have even noticed. (US think: opinion, non-verifiable, negotiable, objective construal)

(36) Seriously, I really do think she won't rest until I'm so messed up she can commit me to a mental institution (UK think: emphasis, negotiable, irreal)

Finally, let us turn to the two predicates that are here postulated to be weaker in their epistemic load, i.e., guess, as used in American English, and suppose in British English. The former verb is predicted by non-emphatic uses expressing predictions. While its British equivalent, suppose, is positively associated with both non-emphatic and non-negotiable usage and negatively with verifiable statements expressing opinions or propositions. These usage features support the hypothesis that the two verbs are epistemically weaker. In other words, suppose and guess are more prone to be used in situations where the speaker’s certainty with regard to the epistemic statement made lacks sufficient inter-subjective grounding. It is, therefore, more likely that, as opposed to think and believe, which are semantically more expressive, both these verbs should be related to contexts of non-verifiability or lack of emphasis, and that rather than opinions or propositions (suppose), they should express predictions (guess).

(37) I am, at current, of a frankly teenage frame of mind. Which, I suppose, isn't anything to be ashamed of. (non-emphatic, non-negotiable)

(38) I kinda guess that now with the good folks in Nuremberg again able to set the goals and apportion the time allocations, something like (or better than) SAX3 will get going...pretty quick.. (non-emphatic, predictive)

In example (37), suppose is used not only without the formal presence of any emphatic devices such as intensifying adverbs or the auxiliary do, but it is also parenthesized, being moved to a medial position and inserted in between commas. In (38), guess also has additional properties that clearly point to its non-emphatic usage. It is accompanied by the weakening adverbial kinda, which removes some of its epistemic leverage. In addition, it makes a predictive statement regarding the performance of a team, which corresponds to the hypothesis formulated in section 1 that predictions, representing epistemic stances that the speaker is likely to be less sure of, may be more prone to be introduced by predicates whose epistemic force is not pronounced.

Given the relatively marginal impact of the dialect on the structuring of the data in Figure 1, we will now see how well we can explain the usage tendencies of the predicates when the variable of dialect is removed from the analysis. This is
achieved by means of combining the British and American occurrences of think and believe, neither of which, as the multiple correspondence analysis demonstrates, exhibits any major differences with regard to their linguistic setting. The findings of this second polytomous logistic regression analysis are provided in Table 4.

Table 4. Confirmatory Analysis: Epistemic stance predicates without dialect effects

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Lexeme ~ Epistemic Mode + Argumentativity + Verifiability + Epistemic Type + Epistemic Class + RL-Subjectivity + RL-Negotiability + Emphasis</th>
<th>Log-odds</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Argumentsativity: Non Arg.</td>
<td>think</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emphasis: Non Emphatic</td>
<td>(-0.4318)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Epistemic Mode: Real</td>
<td>-0.6929</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Epistemic Class: Proposition</td>
<td>-1.132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Epistemic Type: Intention</td>
<td>(0.5422)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Epistemic Type: Opinion</td>
<td>1.119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Epistemic Type: Predict</td>
<td>(0.1131)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RL-Negotiability: Non Neg.</td>
<td>-1.268</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RL-Subjectivity: Subjective</td>
<td>-0.9545</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Verifiability: Verifiable</td>
<td>-1.36</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Null deviance: 1192.0 on 1880 degrees of freedom
Residual (model) deviance: 825.4 on 1836 degrees of freedom

McFadden R²: 0.3077
Nagelkerke R²: 0.5884508
C statistic: 0.8157311

The goodness of fit has improved substantially, which is evidenced by the C statistic measure at 0.81 as well as the pseudo R² scores. These values are indicative of a predictive model. Importantly, the explanatory results for the individual predicates overlap with those in Table 3, which adds further support to the hypothesized cline from think, through believe, to suppose and guess, along the dimension of epistemic expressiveness. Since the explanatory variables are largely re-confirmed here, let us only point out the main highlights corroborating the abovementioned cline of epistemicity. Think, which has been assumed to represent a basic epistemic stance marker, is fully profiled in terms of its stance-taking presence, predating statements that express opinions, which are not susceptible of challenging <Argumentativity> or verifying. This point may well indicate that the statements are likely to concern the speaker’s personal life and internal states, whose intersubjective verifiability or proneness to debate may be greatly hindered. Such epistemic stances are also likely to be of great significance to the subject, which means that the predicate is highly unlikely to be semantically bleached of its
epistemic import. It is not clear, however, why think should be disassociated from sentences constituting propositions and concerning real events. Believe is no longer predicted by the disassociation from subjective construal, but it still manifests one feature which corresponds to comparatively focused profiling of the epistemic stance, namely, its emphatic use, as illustrated in (33) or (34). Another property that points to the semantic completeness of think and believe is their disassociation from non-negotiability, which excludes emphasis. The picture changes considerably when we turn to guess and suppose. Their respective usage profiles emerging in Table 4 are both disassociated from emphasis, a property that is clearly reserved for fully profiled occurrences of semantically rich predicates. In other words, the two expressions exhibit usage properties of semantic bleaching, which is characteristic of subjective construal.

4. Conclusion

The present study combined Cognitive and Functional linguistic frameworks with an advanced multifactorial quantitative approach and applied this theoretically coherent and methodologically sound model to the analysis of epistemicity. More specifically, it investigated the use of the most salient verbal exponent of the category, think, and its three synonyms, believe, guess and suppose. All the occurrences of these predicates were considered from a cross-dialectal perspective in their most canonical performative function, as realized by first-person singular present tense uses. The analysis of these epistemic expressions accounted in great detail for the multifaceted cognitive and inter-subjective usage context in which epistemic stance is interactively constructed. To ensure the dialogic character of the examples, they were extracted from highly interactive online diaries. They were subsequently subjected to meticulous qualitative analysis for semantic and pragmatic usage features constituting the multifactorial intersubjective and cognitive grounding for stance-taking. Following that, multivariate exploratory and confirmatory methods in the form of multiple correspondence analysis and polytomous logistic regression analysis were employed to model the usage tendencies of the predicates. This allowed us to identify the dialect-sensitive and dialect-independent usage profiles of the four epistemic expressions.

The usage tendencies identified for the four predicates partly support the initial hypotheses, but also reveal some unexpected patterns of use. With regard to the quantitative evidence supporting the hypotheses put forward toward the end of section 1, a cline has emerged along the parameter of epistemic expressivity, ranging from think through believe, to guess and suppose. The features correlated with the verbs and constituting their usage profiles show that the speaker’s choice is contingent on the level of certainty or epistemic commitment to the statement made, a characteristic pointed out in section 1. Statements that are more firmly grounded inter-subjectively are more likely to be headed by think or believe, whereas those that are weaker in this respect have been shown to be more liable to
be introduced by *guess* or *suppose*. It has also been demonstrated that although it is possible to identify some subtle differences across the dialectal divide, in fact, the distinctions revealed are not very conspicuous. The reason for this might be that more data are needed, an objective that will be achieved in a forthcoming study (Glynn & Krawczak forth.).

**Notes**

1. I wish to express my gratitude to Antti Arppe, Dylan Glynn, Kris Heylen and Dirk Speelman for sharing with me their expertise in statistics. I would also like to thank the anonymous reviewers for helpful insights and corrections. Any remaining shortcomings are my own.

2. At this juncture, it is revealing to note, following Aijmer (1997), that the expressions of epistemic stance will differ not only in terms of how reliable the reality they project and make a statement on is, but also in terms of at least two other categories introduced by Chafe (1986: 263), namely, the "source of knowledge" and the "mode of knowing". The latter category is subdivided by Chafe (1986) into (a) belief, whose source of knowledge is unknown, but which is the most reliable; (b) induction, which has an evidential basis, slightly weaker in its reliability; (c) hearsay, originating in communication and so intermediary in terms of credibility; and, finally, (d) deduction, which is hypothetical in nature and, therefore, the weakest with regard to reliability. Interestingly, however, unlike Aijmer (1997), Chafe (1986: 266) subsumes *I think*, *I suppose* and *I guess* under the category "belief or opinion" along with the verb *believe*. This, in light of Chafe's typology, would suggest that the degree of reliability these predicates allow is identical for all of them. However, Aijmer's (1997) scale of reliability, which corresponds to the categorization put forward by Lehrer (1974: 139, cited in Cappelli 2007: 85), appears to be more intuitively interpretable in that *I believe* or *I think* does make a more pronounced statement and has more leverage than *I guess* or *I suppose*. However, the notions of the source of knowledge and its mode are essential, as they concern such facets of epistemicity as verifiability or argumentativity (see section 2), which are of importance to the present study.

3. Questions are not pertinent here, since the present study concentrates on present-tense first-person singular uses of the epistemic stance verbs in the affirmative.

4. Entrenchment is also known as "routinization", "automatization", or "habit formation" (Langacker 2000: 3).

5. It should be pointed out here that convictions and opinions correspond to what Aijmer (1997: 12) refers to as beliefs. She also subsumes intentions among the senses of *think*.

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Constructing meaning in L2 discourse
The case of modal verbs and sequential dependencies

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Abstract
This paper offers a multifactorial corpus-based approach to modal stance in L2 discourse. Focusing on may and can's patterns of use in French- and Chinese-English interlanguage, the study examines how L2 speakers exploit may/can's grammatical contexts and construct modal meaning by cutting across the boundaries of morphology, syntax and semantics. Specifically, the study discusses how: (i) the combined effects of pairs of grammatical features (such as negation and voice) in may/can's grammatical context systematically influence learners' lexical choices and (ii) how the nature of those effects varies across French- and Chinese-English interlanguage. Using regression modeling, I investigate 5088 contextualized occurrences of may/can annotated according to sixteen grammatical features and analyzed based on fourteen pair combinations of those features. Overall, the regression reveals that contextual linguistic features relate to one another in ways that influence native speakers and English learners differently. It also emerges that while both types of speakers share a common modal constructional schema for may and can, learners and native speakers differ in the way they instantiate the schema linguistically.

Words and other sorts of linguistic structure are not intrinsically meaningful but are used by speakers to actively construct meaning
(Coulson 2006: 256)

1. Introduction

1.1 Constructing (L2) meaning
In the usage-based tradition, language is dynamic in nature. Linguistic structure is in constant change as a result of speakers' on-going processing and storage of information and the shape of language is fundamentally grounded in usage events (Kemmer & Barlow 1999). Knowing a language therefore results from the experience of actual speech events. Crucially, this approach to language assumes no dichotomy between syntax and lexicon. Instead, it involves acquiring a very large amount of co-occurrence data: tense t and number n require subject-verb agreement with morpheme m, idiom i consists of word w and word x, communicative function f is communicated with intonation curve c, etc. Those co-
occurrences, or constructions, are “form-meaning mappings conventionalized in the speech community, and entrenched as language knowledge in the learner's mind” (Ellis 2008: 2). Importantly, constructions represent the basic grammatical units that form the structured inventory of speakers' knowledge (Ellis and Ferreira-Junior 2009). As such, they relate “the defining properties of their morphological, syntactic, and lexical form with particular semantic, pragmatic, and discourse functions” (Ellis 2008: 2). Crucially, within constructions, linguistic forms are assumed to compete with one another: “forms are stored in associative maps [...] and the selection of forms is governed by cue strength within a competitive central syntactic processor” (MacWhinney 2008: 342). By being exposed repeatedly to individual linguistic instances (or exemplars), speakers are able to extract generic information about a given linguistic category. In other words, speakers are able to identify groups of attributes that characterize that category and as a result, they acquire a more abstract knowledge of that category. Cross-linguistically, cues are instantiated in different ways. Speakers assign them varying degrees of strength, which makes producing native-like form-meaning mappings (i.e. native-like constructions) a challenging task for second language learners. The difficulty lies particularly in abstracting away the many form-function mappings that learners have acquired for their native language and to not let those mappings interfere with the production of the target language. In that respect, as Ellis & Sagarra (2011: 593) explain, learners’ experience of form-function relations represents a “processing bias” that affects their cue learning in L2 and cause them to produce construction patterns that deviate from the native norm.

1.2 Constructing modal meaning: A challenge for the L2 learner

The complexity of the two linguistic forms may and can is a hurdle for English learners. As near synonyms in the domain of modality, the main difficulty for learners is to fully grasp the two modals' semantic relations and particularly their overlapping meanings (cf. Leech 1969, Coates 1983, Collins 2009, among others). Both may and can cover simultaneously the meanings of possibility, permission and ability, making it difficult to distinguish between their various senses (Leech 1969, Coates 1983). However, corpus-based studies on modal verbs in native English such as Leech (2004) strongly suggest that constructing modal meaning reaches beyond modal verbs per se and it requires speakers to take full advantage of the modals' grammatical contexts in order to formalize modal stance. In that respect, Klinge & Müller (2005) have recognized that in order to capture modal meaning, analyses must be contextualized such that they cut across the boundaries of morphology, syntax, semantics and pragmatics and involve all dimensions from cognition to communication.

Cutting across those boundaries and thereby reconstructing the grammatical contexts that native English speakers associate may and can with, is precisely what English learners wrestle with. As Smadja (1989: 164) notes, “[l]anguage learners often stumble across co-occurrence relations”. Qualitative empirical work by Guo (2005) on the uses of modal verbs by Chinese English learners demonstrates how
non-native writers fail to understand the colligational requirement and the semantic prosody of particular linguistic patterns even though they use the forms correctly, and how, as a result, they either fail to reproduce multiword sequences or they produce them in a deviant way. Interestingly however, Guo (2005) observes systematicity in the way Chinese English learners integrate modal verbs to their grammatical environments. He notes, “modal verbs do not occur randomly but with a strong tendency to co-occur with other lexical or grammatical words to form a systematic relationship within a wider environment”. The interesting aspect of Guo's study lies in its potential implications for the linguistic realization of modal stance in L2 discourse. His work suggests that learners take advantage of the modals' grammatical contexts in ways that set them apart from native speakers. In addition, his work, which focuses exclusively on Chinese-English interlanguage, raises the question whether or not learners with different native linguistic backgrounds construct modal meaning by utilizing grammatical contexts in the same way.

1.3 Investigating L2 discourse: Current limitations
1.3.1 Second language phraseology
Research in second language phraseology has played an important role in improving our understanding of how non-native speakers construct discourse in their second language. A central aspect of this research includes work conducted on collocations and colligations (see Henriksen (2012) for an overview on research on L2 learners' collocational knowledge). This focus on collocations/colligations is mainly motivated by the fact that “[l]anguage is rich in collocational and colligational restrictions and semantic prosodies [and that] the phrase is the basic level of language where form and meaning meet with greatest reliability” (Ellis 2008:6). Further, from an acquisitional standpoint, multi-word units are not only part of what we learn when we learn a language (Kennedy 2008:36) but larger sequences of collocations or lexical phrases also satisfy learners' search for meaningful chunks (Ellis 1997:1). The collocational knowledge of native and non-native speakers differs in two ways: quantitatively (see Granger 1998; Altenberg & Tapper 1998, Virtanen 1998, Granger & Rayson 1998, amongst others) and qualitatively. With regard to the latter, learners' deviance patterns are very subtle:

[deviations] do not often take the form of explicit errors. Advanced L2 learners may produce phrases and expressions which, considered individually, are correct, in the sense that they do not violate the L2 rules of morphology, syntax, semantics, etc. However, the cumulative effect of the use of certain phrases rather than others may give the impression of non-nativeness. (Leśniewska 2006:99)

Corroborating with Guo (2005), Nesselhauf (2005) shows how learners' collocational knowledge differ from that of native speakers at different linguistic levels such as the verb phrase level, the noun phrase level and the prepositional
phrase level. L2 discourse patterns also vary structurally. With noun phrases, for instance, Nesselhauf (2005) reports on inappropriate mappings of nouns onto constituents (feed computers with data vs. feed data to the computers), missing constituents or issues of constituent order.

Although this body of research provides us with valuable clues on L2 discourse construction, it also yields a main limitation that prevents us from drawing a more comprehensive and psychologically-grounded picture of the mechanisms at play during the construction of modal stance in L2 discourse. Collocations are treated as linguistic chunks which analysts preselect, extract from native and learner corpora and then analyze in terms of their frequencies across learner and native data (see DeCock et al. 1998, Granger 1998). This means that collocations are approached as fixed combinations of either specific co-occurring words or parts of speech. From a usage-based standpoint, this approach is problematic because it ignores that constructions are form-meaning mappings in which morphological, syntactic and lexical forms compete and which, as such, bear semantic discourse functions. At this point, building a more realistic picture of learners' collocational knowledge involves approaching phrases or constructs as flexible combinations of grammatical features rather than rigid units.

1.3.2 Multifactorial approaches to learner language

In the field of learner language, recent corpus and experimental studies such as Gries & Wulff (2009) as well as a growing body of research by Gries & Deshors strongly suggest that grammatical contexts and cognitive processes are two factors that influence simultaneously the shape of interlanguage discourse. In that regard, Deshors (forthc.) and Deshors & Gries (2014) have specifically focused on may and can lexical choices by French and Chinese English learners. Those studies solidly support the existence of systematic differences between the co-occurrence patterns of may and can in French- and Chinese-English interlanguage and native English. Crucially, they also demonstrate how cognitive routines trigger such differences. Deshors & Gries (2014), for instance, is based on a fine-grained analysis of contexts of may and can involving 98 semantic and grammatical features using logistic regression modeling. The authors identified six grammatical features that are correlated with non-native patterns of use of may and can (clause type, semantics of the modalized lexical verbs, subject number, referent (in)animacy, type of referent (in)animacy and negation).

The multifactorial approach also helps the authors make a connection between degrees of grammatical complexity of speakers' utterances and learners' lexical choices during second language production. For instance, they observe that can rather than may is more frequently used by French English learners (compared to native speakers) in more complex grammatical environments such as negated or subordinated linguistic contexts. Ultimately, this finding is compatible with the assumption that grammatical complexity constrains learners’ lexical choices and with Rohdenburg’s (1996) complexity principle, which states that speakers resort to a default term when are under a high processing load. Although multifactorial
approaches represent an important step forward towards furthering our understanding of L2 discourse construction, they nonetheless currently present one main caveat. So far they have been applied in a way that overlooks the relational nature of language structure. As Langacker (2000:3) notes, one of our main abilities as speakers is to “establish relationships”. That is,

to conceive of [linguistic] entities in connection with one another (e.g., for the sake of comparison, or to assess their relative position), not just as separate, isolated experiences. This is linguistically important because relationships figure in the meaning of almost all expressions, many of which (e.g., verb, adjectives, prepositions) actually designate relationships. (Langacker 2000:3)

Against this background, one may question to what extent the context of use of may and can involves relationships between linguistic features and to what extent those relationships may interfere with the uses of may and can in L2. In other words, while Deshors & Gries (2014) observe that individual grammatical features in the context of may and can influence learners in their uses of the two modals, it remains to be investigated whether combinations of linguistic features in such same contexts also interfere with the uses of may and can. With such question in mind, the present study seeks to build on Deshors & Gries' (2014) study and delve even more into the grammatical context of occurrence of the two modal verbs. Ultimately, this work aims to draw a clearer picture of how L2 learners formalize modal stance and to establish whether

- the combined effects of pairs of grammatical features (such as negation and voice) in may/can’s grammatical context systematically influence learners' uses of the two modal forms; and how
- the nature of those effects varies across French and Chinese English.

2. Methods

The study compares the uses of may and can in two language varieties (i.e., native and learner English) and across two learner English varieties (i.e., French- and Chinese-English IL). The main focus is on the patterns of use of the two modals and, specifically the grammatical features that co-occur with may and can and that learners utilize to realize modal meaning. In order to first identify characteristic patterns within the two learner varieties and then contrast those patterns across learner varieties, may and can were analyzed on the basis of a total of 81408 data points, following the two main methodological steps below:
1. 5088 contextualized occurrences of may and can were retrieved from a corpus of written native, French- and Chinese-English IL, annotated manually according to semantic and morpho-syntactic features (annotation scheme described below);
2. the native and French- and Chinese-English data were analysed statistically using a logistic regression statistical technique in order to discern any systematic differences between the may/can's patterns of uses across the three language varieties.

2.1 Data/corpus data
The data consist of instances of may and can produced by native English speakers, non-native English speakers whose first language is French and non-native English speakers whose first language is Chinese. The occurrences of may and can were extracted from three untagged corpora: The Louvain Corpus of Native English Essays (LOCNESS) and the French and Chinese subsections of the International Corpus of Learner English (ICLE). The three corpora included in the study are comparable in that they all consist of essays of approximately 500 words, all dealing with similar topics such as crime, education, Europe, university degrees, among others. The non-native data consist of essays written by advanced English learners in their third and fourth year at university as students of English.

Table 1, below, summarizes the number of occurrences of the may and can throughout the entire dataset, both in their affirmative and negated forms.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>may/can</th>
<th>Modal form</th>
<th>Native English, French- and Chinese-English IL (LOCNESS ICLE-CH &amp; ICLE-FR)</th>
<th>Native English (LOCNESS) French-English IL (ICLE-FR)</th>
<th>Chinese-English IL (ICLE-CH)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>may</td>
<td>may</td>
<td>1086</td>
<td>410</td>
<td>343</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>may not</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1186</td>
<td>466</td>
<td>366</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>can</td>
<td>can</td>
<td>3194</td>
<td>1072</td>
<td>983</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>cannot</td>
<td>471</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>212</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>can’t</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>can not</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>3902</td>
<td>1322</td>
<td>1290</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2.2 Extracting the data and operationalising the variables
The data were extracted using the software R (cf. R Development Core Team 2010). An R script was written to retrieve all occurrences of may and can from the data and to import the data into a spreadsheet software to allow for the annotation process which involved coding each occurrence of may/can according to a total of 16 co-occurring semantic and morpho-syntactic features and operationalized as variables. Each grammatical feature or variable was annotated for a range of levels.
Constructing meaning in L2 discourse

Table 2 presents an overview of the range of variables included in the study and their respective levels.

Table 2. Overview of the variables used in the annotation of the native, French- and Chinese-English data and their respective levels

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Levels</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>data</td>
<td>Corpus</td>
<td>native, Chinese, French</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>GramAcc (acceptability)</td>
<td>yes, no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>syntactic</td>
<td>Neg (negation)</td>
<td>affirmative, negated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SentenceType</td>
<td>declarative, interrogative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CTType (clause type)</td>
<td>main, coordinate, subordinate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>morphological</td>
<td>Form</td>
<td>can, may (and their negated forms)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SubjMorph</td>
<td>adj., adv., common noun, proper noun, relative pronoun, date, noun phrase, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(subject morphology)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SubjectPerson</td>
<td>1, 2, 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SubjectNumber</td>
<td>singular, plural</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Voice</td>
<td>active, passive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Aspect</td>
<td>neutral, perfect/progressive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SubjRefNumber</td>
<td>singular, plural</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(subject referent number)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>semantic</td>
<td>Senses</td>
<td>dynamic, other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>VerbSemantics</td>
<td>abstract, general action, action incurring transformation, action incurring movement, perception, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SubjectAnim</td>
<td>animate, inanimate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(subject referent animacy)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>AnimType</td>
<td>animate, floral, object, place/time, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(type of subject animacy)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>VerbType</td>
<td>achievement, accomplishment, process, state</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(type of modalized lexical verb)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

To ensure a thorough treatment of the data, each variable was encoded according to an encoding taxonomy established to allow for its measurement and its consistent treatment across the three sub-corpora. Throughout the annotation process, the assignment of semantic features to each occurrence of the two modals represented a crucial methodological step, particularly in relation to the variables Senses, VerbType and VerbSemantics. Broadly, the variable Senses encodes the semantic interpretations of *may* and *can* as two modals belonging to the semantic domain of possibility and each level included in the variable Senses reflects a particular facet of that semantic domain. The VerbType variable marks the types of lexical verbs used alongside *may* and *can*. Conceptually, the VerbType variable follows Vendler (1957:143) in its recognition that the notion of time is crucially related to the use of a verb and is “at least important enough to warrant separate treatment”. Like VerbType, VerbSemantics targets lexical verbs used alongside *may/can* and identifies the type of information that they convey in terms of abstraction, action,
communication, etc. The internal organization of this variable results from a careful bottom-up approach rather than any particular theoretical framework. Examples (1) and (2) illustrate the annotation of the levels abstract and mental/cognition for VerbSemantics:

(1) for we may also let our imagination wander, disregarding the external concrete reality that imprisons us (ICLE-FR-UCL-0036.3) – abstract
(2) her search for the final touch can be seen as a search for harmony (ICLE-FR-UCL-0039.2) – mental/cognitive

Another semantic variable whose taxonomy resulted from a through bottom-up approach is AnimType. AnimType identifies the types of (in)animacy of the subject referents. Table 3, below, provides an overview of the levels included under AnimType and thereby provides an illustration of the level of granularity that this type of methodological approach allows us to reach.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable Type</th>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Variable levels</th>
<th>Examples</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Semantic AnimType</td>
<td>animal</td>
<td>birds</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>flora</td>
<td>plant</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>human</td>
<td>people, guy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>imaginary being</td>
<td>fictional beings, character</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>nationals</td>
<td>Americans, Europeans</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>social role</td>
<td>shop owners; scientists</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(pseudo) cleft structure</td>
<td>it may be predicted that</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>abstract</td>
<td>cultural differences, problems, power</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>action</td>
<td>reading, prayer</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>form/substance</td>
<td>drugs, radioactive materials</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>group</td>
<td>Parliament, committees</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>mental/emotional</td>
<td>consciousness, imagination</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>object/artifact</td>
<td>computers, missiles</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>place/time</td>
<td>1993, countries</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>process</td>
<td>changes, progress</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>state</td>
<td>existence, knowing</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2.3 Statistical evaluation
The statistical approach adopted in the current work involves logistic regression modeling. Binary logistic regression is a confirmatory statistical technique that allows the analyst to identify possible correlations between the dependent and the independent variables. Ultimately, this statistical approach allows us to see what factors influence learners' choices of may and can. In the present study, this statistical approach provides a way to establish whether the same co-occurring
grammatical features influence French and Chinese English learners in their uses of *may* and *can*.

The regression analysis was conducted using a stepwise modeling approach (using the R function stepAIC). This is a procedure that allows analysts to reach a minimal adequate regression model by discarding first insignificant interactions and then individual variables that were not significant and did not participate in a significant interaction. For the regression, all occurrences of *may* and *can* across English varieties were subjected to a generalized linear model that was applied using the GLM function in R. The model included the following independent variables:

- Form as the dependent variable with the only two levels: *May* and *can*;
- Corpus, GramAcc, Neg, Senses, VerbType, VerbSemantics, SubjAnim, AnimType, SubjNumber, SentenceType, CIType, SubjPers, SubjMorph, Aspect, Voice, as independent variables in the form of main effects;
- all these variables interactions with Corpus as additional predictors (to see which predictors may potentially cause *may* and *can* to behave differently in native and learner English);
- all these variables interactions with Corpus as well as one another (e.g., Corpus:VerbSem:Voice)

In what follows, I present the results of the two logistic regression models. I first briefly discuss overall generalities of the regression results. In a second step, I take a closer look at the specific combinations of grammatical features that influence English learners' uses of the two modals.

3. Results

3.1 General results

Overall, the final GLM model reveals a relatively high correlation between the predictors and speakers' choice of *may* and *can* (Likelihood ratio = 910.27, df = 62, \( p<151 \)) and a relatively high classification accuracy (\( C=0.77 \))^3. Table 4 below, shows a summary of the (marginally) significant predictors and interaction terms identified by the model including their degrees of freedom and statistical significance.

Based on Table 4, it is clear that investigating modal stance (in L2) requires to take full account of the grammatical contexts of modal verbs. To the exception of GrammAcc which is not a grammatical feature *per se*, nine linguistic features are found to contribute highly significantly to the expression of possibility and probability across native and learner language (the semantics of the modalized lexical verb, aspect, subject person, voice, morphology of the subject, type of
subject animacy, clause type and subject number). What is perhaps more interesting, however, is that three of those linguistic features (verb type, voice and subject animacy) influence native speakers and learners differently. In other words, in the context of those features, native speakers and learners are predicted to use *may* and *can* in different ways. What is even more interesting at this point is that those features only influence speakers differently when they occur in the specific context of other grammatical features. This finding is revealed by the four three-way interactions in Table 4 (Neg:VerbType:Corpus, Neg:Corpus:SubjAnim, Aspect:Neg:Corpus, Voice:Corpus:SubjAnim). Based on those interactions, native speakers and learners only use *may* and *can* differently when negation and verb type are taken into consideration simultaneously. Likewise, they use *may* and *can* differently when negation and subject animacy, aspect and negation and voice and subject animacy are also considered as co-occurring pairs of grammatical features. Overall, these results bring a new perspective on the complexity of L2 discourse: not only individual contextual grammatical features matter to speakers in their uses of *may* and *can* but also how those features relate to one another contextually (i.e., as combinations of features) and thereby influence speakers' linguistic choices. Below, I briefly discuss the nature of the effects focusing specifically on the four three-way interactions identified by the regression model.

Table 4. Summary table of the significant variables and interactions yielded across the French- and Chinese-English data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Predictor</th>
<th>Chisq (df) sign.</th>
<th>Predictor</th>
<th>Chisq (df) sign.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>VerbSemantics</td>
<td>56.568 (4) ***</td>
<td>VerbType:Corpus</td>
<td>18.065 (4) **</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aspect</td>
<td>24.036 (1) ***</td>
<td>Voice:Corpus</td>
<td>5.419 (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SubjPers</td>
<td>101.957 (2) ***</td>
<td>Corpus:SubjAnim</td>
<td>6.544 (2) *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voice</td>
<td>89.536 (1) ***</td>
<td>GrammAcc:Corpus</td>
<td>6.289 (2) *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SubjMorph</td>
<td>56.147 (5) ***</td>
<td>Neg:VerbType:Corpus</td>
<td>14.571 (6) *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AnimType</td>
<td>61.120 (9) ***</td>
<td>Neg:Corpus:SubjAnim</td>
<td>12.115 (3) **</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SentenceType</td>
<td>38.592 (1) ***</td>
<td>Aspect:Neg:Corpus</td>
<td>6.883 (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GrammAcc</td>
<td>17.863 (1) ***</td>
<td>Voice:Corpus:SubjAnim</td>
<td>6.505 (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ClType</td>
<td>24.231 (2) ***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SubjNumb</td>
<td>9.318 (1) **</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3.2 Multifactorial results

The multifactorial results focus on the four three-way interactions involving the variable Corpus (i.e., English variety): Neg:VerbType:Corpus, Neg:Corpus:SubjAnim, Aspect:Neg:Corpus, and Voice:Corpus:SubjAnim. Beginning with Neg:VerbType:Corpus, Figure 1 presents a graphic representation of the nature of the effect.

Based on Figure 1, below, grammatical contexts including a neutral aspect does not seem to influence French and Chinese English learners both in negated
and affirmative cases. In affirmative context, both learner populations make lexical choices that are relatively native-like. In negated contexts, however, both the French and the Chinese tend to slightly underuse may compared to native speakers (more so for the French than the Chinese learners). More interesting cases, however, are those including a perfective/progressive aspect combined with a negated clause. It is in such contexts that Chinese and French English learners not only differ the most form each other but also from the native norm. More specifically, in negated perfective/progressive contexts, although both learner populations make non native-like lexical choices, those choices differ in nature: the French learners exclusively use may (while native speakers use it about eighty percent of the time) and the Chinese learners underuse it by selecting it about fifty percent of the time. It is interesting to note here that the negation seems to cause the two learner populations to behave differently. This observation is mainly based on the fact that in affirmative cases, although French and Chinese learners still make non native-like choices, the two learner populations behave similarly by significantly overusing can.

![Bar plots of relative frequencies of Neg x Corpus x Aspect](image)

*Figure 1.* Bar plots of relative frequencies of Neg x Corpus x Aspect
In the second three-way interaction, Neg:Corpus:SubjAnim (see Figure 2), negation continues to set apart native speakers and learners. This time, it is when negation co-occurs with animate subjects that the two learner populations make different lexical choices. In those contexts, native speakers tend to use *can* eighty percent of the time; the rest of the time they use *may*. Learners, however, tend to underuse *may*, particularly the French English learners.

The third interaction, Neg:VerbType:Corpus (see Figure 3), provides yet another example of the importance to approach grammatical contexts as combinations of linguistic features that relate to one another and whose combined effects influence the shape of speakers’ discourse.

![Figure 2](image)

*Figure 2.* Bar plots of relative frequencies of Neg x Corpus x SubjAnim

In the case of negation and verb type, it is mostly when state verbs and accomplishment and achievement verbs co-occur with a negated clause that French and Chinese English learners deviate the most from the native norm. With state verbs, both learner populations tend to overuse *may*; this is particularly the case for the French learners who use *can* exclusively with negated state verbs. With accomplishment and achievement verbs, the French learners also underuse *may*,

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*Sandra Deshors*
but the Chinese learners slightly overuse it compared to native speakers. Interestingly, we observe here that negation has no effect on process verbs. Similarly to negated contexts, in affirmative contexts, main differences in speakers' uses of *may* and *can* are also observed in relation to state and accomplishment/achievement verbs. However, in both cases, only one learner population deviates from the native norm while the other one makes relatively native-like lexical decisions. Concretely, with accomplishment and achievement verbs, the French learners underuse *may* compared to native speakers and the Chinese learners. With state verbs, however, the Chinese learners are those who deviate from the norm by also underusing *may*.

**Figure 3.** Bar plot of relative frequencies of Neg x Corpus x VerbType

In the final interaction, Voice:Corpus:SubjAnim (see Figure 4), the combinations of a passive voice with an inanimate subject and an active voice with both animate and inanimate subjects trigger different uses of *may* and *can* across the three types of speakers in focus. In the first case, only the French learners seem to be influenced by the combined effect of a passive voice and an inanimate subject. As a result, they tend to overuse *may* compared to the native speakers and the Chinese learners. In the case of an active voice and an animate subject, both learner
populations slightly underuse *may*; the same pattern is observed in the case of an active voice with an inanimate subject – although the Chinese learners deviate from the native norm more than the French learners do.

**Figure 4.** Bar plots of relative frequencies of Corpus x SubjAnim x Voice

4. **Discussion and concluding remarks**

This study was set out to explore in an innovative way how English learners formalise modal meaning in L2 discourse with a view to examine how and to what extent different English learner populations (i.e., French and Chinese) exploit the grammatical contexts of *may* and *can* in order to express possibility and probability. At the onset of the study, contextual grammatical features were recognized to play an essential part in the uses of English modal verbs (Leech 1969, 2004). Those grammatical contexts were also reported to (i) influence English learners in ways that prevent them from using *may* and *can* native-likely and (ii) to vary in nature across L2 varieties (Gries & Deshors (2014), Deshors (forthc.)). However, despite the methodological sophistication of Gries & Deshors'
multifactorial studies which, to date, provide state-of-the-art fine-grained quantitative analyses of *may/can* in L2, the interconnectedness of the linguistic features in *may* and *can*'s contexts of use and its effects on learners' uses of *may* and *can* remains to be examined. In order to conduct such an examination, I adopted a comprehensive data annotation scheme and I used logistic regression modeling. With this methodological approach I was able to analyze the mutual interactions between sixteen linguistic features in the grammatical contexts of *may* and *can* and assess to what extent their combination constrains the lexical choices of French and Chinese English learners.

In contrast with traditional studies of modal verbs in L2 (which have approached modal verbs in isolation from their contexts of use; see Aijmer 2002 and Neff *et al.* 2003 amongst others), the present work shows how those contexts and, crucially, their composition, are in fact inherent to the uses of *may* and *can*. Therefore, the way contextual grammatical features relate to one another should not be taken for granted. This is because those relations explain structural variation across learner varieties. The case of negation provides a particularly good illustration of this view: when considered on its own, negation is not observed to trigger variation across native and learner English varieties. However, when it co-occurs with other features such as animate subjects and accomplishment/achievement verbs or state verbs, then all English speakers in focus (i.e., French- and Chinese-English learners and native speakers) use *may* and *can* differently. The same observation is made in cases where a passive voice co-occurs with an animate subject. From a usage-based perspective, the above results can be explained by the fact that “[g]rammar resides in patterns of composition, which take the form of constructional schemas” (Langacker 2000:20). Langacker further notes that

> [c]ollectively, these patterns sanction the progressive assembly of expressions at any size and degree of symbolic complexity. At any given level of organization, a construction or constructional schema includes component and composite structure linked by relationships of correspondence and categorization (Langacker 2000: 20) [emphasis added]

Against this background, we may infer that the observed combinations of linguistic features observed in the contexts of *may* or *can* represent linguistic structures that are themselves part of a larger constructional schema shared by learners and native speakers. Figure 5 presents a schematic representation of such a modal constructional schema that captures the complexity of modal stance construction across both English varieties.
Based on Figure 5, *may*/*can* constructional schemas are formed of two symbolic structures: a primary (and necessary) structure which consists of the combination of two contextual linguistic features and which ultimately contributes to shaping the uses of *may* and *can*. The second structure is a higher-level structure which consists of the primary combination and a modal verb (here *may* or *can*). It is interesting to note here that at an abstract (or schematic) level, native speakers and learners do not vary: Both types of speakers utilize *may* and *can*’s grammatical contexts in the same way; that is by combining contextual linguistic features. However, at a more concrete level (i.e., at the level of individual linguistic instances), both types of speakers (as well as both types of learners, French and Chinese) instantiate the *may/can* constructional schema differently, thus leading to the differences observed across English varieties. Overall, this result corroborates with Deshors (forthc.) who finds that different degrees of schematization reveal different degrees of similarity between L2 constructions and their native counterparts and that, linguistically, learners tend to represent abstract constructs systematically differently compared to natives.

Generally, the current results support the usage-based notion that discourse production involves combining linguistic structures. In that regard, Langacker writes that as speakers,

> [w]e are [...] capable of grouping a set of entities – on the basis of similarity, proximity or some other relationship – and manipulating that group as a unitary entity for higher-order purposes. This dual process (grouping and manipulating as a unitary entity) amounts to conceptual reification (Langacker 2000:3)

From the perspective of (L2) discourse construction, it emerges from the present study that speakers do not tend to use modal verbs and construct modal stance in a linear fashion. Instead, they proceed in two sequential steps: One step which involves speakers’ recognition of the composition of the grammatical context of *may* and *can* and the constraints that this composition incurs and another step which involves selecting *may* or *can* in view of those constraints. This step-wise
approach to the construction of modal discourse is in line with the view that producing language constantly involves sequential dependencies:

Language, as a complex, hierarchical, behavioral structure with a lengthy course of development... is rich in sequential dependencies: syllables and formulaic phrases before phonemes and features..., holophrases before words, words before simple sentences, simple sentences before lexical categories, lexical categories before complex sentences, and so on (Studdert-Kennedy 1991:10)

While it is clear that the described sequential process involved in the construction of modal stance (in L2) remains to be explored further experimentally and/or using sophisticated corpus methodologies, the current results nonetheless identify a need for L2 phraseology research to develop in two main ways: First, by broadening the scope of investigation to include co-occurrence patterns along side collocational/colligational patterns. Although, undeniably, the latter have so far played an important role in furthering our understanding of how L2 learners construct discourse, learners' knowledge of co-occurrence patterns emerges as an important factor that should also be accounted for. The second aspect to consider involves shifting the existing analytical focus: Instead of studying co-occurrences of linguistic features for their own sake, attention should be paid to the effect of those co-occurrences on other parts of discourse. Ultimately, this will allow analysts to approach L2 discourse from a higher level of organization and therefore draw a more comprehensive picture of the mechanisms at work in producing learner language.

Notes
1. Guo's (2005) analysis uses the Chinese College Learner English Corpus (subsection of the Chinese Learner English Corpus) as the learner English corpus and the Louvain Corpus of Native English Essays corpus as the native English corpus.
2. All statistical analyses and plots were performed with R (for Linux), version 2.12.0.
3. C is an index of concordance between a predicted probability and its observed response. C ranges between 0.5 and 1 where 0.5 scores indicate that the investigated item occurs by chance and 1 indicates a perfect predictive accuracy. A C value greater than 0.8 indicates that the model has a strong predictive power (see Baayen (2008) and Gries (2009) for a detailed description of interpretations of binary logistic regression models).

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Subjectivity and epistemicity
An annotated bibliography

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1. Introduction

This bibliography attempts to bring together four divergent, yet related, lines of research, modality, evidentiality, stance / evaluation and subjectification, into a single field that we can call subjectivity and epistemicity. A definitive bibliography of the field is not possible for two reasons. Firstly, the quantity of research and rate of its production across all four lines of research is considerable. Secondly, the field itself, lying at the crossroads of many other fields of research and various scientific disciplines, is impossible to clearly demarcate. For these reasons, no attempt at completeness is made. The aim of this bibliography is, instead, to allow researchers in each of the different lines of research, quick access and reference to research in comparable, yet distinct approaches.

The principle works in the field of subjectivity are widely known. Bakhtin’s (1975 [1934-1935]) work on voice and Benveniste’s (1966) work on the notion of the subject in language are both key texts in language-based research on subjectivity. In literature, and more specifically narratology, Genette (1972) and Bal (1977) represent the seminal texts. In Linguistics, if we include the research on epistemic modality, Lyons (1977; 1981; 1982; 1995) and Palmer (1979 [1990]; 1986 [2001]) were the forerunners of the field, where in subjectivity research per se, Langacker (1985) and Traugott (1989) as well as various other works by these authors dominate the early field. Nuyts (2000a), Verhagen (2005), Boye (2012) and Narrog (2012) should also be mentioned at this stage as more recent, yet fundamental, contributions. Moreover, two important edited volumes, which brought early research together, are Yaguello (1994) and Stein & Wright (1995). If we extend the notion of subjectivity to include stance and evaluation, two edited volumes, Hunston & Thompson (1998) and Englebretson (2007) as well as two monographs Scheibman (2002) and Kärkkäinen (2003) are surely amongst the most important. However, the point of this bibliography is not cover well-known ground, but to open different, but related, dimensions of the field of enquiry to researchers already established in one of the subfields.

Due to the high amount of overlap between the sub-fields of research, simply listing works under categories was not possible. In order to deal with this
problem, the bibliography presents each sub-field with a discussion where it lists references that are then listed in a reference section at the end. This permit redundancy in the references but also makes it easier to show where the fields overlap. As mentioned, four subfields are delineated: modality (section 2), evidentiality (section 3), stance & evaluation (section 4), and subjectification and epistemic predication (section 5).

2 Modality

Modality and mood are possibly the most widely studied grammatical categories in linguistics. This is partially because the label is used to mean vastly divergent things. Bybee (1994: 176) suggests that “it may be impossible to come up with a succinct characterization of the notional domain of modality”. This is probably, in part, due to the fact that the term was traditionally used to refer specific lexico-morphological categories (should, would, etc.), yet today has been extended to include any linguistic device that encodes, more or less, what those specific morphological markers encode. Within linguistics, this field is, perhaps, the most traditional line of research that contributes to our understanding of the function of subjectivity and the role of epistemicity in language. This is simply because epistemic modality is one of two central types of modal structuring in language. Therefore, there is very little work on modality, be that typological, formal, or functional that does not treat the question to some degree. Two works, Lyons (1977) and Palmer (1979), could be argued to be seminal. These monographs set the scene for the study of modality as semantic category beyond grammatical mood and are still reference works today. Some other important treatments of the notion of modality per se include Calbert (1975), Kratzer (1977, 1981), Hermerén (1978), Sweetser (1982), Kiefer (1984, 1987, 1997), Akatsuka (1985), Papafragou (1988, 2006), Declerck, (1992) Nuysts (1992, 1993, 1994, 2000b, 2001, 2005, 2006, 2013), De Haan (1999), and Narrog (2005).

However, given the substantial cross-linguistic variation in the structuring of this category, much research takes a cross linguistic perspective. Nuysts (2000a) and Boye (2012) represent two important monographs in this regard, the former more contrastive and the later typological. Edited volumes that bring together collections of studies across various languages include Bybee & Fleischman (1995), Dendale & van der Auwera (2001), Davidse & Simon-Vandenbergen, (2001), Klinge & Müller (2005), Frawley (2005), Guentchéva & Landaburu (2007), Salkie, Busuttil & van der Auwera (2009), Mortelmans, Mortelmans & De Mulder (2011), Diwald & Smirnova (2011), Patard & Brisard (2011), Abraham & Leiss (2013), Marin-Arrese et al. (2013), and Leiss & Abraham (2014), Nuysts & van der Auwera (forthc.). The extent to which such anthologies succeed in synthesising a coherent understanding of the expression of modality varies.

Research specifically devoted to modality in typology and contrastive linguistics is extensive, but some early influential studies include Bybee (1985),


Collections of studies in edited volumes are a mainstay of the field. The follow works constitute examples of substantial contributions Swan & Westwik (1997), Vogeleer et al. (1999), Nuyts & Vonk (1999), Müller & Reis (2001), Birkelund et al. (2003), Facchinetti et al. (2003), Facchinetti & Palmer (2004), Marin-Arrese (2004), Nuyts et al. (2005), Tsangalides & Facchinetti (2009), Pizziconi & Kizu (2009), Becker & Remberger (2010), van der Auwera & Dendale (2011), and Barbet & de Saussure (2012). Cornillie & Pietrandrea (2012) is an edited volume that attempts to bring together work on modality and the stance orientated epistemic research described below.

An important line of research in this work concerns modal auxiliaries in Germanic languages. Several doctoral theses examining modal auxiliaries should be mentioned. These include Løken (1996), Rizomilioti (2003), Wärnsby (2006), Byloo (2009), Beijering (2012), and Deshors (2012).

question of subjectivity and the descriptive research essentially charts many of the different possibilities for encoding epistemic stance.

3 Evidentiality

Aikhenvald (2005: 3) succinctly defines evidentiality as “a linguistic category whose primary meaning is source of information”. The relevance of this category to subjectivity and epistemicity is fundamental. By referring to the source of information, a speaker shifts the focus from the subjective to the objective. This is effectively a universal strategy for epistemic stance taking. Consider the contrast between the 3rd person evidential *it appears that it will rain* and the 1st person epistemic *I believe it will rain*. The reference to visual evidence and the shift to the third person, adds ‘evidence’ to the proposition of rain and this objectification in stance taking makes the linguistic category central to our field of research.

The category of evidentiality is not a traditional grammatical category. The field of research per se begins with Jakobson (1957). The contemporary research, however, begins and continues to this day along two relatively distinct lines of: discourse analysis and descriptive grammar. Arguably, Aijmer (1980) and Givón (1982) are two of the most influential early studies along these two lines. Viberg (1983) is typological in orientation, but also a seminal study. The anthology, Chafe & Nichols (1986), which is itself a fundamental contribution, brings these two, otherwise distinct, research projects together. Since these early works, a list of influential works relevant to this volume would include Lazard (1999), de Haan (1999, 2001), Nuyts (2001), DeLancey (2001), Speas (2008), Cornillie (2009), Boye & Harder (2009), and Boye (2010).

offer an overview of the state-of-the-art in French. With regards to descriptive grammar and the category of evidentiality, Aikhenvald (2011) offers a comprehensive bibliography. Lastly, again with an orientation toward descriptive grammar, Nuyts & Dendale (1994) have compiled an annotated bibliography on the earlier works on evidentiality.

Turning to the role of evidentiality in discourse analysis, early works include Aijmer (1980), Chafe (1986), Biber & Finegan (1989). However, much of the seminal research in evidentiality in discourse overlaps with work in stance taking and evaluation, summarised below and with epistemic modality summarised above. Six monographs devoted to the category of evidentiality that take various discourse and pragmatics approaches include Trent (1997), Mushin (2001a), Ifantidou (2001), Cornillie (2007), Whitt (2010), and Hennemann (2013). In the anthologies devoted to the topic, one encounters a certain amount of overlap with descriptive and comparative grammar. The following collections, nonetheless, are all oriented towards question of evidentiality in discourse: Hill & Irvine (1993); Marín-Arrese (2004); Hornero (2006); Ekberg & Paradis (2009); Marín-Arrese et al. (2013); and Nuckolls & Lev (2012).


4. **Stance and evaluation**

The title of White’s (2004) study “Subjectivity, evaluation and point of view” might be a good summary of the field in question here. The role of evaluation is extremely important in language and it overlaps considerably with stance taking, both of them tied up with notion of subjectivity. Although the two functions are distinct at a notional level, evaluating almost necessarily includes a degree of epistemic stance and is, of course, entirely subjective. In discourse analysis, conversational analysis and the theoretical paradigm of Systemic Functional Grammar (Halliday 1985), this line of research overlaps with the study of stance taking per se. Moreover, such questions are more recently being addressed within Cognitive Linguistics and computational linguistics, both of which employ corpus methods bringing them closer to discourse analysis. Despite the clear overlap in
research question, theoretical assumption and methodological practices, research in modality and evidentiality remains relatively distinct from the ‘discourse’ approaches presented below. Arguably, much would be much gained by the further integration of findings and methods in the discourse ‘based’ studies of stance / evaluation and descriptive grammar research in modality / evidentiality.

4.1 Stance


A final mention should be made of an emerging line of research that seeks to

4.2 Evaluation


Although the line between corpus linguistics and discourse analysis is never clear, other than Hunston (2011), a representative sample of corpus-driven studies of evaluation would comprise Coffin & O’Halloran 2004, Hewings (2004), Charles (2006a, 2006b, Hyland 2009), Morley & Alan Partington (2009), and Partington et al. (2013)

Within the theoretical framework of Systemic Functional Grammar, an analytical model has been developed, commonly referred to as APPRAISAL. The model was developed in Martin & White (2005). Many of the studies mentioned here employ this model to some extent. A description of the model is beyond the
means of this overview and there exist well-developed Internet resources
describing its use. Although not inherently related to stance and evaluation, Brown & Gilman (1960) represents one of the first studies to examine how pronouns are used to obtain social power. The ramifications for understanding the expression of propositional authority are clear. The role of pronouns and terms of address in this field has yet to be properly developed. Some important inroads include Kitagawa & Lehrer (1990), Kamio (2001), Bredel (2002) and De Cock (2011, 2014, forthc.)

Another subfield which is closely related to stance is persuasion and authorial or epistemic authority. Although this line of research is often treated in the studies listed above, there are works devoted to the question. Hyland (1998b), Heritage (1998; 2002a, 2002b), Butler (1990), Barry (1991), Barton (1993, 2000), Bednarek (2006b), Heritage & Raymond (2005), and Paradis (2009a, 2009b) are studies representative of this line of research.

More broadly, in psychology, research on evaluation and attitude remains, perhaps unfortunately, entirely distinct from linguistics research. Potter (1998) and Schwarz (2007) are a good points of entry to this tradition and are excellent examples of where the two approaches could, ideally, inform each other. In contrast, critical discourse analysis and sociolinguistics directly inform each other and are, in turn, informed by research on stance and evaluation. An overview of this line of research would take us too far afield, but key works relevant to the topic of stance and subjectivity include Grimshaw (1990), Marková & Klaus (1991) Hoyle (1998), Strauss (2004), Goodwin (2006), Coffin (2006), Haarman & Lombardo (2009), and Morley & Bayley (2010).

In quantitative corpus-driven research, there are two schools, which although overlap completely in methodological terms, remain distinct in their work. Firstly, Multifactorial Usage-Feature Analysis, or the Behavioural Approach, developed in Cognitive Linguistics (Dirven et al 1982, Geeraerts et al 1994, Gries 2003) has been applied to questions of evaluation and stance (for example D. Liu (2010), Krawczak & Glynn (2011), Krawczak & Kokorniak (2012), Pöldvere (2013), Diehl (forthc.), Glynn & Krawczak (forthc.), De Cock (forthc.) and Doro-Mégy & Malinier (forthc.). However, secondly, the more recently developed approach in computational linguistics, termed Sentiment Analysis, has made a significant headway in precisely the study of evaluation. Wiebe et al. (2005) and Verdonik et al. (2007) are seminal works in this tradition. Further examples representative of Manual Sentiment Analysis / Multifactorial Usage-Feature Analysis relevant to stance and evaluation research include Wilson (2008), B. Liu (2010), Degaetano & Teich (2011, 2014), Fuoli (2012,) Degaetano, Kermes, & Teich (2013), Taboada, Maite & Marta Carretero (2012).

Probably the most important extension of the study of evaluation and stance is the research in discourse particles, hedging and boosting. This research domain goes clearly beyond the means of this bibliography, but much of it is directly relevant to subjectivity and stance. From the perspective of stance and evaluation, this line of enquiry is probably best represented Hübler (1983), Holmes (1984a, 1984b, 1990), Erman (1987, 2001), Skelton (1988), Fraser (1988, 1990).

Within the sociolinguistic tradition, the notions of voice (inherited from Bakhtin 1975 [1934-1935]) and what is termed ‘footing’, where speakers adopt specific interpersonal roles, are also relevant to the study of stance taking and subjectivity. Work on footing begins with Goffman (1979, 1981) and has later been developed by Clayman (1992), Agha (2005), and Goodwin (2007). Voice, from a discourse analysis perspective, is best represented in Clayman (1988), Coffin & Mayor (2004), and Pounds (2010).

There are various attempts at formalising the description of such phenomena. The APPRAISAL approach mentioned above is probably closest to the orientation of the this volume, but four other studies must be mentioned: Barwise & Perry (1983); Malrieu (1999); Ginzburg (2012); and Alba-Juez & Alba-Juez (2013).

For the reader interested in the theoretical background to these lines of research, the original ideas are to be found in Bakhtin 1975 [1934-1935], Benveniste 1966[1958], and Vološinov (1973). At this stage, the tradition overlaps entirely with the research in literature. The purely linguistics line of thought develops in French Functionalism with works such as Ducrot (1972, 1984) and Culioli (1990) and in British Functionalism with work such as Halliday (1973, 1981, 1985), Hasan (1985), Martin (1985), and Martin & White (2005). Tying this to current trends is a series of works that bridge various theoretical orientations in linguistics but also tease out how the idea of the expression of subjectivity, through stance taking or evaluation, can inform a range of questions in social science. Perhaps the most important works in this regard include Iwasaki(1993), Maynard (1993), Verhagen (1995, 2005), Kamio (1997), Nuyts (2000a; 2001), Mushin (2001a). Other specific studies that are important theoretically might include Pomerantz (1984a, 1984b); Graumann (1989), Davies & Harré gauge(1990), Schiffrin (1990), Harré & Luc Van Langenhoeve (1991), Lyons (1994) and Sarangi (2003).

5. Subjectification, parentheticals and epistemic predication

These fields of research are at least as diverse and large as the fields described above. Subjectification is a theory of semantic change that focuses on modal categories. Parentheticals are chunks of language which are believed to be grammaticalising, often into an epistemic modal role. The term epistemic predication is here used to refer to research that focuses on mental state predicates
or cognition verbs (such as think and believe) and / or on the grammatical constructions with which they are associated.

5.1 Subjectification, grammaticalisation and semantic change
Subjectification is a theory proposed by and developed by Traugott (1989, 1995, 1999, 2003, 2007a, 2007b, 2008b, 2010), Traugott & König (1991) and Traugott & Dasher (2002) as well as in Stein & Wright (1995). This theory states that there is systematic shift in the diachronic change from non-subjective meanings, such as deontic modality, to subjective meanings and then finally to intersubjective meanings. Although the lines along which the semantic change occurs are generally accepted, whether this change is unidirectional and whether intersubjectivity is the final point in that change are currently debated in the literature (cf. Finegan 1995; Ziegeler 2003; Fitzmaurice 2004; and Narrog 2012, in press). Currently, research in the field is extremely active. Anthologies and monographs include Fitzmaurice (2004), Athanasiadou et al. (2006), Cornillie & Delbecque (2006), Onodera & Suzuki (2007), Breban (2010), and Davidse et al. (2010). Nordlinger & Traugott (1997), Akatsuka (1997), Visconti (2004), Athanasiadou (2006, 2007a, 2007b), and Van Bogaert (2007) are examples of specific studies in this field.

Although the process of subjectification is diachronic and epistemic modality is often thought of as a grammatical category, it is not necessarily one of grammaticalisation. The topics of semantic change, subjectification, grammaticalisation and lexicalisation are all entwined, making it is completely impossible to discretely categorise research in these fields. For example, Silva-Corvalán (1985) is an early work that examines the shift of the use of the imperfect indicative towards an epistemic and deontic use. This study could easily be described as research in any or all of these fields. Arguably, from our epistemic / subjectivity point of view, Traugott & Dasher (2002) and Narrog (2012) are the most comprehensive works that fit into this broad perspective.

It is also important to note that not all diachronic research in epistemic structures is specifically concerned with subjectification. Grammaticalisation is a diverse domain of research, only some of which is concerned with epistemic constructions. However, given the central role of epistemic modality and the nature of this linguistic function, much of the research, whether typological, contrastive or language specific, treats epistemic structures. The seminal texts on grammaticalisation per se would include Lehmann, (1982), Heine (1993), Kuteva (2001), Heine & Kuteva (2002). Two more recent monographs of importance are Hoffmann (2006) and Eckardt (2006). There are numerous anthologies treating the subject in which various specific studies treat subjectification and / or epistemic modality. Perhaps the most often cited are Heine & Reh 1984, Bernd et al. (1991), Traugott & Heine (1991), Hopper & Traugott (1993), Ramat & Hopper (1998), Lindquist & Mair (2000), Fischer et al. (2000), Wischer & Diewald (2002), Fischer et al. (2004), Brinton & Traugott (2005), Cornillie & Delbecque (2006), Verhoeven et al. (2008), Seoane & López-Couso (2008), López-Couso & Seoane
(2008), Davidse, Vandelanotte & Cuyckens (2010), Trousdale & Traugott (2010),
Degand & Simon-Vandenbergen (2011), van der Auwera & Nuyts (2012) and,
most recently, Bisang et al. (2014). Although the field is immense, for the reader
less familiar with the question, some shorter but significant studies might be
suggested. These include Lehmann (1985), Willett (1988), Matlock (1989),
Thompson & Mulac (1991), Heine (1992), Ramat (1992), Haspelmath (1998) and
Paradis (2000b). Less well-known studies, but closely related to issues of
specifically subjectivity, epistemicity and evidentiality, see Lazard (2001),
Brems & Davidse (2010), and Van Bogaert (2011). Finally, a special mention
should be made here concerning the diachronic semantic research of Palander-
Collin (1996, 1997) and Wischer (2000) who specialise on English methinks and
English modals. The latter research is, at times, in direct dialogue with the theory
of subjectification, but also Cognitive Linguistics.

5.2 Parenthetical constructions and zero complementisers
A special case of grammaticalisation are epistemic parentheticals. These are
typically clauses, such as I guess, for which the use / meaning has shifted from
being full clausal to adverbiaial in that it is ‘added’ to a proposition. In this, the
expression is ‘outside’ the normal syntax and grammar of the proposition as if it
were in parentheses. Embedded clauses are also parenthetical, but it is principally
grammaticalised parentheticals which are of concern to the study of subjectivity.
Kaltenböck (2007) offers an extensive definition and overview of parentheticals
more generally.

Epistemic parenthetical more specifically began with the seminal article
Urmson (1952). The Generative tradition spilled a great amount of ink over the
topic. Of more concern to us is the empirical research tradition. Parentheticals are a
well-known area of investigation and summaries of the research are common.
Some diverse examples of empirical research in the field include Markkanen

A question that directly overlaps with questions of epistemic parentheticals
and grammaticalisation is that of complementiser ‘deletion’ in English and some
closely related languages. This leads to an alternation of the kind think that versus
think 0. The relationship of this phenomenon to subjectivity and epistemic stance is
that this deletion is often considered to be a symptom of grammaticalisation and
even subjectification. Despite the sound logic behind this proposal, empirical
evidence is far from clear and debate remains as to exactly what causes this
phenomenon. A cross sample of the research upon this question would include
Tagliamonte & Smith (2005), Kearns (2007, 2009), Shank & Cuyckens (2009),
Shank et al. (2014), and Janssens & Nuyts (2014a).
5.3 Epistemic predication

By the term epistemic predication, we refer to any construction that explicitly encodes beliefs or opinions. Although, such lexemes and the semantics they encode have been treated from a wide range of perspectives, Doherty (1985), Apresjan (1995), Aijmer (1997), and Fortescue (2001) are four seminal texts, emerging from different traditions yet which all inform text-based approaches to subjectivity and epistemicity. Obviously, this topic leads into the philosophical domain of epistemology proper. A study in this regard, accessible to the linguist, might be Parret (1983). An overview of the research on epistemic verbs goes beyond our the purview of this bibliography, but within corpus linguistics and the Functional Linguistic tradition certain studies must be mentioned. Vet (1994) represents an early concise study and Doro-Mégy (2008) is a good example of contrastive research. The studies by Simon-Vandenbergen (2000), Scheibman (2002), and Kärkkäinen (2003, 2007) are, perhaps, the most important from a text-based and subjectivity point of view. Related to this work are the studies by Pichler (2009, 2013) which examine these structures in English negation constructions from a conversation analysis perspective. Capelli (2007) is a comprehensive study of the full set of epistemic predication verbs in English and Ebeling (2007) is a concise study of the structures in Portuguese. Van Bogaert (2010) offers an excellent contemporary overview. Arppe (2008), Krawczak & Glynn (2011), Krawczak & Kokorniak (2012), Fabiszak et al (2014), Janssens & Nuyts (2014b), and Glynn & Krawczak (forthc.) represent recent approaches to epistemic predication using quantitative corpus-driven methods.

6. Summary. Subjectivity and Intersubjectivity

emphasise the different dimensions of the research, others focus on how they inform each other. Two short studies that may help the linguist gain access to the research on subjectivity in Literature and Anthropology are Reboul (2000) and Kockelman (2005) respectively.

One of the most important differences between the two approaches is the role of the related notion of intersubjectivity. Where Traugott (2003) stresses that the intersubjective follows from the subjective, others hold it be integral to understanding subjectivity per se (Verhagen 2005) and yet others understand it as an entirely separate phenomenon (Nuyts 2000a). Moreover, as mentioned above, for research in subjectification, there exists an important point of debate on whether ‘intersubjectification’ is a necessary endpoint in the subjectification semantic continuum (Fitzmaurice 2004, Narrog 2012). More important for the research on epistemic stance, recent years have seen a research trend that examines specifically the structuring of intersubjectivity in its own right. Morganti et al. (2008), Brems et al. (2012), van der Auwera & Nuyts (2012) are three edited volumes largely dedicated to the subject. Abraham (2005), Narrog (2010), Nuyts (2014b), Byloo & Nuyts (2014), and Nuyts & Byloo (2015) are highly relevant articles that address the issue. The various studies included therein open up a whole range of possibilities and new directions. Yet perhaps the most interesting point to emerge from the study of intersubjectivity is how it may help to bring together the fields of stance and modality, summarised in the previous sections. Haselow (2012) in an empirical study and Krawczak (in press) from a theoretical perspective, both show how the notion can bridge existing analytical divisions in the field. Unfortunately, however, there has yet to be any systematic attempt at bringing together literature and linguistics.

In this bibliography, no attempt has been made at completeness, the goal being to bring together the widely divergent approaches to what is essentially the same phenomenon. To these ends, the bibliography is intended as a point of departure for a researcher from one line of research who wishes to enter an adjacent, but often directly informative, line of research.

Notes

1. The address of the Internet site with information concerning the APPRAISAL framework is www.grammatics.com/appraisal

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